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For Alexis de Tocqueville, liberty is at risk in democracy, but it can be secured by mores. The 
importance of mores is well established in existing scholarship, but the role of the domestic 
sphere in forming those mores has been largely neglected. This thesis fills the gap in the 
literature by arguing that the domestic sphere was a central component of Tocqueville’s 
democratic theory. Womanhood and family life were normative models of primary 
importance in Tocqueville’s associationalism because they generated the mores exercised 
across associative life. The domestic sphere contributes to associative life in two ways. First, 
the domestic sphere feeds other moderating forces as the initial, most proximate, and natural 
‘school’ for citizens. Second, the domestic sphere establishes the habit of respecting authority, 
which is necessary to the perpetuation of mores across associative life. Analysing the 
domestic sphere elucidates the place of nature, authority, and other-regarding virtue within his 
democratic theory. For Tocqueville, sex differences and paternal authority could help to resist 
a total democratisation of the domestic sphere, safeguarding the moral work therein and 
benefitting liberty in a democracy.  
This thesis contributes to the scholarship on gender and family in Tocqueville by 
offering a comprehensive analysis of these themes. This thesis also explores the relationship 
between the domestic sphere and Tocqueville’s wider democratic theory, benefitting our 
understanding of his theory of associationalism and making the case that the domestic sphere 
is on par with acclaimed mediating elements, like civil associations, religion, and 
decentralisation. This discussion also contributes to scholarship on religion and individualism, 
which often overlooks gender and family. Lastly, this thesis evaluates how Tocqueville’s 
associationalism has been appropriated by more recent social scientists and suggests some 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Studying the Domestic Sphere and Democratic 
Society in Tocqueville 
Alexis de Tocqueville valued liberty as the highest good. As he wrote towards the end of his 
life, ‘I see, as I have always done, liberty as the first of goods…. There is no tranquillity or 
well-being that can take its place’.1 Tocqueville worried, though, that ‘most men’ were not 
adequately alert to this.2 He was anxious about the precarious position of liberty in democratic 
society and offered solutions to preserve liberty in the future. Seeing the advent of the 
democratic age as inescapable and ‘providential’, he was burdened by ‘a sort of religious 
terror’ that inspired his great work Democracy in America (1835/1840).3 He loved liberty, 
defended democracy, and appreciated the moral ‘grandeur’ and ‘beauty’ of equality.4 At the 
same time, he thought that, prone to vices and ‘wild instincts’, democracy must be 
domesticated, tamed, and moderated to remain free and flourishing.5                   
Tocqueville thus offered a ‘new political science’ to ‘instruct democracy, to revive its 
beliefs if possible, to purify its mores, to regulate its movements, to substitute little by little 
the science of public affairs for its inexperience, knowledge of its true interests for its blind 
instincts’.6 Without this, society risked a democracy instituted ‘haphazardly’, as in France.7 
Tocqueville discovered in American democracy what French democracy lacked, which was 
‘what must attenuate its vices and bring out its natural advantages’.8 The answer to France’s 
problems and the vices of democracy was Tocqueville’s theory of democratic 
associationalism.  
This thesis focuses on a neglected aspect of his associationalism: the domestic sphere, 
i.e. womanhood and family life. It argues that the domestic sphere is vital for understanding 
Tocqueville’s associationalism and his wider democratic theory. To establish why the 
domestic sphere is so important, it helps first to understand the problem that his 
associationalism addressed. That problem, the maintenance of liberty, concerns the precarious 
relationship between equality of conditions and liberty, which are the central concepts at the 
heart of Tocqueville’s understanding of democracy as a social state. For Tocqueville, equality 
                                                
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘Lettre à Madame Swetchine, 7 Janvier, 1856’, in Correspondance, 307. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Alexis de Tocqueville, DA1 14. 
4 Alexis de Tocqueville, DA2, 1282. 
5 Tocqueville, DA1, 18. 
6 Ibid., 16. 
7 Ibid., 17–18. 
8 Ibid., 19. 
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is inevitable and ‘providential’.9 Liberty has a less certain future in democracies. The two 
sometimes go hand-in-hand: equality means ‘no one will be able to exercise a tyrannical 
power’, so ‘men will be perfectly free, because they will all be entirely equal’.10 Democracy 
eliminates the tyranny of arbitrary authority justified by social hierarchy. Equal peoples are 
free because no one citizen wields power over fellow citizens. Concomitantly, there can be 
‘[a] kind of equality’ without political liberty, meaning a freedom defined in terms of the 
citizen’s relationship with the state (not fellow citizens); and though they can overlap, 
equality and liberty are separate.11 Equality is ‘the distinctive feature of democratic centuries’, 
not liberty.12 Liberty is the potential feature.  
Equality is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for preserving liberty because, in 
certain respects, equality threatens liberty. Individualism, homogeneity, and mediocrity were 
by-products of equality of conditions that endangered liberty by making citizens more 
susceptible to a ‘tyrannical power’. Tocqueville feared a socially atomised yet uniform 
citizenry, concerned only with private affairs and material enjoyments, all to the detriment of 
moral and spiritual greatness. This ‘spectacle of this universal uniformity’ and ‘mediocrity’ 
dismayed Tocqueville. 13  
The consequences of equality of conditions (individualism, uniformity, and 
mediocrity) were in tension with the associative life that maintained liberty in the face of 
Tocqueville’s greatest fear— democratic despotism, a form of gentle tyranny unique to 
democracies. Seeing liberty as related to the absence of ‘tyrannical power’, he understood 
liberty as largely defined in contradiction to a mighty administrative state enacting 
despotism.14 The negative by-products of equality made citizens all the more receptive to 
seductive promises of a ‘tutelary power that alone takes charge of assuring their enjoyment 
and of looking after their fate’.15 Democracy is disposed to this ‘absolute, detailed’ power: 
this is why liberty is merely a potential feature of democracies.16 For Tocqueville, managing 
the problems of equality, such as the tendencies to individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity, 
was essential to preserving liberty. Liberty, as well as moral grandeur, cannot flourish in 
societies plagued by tutelary power.  
                                                
9 Ibid., 10. 
10 Tocqueville, DA2, 874. 
11 Ibid., 874–75.  
12 Ibid., 875. 
13 Ibid., 1281. See: Ibid., 834. 
14 Ibid., 874. 
15 Ibid., 1250. 
16 Ibid. 
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The features of democracy, equality and liberty, exist in tension, but Tocqueville’s 
associationalism can work to ease this tension. Associative life comprises a network of 
moderating forces that worked with the best of democracy, such as the self-governing 
independence of equal citizens, to oppose the worst of democracy, such as individualism, 
homogeneity, mediocrity, and, ultimately, despotism. American society offered examples of 
what the self-governing independence of equal citizens could produce: mores, associations, 
and local institutions keeping them free.   
The domestic sphere was one such local institution. Tocqueville formulated a vision of 
womanhood and family life that was plausible in democratic societies yet was not overrun by 
individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity. The domestic sphere is thus crucial to 
understanding how to preserve liberty. 
This thesis thus scrutinises a central part of Tocqueville’s network of moderating 
forces for preserving democratic liberty. Appreciating this element is essential to 
understanding womanhood and family in Tocqueville. This thesis contributes to existing 
literature in four areas: gender and family life in Tocqueville; womanhood in the nineteenth 
century; associationalism, civil society, and the preservation of liberty in Tocqueville; and 
areas of social science that draw on Tocqueville to study associations, civil society, and 
localism. Thus, this thesis is not simply a study of gender and familial roles. Rather, it 
advances our understanding of Tocqueville’s defence of liberty via democratic 
associationalism, and that proposal’s legacy today.  
The next section outlines the idea of womanhood and family as normative models in 
Tocqueville’s system. I address how the domestic sphere works in Tocqueville’s democratic 
theory and why it matters for understanding both Tocqueville’s thought and modern 
associationalism. I then show that these problems have been largely neglected in existing 
Tocqueville scholarship, before turning to a methodological discussion of the approach taken 
in this thesis.  
 
Womanhood and Family as Models and Why They Matter 
This thesis argues that the domestic sphere was a central feature of Tocqueville’s democratic 
theory. I establish this argument on three levels: first, womanhood and family life were 
normative models designed with particular ends in mind; second, these models were integral 
to the functioning of Tocqueville’s theory of associationalism because they generated the 
mores exercised across associative life; third, these models are a way into understanding how 
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associationalism works because they teach readers about the place of nature, authority, and 
other-regarding virtue within Tocqueville’s system.  
I argue that Tocqueville theorised normative models of womanhood and family, which, 
operating in the guise of traditional gender tropes, related to the profoundly new problems of 
democracy. His stance on gender roles and authority within the family, seemingly 
undemocratic to the modern reader, was directed to the new democratic challenges that he 
identified (individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity). His theory of womanhood and family 
is new in so far as it is tailored to remedying the dangers of democratic despotism. Thus, I 
argue that we can speak of a ‘democratic womanhood’ and a ‘democratic family’; they are 
made by and made for democracy. Previous scholarship hints at how Tocqueville embellished 
American norms or treats his comments as admiring reports of observed realities.17 This 
thesis argues otherwise. Making a bolder argument, I suggest that they were models of 
democratic social life.18 Tocqueville’s comments on women and family were not solely 
reports of American historical realities. Throughout this thesis, then, democratic womanhood 
and democratic family refer to Tocqueville’s normative models. 
I highlight the instances of specifically American features within his discussion of 
women and family, which are indeed historical peculiarities. For the most part, however, the 
references to the ‘American’ features, within these comments on women and family, can be 
understood as illustrative of Tocqueville’s normative proposal for France and future 
democracries. The details of American life that he admired became prescriptive. I also 
employ the phrase ‘Tocqueville’s Americans’; calling these Americans ‘his’ draws attention 
to how, in some instances, Americans are actually stand-ins for what he considered good 
democrats, those who manage the defects of democracy well.  
                                                
17 For example, Welch hints that, instead of reporting on Americans, Tocqueville had French women in mind: 
Cheryl B. Welch, De Tocqueville (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 203. For examples of suggesting a 
normative tone or sense of the ‘ideal’ in Tocqueville’s presentation, (without conceptualising these as 
democratic forms and continuing to refer to ‘American’ women and families), see: Barbara Allen, Tocqueville, 
Covenant, and the Democratic Revolution: Harmonizing Earth with Heaven (Lanham: Lexington, 2005), 195–
217; John C. Koritansky, Alexis de Tocqueville and the New Science of Politics: An Interpretation of Democracy 
in America (Durham, NC, USA: Carolina Academic Press, 1986), 131–34; William Mathie, ‘God, Woman, and 
Morality: The Democratic Family in the New Political Science of Alexis de Tocqueville’, Review of Politics 57 
(1995): 7–30; Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 330–35. Janara and Locke both suggest that the ‘American’ 
woman is an idealistic invention in the face of societal flux, but neither conceptualises womanhood or family as 
democratic models essential to the wider theory: Laura Janara, ‘Democracy’s Family Values’, in FIAT, 47–70; 
Jill Locke, ‘Aristocratic Mourning: Tocqueville, John Quincy Adams, and the Affairs of Andrews Jackson’, in 
FIAT, 125–50. 
18 Consider Tocqueville’s preoccupation with democracy as ‘movement that sweeps along’ all ‘Christian 
peoples’: Tocqueville, DA1, 15. See: François Furet, ‘Naissance d’un Paradigme: Tocqueville et Le Voyage En 
Amérique (1825-1831)’, Annales 39 (1984): 225–39. 
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I also argue that these normative models were fashioned to generate the virtues, the 
‘habits of the heart’, and the other-regarding social attitudes that are necessary to all aspects 
of associative life. Associations cultivate, foster, and strengthen other-regarding mores, but 
the home makes the mores. The domestic realm, a domain of family life ruled by women, 
played its own peculiar role within Tocqueville’s associational network as a bolster against 
the ‘wild instincts’ of democracy, which ultimately deliver democratic despotism. A careful 
reading of how the most intimate associations of the home relate to Tocqueville’s wider 
democratic theory enriches our understanding of his prescriptions for the preservation of 
liberty within democratic society, which were the crux of his thought. Examination of the 
domestic sphere sheds light on Tocqueville’s understanding of the roles of nature, authority, 
and other-regarding mores, and the roles that they play in democracy. We learn about the 
centrality of the private and local in his theory, and the study of the domestic sphere also 
exposes how the bonds of associative life are formed and what they are for. I argue that the 
domestic sphere helps us to understand the unifying feature across Tocqueville’s myriad of 
associations – other-regarding mores. Democratic hearts habituated to virtue are essential to a 
robust associative life. The formation of character, for Tocqueville, begins at home. This 
thesis shows why the study of associations in Tocqueville’s democratic theory ought to begin 
at home, too. 
In Tocqueville’s democratic theory, equality and liberty both affect the domestic 
sphere, and vice versa. Equality affects women and family life more than liberty. Compared 
to equality, this thesis thus says less about how liberty influences womanhood and family life. 
Both influence the life of the woman and family norms, but the ways in which equality shapes 
(or, conspicuously, does not shape) the womanhood and family are more significant in 
determining what Tocqueville was attempting to do with his models. Equalisation and the 
products of equality (individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity) are all relevant in 
considering how Tocqueville formulated his democratic domestic sphere. Women and 
families, however, do not ultimately promote equality: they moderate its excesses, protecting 
liberty.  
This thesis demonstrates that equality of conditions shapes and threatens the domestic 
sphere much as it shapes other aspects of social life in Tocqueville’s democratic theory, but I 
also show how he protected the moral work of the domestic sphere by positing that natural 
sex differences and natural authority meant a complete democratisation of the domestic 
sphere can be resisted. Robust in the face of the harmful by-products of equality, the domestic 
sphere is well positioned to contribute to associative life. I argue a richer intellectual history 
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of the place of associations in Tocqueville can in turn benefit contemporary social science, by 
offering a better understanding of his theory and suggesting that attention to issues of gender, 
familial relationships, love of home, and virtuous habits can enhance existing research that 
uses Tocqueville and his associationalism to analyse the modernity.19  
For Tocqueville, liberty was at risk in the democratic experiment. Associationalism 
was the safeguard. This thesis argues that Tocqueville’s associationalism does not work 
without his recommendations for gender roles and family solidarity, and the resulting 
production of virtuous mores, and, therefore, his associationalism relies on his understanding 
of natural sex difference and natural authority.   
 
Historiography  
The following historiographical outline frames my contribution. Though this thesis appears 
positioned within the scholarship on gender and family, I seek to address, primarily, 
Tocqueville scholarship concerned with associations and liberty. Secondarily, I address the 
social science scholarship concerned with modern associations.  
Alexis de Tocqueville has not always been regarded as a great theorist of the 
associationalism that maintains freedom within democracies. Tocqueville receded ‘toward 
oblivion’ before interest in him was revived, when the ‘totalitarian experience’ of the 
twentieth century yielded a renewed interest in the proponents of a moderate form of 
liberalism in both France and the United States.20  
Since this revival in interest in Tocqueville’s thought, he has been embraced in 
                                                
19 Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom (Wilmington, Del: 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2010); Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the 
Vulnerabilities of Democracies: A Response to Tocqueville’s Challenge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997). 
20 Françoise Mélonio, Tocqueville and the French, trans. Beth G. Raps (Charlottesville and London: University 
of Virginia Press, 1998), 149–88; Harvey C. Mansfield, Tocqueville: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 5. Matthew Mancini disputes this narrative: Matthew J. Mancini, Alexis de Tocqueville 
and American Intellectuals: From His Times to Ours (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 99–149. See also: 
Cheryl B. Welch, ‘Introduction: Tocqueville in the Twenty-First Century’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Tocqueville, ed. Cheryl B. Welch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4; Louis Hartz, The Liberal 
Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (Orlando: Harcourt, 
1991). For Tocqueville in eastern and central Europe, see: James T. Schleifer, The Making of Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000), xix; Stjepan G. Meštrović, Letica Slaven, and Goreta, 
Miroslav, Habits of the Balkan Heart: Social Character and the Fall of Communism (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1993); Aurelian Craiutu, ‘Tocqueville and Eastern Europe’, in Tocqueville’s Voyages: 
The Evolution of His Ideas and Their Journey Beyond His Time, ed. Christine Dunn Henderson (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2015), 390–424. Anglophone and Francophone scholarship dominates. For a period, access to the 
Tocqueville archives excluded Anglophone scholars. See Brogan on how ‘times were hard for a Tocqueville 
biographer’: Hugh Brogan, Alexis de Tocqueville: A Life (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 
695. See also: Schleifer, Making, xxiii–xxiv. 
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various ways and across disciplines, including political philosophy, sociology, and history. In 
France, Raymond Aron’s work popularised Tocqueville’s thought among ‘sociologists, 
philosophers, and political scientists’ during the 1950s.21 This moment was characterised by 
renewed attention to liberal thinkers by political scientists and philosophers seeking to reflect 
upon contemporary issues.22 Americans likewise sought inspiration from Tocqueville in 
addressing the concerns of democracies, with it often appearing ‘that Tocqueville has been 
embraced more than studied by political scientists, who use small Tocquevillean passages to 
stake out large theoretical territory’.23 French and American sociologists discovered an 
affinity for Tocqueville during the post-war era, using him as a foil to Durkheim, Weber, and 
Marx.24 Tocqueville’s usefulness within sociology and social science was reasserted in the 
twenty-first century with Jon Elster’s claiming Tocqueville as ‘an important social 
scientist’.25 Additionally, much as Aron’s work had ushered in sociologists and philosophers, 
François Furet’s work of the 1970s ushered in historians.26   
As well as being studied as a theorist relevant to the fields of political philosophy, 
sociology, and history, Tocqueville has been examined in relation to specific themes, such as 
civil society, religion, and, more recently, race, slavery and empire. 27 I adopt a similar 
approach by focusing on the relatively neglected themes of womanhood and family. 
                                                
21 Mélonio, Tocqueville and the French, 203. 
22 See: Françoise Mélonio, ‘Tocqueville and the French’, in The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville, ed. 
Cheryl B. Welch, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 345. 
23 Welch, ‘Introduction’, 4. Also: Chapter Seven. 
24 Ibid., 4–5. 
25 Jon Elster, Alexis de Tocqueville: The First Social Scientist (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 1.  
26 Mélonio, Tocqueville and the French, 203. 
27 For civil society and moderating forces, see: Aurelian Craiutu, ‘Tocqueville’s Paradoxical Moderation’, The 
Review of Politics 67 (2005): 599–629.; William A. Galston, ‘Civil Society and the “Art of Association”’, 
Journal of Democracy 11 (2000): 64–70.; Peter Augustine Lawler, ‘Tocqueville’s Elusive Moderation’, Polity 
22 (1989): 181–89.; Dana Villa, ‘Tocqueville and Civil Society’, in The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville, 
ed. Cheryl B. Welch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 216–44. For religion, see: Allen, 
Covenant.; Agnès Antoine, L’impensé de La Démocratie, Tocqueville, La Citoyenneté, et La Religion (Paris: 
Fayard, 2003).; Nader Hashemi, ‘Islam, Democracy and Alexis de Tocqueville’, Queen’s Quarterly 110 (2003): 
21–29.; Cynthia J. Hinckley, ‘Tocqueville on Religious Truth and Political Necessity’, Polity 39 (1990): 39–52.; 
Sanford Kessler, Tocqueville’s Civil Religion: American Christianity and the Prospects for Freedom (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1994).; Sanford Kessler, ‘Tocqueville’s Puritans: Christianity and the American Founding’, The 
Journal of Politics 54, no. 03 (1992): 778–92; Peter Augustine Lawler, ‘Tocqueville on Pantheism, Materialism, 
and Catholicism’, Perspectives on Political Science 30 (2001): 218–26.; Joshua Mitchell, The Fragility of 
Freedom: Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy, and the American Future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995). For race and empire, see: Alexis de Tocqueville, Writings on Empire and Slavery, ed. Jennifer Pitts (JHU 
Press, 2001). Gerald M. Bonetto, ‘Tocqueville and American Slavery’, Canadian Review of American Studies 15 
(1984): 129–39.; Richard Boyd, ‘Imperial Fathers and Favorite Sons: J.S. Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville, and 
Nineteenth-Century Visions of Empire’, in FIAT, 225–52.; Margaret Kohn, ‘Empire’s Law: Alexis de 
Tocqueville on Colonialism and the State of Exception’, Canadian Journal of Political Science 41 (2008): 255–
78; Margaret Kohn, ‘The Other America: Tocqueville and Beaumont on Race and Slavery’, Polity 35 (2002): 
169–93; Cheryl B. Welch, ‘Colonial Violence and the Rhetoric of Evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria’, Political 
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Concerning the themes of womanhood and family, the earliest attention to these topics 
offered two very different perspectives on their value. In 1840, John Stuart Mill reviewed his 
friend’s work, and, with no clear justification, he dismissed Tocqueville’s chapters on family 
and womanhood in Democracy in America as dispensable and devoid of ‘any considerable 
value’.28 In contrast, American educator Catherine Beecher took particular interest in the 
chapters, quoting Tocqueville extensively in her 1842 A Treatise on Domestic Economy.29 
Motivated to demonstrate women’s place in society as ‘agents in accomplishing the greatest 
work that ever was committed to human responsibility’, Beecher was drawn to Tocqueville’s 
praise of the American woman’s selfless domestic stewardship.30  
Tocqueville scholars largely followed Mill’s, rather than Beecher’s, example until 
about 1980.31  Since then, Tocqueville’s thought on family and womanhood has garnered 
more attention, both in general works and in studies focused on family and gender. The 
general works on Tocqueville that include his considerations on family and gender offer 
useful but rarely in-depth commentary.32 Although Pierre Manent noted in 1993 that gendered 
familial roles constitute a ‘moderating principle’,33 more recent studies of Tocqueville’s 
‘democratic remedies’ and ‘mediating organizations’ neglect the role of family and women 
altogether.34 I hope to intervene on this front. The ‘domestic sphere’ or ‘family life and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Theory 31, no. 2 (2003): 235–64; Alvin B. Tillery Jr., ‘Tocqueville, Black Writers, and American Ethnology: 
Rethinking the Foundations of Whiteness Studies’, in FIAT, 253–80. 
28 John Stuart Mill, ‘De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [II]’, in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 
Volume XVIII - Essays on Politics and Society Part I, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto and London: University of 
Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/233.  
29 Catherine E. Beecher, A Treatise on Domestic Economy, for the Use of Young Ladies at Home and at School 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1846), 28–32, 34, 46, 146. 
30 Ibid., 38. 
31 Many general studies of Tocqueville’s political thought neglected to comment on women and referred to 
family briefly, often mischaracterising family life as primarily bound up with individualism. Jack Lively, The 
Social and Political Thought of Alexis Tocqueville (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), 77; Marvin Zetterbaum, 
Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 42, 60, 68–69; Seymour 
Drescher, Dilemmas of Democracy: Tocqueville and Modernization (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1968); Whitney Pope and Lucetta Pope, Alexis de Tocqueville: His Social and Political Theory (Beverly Hills 
and London: Sage Publications, 1986), 55–56; Schleifer, Making, 295, 302–8; Roger Boesche, The Strange 
Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 47–53. Schleifer, Making, 295, 
302–3, 306–8; Pope and Pope, Alexis de Tocqueville: His Social and Political Theory, 55–56; Boesche, The 
Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville, 47–53. 
32 Jean-Claude Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, USA 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1989), 150; Koritansky, Science, 129–34; Saguiv Hadari, Theory in 
Practice: Tocqueville’s New Science of Politics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 110-111,150-
151; Pierre Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy, trans. John Waggoner (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1996), 74–75; Mitchell, Fragility, xi, 113, 196 note 117; Wolin, Worlds, 224, 332; Allen, Covenant, 
192–215; Lucien Jaume, Tocqueville: The Aristocratic Sources of Liberty, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), 117–21; Richard Swedberg, Tocqueville’s Political Economy (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 39–43, 154–57. The exception: Welch, Tocqueville. 
33 Manent, Tocqueville, 83. 
34 Craiutu, ‘Moderation’, 625; Villa, ‘Civil’, 224. 
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womanhood’ ought consistently to make the lists of moderating features, mediating 
organisations, and tempering institutions – such as schools, faith, freedom of the press, 
decentralised powers, and localism – that constitutes Tocqueville’s associationalism.35 
 Neglected from a different perspective, several studies on the ‘woman question’ and 
the transforming position of women during the nineteenth century overlook Tocqueville’s 
thought. This indicates that he is not typically considered a theorist of gender and family.36  
Some general studies on women’s history and feminist theory do touch on Tocqueville’s 
discussions of womanhood and family, but these only offer an introduction to his ideas on the 
subject.37 This thesis also seeks to intervene by suggesting that he did have a theory of gender 
roles and family life that is worth taking seriously. While Tocqueville’s answer to the ‘woman 
question’ largely rests within his wider work on democracy, historians of gender should not 
neglect his contribution.   
  From the 1980s, general works on Tocqueville began to include more direct 
references to his views on family and womanhood, but analysis of these topics was still not 
that extensive or rigorous.38 The exception is Cheryl B. Welch’s 2012 De Tocqueville, which 
offers a feminist recovery of Tocqueville from an earlier ‘conservative monopoly’.39 Welch’s 
book is a landmark account because she provided the most extensive account of family life 
and womanhood within a general study of Tocqueville. I expand upon her work by arguing 
that not only are these topics worthy of extensive treatment, they are also primary in 
understanding Tocqueville’s associationalism, an aspect that Welch did not thoroughly 
                                                
35 See: Craiutu, ‘Moderation’, 625. 
36 Bell and Offen only mention Tocqueville in an introduction to the writings of Catherine Beecher and Angelica 
Grimké. See: Susan G. Bell and Karen M. Offen, Women, the Family, and Freedom: 1750-1880, vol. 1 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 180. McMillian neglected Tocqueville’s treatment of the ‘woman 
question’: James F. McMillan, France and Women, 1789-1914 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 43,53, 
81–84. Delap neglects Tocqueville: Lucy Delap, ‘The “woman Question” and the Origins of Feminism’, in 
Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. Gregory Claeys and Gareth Stedman Jones 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 319–48. 
37 For brief reference to Tocqueville from a gender and literary history perspective, see: Louise M. Young, 
‘Women’s Place in American Politics: The Historical Perspective’, Journal of Politics 38 (1976): 312–13; 
Catherine H. Zuckert, ‘American Women and Democratic Morals: “The Bostonians”’, Feminist Studies 3 
(1976): 44–45. For passing consideration in extended accounts, see: Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private 
Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 129–31; 
Christine Fauré, Democracy Without Women: Feminism and the Rise of Liberal Individualism in France, trans. 
Claudia Gorbman and John Berks (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 133; Geneviève Fraisse, 
Reason’s Muse: Sexual Difference and the Birth of Democracy, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 175–76; Linda Kerber, ‘Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric 
of Women’s History’, Journal of American History 75 (1988): 10, 22, 37. In feminist theory, see: Susan Moller 
Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 19; Mona Ozouf, Women’s Words: 
Essay on the French Singularity, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 256–57. 
38 Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies, 150; Koritansky, Science, 129–34; Hadari, Theory, 110-
111,150-151; Manent, Tocqueville, 74–75; Mitchell, Fragility, xi, 113, 196 note 117; Wolin, Worlds, 224, 332; 
Allen, Covenant, 192–215; Jaume, Aristocratic Sources, 117–21; Swedberg, Economy, 39–43, 154–57. 
39 Jill Locke and Eileen Hunt Botting, ‘Introduction’, in FIAT, 3.  
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investigate. More recently, general overviews typically include some discussion of family and 
women.40  
Within longer general overviews of Tocqueville’s thought, a range of treatments of the 
topics of family and womanhood has emerged.41 Koritansky explored Rousseau’s influence 
on Tocqueville.42 Hadari and Allen underemphasised Tocqueville’s appeal to nature in 
modelling equality of sexes, which is a major point of tension within the literature.43 Manent 
and Jaume explained Tocqueville’s balanced stance, appreciating both convention and 
nature.44 Welch, Swedberg, and Schleifer all noted absences in Tocqueville’s considerations 
on family and women.45 Even though family and women are now mainstream topics touched 
on in broad studies of Tocqueville’s thought, I argue that they still demand further attention.  
Studies focused on family and women unsurprisingly offer more comprehensive 
analysis, although these studies are usually article or chapter length.46 Among studies 
focusing on gender in Tocqueville’s thought, two categories emerge: conservative and 
feminist. These both offer exacting exegesis and contextual details, while also exhibiting 
some ideological biases in interpretation. The feminist characterisation of the 1980s as a 
period of ‘consensus that valorized or at least vindicated Tocqueville as a defender of separate 
spheres for men and women’ and the late 1990s as a period of ‘conservative monopoly on 
[Tocqueville’s writings]’ suggests a useful chronological outline of the existing literature. 47 
Without an explicitly conservative stance, F.L. Morton, Reiji Matsumoto, and William 
Mathie all belonged to this earlier wave. All considered the intersecting issues of womanhood, 
family, and democratic conditions.48 Gita May and Allen Bloom both compared Tocqueville’s 
treatment of gender to Rousseau’s ideal of womanhood.49 Other articles that are considered 
                                                
40 See: James T. Schleifer, The Chicago Companion to Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 58–59, 133–35; Mansfield, Tocqueville, 30–31, 74–75. 
41 Also, biographical works, such as those of Jardin and Brogan, mention Tocqueville’s relationships with 
women and considerations about women: Brogan, Tocqueville, 9, 83–84, 100, 58, 239, 78, 87–88, 340, 43, 95, 
402, 545, 59.; André Jardin, Tocqueville: A Biography, trans. Lydia Davis with Robert Hemenway (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1989), 39, 52, 53, 66–67, 102, 15, 260. 
42 Koritansky, Science, 129–134. 
43 Hadari, Theory, 110; Allen, Covenant, 196. 
44 Manent, Tocqueville, 84; Jaume, Aristocratic Sources, 119–21. 
45 Welch, Tocqueville, 192; Swedberg, Economy, 41; Schleifer, Companion, 135. 
46 One exception: Laura Janara, Democracy Growing Up: Authority, Autonomy and Passion in Tocqueville’s 
‘Democracy in America’ (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002). 
47 Locke and Botting, ‘Introduction’, 3. 
48 For gendered spheres, family, and democratic conditions: F.L. Morton, ‘Sexual Equality and the Family in 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America’, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science 
Politique 17 (1984): 309–24. For Tocqueville’s family in context: Reiji Matsumoto, ‘Tocqueville on the Family’, 
Tocqueville Review 8 (1987 1986): 127–52. For the private yet political sphere: Mathie, ‘God’. 
49 Gita May, ‘Tocqueville and the Enlightenment Legacy’, in Reconsidering Tocqueville’s “Democracy in 
America”, ed. Abraham S. Eisenstadt (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 35–38; Allan Bloom, 
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part of the earlier wave betray an explicit normative tone. In 1989, Sanford Kessler 
scrutinised Tocqueville’s thought on sexual morality.50 Kessler was anxious for ‘today’s 
America’ where ‘sexual freedom has merged with a swollen individualism to seriously 
endanger traditional family life’, and he found his anxieties anticipated in Democracy in 
America.51 William Kristol’s 1991 article argued that Tocqueville’s thought on family life and 
womanhood is relevant to concerns about the dissolution of gendered spheres generated by 
twentieth-century women’s liberation.52 Kristol has been criticised for indicating how 
‘Tocqueville’s understanding of the “natural” course of democracy may have anticipated this 
move toward equality of the sexes [i.e. modern women’s liberation]’ without following 
through and ‘explain[ing] why we should not then accept, on Tocquevillean terms, the 
equality of the sexes and related mores as “natural” outcomes of democratization’.53 Kristol 
fails to justify why society should be anxious about what can be considered inevitable by-
products of democracy. Analysing this tension between Tocqueville’s understanding of the 
‘“natural” outcomes of democratization’ and his understanding of natural gender differences 
and natural authority is one aim of this thesis. Jean Bethke Elshtain’s 2000 article probed the 
relevance of Tocqueville to modern social problems, i.e. a home with no leader ‘charged with 
the singular tasks’ of inculcating and cultivating ‘civic and ethical’ virtues.54 Elshtain 
advocated active domestic and civic life without exhorting women to abandon the workforce. 
She provides a good example of how turning to Tocqueville’s thought can raise contemporary 
questions, an approach this thesis adopts in the final chapter. 
 Amid this early wave, one article stands out. Eileen Hunt Botting and Jill Locke, 
feminist political theorists, have identified Delba Winthrop’s 1986 article as ‘a landmark 
article on Tocqueville’s portrait of the American woman, calling attention to its dissonance 
with late twentieth-century feminist constructions of female identity and freedom’.55 
Winthrop examines womanhood and Tocqueville’s ‘true notion of democratic progress’. She 
contends this ‘ironic’ phrase represented Tocqueville’s ‘prognosis for democracy’, which 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘Rousseau on the Equality of the Sexes’, in Justice and Equality Here and Now, ed. Frank S. Lucash (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), 68–88. See also: Gita May, ‘Tocqueville on the Role of Women in a 
Democracy’, in Voltaire, the Enlightenment and the Comic Mode: Essays in Honor of Jean Sareil, ed. Maxine G. 
Cutler (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 159–70. 
50 Sanford Kessler, ‘Tocqueville on Sexual Morality’, Interpretation 16 (1989): especially 465-470. 
51 Ibid., 477. 
52 William Kristol, ‘Women’s Liberation: The Relevance of Tocqueville’, in Interpreting Democracy in America, 
ed. Ken Masugi (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 480–94. 
53 Christine Carey, ‘Annotated Bibliography on Alexis de Tocqueville and Gender, Feminism, and Race’, in 
FIAT, 344. 
54 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Women, Equality, and the Family’, Journal of Democracy 11 (2000): 162. 
55 Locke and Botting, ‘Introduction’, 2.  
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concludes that democracy is morally and intellectually limited ‘because it will not give public 
recognition to moral and intellectual superiority’.56  She also emphasises convention over 
nature in Tocqueville’s version of womanhood.57 By highlighting nature, this thesis 
challenges her interpretation in Chapter Three. 
Following Winthrop, the next key feminist work, and the only gender-focused book 
on Tocqueville, was Democracy Growing Up, by Laura Janara. This work demonstrates how, 
in Democracy in America, Tocqueville ‘crafts an analogy between humans’ ontogenetic 
development and the phylogenetic development of human society’.58 She contended that 
Tocqueville’s account is rife with under-examined metaphors and ‘symbolic family drama’ 
imagery that demonstrates how ‘democracy generally requires the primacy of male forces 
over contained though essential female forces’.59 While Janara insisted that Tocqueville’s 
‘gendered and familial metaphors must themselves be interpreted as historical artifacts’, her 
study is a literary and psychoanalytic, rather than historical, investigation. Overall, Janara did 
not provide an extensive contextualisation of Tocqueville’s understanding of family and 
womanhood within his political thought.  
The contributions to Feminist Interpretations of Alexis de Tocqueville (2009) 
comprise the final examples of feminist scholarship. Some of these contributions offer 
insights that this thesis will build upon as well as interpretations that it will challenge.60 Some 
chapters focused on Tocqueville’s potential contributions to feminist political theory, rather 
than extensively analysing his ideas.61 Other contributions focused on historical context: 
Janara and Locke, separately, argued that Tocqueville’s gendered family ideals imposed a 
useful structure in the face of ‘the flux that democratic society heralds’ and the post-
aristocratic anxiety of Jacksonian America.62 Both emphasise Tocqueville’s nostalgia for an 
aristocratic age in his discussion of women. Alternatively, I suggest Tocqueville was more 
                                                
56 Delba Winthrop, ‘Tocqueville’s American Woman and “The True Conception of Democratic Progress”’, in 
FIAT, 193. 
57 Tocqueville, DA2, 1067.  
58 Janara, Democracy, 9.  
59 Ibid., 157. 
60 Most chapters focus on Democracy in America. Dana Villa and Richard Boyd were exceptions. Both 
discussed Tocqueville’s gendered virtues and metaphors, drawing on The Old Regime and the Revolution, his 
writings on Algeria, and his Souvenirs. These articles do not relate to the bigger picture of Tocqueville’s 
associationalism. Dana Villa, ‘Tocqueville and the “Feminization” of the Bourgeoisie’, in FIAT, 71–98; Richard 
Boyd, ‘Imperial Fathers and Favorite Sons: J.S. Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Nineteenth-Century Visions of 
Empire’, in FIAT, 225–52.  
61 Barbara Cruikshank, ‘Tocqueville’s Authority: Feminism and Reform “Between Government and Civil 
Society”’, in FIAT, 305–35. Kathleen S. Sullivan, ‘Toward a Generative Theory of Equality’, in FIAT, 199–223.  
She draws attention to the American frontier couple, and how it explains Tocqueville’s gender roles, see: Ibid., 
210–13. The frontier theme is investigated in this thesis; see: Chapter Six, 142-144. 
62 Adapted from her book: Janara, ‘Family’, 67; Locke, ‘Mourning’, 125–50.  
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forward-looking, as he addressed the coming problems of the democratic age. Jocelyn 
Boryczka explored the separate gendered spheres presented by Tocqueville.63 However, she 
downplayed Tocqueville’s democratic man, suggesting that men are relieved of any moral 
responsibility in his account.64 Contrastingly, this thesis suggests that, in Tocqueville’s 
thought, gender roles divide burdens, and that paternal authority plays a role in directing 
children towards virtue.   
Other chapters in this volume compared Tocqueville’s account to other writers. Eileen 
Hunt Botting’s contended that Tocqueville engaged with Wollstonecraft’s ideas, while Lise 
Pace Vetter compared Tocqueville’s and Harriet Martineau’s comments on the position of 
women in America.65 Vetter’s contribution proves more useful for present purposes: 
Martineau’s comments contrast with those of Tocqueville and thereby prompt questions 
relevant to this thesis concerning what he was attempting to achieve with his own comments 
on American women.66  
Drawing on Tocqueville’s other writings and letters to supplement Democracy in 
America, Welch’s chapter in Feminist Interpretations examined how the private bon ménage 
related to women’s pseudo-public role as citoyenne in Tocqueville.67 Chapter Two of this 
thesis makes use of Welch’s insights to argue that the womanhood of Democracy in America 
was a democratic model of womanhood; it was a political ideal, rather than his personal ideal 
of the best companion.  
The Feminist Interpretations volume ‘moves beyond traditional readings’, and this 
break with conservative scholarship benefitted the study of gender and family in 
Tocqueville.68 This also means, however, that the most recent comprehensive attention to 
gender and family is preoccupied with ‘emphasizing the relationship of his life and work to 
modern feminisms, especially as they pertain to the analysis of gender, sex, sexuality, race, 
class, ethnicity, nationality, and colonialism’.69 This is primarily a contribution to feminist 
scholarship rather than to Tocqueville scholarship. This thesis is instead preoccupied with 
                                                
63 Jocelyn M. Boryczka, ‘The Separate Spheres Paradox: Habitual Inattention and Democratic Citizenship’, in 
FIAT, 287–94. 
64 Ibid., 293. 
65 Eileen Hunt Botting, ‘A Family Resemblance: Tocqueville and Wollstonecraftian Protofeminism’, in FIAT, 
100; Lisa Pace Vetter, ‘Sympathy, Equality, and Consent: Tocqueville and Harriet Martineau on Women and 
Democracy in America’, in FIAT, 151–76.  
66 The accounts of other travellers are compared to Tocqueville’s in Chapter Two, 45-63. Also: Botting’s 
argument rests upon tenuous links. See: insight into methodological fallacy of influence: Quentin Skinner, 
Visions of Politics Volume I: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 74–76. 
67 Cheryl B. Welch, ‘Beyond the Bon Ménage: Tocqueville and the Paradox of Liberal Citoyennes’, in FIAT, 
19–46. 
68 Locke and Botting, ‘Introduction’, 1. 
69 Ibid., 1–2. 
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emphasising the relationship of Tocqueville’s thought on gender and family to his ultimate 
good, liberty. 
 Feminist and conservative scholarship exhibit various insights and shortcomings. 
Often, conservative scholarship takes Tocqueville’s understanding of nature into account, 
explains the gendered spheres, and suggests how Tocqueville may help us to reflect on gender 
roles today.70 Feminist scholarship uncovers details, such as the relevant social context, but 
frequently feminist scholarship rests on questionable interpretations of key ideas, such as 
Tocqueville’s balancing of nature and convention, which this thesis aims to correct.71 The 
divide between conservative and feminist readings would perhaps not have surprised the ever-
prescient Tocqueville, who wrote to a friend in 1835, ‘[m]y work appeals to people of 
opposite opinions … because, by considering only one side of my work, they find arguments 
favourable to their current whims’.72  
Some scholarship forgoes a balanced explanation of the tension within the private 
family life Tocqueville described in Democracy in America, producing an incomplete picture 
of the family that focuses on the problem of private individualism. Tocqueville thought 
family life could encourage both the habits essential to democracy and the privatism that 
undermines democracy.73 Additionally, much scholarship mishandles Tocqueville’s treatment 
of natural sex difference. Tocqueville’s understanding of sexual equality and family order 
derived from nature and convention. To misunderstand this relationship between convention 
and nature is to misunderstand Tocqueville’s hopes and fears for democracy. This is 
detrimental to understating the domestic sphere and overlooks how the domestic fits within, 
and even explains, the wider theory. This thesis aims to avoid these pitfalls. Tocqueville 
stated that he wished ‘to be well understood’ concerning these themes.74 This, together with 
his hesitation to publish that discussion, indicates his anxiety to be read correctly on these 
matters.75  
With this in mind, this thesis seeks to avoid the drawbacks of previous scholarship by 
taking Tocqueville on his own terms before seeking inspiration, as conservatives do, or scope 
                                                
70 See: Matsumoto, ‘Family’; Mathie, ‘God’; Kristol, ‘Liberation’; Elshtain, ‘Women’. I also expand upon how 
Tocqueville’s gender roles suggest provocative questions for modern democracies in Chapter Seven, though 
with a less conservative stance.  
71 Locke, ‘Mourning’; Welch, ‘Ménage’. For misunderstanding nature: Winthrop, ‘True’, 178; Janara, 
Democracy, 158, 174, 187. 
72 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘Letter to Eugène Stoffels, February 21, 1835’, in Lettres, S, 315. 
73 For example, see: Tocqueville, DA2, 882, 1040. 
74 Ibid., 1063. 
75 Tocqueville wished his friend Beaumont to pay particular attention to this chapter before publication. Schleifer, 
Making, 44. 
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for criticism, as feminists do.76 I address nature and authority in understanding his models of 
womanhood and family life. I examine his entire presentation of the family throughout 
Democracy in America in order to establish the sides of family life, prone to both 
individualism and habits of affection. I do not use Tocqueville to criticise modern feminist 
movements, or tie him to feminist projects of public policy or literary criticism.77  
This lets me contribute to the literature in four ways. First, within Tocqueville studies, 
this thesis explores a gap in scholarship on family and gender. Many studies are brief and 
from a feminist theoretical perspective. This thesis fills this gap in the scholarship by offering 
a comprehensive account of womanhood and family in Tocqueville’s thought, from a more 
historical perspective that is oriented towards Tocqueville scholarship, rather that feminist 
scholarship.  
Second, this thesis contributes to nineteenth-century gender studies. Tocqueville is not 
typically considered a prominent theorist of gender and family.78 Though I do not argue that 
my interpretation should lead us to revise broader narratives about gender in the nineteenth 
century, this thesis nevertheless makes a contribution. By comprehensively addressing his 
answers to important questions about the role of women in the face of societal flux, this thesis 
seeks to establish Tocqueville as a theorist of democratic gender and family, complementing 
his more usual status as a theorist of democratic society.  
Third, and most significantly, this thesis also understands family and gender in the 
context of Tocqueville’s wider normative democratic theory. This augments our 
understanding of nature, authority, and other-regarding mores in Tocqueville’s thought, 
contributing to our understanding of his associationalism. I show how the domestic sphere 
undergirds associative life and explains the most important aspect of Tocqueville’s theory of 
associations: the virtuous habit that counters individualism. I establish that the domestic 
sphere should always make the list of Tocqueville’s ‘democratic remedies’ and ‘mediating 
organizations’.79 This thesis also contributes to the literature on religion and individualism, 
demonstrating the (often overlooked) relevance of domestic sphere.  
                                                
76 For conservative seeking answers in Tocqueville, see: Kessler, ‘Morality’; Kristol, ‘Liberation’; Elshtain, 
‘Women’. For feminist criticism, from the philosophical and political to the psychoanalytic and textual, see: 
Okin, Justice; Sullivan, ‘Generative Theory’; Janara, Democracy; Botting, ‘Resemblance’. 
77 See: Kristol, ‘Liberation’. For public policy, see: Cruikshank, ‘Tocqueville’s Authority’. For literary criticism, 
see: Janara, ‘Family’. I count Botting’s project as textual or literary criticism: Botting, ‘Resemblance’. 
78 Examples overlooking Tocqueville on the ‘woman question’: James F. McMillan, France and Women, 1789-
1914 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 43,53, 81–84. Lucy Delap, ‘The “woman Question” and the 
Origins of Feminism’, in Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. Gregory Claeys and 
Gareth Stedman Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 319–48. 
79 Craiutu, ‘Moderation’, 625; Villa, ‘Civil’, 224. 
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Fourth, regarding how social scientists adopt and adapt Tocqueville, I address modern 
and future projects of democratic associationalism by suggesting how a more thorough 
understanding of his associationalism (through studying the domestic sphere) can offer new 
opportunities for social-scientific inquiry.  
To make these contributions, I read Tocqueville’s thoughts on the domestic sphere in 
historical context to understand the pervasive gender norms of his time, and I read them 
within their textual context in Democracy in America to understand the relationship of the 
domestic sphere to his wider democratic theory. I then suggest how the lessons of the 
democratic domestic sphere can inform modern social science research agendas. The next 
section justifies this approach further.  
 
Methodology: Intellectual History and Contemporary Relevance  
This thesis has methodological debts to the ‘Cambridge School’ of intellectual history, the 
‘Yale School’ of Tocqueville studies, and the recent work of Alan S. Kahan. The ‘Cambridge 
school’ has prevailed as the principal methodological approach to intellectual history in recent 
decades. While there are differences between its main proponents, overall the ‘Cambridge 
School’ advocates a ‘historically-minded approach to the history of ideas’ to ‘recover’ a 
thinker’s ‘meanings and motives’.80 Skinner summarises: ‘if we want a history of philosophy 
written in a genuinely historical spirit, we need to make it one of our principal tasks to situate 
the texts we study within such intellectual contexts as enable us to make sense of what their 
authors were doing in writing them.’81 This simple exhortation guides the ‘historical spirit’ of 
this thesis, which seeks to uncover the ‘buried intellectual treasure’ of Tocqueville’s thought 
on gender and family.82 I endeavour to take Tocqueville on his terms and avoid normative 
biases in interpretation—insofar as either is possible. Doing so, combined with recovering 
intellectual context, helps to, in Skinner’s phrase, ‘see things their way’.83  
Cambridge-School close reading and contextualism influence my thesis.  Exegesis, 
textual analysis, and ‘careful reading’ form the core of this thesis, but my argument that 
Tocqueville modelled, rather than simply reported on, a democratic womanhood and 
democratic family is supplemented by details from three contexts: the French intellectual 
                                                
80 Skinner, Visions I, 3; Adrian Blau, ‘Interpreting Texts’, in Methods in Analytical Political Theory, ed. Adrian 
Blau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 243–69. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 112. 
83 Skinner, Visions I, 3. 
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context, the social history of Jacksonian America, and Tocqueville’s personal experiences.84 
The context appears first, but it is secondary in making my case. As Skinner exhorts, context 
can ‘be deployed as a further test of plausibility, apart from the evidence of a writer’s own 
works, for any suggested interpretation of those works’.85 My argument that Tocqueville 
specified models of democratic womanhood and family is bolstered by the context of 
intellectual discourse concerning women and the context of the realities of nineteenth-century 
America as well as the context of his personal, private ideals for female companions. All 
indicate that his comments on women and family in Democracy in America related to his 
normative aspirations for democracy.  
Contextual analysis in Chapter Two enriches our understanding of Tocqueville’s 
thought on family and gender by showing that he used prevailing traditional gender norms of 
his time to express his normative hopes for the uniquely new democratic problems. Drawing 
on a wide range of Enlightenment and nineteenth-century thinkers, I establish a background 
illustration of the intellectual setting and prevailing discourse. Additionally, I compare 
Tocqueville’s comments to those of other travellers and to the everyday social realities of 
American life in Jacksonian America. These did not quite match Tocqueville’s description. I 
also look to Tocqueville’s personal life. This context reinforces the plausibility of my 
understanding of his comments as normative innovations, which are partly reported 
observations and largely imagined ideals.  
My main arguments rest on close textual reading. To discover why Tocqueville 
modelled a domestic sphere rather than reported a domestic sphere, we can inspect 
Democracy in America itself. It offers his most thorough account of the logic of equality of 
conditions and his domestic sphere must be evaluated in this ‘textual context’.86 The chapters 
in Democracy in America that I focus on here have a significant place in the broader issues 
that define Tocqueville’s thought; womanhood and family relate directly to his urgent 
concern for how citizens remain free and moral in a society inherently inclined to lead 
citizens to the opposite. I offer a reconstruction of his thought; this is particularly needed in 
the case of gender and family because features of Tocqueville’s perspective on these topics 
appear in conflict with some parts of his wider theory (the logic of equality of conditions) as 
                                                
84 See: Adrian Blau, ‘History of Political Thought as Detective-Work’, History of European Ideas 41 (2015): 
1190. 
85 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 285. 
86 Blau, ‘Detective-Work’, 1190. Emphasis in original.  
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well as essential to other parts (associationalism).87 As Blau notes, reconstruction benefits our 
understanding because ‘thinking through the implications of ideas, and probing their 
consistency with other things they said or implied, gives us evidence about what authors 
might have meant’. ‘Contextual analysis is all well and good’, he adds, ‘but it goes hand in 
hand with more philosophical analysis, even merely of the kind that probes consistency’.88 
This thesis makes only brief references to Tocqueville’s other major work, The Old 
Regime and the Revolution, because that text does not address the topics of family and 
womanhood as Democracy in America does.89 Alan Kahan has discussed how the two books 
tackle religion differently.90 He concluded that ‘France served Tocqueville, to his infinite 
regret, as the negative counterpart to America with regard to religion, demonstrating how 
stable politics was impossible in a society in which religion was perceived as a political 
partisan, rather than as a necessary moral foundation politics’.91 I speculate that something 
similar was afoot with regard to womanhood and family. As with religion, Tocqueville 
observed gender norms in America that he later elaborated to create the womanhood and 
family suited to democracy. He recounted his observations of religion charitably, smoothing 
the rough edges when the details did not suit his argument about religion and democracy.92 
Gender roles and family norms were not in turmoil as religion was in nineteenth-century 
France, but I suggest that, as with religion, America offered Tocqueville an opportunity to 
theorise a womanhood and family that serves in the ‘moral foundation for politics’, in a way 
that the French Revolution did not offer. 93 Tocqueville’s illustrations of American women 
and American family life certainly presented to his readers ‘more than America’.94 My 
exegesis strives to unpack ‘more than’ the American domestic sphere. 
Additionally, I focus on Democracy in America, even though Tocqueville did discuss 
women in his letters, notebooks, and less famous writings, because the primary interest of this 
thesis is his democratic theory of associationalism and how his democratic theory of the 
domestic sphere relates to associationalism. Other writings, like his letters and notebooks 
from his American travels and his Memoir on Pauperism from his English travels, 
                                                
87 On reconstruction see: Blau, ‘Texts’, 251-257. 
88 Ibid., 252. 
89 Some themes, relating to the intersection of family, individualism, and inheritance, appear in The Old Regime. 
I note these throughout the thesis, e.g. notes on pages 53, 131, 141, 150, 151, 175. Women are barely mentioned, 
and The Old Regime does not offer a coherent democratic womanhood.  
90 Kahan, Religion, 160. 
91 Ibid., 171. 
92 See: Ibid., 140. 
93 Ibid., 171. 
94 Tocqueville, DA1, 28. 
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demonstrate Tocqueville’s on-going interest in women and the family. I touch on some of 
these writings in Chapter Two to demonstrate how Tocqueville’s conception of democratic 
womanhood and family emerged from his observations in America and his continuing 
preoccupation with women and family, but they are not essential to my aims—demonstrating 
that gender roles and family life ought to be considered among the most prominent themes 
within Tocqueville’s thought on maintaining liberty in a democracy.  
The Yale School approach informs my close reading of Tocqueville’s comments in 
Democracy in America at the heart of this thesis and my attention to modern associationalism 
at the conclusion. Inaugurated in the 1930s by George Wilson Pierson, the ‘Yale School’ is at 
the core of American Tocqueville scholarship.95 Pierson’s student and intellectual successor, 
James T. Schleifer, has cultivated the Yale School legacy.96 The Yale school is also shaped by 
the wealth of Tocqueville manuscripts and documents in the Yale Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library.97 In 2010, Eduardo Nolla edited (with James Schleifer’s translation) the 
definitive annotated edition of Democracy in America, which relied on the Yale documents.98 
The Yale School’s status, as a methodological approach or as ‘a way of studying 
intellectual history’, has not yet been theorised. However, the Yale School does inform my 
method. First, the ‘textual evidence’ for my interpretation is influenced by the Yale School 
understanding of relationship between the two volumes of Democracy in America and of the 
nature of the second volume. Second, the Yale School view that Tocqueville remains germane 
to modern democracies relates to the aim of this thesis to connect intellectual history with 
contemporary relevance.  
The Yale school is affiliated with the ‘lumpers’ of the ‘lumpers versus splitters’ 
debate, which revolves around ‘judgments about the unity or disunity’ of the two volumes of 
Democracy in America.99 The Yale school seeks ‘unity (amidst change)’, attends to the 
‘evolution’ of Tocqueville’s thought, and sees ‘the differences between 1835 and 1840 as 
variations in tone’.100 This thesis does not ‘split’ the two volumes of Democracy in America, 
but does acknowledge a change in tone in the second volume, which features Tocqueville’s 
                                                
95 Welch, ‘Introduction’, 3. 
96 See: Schleifer, Making, xx.  
97 Eduardo Nolla, ‘Foreword’, in DA1, xxxi–xxxii. 
98 Throughout this thesis, quotations from notes are highlighted as distinct from Tocqueville’s final version, 
following Nolla’s edition.  
99 Schleifer, Making, 354. See: Seymour Drescher, ‘More Than America: Comparison and Synthesis in 
Democracy in America’, in Reconsidering Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America”, ed. Abraham S. Eisenstadt 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 77–93. 
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most thorough account of womanhood and family.101 Understanding this shift in tone is 
essential to understanding what Tocqueville was attempting to achieve with his models of 
democratic family and democratic womanhood.  
Volume Two is more concerned with mores, the possible breakdown of civic spirit, 
and the nature of democracy, than with peculiarities of American life. Tocqueville considered 
publishing the second volume under a different name: ‘On the Influence of Equality on the 
Ideas and Sentiments of Men’. Both volumes are motivated by the same hopes and fears, but 
it is apparent that Volume Two indicates a shift in ‘mood’.102 As Schleifer contends, by 1840 
Tocqueville understood ‘more clearly’ that ‘selfishness and apathy’ constitute a ‘democratic 
illness’.103 In the second volume, Tocqueville explored his anxiety over the defects of 
democracy and the possible normative solutions for democracy itself, not just for Americans. 
As this thesis argues, the domestic sphere is integral to Tocqueville’s theory of associations 
that keeps democratic citizens free. Though complemented by his other comments and the 
insights of Volume One, the core of my illustrations of Tocqueville’s democratic domestic 
sphere relies on the second volume. The nature of the second volume informs my 
understanding of Tocqueville’s thought on women and family as normative. 
The Yale School tradition consists of historians, but it maintains a philosophical 
disposition. It demonstrates historical precision by looking to ‘Tocqueville’s background, 
readings, friendships and other intellectual influences, travel experiences, political 
involvements, his habits of thinking and writing’.104 Yet, the Yale School allows Tocqueville 
to speak down the ages. Pierson wrote of Tocqueville’s ‘enduring qualities’.105 He considered 
Tocqueville’s conclusion about centralisation to be a ‘thought still worth pondering’, and he 
questioned whether his age needed a version of Tocqueville’s localism.106 Upon the centenary 
of Democracy in America, Pierson wrote:  
But there is about [Tocqueville’s] writing an intelligence that compels respect, and a 
timelessness that defies the years. Strip off the incidental description, and the kernel of 
his thought will be found still tough and sound. For he was writing less of America 
than of democracy, and less for 1835, less even in a sense for Americans and 
Frenchmen of his own generation, than for the guidance of all humankind in their long 
                                                
101 For the defense of the ‘Yale School’ perspective, see: Schleifer, Making, 354–69. Furet’s argument that 
Tocqueville’s democratic theory was largely formed before travelling to America also augments the case for 
lumping the two volumes, see: Furet, ‘Naissance d’un Paradigme’. 
102 Schleifer, Making, 367. See: Jeremy Jennings, ‘Constitutional Liberalism in France: From Benjamin Constant 
to Alexis de Tocqueville’, in Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. Gregory Claeys 
and Gareth Stedman-Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 366–69. 
103 Schleifer, Making, 362. For Schleifer’s historiographical overview of the debate: Ibid., 354–68. 
104 Schleifer, Making, 355.  
105 George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 768–77. 
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struggle toward a more perfect body politic.107 
 
Schleifer reveals a similar attitude, stating that Tocqueville’s Democracy in America ‘offers a 
political program for’ democracies, and he finds ‘[p]erhaps’ that ‘[Tocqueville’s] more 
significant message for readers today…involves not his proposed solutions, but the questions 
he posed’.108 I follow suit and aim to link the grand claim of ‘timelessness’ to concrete 
exemplars of ‘Tocquevillian’ social science.  
The Cambridge School method has been caricatured as, in Skinner’s summary, 
‘nothing more edifying than a conducted tour of a graveyard’, and characterised as disdainful 
of this idea of ‘timelessness’ represented by the Yale School.109 Nevertheless, Skinner 
acknowledges that historical work can be seen ‘as a contribution to the understanding of our 
present social world’.110 Intellectual history demonstrates its ‘relevance’ by helping ‘us stand 
back from our own assumptions’.111 For Skinner, the historian of political thought can be ‘a 
kind of archaeologist, bringing buried intellectual treasure back to the surface, dusting it down 
and enabling us to consider what we think of it’.112 In the act of considering ‘what we think of 
it’, we also evaluate ‘our present social world’. 
While this indicates that Skinner and the Cambridge School are not simply conducting 
an antiquarian ‘tour of a graveyard’, the ‘buried intellectual treasure’ remains an artefact by 
which we judge our world. This reflective critical distance is often a fruitful exercise, but not 
suited for the purposes of this thesis. The Cambridge School attitude precludes the possibility 
of making use directly of what Tocqueville, on his own terms, wrote. For this reason, with 
Kahan, this thesis diverges from traditional Cambridge-school caution to insist that good 
intellectual history can foster better political and social science. Sometimes, historical ideas 
are not artefacts: they are answers.  
Skinner may object ‘that this is insensitive to the possibility that earlier thinkers may 
have been interested in a range of questions very different from our own’.113 I acknowledge 
the contextualist reminder that seeking answers to ‘perennial issues’ may make for inaccurate 
interpretation.114 However, if we avoid reading in Tocqueville what we wish to find in him, 
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why must an idea, once ‘dusted down’, remain an artefact and not an answer?115 Why must 
the treasure remain an artefact that belongs to the people of another age and not a tool that can 
belong to the demands of our age, be they ‘perennial’ or otherwise? Not all artefacts are 
answers, and indeed, we must remain cognisant that the questions of the past do not always 
parallel our own. Nevertheless, in our zeal for accuracy, we should not overlook the thinkers 
whose concerns very nearly match our own. Tocqueville is exemplary of a historical thinker 
who speaks directly to our time. As Kahan writes, 
It may not be true that all great writers remain our contemporaries. It is certainly true that 
we cannot understand them without understanding their historical context. But 
Tocqueville was writing for and about a democratic society, a form of social organization 
even more prevalent in today’s world than in his.116 
 
We do ask the same questions as Tocqueville, and though we may not feel a ‘religious terror’, 
we have the same worries. How do democratic societies best preserve liberty? How can 
democratic society be dangerous? How do we sustain a healthy democratic society?  
This thesis acknowledges a debt to the ‘Cambridge School’, but ultimately diverges 
from strict ‘Cambridge school’ contextualism in order to align more closely with the 
‘eclecticism’ of Kahan.117 Fashioned in a spirit similar to Kahan’s Tocqueville, Democracy, 
and Religion, this thesis takes care with ‘the particular historical contexts in which 
Tocqueville wrote’ and accounts for a broader ‘picture of what Tocqueville was doing’, 
before finally defending a case for the relevance of Tocqueville to modern social science.118 
Historians must reckon with Tocqueville’s enduring appeal across disciplines. 
Intellectual historians have a responsibility to offer rigorous interpretations that engage with 
modern social science, especially when, as in the instance of Tocqueville, historical figures 
are used by social scientists. Though elements of contextualism guide this work, the thesis, 
following Kahan, disputes the idea that the use of intellectual history for the sake of 
contemporary ends is a methodological sin or an ‘exercise in anachronism’.119  
Intellectual historians who acknowledge Tocqueville’s contemporary relevance can 
meet ‘Tocquevillian’ social science research halfway, in order to provide insights for the 
study of modern democratic societies. The Yale School tradition and Kahan’s most recent 
work on religion remind readers that Tocqueville’s wisdom can have relevance to our 
democracies today. My research aims to bridge the gap between intellectual historians, who 
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insist upon contextual and historical details, and social scientists, who paint with broad 
‘Tocquevillian’ brushstrokes and have none of the qualms concerning ‘anachronism’ that 
haunt the intellectual historian’s practice. Modern (especially American) political and social 
sciences that use Tocqueville seem disciplinarily removed from historical research. This 
thesis aims to correct this ‘cooptation’ by enriching the historical foundations of twentieth-
century exemplars of a ‘Tocquevillian’ treatment in political and social science.120 The final 
chapter of this thesis unpacks this phenomenon, relying on the precedents of the Yale School 
and Kahan’s Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion.  
   
Thesis Structure 
Chapter Two explores the intellectual context that illustrates Tocqueville’s position within 
debates on family and gender, revealing how he defended his theory of gender using 
traditional norms. By examining the social historical context, I also illustrate the varied 
experiences of women in Jacksonian America, noting what he reported correctly and what he 
overlooked. This supports my proposal that Tocqueville’s reporting of family and 
womanhood in America was normative. Lastly, Chapter Two addresses Tocqueville’s 
personal reflections and relationships in order to establish his on-going interest in the position 
of women and to demonstrate that he also conceived an alternative version of womanhood, 
reserved for elite women, different from that in Democracy in America.  
Chapter Three explains Tocqueville’s model of womanhood, covering his 
understanding of democratic girlhood and highlighting the ideal features of the democratic 
wife. Chapter Four describes his model of family and the domestic sphere, noting the 
tenderness and affection of the democratic family and underscoring the place of natural 
authority in the family order. These chapters primarily rely on the accounts in chapters eight 
through thirteen of the second volume of Democracy in America. Wider materials are 
relevant; I draw upon Tocqueville’s admiration of the orderly home and family life across 
both volumes of Democracy in America and refer to his personal correspondence. For 
Tocqueville, the well-ordered democratic domestic sphere is one that attends to nature, 
authority, and democracy in order to support the functioning of democracies. Moral and 
intellectual authority provide for mores, the ‘moral and intellectual state of a people’, and 
Tocqueville maintained moral and intellectual authority within the domestic sphere through a 
mother who is naturally the maker of mores and the father who retains his ‘natural right’ to 
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rule his family.121 Intergenerational regard solidifies this authority. These chapters intervene 
in the interpretive debate concerning the role of nature in Tocqueville’s understanding of 
gender and familial roles. Chapter Four redresses the dearth of attention given to 
Tocqueville’s comments on family that lie outside his chapter specifically dedicated to family 
in the second volume of Democracy in America.  
Chapter Five elucidates the impact of democracy on womanhood and family life by 
explaining how equality of conditions shapes the position of women in society and internal 
family relations. This chapter also explains the ways in which Tocqueville’s womanhood and 
family are conspicuously immune to the expectations of the impact of equality of conditions. 
In short, his theory of family and gender does not quite fit with his theory of equality of 
conditions, and yet somehow, it does fit, as an integral element of his theory of 
associationalism. In formulating ideals of womanhood and family appropriate to democratic 
life, asserting natural differences and natural authorities in the face of democratisation is 
curious; these differences and authorities are both seemingly undemocratic and seemingly 
unlikely when judged in the context of his logic of equality of conditions. This curious 
incongruity merits thorough analysis. Scholars rarely comment on this. When scholars do 
note this peculiarity, it is without detailed exploration.122 Also, individualism is usually 
studied with regard to interpersonal, social links. Chapter Five addresses the understudied 
relationship between individualism and intergenerational, familial links.123 
These models, robust in the face of the pernicious elements of democratisation, are 
supposed to have a meaningful impact on democracy. This is explored in Chapter Six. I 
identify the significant role of the domestic sphere within Tocqueville’s associationalism, and 
specify what the domestic sphere teaches us about the nature of his theory of associations and 
moderating forces by highlighting the importance of other-regarding mores that are cultivated 
through intergenerational regard. Chapter Six unites our understanding of associations by 
highlighting the unifying feature of associations and moderating forces. Chapter Six also 
addresses the understudied relationship between womanhood and religion. 
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By examining the domestic sphere within Tocqueville’s overall democratic theory, I 
demonstrate that he theorised gender and family innovatively to the particular end of 
preserving liberty. These models provide the mores necessary to the associative life that keeps 
a looming tutelary power at bay. The in-depth exploration of Chapters Three through Six 
demonstrates why Tocqueville’s thought on the domestic realm matters in terms of his overall 
democratic theory and his ‘first of goods’— liberty.124   
Lastly, in Chapter Seven, I connect the lessons of Tocqueville’s domestic sphere to 
modern social science, arguing that ‘Tocquevillian’ discussions concerning community, social 
capital, and localism ought to attend to themes of family and gender, love of home, and other-
regarding mores. I suggest that, though our attitudes on gender and familial roles have shifted 
in many modern Western democracies, our mores have yet to take a coherent and common 
form. I suggest that we must hope, with Tocqueville, that the mores of the future will attend 
to the cultivation of other-regarding habits that can serve a flourishing associative life.   
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Chapter 2. Tocqueville’s Contexts: Answering the ‘woman question’, 
Exploring Womanhood in Jacksonian America, and Examining 
Tocqueville’s experiences 
Introduction   
Three contexts serve as background to Tocqueville’s models of womanhood and family life. 
First, the discourse concerning the ‘woman question’ contextualises his normative theory 
about gender, family, and the domestic sphere. Second, other travellers’ reports and the socio-
economic realities of life in Jacksonian America demonstrate that his illustrations of women 
and family life were partly representative of everyday American realities and partly selective. 
Third, Tocqueville’s own experiences and reflections contextualise his 1840 considerations 
on women within a lifelong interest in women, marriage, domestic happiness, and gender 
complementarity. In light of the background that these contexts provide, I argue that 
Tocqueville used seemingly traditional gender norms in order to offer something new for the 
sake of his democratic theory.  
Examination of the relevant discourse on gender shows that, apart from the democratic 
education for girls that he proposed, his ‘separate spheres’ approach had a basis similar to 
many nineteenth-century perspectives on gender roles; from this similar basis, he put forward 
a moderate stance on the position of women in society. Examination of other travelogues and 
the social history of Jacksonian America shows that his supposed report on American women 
and family life, partly accorded with others’ observations and the prevailing American ideals, 
while other aspects were left out, such as women’s work outside the home, divorce, and 
singlehood. This suggests that Tocqueville had broader aspirations for his vision of 
womanhood and family, which cannot merely be reduced to the observed details of a 
traveller’s report. As later chapters of this thesis explain, he offered moderated forms of 
longstanding, prevailing gender roles in order to ameliorate the uniquely modern problems of 
democratic society. By demonstrating both his adherence to the dictum of gender difference 
and his deviation from the everyday realities of nineteenth-century American life, these 
contexts indicate both the seeming traditionalism of his stance and the idealised nature of his 
account. By addressing his personal reflections and relationships, I show how the ideals of 
Tocqueville’s 1840 account of womanhood related to and deviated from his experiences.  
This chapter makes four principal contributions to existing scholarship. First, few of 
these studies of gender and family place Tocqueville’s views in the broader discourse of 
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gender roles during the nineteenth century.1 This pattern indicates that, while occasionally 
compared to one or two thinkers expressing similar thoughts, such as Rousseau and 
Wollstonecraft, Tocqueville’s considerations on women and family life have not been 
contextualised within nineteenth-century debates about gender roles. 2 One reason why this 
matters is that Tocqueville’s discussion of women and family has been interpreted as a 
nostalgic, traditional affirmation of family structure and hierarchy.3 In order to acknowledge 
similarities between Tocqueville’s answer to the ‘woman question’ and the answers of other 
thinkers, I contextualise his thought within the intellectual environment, before the rest of the 
thesis demonstrates what is curious and unusual about his perspective.  
The first part of this chapter shows that everyone who addressed this question insisted 
upon differences between the sexes. Various philosophical schools differed in what this meant 
for social roles. Most favoured an understanding of sex difference that necessitated a ‘division 
of labour’ along public and private lines. Part of the question concerned how private a woman 
should be, given her unique nature, and what kind of education she deserves. I explore, 
chronologically, examples from various camps: from Tocqueville’s Enlightenment forbearers 
to feminists and Catholic counterrevolutionaries of the Revolutionary period to the moderate 
liberal and socialist utopians of the nineteenth century. These exemplary figures demonstrate 
how different groups interpreted sexual difference. By providing an analysis of a cross-
section of theories, the first part of this chapter indicates the existing positions on the subject 
available to someone writing during Tocqueville’s time; this reveals that he was not 
especially daring in his conception of a private womanhood. This first part of the chapter 
demonstrates the first background insight: Tocqueville articulated traditional gender roles. In 
later chapters, I show that even if Tocqueville adopted traditional gender roles, he related 
them to the democratic context and made them indispensible to the new demands of 
democracy.  
Second, much scholarly debate concerns how much he observed and understood about 
American society, summarised neatly by the title of the famous Gary Wills article on the 
theme: ‘Did Tocqueville “get” America?’.4 This question has not been examined in depth on 
the topic of women.5 The second part of the chapter undertakes this investigation, first, by 
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sketching a broad picture of nineteenth-century American womanhood, and, then, focusing on 
the life and expectations of the American girl, wife and mother, and spinster. Family life is 
discussed in relation to American wifehood. My account is based upon other travellers’ 
reports, American didactic literature, and the socio-economic history of the period. Using this 
picture, I establish the second key contribution of this chapter: some of Tocqueville’s 1840 
account of American women can be corroborated, but his neglect of other areas is worth 
considering. I propose that these findings suggest that Tocqueville’s treatment of womanhood 
and family was both observed and idealised. 
The third section addresses Tocqueville’s considerations on women (apart from his 
1840 account) and personal experiences, providing for two more insights. Welch made the 
case for the usefulness of examining ‘Tocqueville’s private writings’.6 Her work aims to use 
gender to demonstrate tensions in post-revolutionary French liberal politics, whereas the 
interest of this thesis is more specifically focussed on questions of how gender and family 
relate to Tocqueville’s associationalism. I nevertheless benefit from following her example. I 
demonstrate that, despite the disjuncture between Tocqueville’s vision of womanhood in 
Democracy in America and the social realities of 1831 American womanhood, we cannot 
conclude that this amounts to a lack of inquisitiveness and ultimately superficial reporting. 
Thus, the third background insight also relates to what we may call the ‘Gary Wills question’. 
I show a commitment to understating women, marriage, and domestic happiness during his 
travels and the rest of his life. Tocqueville tried to ‘get’ women in a democracy.  
Lastly, following Welch’s examination of Tocqueville’s conception of the citoyenne 
and expanding upon her work using his American correspondences, I recognise an additional 
disjuncture— a difference between his conception of the citoyenne that we glean from 
personal writings and the democratic woman explored in Democracy in America. I highlight 
the difference between the former, who blurred the lines of the public/private divide, and the 
latter, who was strictly domestic. Revealing the fourth insight of this chapter, this discussion 
suggests that Tocqueville especially valued domestic privacy in modelling womanhood for 
the democratic age. This means the analysis of the citoyenne reveals this insight into the 
importance of the public/private divide in Tocqueville’s published thought on gender, but the 
citoyenne does not actually reveal more about his democratic theory. 
                                                                                                                                                   
131–34; Mathie, ‘God’; Wolin, Worlds, 330–35. For woman as an idealistic portrayal: Janara, ‘Family’; Locke, 
‘Mourning’. None thoroughly examines gaps between Jacksonian America and Tocqueville’s comments.  
6 Welch, ‘Ménage’, 27. 
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 These three contexts, providing four key insights, prepare us for understanding 
Tocqueville’s models of democratic womanhood and family life in the subsequent chapters of 
the thesis. He was interested in using the typical language of separate gendered spheres in 
order to suggest an account of gender and familial roles. This account, however, differed from 
the exact realities of American life, and it differed from the ideals that he had for elite women 
expressing qualities of the citoyenne. This chapter also shows that his account was 
representative of a lasting interest in the habits of women and the merits of domestic 
happiness. 
 
Women and the Enlightenment Legacy 
From the Enlightenment through to the mid-nineteenth century, France reckoned with the 
question of women’s place and social role in society. I follow Lucy Delap in using the phrase 
the ‘woman question’ to encompass the discourse on gender roles, rights, and duties during 
this period in order to include a variety of thinkers beyond ‘feminist’ perspectives.7 In its 
broadest sense, the women question asks: how should women contribute to society? 
Before the ‘woman question’ was coloured by the urgency of revolution, 
Enlightenment scientists and philosophers grappled with the relationship between sexual 
difference and political order. This section notes the norms of Enlightenment ‘science’ and 
salon culture which both shaped conceptions of womanhood, before highlighting key thinkers 
of the period: Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Condorcet, in order to understand how 
Tocqueville mirrored or diverged from the conventions of the previous generation. 
Understanding women’s ‘otherness’ in a scientific spirit, the Enlightenment yielded an 
understanding of women as fundamentally different from men, and therefore, responsible for 
different duties.8 Relatedly, many philosophers accounted for ‘women’s empire’, the exercise 
of soft power ‘behind-the-scenes’. Thinkers such as Diderot, Barthez, Marie-Genevieve-
Charlotte Thirous d’Arconville, and Pierre Roussel based ideas concerning sex differences on 
biology. They found that ‘woman is not woman in one place only, but in all aspects 
imaginable’ and that a woman is a ‘un homme manqué’, a man lacking.9 F.A. Pouchet, 
Achilles Chereau, and Pierre Jean George Cabanis carried this idea into the nineteenth 
                                                
7 For more, see: Delap, ‘Question’, 320. 
8 McMillan, France, 5. 
9 Ibid., 5, 7; Claire Goldberg Moses, ‘“Difference” in Historical Perspective: Saint-Simonian Feminism’, in 
Feminism, Socialism, and the French Revolution, ed. Claire Goldberg Moses and Leslie Wahl Rabine 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 26; Fraisse, Reason’s, 79. 
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century.10 Cabanis promoted the idea that biology fixes divergent social roles, characteristics, 
and routines. Accordingly, women ought to be barred from public life.11 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, commentators opposed to women’s education quoted and reprinted 
Cabanis.12  
Despite the scientific reasoning that excluded women from public life, elite women, 
particularly during the height of salon culture of the eighteenth century, exercised ‘behind-
the-scenes’ power. The Goncourt brothers captured this in their 1862 work documenting the 
condition of women during the eighteenth century.13 They wrote:  
woman, during the eighteenth century, is the governing principle, the directing reason, 
the commanding voice. She is the universal and fatal cause, the origin of events, the 
sources of things. She presides over the times, as Fortune does over history… 
Revolutions of alliances and system, peace, war, literature, arts, fashions of the 
eighteenth century as well as their destinies, she carries them in her dress.14  
 
The Enlightenment ‘science’ concerning sex difference as well as the reality of powerful 
female influencers shaped philosophical analysis of women’s place in the political order. 
Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Condorcet are representative of various interpretations of sexual 
difference during this period. Among mid-eighteenth-century thinkers, Montesquieu and 
Rousseau are of special interest because Tocqueville felt that he ‘live[d] a little every day’ 
with these thinkers.15 Contrastingly, Condorcet was representative of more radical 
Enlightenment views on women. Each of these examples, however, established their 
prescriptions for gender roles on the idea of the distinctive natures of men and women. 
Montesquieu contended that men and women possessed fundamentally different 
natures, but, unlike thinkers like Diderot, who focused on biological difference, his thought 
on the ‘woman question’ involved analysis concerning environment, education, and political 
circumstances. His Persian Letters demonstrated the dire consequences associated with both 
libertine women and subjugated women.16 Montesquieu was concerned with women’s empire, 
noting ‘I found the late king completely ruled by women’. He continued:  
                                                
10 Moses, ‘Difference’, 26.  
11 Karen Offen, European Feminisms, 1700-1950: A Political History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000), 67. 
12 Ibid.  
13 McMillan, France, 3; E. Goncourt and J. Goncourt, La Femme Au 18e Siècle (Paris: Bibliothèque-Charpentier, 
1907), 65, 372. 
14 Goncourt and Goncourt, La Femme Au 18e Siècle, 372. My translation.  
15 Quoted in: Mansfield, Tocqueville, 14. 
16 See: Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 31.   
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[t]hese women… compose a sort of commonwealth… It is like another state within 
the state, and a man who watched the actions of ministers, officials, or prelates at 
court, in Paris or in the country, without knowing the women who rule them, is like a 
man who can see the machine in action but does not know what makes it work.17  
 
He also criticised infidelity and lack of family stability in France, stating that husbands 
‘consider their wives’ infidelities to be inevitably destined by the stars’.18 While he satirised 
such disorderly behaviour, he also advocated for the right to divorce.19 In The Spirit of the 
Laws, as a component of his attempt to chart a moderate course between extreme liberty and 
despotism, Montesquieu explored the impact of governmental forms, from monarchy to 
republics, on the condition of women.20 He concluded that women’s standing in society and 
women’s morality were related to the political order.21 ‘In despotic states’, women were ‘kept 
in extreme slavery’, whereas in ‘republics women are free by the laws and captured by the 
mores’.22 Thus, social norms play a larger role in the lives of women in freer societies. He 
thought that ‘the servitude of women’ related to the ‘despotism of the prince’, suggesting that 
the liberty within society can be understood through examining the status of women in that 
society.23 This may also suggest that liberating women from total servitude can foster wider 
liberty within society.24 Montesquieu, again, held to a difference model that implied a 
particular role for women, though he acknowledged that this changed depending on the social 
state. He believed women were due a degree of autonomy, determined by which form of 
government they lived under. Considering his satire of the Persian harem, we can conjecture 
that he favoured a degree of freedom for women from the confining home and ‘extreme 
slavery’, but he also thought that this liberty—as with all liberty—ought to be circumscribed 
by customs and morals.  
Like Montesquieu, Tocqueville later discussed how mores governed the liberty of a 
democratic girlhood, helping girls to remain chaste. In his notes, Tocqueville also commented 
on how the position of women changed in different environments, noting their ‘complete 
                                                
17 Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, Persian Letters, trans. C.J. Betts (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1973), 197.  
18 Ibid., 118–19, 166-167. 
19 Ibid., 210–11; Suzanne Desan, The Family on Trial in Revolutionary France (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004), 27, 36. 
20 See: Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn 
Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 104–5.  
21 Pauline Kra, ‘Montesquieu and Women’, in French Women and the Age of Enlightenment, ed. Samia I. 
Spencer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 281.  
22 Montesquieu, Spirit, 104. 
23 Ibid., 316. 
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separation’ and ‘imprisonment among Orientals’.25 Overall, however, he diverged from 
Montesquieu, opting for a more private womanhood. As Welch describes, as much as he 
relied upon Montesquieu, Tocqueville ‘was deaf, however, to Montesquieu’s implication that 
the social freedom of women promotes public liberty’.26 Tocqueville, anxious about how 
democracy would unfold, did not draw on Montesquieu’s optimism about how society may 
benefit from social freedom among women.27  
 Drawing on ‘classical republican notions’28, instead, Tocqueville sided with a 
position closer to Rousseau. Rousseau’s approach was traditionalist— a male/female, 
public/private divide, which was complicated by a profound admiration of the private sphere. 
Rousseau believed in natural sex differences.29 He asked ‘[f]rom where does this [sex] 
difference come if not from nature?’ His answer was that ‘the plan of nature… gives different 
tastes to the two sexes, so that they live apart’.30 For Rousseau, the public and private could 
overlap, as the political realm was dependent upon the domestic realm. However, the social 
interaction between public men and private women was problematic. Socialising, represented 
by flirtatious salon culture, between men and women risked the blending and subsequent 
dissolution of distinct gender roles. Rousseau thought that women ‘no longer wishing to 
tolerate separation, unable to make themselves men’ will try to ‘make us into women’.31 As 
the sound republic requires ‘manly’ men, the effects of this are deleterious.  
Rousseau feared and admired women’s influence or ‘empire’, which they possessed 
according to ‘nature’.32 Women’s empire was best when directed towards the end of a good 
republic, shaping the mores of a society. If not, republics would ‘perish from the disorder of 
women’.33 Through the self-sacrificing, private woman, Rousseau explored his concern for 
other-regarding community attachment.34 Ennobling the role of motherhood, Rousseau both 
empowered women while enshrining that power within a domestic, private sphere ruled by a 
                                                
25 Tocqueville, DA2, 728. 
26 Welch, Tocqueville, 207. 
27 Welch elaborates the comparison, see: Ibid., 204–7. 
28 Ibid., 207. 
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31 Ibid., 100; Landes, Women, 87.  
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male head.35 In the Social Contract, he wrote that the family could be seen as ‘the first model 
of political societies’ because of the nature of the father’s natural command over his 
children.36 In his Discourse on Political Economy, however, he noted that politics was not 
based on patriarchal right because, simply put, the sentiments and habits of the family cannot 
be scaled to the polity.37 The authority found in family life is akin to political life, but political 
life is not modelled on every detail of family life. Family stability, however, underpinned the 
political order, so women’s submission within the family determined political stability. Jean 
Bethke Elshtain explains: ‘Rousseau feared and despised parental divisiveness’ and therefore 
paternal authority represented the ‘indivisibility of familial authority’.38 Chapters Four and 
Five of this thesis show that Tocqueville shared with Rousseau a regard for natural sex 
difference and natural authority and that his hopes for the production of social mores lay in 
women, but his system differed from Rousseau in terms of the education he considered 
appropriate for girls.39 The free girlhood of the savvy democratic girl that Tocqueville 
described was unlike the demure education of Rousseau’s Sophie.40  
‘Republican motherhood’ is often associated with Rousseau and his version of 
womanhood that was steeped in moral gravity and political significance. Breastfeeding and 
‘natural childrearing’, as opposed to the ‘mercenary’ use of wet-nurses, represented a nexus 
of natural responsibilities, tenderness, and social attachment.41 By granting political 
significance to the private sphere, Rousseau blurred the lines of public and private.42 
Rousseau’s answer to the ‘woman question’ was difference-based and prescribed for women a 
domestic role, yet his considerations exalted motherhood and domestic orderliness as integral 
to political society. Like Rousseau, Tocqueville would argue that women’s confinement to the 
domestic realm is crucial for political reasons. 
Finally, Condorcet was unique among Enlightenment thinkers, many of whom 
contended that sexual anatomy fated a sex-based division of labour, which excluded women 
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from political rights. 43 Condorcet emphasised socialisation, education, and customary norms 
in explaining the differences between men and women.44 He believed in women’s capacity for 
reason, but he did not neglect motherhood as defining of women’s experience, nor did he 
overlook women’s talent for ‘the gentle and domestic virtues’.45 More importantly, he 
believed that women ‘have shown that they possess the virtues of citizens’.46 Condorcet even 
suggested that property-owning women should be empowered with the vote and that women 
could be worthy of public office.47 Contrary to Rousseau, Condorcet held that the logical 
consequence of political equality between men and women would be the elimination of 
women’s ‘special empire’.48 For Condorcet, this eradicated an insidious and secretive form of 
political influence. Tocqueville also thought women could be ‘manly’ in their capacity for 
reason, but he rejected Condorcet’s more radical conclusions.  
Late eighteenth-century thinkers saw women as possessing a unique nature 
prescribing a particular and morally worthy role, but admiration for women’s influence could 
quickly turn to scorn. Before the Revolution, thinkers exhibited a resistance to the frivolous 
decadence, including sexual decadence, of the salon culture presided over by aristocratic 
women. A corresponding wariness of ‘women’s empire’ emerged, a sense that women’s 
capacity for influence had transgressed private boundaries. For many, salon reform and the 
return of prominent salonnières to fidelity and family was the remedy. Prevailing normative 
considerations on private womanhood and natural motherhood related to a wider conversation 
about natural rights and how nature informs the political order. As those ideas were pushed 
even further during the Revolution and the confusion of the 1790s, attitudes towards the 
woman question were inevitably affected.  
 
The Revolutionary Period 
During the Revolutionary period, the theme of natural sex difference continued to 
predominate. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord represented prevalent attitudes toward 
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women, the family, and the home. His prominence lasted through the many governmental 
turnovers from the reign of Louis XVI to the July Monarchy. His influential report on 
education of 1791 is especially helpful for understanding views on sex difference in the 
1790s. Talleyrand was invested in reforming education for all children. He considered public 
education a universal right regardless of gender, and therefore schools must be available for 
boys and girls.49 However, on the stage of the National Assembly, he also echoed Rousseau: 
‘if excluding women from public employment is for both sexes a way of augmenting the sum 
of their mutual happiness’, then women should not seek ‘political rights’.50 He upheld the 
values of maternity and domesticity, and ultimately ‘recommended a domestic education for 
women’.51 He cited ‘[t]he will of nature’.52  
Challenging figures like Talleyrand, feminist revolutionaries made radical calls for 
change, but, on the whole, they maintained the principle of sexual difference and the 
significance of motherhood and women’s particular capacity for virtue. In addressing the 
National Convention in 1790, Etta Palm d’Aelders acknowledged women’s frivolity, a 
criticism that lingered following the excesses of the Old Regime. She held that ‘when 
[women] are degraded under despotism, pleasing frivolity was their lot, when they are 
restored to the dignity of their being, they will be the model for all civic virtues’.53 D’Aelders 
exhorted Republican motherhood, embellishing her address with ostentatious gestures to the 
great mothers of classical history.54 She believed citoyennes were responsible for the civic and 
moral education of children and for the welfare of the poor.55 Speaking to republican 
motherhood by no means diluted her insistence upon women’s rights. She concluded: ‘the 
powers of husband and wife must be equal and separate’.56 
Pauline Léon also encouraged republican motherhood, the set of norms that blended 
love of homeland with maternal duties. In 1791, Léon appealed to the National Assembly to 
set up a female militia.57 She believed that the revolution meant women had been ‘raised to 
the ranks of citoyennes’, and having ‘sampled the promises of liberty’, women could no 
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longer subject themselves to ‘slavery’.58 Ultimately, she was arrested. When she pleaded her 
case, Léon declared her dedication to her ‘household’ and highlighted her ‘conjugal love and 
domestic virtues which are the basis of love for country’.59 She couched her domestic duties 
in the language of patriotic Republican motherhood.  
Théroigne de Méricourt was also outspoken concerning arming women. She saw the 
lack of women in the military as a symbol of women’s general exclusion from the polity. She 
argued: ‘we covet the honor of dying for liberty’, but after a brutal attack on her life, 
Méricourt was institutionalised.60 Claire Lacombe was also representative of this feminist 
revolutionary perspective, and she highlighted motherhood as women’s unique avenue to 
political agency. In a 1793 petition, she urged: ‘while I do my duty by fighting the enemies of 
our nation, fulfil your duties by instilling in your children the sentiments that all French 
should have from birth, the love of liberty and the hatred of despots’.61 She was arrested as 
well. 
As an actress, Olympe de Gouges was a visible figure, by no means tied to the privacy 
of the home. She grasped the incongruity between the changes in women’s status under 
revolutionary law, for example, changes in divorce law, and their continued exclusion from 
political rights. Inspired by Condorcet, she highlighted this paradox and demanded rights for 
women in her 1791 piece Declaration of the rights of woman and (female) citizen.62 Though 
her declaration argued for political rights for women, the document remained tinged with the 
sense of women’s unique nature. She acknowledged the complementarity of the sexes in 
nature and she highlighted women’s capacity for motherhood and their unique beauty.63 She 
also ridiculed the negative impact of women’s empire, casting it in a disreputable light as 
‘women’s nocturnal administration’.64 Gouges emphasised freedom of speech and opinion, 
and she contended that marriage needed further reform.65 A moderate revolutionary with 
Girondin ties, she was executed during the Terror in 1793. All of these women advocated a 
feminist revolutionary perspective that highlighted women’s unique qualities, especially 
regarding women’s capacity to encourage patriotism and civic virtues. At the same time, these 
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women all met tragic fates. Their balancing act of advocating full political rights, while 
highlighting sexual difference and motherhood, was unsuccessful.  
It was not only women who advocated this perspective during the revolutionary period. 
Charles Thérémin, in his 1799 On the condition of women in republics, argued that women 
ought to be guaranteed the right and freedom to pursue happiness. Thérémin maintained that 
women have a unique nature, and he made his argument for their ‘admittance to the city’ by 
way of this powerful, socially useful, particular nature. While he highlighted individual 
happiness, there remained an auxiliary spirit in women’s political agency even in his radical 
work: woman moderates man’s anger, and she enflames his courage.66  
These feminist Revolutionaries, who did not wish to overturn the gender order, upheld 
the theme of difference, though they adjusted the boundaries of women’s sphere of activity. 
By suggesting women should play a large role in political life, they theorised difference 
somewhat more liberally than predecessors like Rousseau, even though they made use of his 
ennoblement of motherhood to argue for political rights. The tragic fates of most of feminist 
revolutionaries demonstrate that their ideas, while significant and disruptive, did not triumph 
during this period.  
The 1790s is sometimes seen as a period that enshrined republican motherhood to the 
point of imprisoning women at home.67 Indeed, the Montagnard André-Amar encapsulated 
the idea of a woman patriotically confined to the home, stating:  
[Women] have more than one way of rendering service to the patrie; they can 
enlighten their husbands, relay to them precious thoughts… they can strive, by all the 
sway that private love gives them, to strengthen in their husband love of country; and 
man, enlightened by peaceful, family discussions in his home, will bring to society the 
useful ideas imparted to him by an honest woman.68  
 
Recently, however, Sarah Desan and Annie Smart have demonstrated that the 1790s 
were more complicated than the narrative of the male statesmen who suppressed women’s 
voices and the female thinkers who glorified motherhood and sanctified the home.69 The 
boundaries of public and private were complicated by the variety of discourses during the 
1790s, and feminist revolutionaries explicitly sought political rights. The only common thread 
among these groups remains sexual difference.  
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Close examination of Tocqueville’s gender roles in later chapters reveals that he was 
aware of the impact that democratisation would have on the position of women, just as the 
tumult of the Revolution meant women could not turn back having ‘sampled the promises of 
liberty’.70 Even though he knew democracy would affect women’s status, unlike the feminist 
revolutionaries, he did not conclude that women deserve full political rights. It is reasonable 
to assume, however, that he would have been familiar with these revolutionary ideas. This is 
important to highlight because, rather than interpreting Tocqueville as uncritically following 
the conventions of his day or the teachings of his Catholic tutor, the memory of the tumult of 
the Revolution meant that there were more radical views available, and he implicitly rejected 
these views. As later chapters demonstrate, like Rousseau, he was worried about making 
women too similar to men.  
 
Napoleonic Period  
Napoleon’s words encapsulate the sentiments of this period: ‘I don’t like women to mix in 
politics’. He believed ‘[women] should not be regarded as the equals of men. They are in fact 
mere machines for making children’.71 Established in 1804, the year before Tocqueville’s 
birth, the Napoleonic Code legally enshrined the notion of the private, submissive woman and 
thereby limited French women to a solely domestic existence. This period saw conservative, 
traditional Catholics rise to prominence as stability and order were increasingly prised 
following the disorder and bloodshed of the previous decade.  
Joseph de Maistre was a Catholic, counterrevolutionary thinker and statesman who 
promoted the confined, ‘new domesticity’ of women. He felt religious women were 
fundamental in shaping ‘the moral man’, and he praised women’s unique capacity for the 
good achieved through motherhood.72 To his somewhat rebellious daughter he wrote:  
[Women] did not write the Iliad or the Aeneid,… they did not build the Pantheon, or 
Saint Peter’s… They did not invent algebra, or telescopes, or achromatic lenses, or the 
fire engine, or the loom, etc.… [they] have done something greater than all that: it is at 
their knee that the most excellent thing the world is formed, a decent man and a 
decent woman.73  
 
Maistre differentiated between moral and intellectual knowledge, favouring the former as 
most appropriate for women.  
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Louis Gabriel Ambroise, Vicomte de Bonald, was of a similar ilk. He campaigned 
against divorce, as it produced a type of equality between husband and wife that disrupted 
familial authority.74 This issue was foremost in Boland’s mind; he stated: ‘[t]he question of 
the indissolubility of the conjugal tie is the first of all social questions after the existence of 
God’.75 He believed that wider political stability relied upon paternal headship at home.76 
Likewise, he iterated ‘[t]o save the State, we must now defend the constitution of the family 
against divorce’.77 Bonald understood sexual difference as relegating women to the domestic 
sphere.78 While the Civil Code was deeply restrictive of women, it did maintain divorce, as, in 
Napoleon’s words, ‘an extreme remedy’.79 Bonald’s lobbying was successful slightly later, in 
1816, under the Bourbon restoration monarchy, when divorce was expunged from the Civil 
Code.80  
Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis, a framer of the Civil Code, guaranteed women’s 
submission, and greatly restricted wives’ recourse to pursue divorce. For him, marriage was 
so central to the grand design of the Code because the family was essential to the patrie, the 
nation as a whole: ‘[i]t is through the little patrie, that is, the family, that we are attached to 
the great one’.81 Portalis contended that marriage was ‘the result of nature’ and comprised of a 
mutually beneficial ‘perpetual protection in exchange for an irrevocable sacrifice’.82 He 
justified the articles concerning female obedience in the Code by an appeal to natural 
difference: it ‘is not law but nature that has determined the lot of each of the two sexes’.83 
Thus, for Portalis, marriage, family life, and social order were founded on the principle of 
natural difference. 
This strain of Catholic, counterrevolutionary thought is relevant to Tocqueville’s 
position. His early education was presided over by the family priest, Abbé Le Sueur, who 
exposed him to Catholic ideas and later sought to warn him of subversive ‘company’ and 
ideas.84 Interestingly, Reji Matsumoto has noted that Tocqueville diverged from the ‘religious 
orientation’ of Catholic traditionalists, like Bonald, who defined the family on Christian 
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grounds.85 Tocqueville deviated from strictly conservative perspectives, as he rejected a 
religious justification of marriage. He knew democrats would only submit to marriage if they 
found it useful. At the same time, it is apparent that Tocqueville valued sex difference, gender 
roles, the integrity of the conjugal bond, paternal authority, and wifely subordination, as the 
conservatives did. Apart from the suggestion of inferior intellects among women, many of 
these conservative ideas surface in Tocqueville’s own articulation of family life and gender 
roles, as later chapters show. 
Another important figure from this period, the economist Jean-Baptiste Say, held 
similar views concerning sexual difference. His 1800 utopian essay ‘Olbie, or Essay on the 
Means of Improving the Morals of a Nation’ defined family as the essential unit of society 
and the wife as its moral leader.86 This meant that he favoured educating women to the end of 
forming good men. Say emphasised chastity and ‘private virtues’ as ‘useful’.87 According to 
Say,  
women influence morals. We owe women our first memories and our last consolations. 
As children, we are the work of their hands; we are still when we reach adulthood. 
Their destiny is to dominate us without cessation, by the authority of their kindness, or 
by that of pleasure; and where women are not virtuous, it is vain for us to aspire to 
virtue.88 
 
During this period of conservative perspectives on the woman question, utopian 
Charles Fourier stands out. In his 1808 Theory of the Four Movements, Fourier emphasised 
the idea that women were generally entitled to the same educational and occupational 
prospects as men.89 Nevertheless, Fourier alludes to a sense of sexual difference with 
corresponding separate duties; women would still be primarily responsible for care of the 
young, laundry, and house and needlework.90 Overall, however, during the Napoleonic period, 
the answer to the ‘woman question’ was to exclude women from politics. The inclination to 
politicise the private sphere, as the feminist revolutionaries had, was diminished. The varied 
answers, however, rested on the familiar rationale of sexual difference.  
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Separate Spheres in the 1830s and 1840s 
The social utopians comprised the next major movement that attended to the woman question. 
The Saint-Simonian brand of utopianism, led by Enfantin, was especially popular among ‘a 
sizable number of young, able, and loyal followers’.91 Unlike their philosophical founder 
Henri de Saint-Simon, who was not concerned with sex and gender, they did preach that 
women deserve full equal rights in the public sphere.92 They theorised difference in a radical 
way, claiming the extraordinary power of women’s unique nature prescribed, logically, equal 
status, differing dramatically from the conservatism of the counter-revolutionaries. Influenced 
by the Romantic appreciation of difference and diversity and capitalising on the tumult of the 
governmental turnover in 1830, Saint-Simonians escalated their campaigns for women’s 
rights at the beginning of the 1830s.93 Through the complementarity of male and female 
natures, the Saint-Simonians saw the couple as the social individual. Woman’s gentle 
nurturing qualities were ennobled, but not necessarily relegated to the private sphere. 
Considering that Tocqueville thought the Saint-Simonians were a ‘dangerous association’, his 
general scepticism regarding socialism, and his own preference for a private womanhood, we 
can speculate that he scorned the Saint-Simonian perspective on the ‘woman question’.94 
Tocqueville’s biographer Hugh Brogan has suggested that Tocqueville aimed his 1840 
discussion of ‘Europeans’, who make the mistake of mixing the sexes, at the Saint-Simonians 
in particular.95 
In 1829, the movement suffered a schism, concerning the issue of distinctive male and 
female natures. Buchez disagreed with Enfantin on the extent of female difference. For 
Enfantin, the problem with Buchez’s contention—that difference is due to education— was 
that it could undermine the couple as the social individual, which relied upon natural 
complementarity.96 Enfantin despaired at Buchez’s individualism, fearing that the 
undermining of social attachment could lead to brutality similar to that of the Revolutionary 
Terror.97 Buchez left the movement and many followed, deciding to join the Fourierist 
alternative.98 Later in 1831, Enfantin’s plan for radical free love and ‘rehabilitation of the 
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flesh’ caused further controversy. Soon after, he banned women from leadership positions.99 
Leaders of the movement contended that, while they promoted women’s equality in practical 
terms, society needed to be regenerated before the political rights of women could be 
actualised; war and slavery needed to be eliminated first.100 Additionally, Enfantin proclaimed 
the great awaiting of the Female Messiah. Around 1832, when he lead an all-male retreat 
outside Paris, Saint-Simonian women began to dissociate themselves from the central 
movement and turn to practical activism.101 As the men of the movement developed their 
baroque mysticism, the women founded a movement out of which the later French women’s 
movement grew.102  
These femmes nouvelles, e.g. Suzanne Voilquin, Claire Démar, and Jeanne Deroin, 
established the Tribunes des Femmes, where they advocated for workers’ and women’s rights, 
though they maintained their interest in the great messianic mother. They never relinquished 
their belief in women’s unique nature. Though radical, these women iterated familiar themes. 
Cécile Fournel wrote to Enfantin:  
The role my dreams give to woman today does not consist in defying the world, 
throwing herself outside its conventions, rebelling against its feelings, or provoking its 
prejudices. No, her role is to make [the world] love what she loves, to convert it 
without preaching to it… Her role is to embrace it softly… that softness is her greatest 
charm, her truest strength, and her only elevated power... GOD did not create her soft 
in form and tender in heart for nothing… This is the role, the sacred role of woman. 
As long as people see us abandoning our children and breaking openly with the family, 
we will not create any proselytes, but as soon as we become examples for all women 
and show ourselves to be the best mothers, the most devoted sisters and daughters, 
people will easily convert to this faith.103  
 
Spiritual Saint-Simonianism faded, as the feminist offshoot developed a nascent rights 
platform later made increasingly mainstream by feminist advocates.  
The Saint-Simonian movement was influential, but it did not have the social power 
that the Civil Code, which deprived women of legal status, did when it was established. Other 
answers to the woman question were also put forward during the 1830s. Despite his reliance 
on women in managing his political relationships and alliances, the statesman and historian 
Guizot considered the admittance of women to the political sphere as undermining of his 
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definition of marriage as the ‘fusion of two beings’.104 He thought women ‘are dedicated to 
the family’.105 The unit need only be represented once in the public sphere. In 1833, Guizot 
developed a public education law that neglected the primary education of girls.106 As Say did 
earlier, Guizot preserved the principle of difference in affording women political relevance 
only through the private workings of the home. As later chapters will demonstrate, 
Tocqueville’s perspective mirrored those of Guizot in this regard.107 Tocqueville too thought 
women were relevant to politics through the making of mores in the domestic sphere, and 
though he was less explicit in deeming husband and wife to be the primary social unit, his 
emphasis on complementarity demonstrated a similar sense of the conjugal unit as the 
essential unit of society.  
The 1840s saw a continuation of the cult of domesticity. Figures like the anti-clerical 
historian Michelet promoted the ideals of motherhood. Suspicious of women, Michelet 
constructed a gendered reading of the events of the Revolution, concluding that this history 
demonstrated that disorder inevitably followed if women abandon the private sphere.108 In 
1846, Proudhon, the anarchist, proclaimed ‘that woman has only two possible roles in society: 
that of housewife (menagerie) or prostitute (courtisane)’.109 Women also continued to 
promote the dignity of their special sphere. Cora-Elisabeth Millet-Robinet, author of an 
etiquette manual, suggested women’s true calling lay in dedication to domestic details: the 
wife ‘should recognize the importance of her task’.110  
Towards the end of the decade, more radical answers to the woman question emerged. 
The views of the socialist femmes nouvelles were revitalised in the fervour surrounding the 
turbulence of the Revolution of 1848 in publications like Voix des femmes. Again, this largely 
subversive publication maintained gendered social conventions, condemned licence, and 
advocated for ‘good manners’.111 Socialist Flora Tristan argued the claims of the worker and 
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the woman were linked. Her writings also intimate a sense of the intrinsic difference between 
men and women.112   
By the time of Tocqueville’s death in 1859, the political discourse concerning gender 
roles had seen many variations, had experienced the pressure of political upheaval, and 
ultimately had maintained agreement concerning natural sexual difference. As the next 
chapter shows, Tocqueville’s own discussions of the ideal democratic womanhood and 
democratic family rely upon his conclusion that ‘nature had established such a great variation 
between the physical and moral constitution of the man and that of woman’, and ‘[nature’s] 
clearly indicated goal was to give a different use to their different faculties’.113 This cross-
section of various theories of the ‘woman question’ demonstrates that, by founding his answer 
to the ‘woman question’ upon natural sex difference, was not especially unique amid the array 
of perspectives on the ‘woman question’. However, the free girlhood and ‘manly’ reason of 
Tocqueville’s preferred version of womanhood differentiated his perspective. Conservative 
thinkers from Talleyrand to Maistre thought girls deserved a very different type of education 
from their brothers, whereas Tocqueville described a democratic girlhood that was free. He 
emphasised independent reason— the same independent reason that he thought democracy 
necessarily afforded young men. Tocqueville highlighted women’s reason, cultivated by their 
free girlhood, and did not shy away from calling this ‘manly’, though he did not wish women 
to become manly in other regards.114 Tocqueville thought both men and women could 
develop a form of ‘manliness’, and this contrasts earlier thinkers who suggested that women 
and men developed distinct virtues. On the other hand, he contrasted the feminist 
revolutionaries and socialist utopians by denying women full political rights. He followed the 
general trend, however, by offering an answer to the ‘woman question’ that rests on sex 
difference, and in this particular regard his perspective is unremarkable.  
Tocqueville’s more compelling contributions lay in how incongruous his gender roles 
were within his own system, given his expectations of democracy, and in how he made use of 
womanhood and family within his democratic associationalism. Tocqueville’s account of 
womanhood and family was a moderate position resting on a well-established standard of sex 
difference. It rests on accepting some conservative and classical republican views about the 
role of women. In this sense, his project contrasts with the radical democratic movements 
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associated with the French Revolution. Nevertheless, his account remains a democratic vision. 
I argue that he innovated democratic models, something made for ‘a world entirely new’, 
from seemingly old-fashioned tropes, rather than simply rehashing a conservative answer to 
the ‘woman question’ or reporting American social norms.  
 
Exploring Womanhood in Jacksonian America 
Turning now to the American context, this section indicates the extent to which Tocqueville’s 
account captured Americans’ sensibilities concerning women and the daily lives of women. 
By examining social history, American didactic literature, and European commentaries, I 
illustrate the complex, shifting dynamics of American womanhood and family life. Differing 
accounts as well as experiences across social classes illuminate Tocqueville’s 1840 account. 
(His comments from 1831 during his travels are addressed in the final section of this chapter 
on his personal reflections and experiences). Parts of his 1840 commentary accord with that 
of other European travellers, but my investigation also demonstrates that he neglected certain 
aspects of American womanhood and family life, from women’s work outside the home to 
divorce.  
George Wilson Pierson noted that Tocqueville was woefully ‘unscientific’ in how he 
approached ‘contemporary literature’ about America, largely ignoring and ‘deliberately 
avoid[ing]’ the work of other travellers.115 He worried about both the writings of Harriet 
Martineau and Chevalier.116 He wrote to Beaumont, during the years between the publications 
of the two volumes, that news of Martineau’s book made him ‘uncomfortable’ and that he 
refused to read Chevalier, saying ‘you know that it’s a principle with me’.117 This section 
shows that Tocqueville was alert to some of the same features of American womanhood that 
other travellers noticed. In other areas, he overlooked some of the real experiences of 
American women. I suggest that this was due less to neglecting to familiarise himself with the 
relevant communities or reading material, and rather, it was due to his aspiration to set 
forward a normative account of womanhood. Pierson stated that Tocqueville tended to give 
up on ‘gathering facts’ once he felt he had understood the ‘true explanation’ and related all 
observations to his ‘primary cause’.118 Tocqueville’s stubborn attitude regarding works ‘on 
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his immediate subject’ related to his grand aspirations for his work.119 I do not assume, with 
Pierson, that Tocqueville gave up on ‘gathering facts’ in general, but I do suggest that the 
attitude Pierson described was true in the particular case of women and family life. 
Understanding that Tocqueville’s account of womanhood and family largely reflected the 
ideals held by Americans (rather than documenting exact American realities) further bolsters 
the plausibility of the argument of this thesis that he developed democratic models, rather 
than detailed reports, of womanhood and family.  
 
Feminine Features and Social Standing  
Some broad unchanging themes of womanhood affected all women, whether a girl, wife, or 
spinster, whether rich or poor. These themes were the importance of beauty, women’s 
‘separate sphere’, women’s piety and capacity for moral influence, and women’s social 
standing. Many commentators noted the beauty of American women. Felix de Beaujour, a 
French diplomat, stated in his Aperçu des Etats-Unis that American women ‘have more of 
that delicate beauty which belongs to their sex, and, in general, have finer features and more 
expression in their physiognomy’.120 He also noted that this American beauty soon ‘passes 
and fades in a moment’.121 Curiously, this appears to have been a striking feature; travellers 
commenting on female beauty often noted this caveat: it rapidly fades. The historian Médéric 
Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry commented that American women ‘are charming, adorable 
at fifteen, dried-up at twenty-three, old at thirty-five, decrepit at forty or fifty’.122 Gustave de 
Beaumont, Tocqueville’s friend and travelling companion, in his novel exploring American 
manners, commented: ‘this beauty, this freshness, and all the graces of youth will wither 
before their time’.123 He hypothesised that American women carried on ‘an unequal struggle 
against the rigours of climate’ and ‘[t]he sedentary and retired life of women in the United 
States explains… the poorness of their complexions’.124 Contrastingly, Fanny Trollope, also 
noting the swift waning of American beauty, contended that this phenomenon was more 
related to American women’s hard labour ‘as slaves to the soil’, not their domestic retirement. 
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By observing ‘the wife of an American cottager’, it is easy to see ‘the life she leads is one of 
hardship, privation, and labour’; by thirty, these women have lost ‘every trace of youth and 
beauty’. Trollope thought that girls, ‘often with lovely features’ appeared ‘pale, thin, and 
haggard’.125 Tocqueville did not focus on women’s appearance, but he did record meeting a 
frontierswoman whose ‘features faded before their time’.126 Overall, this attention to beauty 
reveals that women were valued for their physical appearance. This is hardly surprising, but 
the curious consensus that American women’s good looks were short lived is more intriguing. 
This may suggest that they withstood stresses that were not typical among European women, 
in particular among those of the middling or aristocratic classes to which most European 
commentators belonged.  
 Beaumont’s insistence that American women lead retired, homebound lives relates to 
a second feature of American womanhood that defined the lives of all girls and married or 
unmarried women, that of ‘separate spheres’. In contrast to the masculine public, professional, 
and commercial sphere, the feminine sphere was private, domestic, and moral. During the 
early part of the nineteenth century, however, many women worked outside the home in 
occupations appropriate to the womanly sphere. Some commentators on the habits of 
Americans noted a division of labour that contrasts with Trollope’s testimony of the hard 
labour of the ‘cottager’s wife’. Michel Chevalier contended that American wealth liberated 
women from physical labour; ‘the woman is exempt from all heavy work’. Unlike other 
travellers, Chevalier concludes that American women had ‘escaped that hideous ugliness and 
repulsive coarseness of complexion which toil and privation everywhere else brings upon 
them’. 127 Chevalier thought it was fortunate that ‘the ruder and harder forms of toil’ belonged 
to men.128 Tocqueville commented similarly that ‘there are no families so poor’ as to require 
women ‘to give themselves to the hard work of plowing or to any one of the difficult 
exercises that require the development of physical strength’.129 Chevalier and Tocqueville’s 
optimism contrasts with Trollope’s account.  
While Trollope did not observe a clear separation in terms of hard labour, she did note 
that men and women were socially separated in America. She noted that Cincinnati women 
rarely attended the theatre and that church services and tea parties alone prevented them from 
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‘becoming perfect recluses’.130 In New York, she found ‘[m]ixed dinner parties of ladies and 
gentlemen’ to be ‘very rare’.131 Aboard steamboats, ‘[t]he separation of the sexes’ is most 
apparent.132 She found men took part in many social activities such as dining, playing cards, 
and enjoying music, but all in the absence of women.133 Before Trollope, Victor Jacquemont 
also remarked upon ‘this intellectual and social separation between men and women in 
America’.134 The expectation and practice of men and women working and living separately 
manifested differently among girls, wives, and spinsters, but women were generally expected 
to attend to matters suited to their sex. 
A foremost responsibility of women was their moral role, from maintaining sexual 
morality as a young girl to moral inculcation as a mother. This was understood in terms of 
women’s peculiar capacity for religion and moral influence. Trollope contended that religion 
had a uniquely powerful ‘hold’ on American women compare to men.135 The didactic 
literature of the period also fostered a sense in American women that they had a ‘peculiar 
susceptibility’ to the sway of religion.136 Tocqueville, too, thought that women had a special 
relationship with religion and making mores.137 As one Fourth of July orator of the early 
Republic put it, ‘manners are of equal importance with laws’ and ‘the women, in every free 
country, have an absolute control of manners’.138 Trollope noted American women’s control 
over social propriety, though more humorously. She contended that its seemed ‘that the old 
women of a state made the laws, and the young men broke them’, revealing a gendered 
understanding of moral authority.139  
Americans took this moral responsibility seriously, and travellers, for the most part, 
noted that women were held in high regard and treated with great respect in the United States. 
Chevalier observed that ‘the American mechanic and farmer’, suggesting Americans who do 
not possess the most polished manners, treat all women with ‘a degree of attention and 
respect’. He also held that all women, no matter the station or wealth of her family, were ‘sure 
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of commanding universal respect and attention’ in public places. 140 Beaumont too observed 
an appreciation of women’s worth in America: ‘[t]he men of this country, whose respect for 
women is profound, scorn all outward show of gallantry… In America, they know the merit 
of women; they do not sing of it’.141 Tocqueville echoed his friend.142 The Pulszkys, 
Hungarian travellers, theorised that this polite deference was a useful affectation; by 
pretending to be ruled by women, men established ‘noninterference’ in ‘their all-absorbing 
passion for business’.143 Harriet Martineau also perceived disingenuousness, while Trollope 
simply held that American women ‘are guarded by a seven-fold shield of habitual 
insignificance’.144 With the exception of Trollope, there was largely a consensus that 
American women were treated with respect, and be it superficial or deeply-held, this respect 
afforded women the position to shape American democracy. 
 
The American Girl 
American womanhood was comprised of many aspects; in order to focus the study, my 
illustration of early nineteenth-century American womanhood continues in three parts, the 
experience and expectations of the girl, the mother, and the spinster. The experience of the 
mother, which entails family life, is most substantial, given the emphasis placed on 
motherhood during the period.  
 The life of the American girl was characterised by a high degree of liberty to which 
she added reason, self-discipline, and chastity. While the domestic sphere remained the 
female realm, many girls during this period worked outside the home, but in typically 
feminine roles. In a wide examination of commentators on the American family life during 
the period 1800-1850, Furstenberg finds a pattern of travellers noting the liberty granted to 
young people before married life, and especially noteworthy was the liberty afforded to young 
women.145 Beaumont illustrated Marie’s independence in his novel, commenting ‘custom 
permitted young girls to go about the city unaccompanied’.146  Many noted that young men 
and women were free to be alone together. Beaumont noted that custom allowed young men 
and women ‘go out together’ without a chaperone; for Americans, this is ‘no offense to 
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decorum’.147 Moreau went so far as to conclude young Americans’ sexual restraint indicated 
chillier romantic attitudes. He recorded that unmarried couples could be left at home without 
a chaperone without risking impropriety; he wrote: ‘sometimes on returning, the servants find 
them fallen asleep’ showing how ‘cold is love in this country!’.148 While many commentators 
noted women’s liberty, Trollope also noted the toil of American girls, calling daughters 
‘domestic slaves’.149 
The freedom afforded to young American women allowed them to be coquettish and 
rational. Beaumont reported that ‘excessive flirtatiousness is a characteristic common to all 
American girls, and is a consequence of their education’.150 Tocqueville came to similar 
conclusions.151 In his 1835 work The Stranger in America, Francis Lieber noted that the 
American girl is as ‘ever so coquettish— yea, even a positive flirt’.152 As alluring as the 
young girl may be, Beaumont noted she had ‘more reason than sensibility’, and, trusting her 
reason, she protected her chastity.153 Beaumont, much like Tocqueville in 1840, emphasised 
that the American girl is presented early with the array of ‘traps besetting her path’. From 
there, ‘she is taught to place her trust in reason’, and ‘[s]he is never lacking in prudence’. 
Because she is free, she ‘needs knowledge to be chaste’. 154 Beaumont therefore presented a 
young girl who is at once pure and worldly.  
Commentators were struck by the sexual morality of American women. In his study of 
French perceptions of American society, Durand Echeverria discusses disagreement among 
travellers, but contends ‘[t]he one aspect of American morals on which there was any sort of 
agreement at all was the high standard of sexual morality among women’.155 In addition to the 
girl’s reason, social pressure guided her decision making. Much like Tocqueville, Beaumont 
noted ‘no woman can flee’ from ‘public opinion’.156 Public opinion expected young women 
to moderate sexual mores, and this was invested with responsibilities to govern men and 
improve society. In 1837, the Rev. Jonathan F. Stearns contended that women’s power over 
men lay in their sexual restraint: ‘[l]et her lay aside delicacy, and her influence over our sex is 
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gone’.157 By mid-century, women’s didactic magazines, such as The Ladies Wreath, reminded 
young women, that chastity is ‘the true pole-star which is to guide humanity aright in its long, 
varied, and perilous voyage’.158 Far from simply protecting herself from unwanted pregnancy 
or scandal, a young woman’s reason steered men and wider society. 
 Beaumont also commented that the young American woman’s capacity for reason and 
her worldliness meant she lacked ‘candor and naïveté’, ‘which are so charming in youth’.159 
Tocqueville echoed this in 1840, thinking this feature lent itself to coldness in romantic 
relations.160 Additionally, Beaumont and Tocqueville both noted, due to their ‘coolness of the 
senses’ and ‘the supremacy of the mind’, young American women were also serious and able 
to hold their own conversationally, giving her a ‘manly’ shade to her character.161 Beaumont 
reported: ‘[t]his precocious liberty gives her though a serious turn and stamps her character 
with a certain masculinity’.  He remembered listening to a twelve-year-old girl expounding 
upon her preference for republican government.162  
 During the early part of the nineteenth century the typical American girlhood was 
characterised by independence and liberty. However, given the expectation that young women 
uphold sexual morality, girlhood was also characterised by a precocious capacity for reason. 
Though a flirt, the American girl’s rational outlook meant romantic passions were cooled. The 
American attitude affording young women liberty complemented a major socioeconomic shift 
during the nineteenth century. Industrialisation, the expansion of ‘commercial markets’, and 
the reshaping of ‘urban economies’ stimulated the breakdown of the family as a unit of 
economic production.163 White-collar and factory work attracted young Americans away from 
traditional work on the farm, and members of families began to part ways for the sake of 
wage labour and professional opportunities.164 With their democratic education, American 
girls were suited to the world of work.  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, unmarried girls and women were presented 
with unparalleled opportunities for work.165 Work remained ‘feminine’, including: domestic 
service, school teaching, and textile mill work. Work in the textile factories was typically 
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associated with younger women and girls, rather than ‘spinsters’. Mill work was a feature of 
this new economic landscape, offering girls the best pay and an escape from the domestic 
circle, whether her parents’ or her wealthy neighbours’. 166 Lowell, Massachusetts came to 
serve travellers as an exemplar town, illustrating the new life experienced by many American 
girls. Curiously, Tocqueville did not visit Lowell, even though, as René Rémond has 
indicated, Lowell became a necessary stop for foreign travellers attempting to grapple with 
American life.167 
Chevalier, before Tocqueville’s visit to the United States, reported on the life of girls 
in the Lowell mills. With good salaries and miles from home, these girls were fairly 
independent. Nevertheless, their lives were directed by the structures and strictures of mill 
life; the expectations of work and of public morality were unforgiving. Chevalier highlighted, 
using Lowell as a case study, that the American norms of propriety governed these 
independent lifestyles. According to him, the ‘manners’, ‘habits’, and ‘Protestant education’ 
of the Americans meant that girls’ ‘thrown together’ far from parental supervision suffer ‘no 
bad effects’.168 Additionally, he highlighted ‘a vigilant, inexorable, and rigid public opinion’ 
and ‘the safeguard of the public faith’, which also curtailed the girls.169 He painted a picture 
of the life of the working girl that accords with the more general descriptions of American 
girlhood, and though Tocqueville did not address industrial work among girls, his 1840 
description of a free and chaste girlhood shaped by public opinion matches Chevalier’s 
account. The majority of girls laboured in the mills for three to five years, seeking ‘economic 
advantage’ rather than a career.170 In 1830, ninety-seven per cent of Lowell mill girls were 
unmarried, but eight-five per cent of them did ultimately get married.171 Parallel to this 
independent girlhood remained a desire and social expectation to marry. Work was temporary.  
 
The American Wife and Her Family 
By exploring norms of marriage, divorce, homemaking, family life, and motherhood, this 
section shows a more complex portrait than the one Tocqueville provided in 1840. He 
reported some details correctly, and he largely accorded with ideal standards of womanhood 
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that prevailed among Americans, but he neglected to report on some areas, such as divorce. 
To begin, like many commentators, Tocqueville noted that marriage occurred across classes 
in America.172 Beaumont noted Americans have ‘only one class; no barrier of social 
distinction separates’ those who wish to marry.173 Several travellers made similar 
observations.174 Travellers also noticed that Americans marry early. Trollope complained: 
‘[t]hey marry very young’; she found no ‘young women in that delightful period of existence 
between childhood and marriage’, which she considered essential to their character formation 
preparing her for ‘the more important parts of wife and mother’.175 Victor Jacquemont also 
noted that custom pressured men into marriage at a young age, while Marryat found women 
over age 21 were sometimes counted as ‘old maids’.176  
Americans, however, did not rush into marriage. James Silk Buckingham in his 1842 
travelogue emphasised this well-considered, rational aspect of marriage, stating, for 
Americans, love is ‘an affair of the judgment, than of the heart’.177 There is some agreement 
among travellers, including Tocqueville, that American women had a great deal of freedom in 
choosing marriage. Freed from parental involvement or coercion, the American girl chose her 
husband and conjugal obligations freely. Beaumont wrote that marriage preoccupied 
American girls as young as sixteen, and because ‘she is so early the mistress of herself and 
her own conduct, she makes her own choice’.178 Another traveller, Lowenstern, noted in 1842 
this ‘remarkable custom’ that ‘gives girls the freedom to choose a husband according to their 
fancy’.179  
After making her choice, the American woman resigned herself to a life of submission, 
and many travellers, similarly to Tocqueville, noted a shift in her character. Moreau wrote: 
‘marriage brings about an absolute change in the life of the girl’.180 Beaumont compared 
American and European wives: the ‘new bonds rest lights upon’ the Frenchwoman, allowing 
her unprecedented freedom.181 He found the opposite in America, where the wife ‘retires from 
worldly pleasures to live among the austere duties of the domestic hearth’, and she ‘becomes 
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isolated’, setting aside her formerly ‘gay life’.182 Jacquemont, like Tocqueville in his 1840 
comments, highlighted the ‘resignation’ of American wives, making for mediocre, but not 
‘detestable’, marriages.183  
American didactic literature promoted this resigned submissiveness. In The Sphere 
and Duties of Woman, George Burnap declared the wife ‘feels herself weak’ and ‘dependent’; 
she therefore seeks ‘wisdom, constancy, firmness, perseverance’ paid for ‘by the surrender of 
the full treasure of her affections’.184 In Women of Worth: A Book for Girls, a burgeoning 
artist Ann Flaxman was lauded for dedicating ‘herself to sustain her husband’s genius and aid 
him in his arduous career’, forgoing her art.185 Similar to French attitudes, this submissive 
wifehood was ennobled. Burnap contended that wifehood provides ‘higher aims and a more 
dignified position’.186  
 The submissive wife was not just an ideal of moralisers. Single women commented on 
the bondage of their married friends. Catherine Sedgwick worried about her sister’s obedient 
position, despairing when she thought ‘to what thraldom her noble spirit is subjected’. 
Elizabeth Payson also fretted about her married friends; she contended that wives ‘possess 
oceans of self-sacrificing love’; she deemed ‘that self-forgetting spirit’ to be ‘essential’ to 
marriage.187  
Trollope, after describing selfless, intelligent, and tireless women, who ‘were “the 
glory of the land”’, bemoaned their condition.188 She noticed that ‘after marriage’, ‘the 
lamentable insignificance of the American woman appears’.189 The traveller Alexander 
MacKay similarly concluded that the American wife is ‘laid on the shelf’.190 Moralists and 
commentators noted that American wifehood featured submission and resignation, and while 
some celebrated the moral impact of her helpmate position, others were struck by her 
subjection and social irrelevance.  
 Many commentators agreed, along with Tocqueville, that the American wife lacked 
charm. Once married, the American woman became austere. Trollope noted that married 
women rarely attended parties, and if they were to go to ‘balls’, wives ‘seldom take much part 
                                                
182 Ibid., 19, 217. 
183 Craiutu, ‘Precursor’, 131. For Tocqueville on the less charming ‘private life’ of American marriages, see: 
Tocqueville, DA2, 1045. 
184 Quoted in: Welter, ‘Cult’, 318. 
185 Quoted in: Ibid., 319. 
186 Quoted in: Ibid., 325. 
187 Quoted in: Chambers-Schiller, Liberty, 51. 
188 Trollope, Manners, 150. 
189 Ibid., 153. 
190 Quoted in: Furstenberg, ‘Family’, 331. 
   
 
55 
in the amusement’.191 American women appeared ‘grim’, ‘hard and unsocial’.192 Beaumont, 
too, concluded that, reflecting the ‘prosaic, rational world’, ‘American women merit your 
esteem, but not your enthusiasm’193 Jacquemont was likewise dismayed by a ‘coldness’ 
between spouses, concluding that young girls were pressured into adult life, requiring a frosty 
seriousness.194 Unlike Tocqueville, Jacquemont noted that Americans undervalue ‘the 
cultivation of [young women’s] minds’, and he lamented the lacklustre marriages that 
ensued.195 The American woman, who ‘lacked charms and grace’, was not ‘half of the 
conjugal community’.196 Tocqueville’s portrait was not so dire as Jacquemont’s illustration, 
but he did note the coldness of American women.197 Democracy seemed to demand a cool 
rationality of American women and unions lacked charm and passion, even though they were 
reliable.  
 Travellers agreed that Americans valued the marital bond. Beaumont concurred with 
his friend Tocqueville: ‘one cannot observe’ Americans ‘without marvelling at the respect in 
which the married state is held’.198 Chevalier noted all Americans considered marriage 
‘sacred’.199 Nevertheless, Tocqueville, Beaumont, Chevalier, and Marryat all concurred that 
marital fidelity was still subject to human passions. Marryat felt Americans were far from 
exceptional: ‘[t]o suppose there is no conjugal infidelity in the United States is to suppose that 
human nature is not the same everywhere’.200  
Beaumont and Tocqueville suggested that married men sought out prostitutes rather 
than entangled themselves in affairs.201 According to Beaumont, the ‘excesses’ of debauched 
Americans were ‘committed outside the circle of family and friends’. American men found 
‘pleasures’ with prostitutes, but they never found pleasure ‘at the expense of conjugal fidelity’. 
Public opinion denounced both men and women who tarnish ‘the domestic hearth’ with 
extramarital affairs that breed disorder in the home. Beaumont, with Tocqueville, seemed to 
suggest that passions confined to the brothel have no such effect on ‘reputation’ and domestic 
order. 202 Chevalier also reported infrequent ‘cases of adultery’ and that ‘popular clamour’ 
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repudiated both the male seducer and ‘the unfaithful wife’.203 Unlike Beaumont and 
Tocqueville, however, Chevalier mentioned divorce.   
 Chevalier noted that the conjugal ‘connexion is more easily dissolved’ in America 
than in Europe.204 It was indeed true that divorce was pervasive compared to Europe. Many 
outside commentators noted the ease and rising rate of American divorce.205 American 
petitioners often relied on the Declaration of Independence, comparing royal and spousal 
tyranny.206 By around 1800, most states had expanded pathways to divorce.207 Additionally, 
in the 1820s, as an emphasis on women’s unique capacity for parenting came to the fore, 
mothers’ custody rights were expanded.208 Tocqueville and Beaumont did not record 
Americans’ perspective on divorce or their legal provisions accommodating divorce. In fact, 
Tocqueville held in Volume One of Democracy in America that ‘America is assuredly the 
country in the world in which the marriage bond is most respected’.209 
 Despite the scope for divorce, standards of American womanhood during this period 
were largely bound up with wifely, maternal, and domestic duties. American wives were 
expected to maintain the home, from ordinary homemaking to moral guidance. Didactic 
literature, women’s magazines, and religious works all promoted an ideal womanhood, which 
was confined to the domestic realm of housekeeping, hospitality, and family life.210 In 1846, 
in Mother’s Magazine, S.E. Farley wrote that the ‘the true dignity and beauty of female 
character’ lay in ‘faithful and cheerful performance of social and family duties’.211 Trollope 
commented that all American women, even the wealthy, busy themselves with ‘the sordid 
office of household drudgery’.212 Moralists put a lofty gloss on housekeeping.213 Lydia 
Sigourney’s 1833 Letters to Young Ladies proposed: ‘[t]he science of housekeeping affords 
exercise for judgement and energy, ready recollection, and patient self-possession, that are the 
characteristics of a superior mind’.214 Mrs. Farrar’s 1838 work The Young Lady’s Friend 
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suggested that ‘[m]aking a bed is such very good exercise of the whole body’ and that the 
monotony of women’s lot builds persistence.215  
Women’s magazine Godey’s said a broad education was essential to housewifery: 
‘chemistry could be utilized in cooking, geometry in dividing cloth, and phrenology in 
discovering talent in children’.216 Perhaps more plausibly, Beaumont suggested that girls were 
educated because American ‘men read nothing; they haven’t the time; the women are charged 
with this duty, and they report on all political and literary publications to either their fathers or 
their husbands’.217 Trollope thought much of this education was in vain, because American 
wives were consumed by household cares and socially insignificant.218  
 Despite Trollope’s lament at wives’ irrelevance, there was a prevailing sense that 
American women were relevant to the moral influence that orderly homes could have on 
society. The Young Ladies’ Class Book contended; ‘the domestic fireside is the great guardian 
of society against the excess of human passions’.219 The Lady at Home explained women’s 
responsibility: ‘even if we cannot reform the world… we can begin the work by reforming 
ourselves and our households—It’s a woman’s mission. Let her not look away from her own 
little family circle for the means of producing moral and social reforms, but begin at home’.220 
Beaumont and Tocqueville made similar observations pertaining to the religiosity of 
women.221  
 The well-kept, moral household was a refuge. Before the American Revolution, the 
family was understood as ‘a microcosm’ of society, as ‘a little church, ‘a school’, ‘a little 
commonwealth’.222 The nineteenth century saw a shift from a conception of the family as a 
smaller institutional constituent, reflective of church and commonwealth, to a conception of 
family as a private refuge, countervailing the instability of society. Women were expected to 
make homes strongholds of the morals and sentiments that were undermined by the hostility 
of marketplace competition. 223 Beaumont contrasted the husband’s ‘exciting, adventurous, 
almost feverish’ commercial life, preoccupied by ‘care’ and ‘tomorrow’s speculations’, with 
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the wife’s ‘sad’ domestic life, preoccupied by religion, morals, and childcare.224 For Chevalier, 
‘the domestic fire-side’ and ‘conjugal bed’ made for a ‘fixed point’, guarded by ‘religious 
sentiment’ amid the flux of American life.225 The responsibility to provide regularity, comfort, 
morality, and refuge afforded the American wife ostensible leadership within the domestic 
sphere. Though he did not comment on the details of ‘household drudgery’, Tocqueville, like 
Chevaliar, observed in 1835 that American homes are points of steadiness, noting that ‘the 
American draws from his home the love of order’.226  
American wives were primarily concerned with the domestic sphere, which was 
changing during the first part of the nineteenth century.227 Professionalization and ‘licensing 
requirements’ began to exclude women from certain types of work.228 Industrialisation 
reshaped the family, as specialisation drew members apart to work outside the home. 
Industrialisation relocated the ‘carding, spinning and weaving’ that had been women’s work 
inside the home to the factory, and younger and poorer women followed this work to the mills. 
Concomitantly, wealthier women became more preoccupied with a refined domesticity 
defined by ladylike manners. 229 Chevalier noted: ‘[e]very woman here has ‘the features as 
well as the dress of a lady; every woman here is called a lady, and strives to appear so’.230 
Bourgeois didacticism, emphasising domesticity and expounding upon women’s proper place, 
was trumpeted when actual practices were shifting.231 Many women began to work outside 
the home, as ‘an old order’ shifted, but these were typically poorer women, and a private life 
of domesticity, refinement, and moralism was practised by more well to do women. These 
recommendations, whether or not most women could afford to realise them, nevertheless 
indicate American values concerning womanhood and family life.  
Historians of gender and the family, Mintz and Kellog conclude that, regardless of 
‘some misconceptions and factual errors’, Tocqueville gleaned the ‘new kind of middle-class 
family’ that took shape between 1770 and 1830.232 They summarise:  
the chief functions of the democratic family were psychological and ideological. Its 
purposes were to ensure individual happiness and to serve the political order by 
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diffusing self-serving needs and instilling children with values of order, responsibility, 
and self-discipline— the values of good citizenship.233 
 
Industrialisation and new ways of organising labour and production meant ‘the family as a 
largely self-sufficient economic unit’ was vanishing during the nineteenth century. Husbands 
and older children more often worked outside the home, and ‘a new domestic division of 
labor’ took hold.234 This accords with Tocqueville’s commentary that the American family 
realised ‘the great principle of political economy that dominates industry’ along gender 
lines.235 Beaumont also spoke of ‘two worlds’ in every family; the husband’s was ‘material’, 
and the wife’s was ‘moral’.236 Economic changes reinforced wives’ position as family 
moraliser. Curiously, this conception of an especially moral womanhood, as Barbara Welter 
articulated, contained the ‘seeds of its own destruction’ because moral claims on women’s 
labour drew women from the home to social reform projects, missionary work, utopian 
ventures, and community volunteering.237 Tocqueville did not discuss this burgeoning 
women’s sphere outside the home.  
Colonial childrearing books were addressed to the father, but norms of nineteenth-
century motherhood expected women to nurture and cultivate moral children.238 The Ladies’ 
Companion explained that the wife shaped ‘the infant mind’, which was ‘like wax beneath the 
plastic hands of the mother’.239 Beaumont commented that the American mother ‘cares for 
and loves’ her children, while the father infrequently demonstrates ‘tenderness and 
affection’.240 Catherine Beecher, an admirer of Tocqueville, wrote in her work on domestic 
management that ‘the success of democratic institutions’ relied ‘upon the intellectual and 
moral character of the mass of the people’; and ‘the formation of the moral and intellectual 
character of the young is committed mainly to the female hand’. Beecher thought ‘[t]he 
mother forms the character of the future man… the wife sways the heart, whose energies may 
turn for good or for evil the destinies of a nation’.241 Much of nineteenth-century womanhood 
was bound up in the moral responsibilities of motherhood. Tocqueville also underscored this 
moral role of women, as makers of mores.  
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 The family life that women oversaw in nineteenth-century America became warmer, 
as the family became a place for morals and sentiments, rather than economic production. 
However, the impact of democracy and industrialisation cut both ways. A domestic sphere 
that is protected from commerce, with a relatively loosened hierarchical structure, may appear 
conducive to affectionate family bonds. Conversely, both democracy and industrialisation 
encouraged individual members to separate. Mintz and Kellog conclude, however, that 
‘[d]uring the early nineteenth century, life became more domestic’.242 Religion often brought 
families together for prayer or Bible readings, and on Sundays for church services.243 
Beaumont illustrated this, describing in his novel how the father of the central characters 
gathered ‘his children and servants’ to pray ‘[m]orning and evening’.244 Parent-child 
relationships became less aloof and more affectionate.245 Jacquemont, however, observed that 
family relations were defined by a cool respect. He thought a cohesive family could not last in 
a place as changeable as America, where conditions encourage social betterment and 
perpetual displacement in pursuit of profit. 246 
The democratic family did not cohere around a plot of land, as in aristocratic society. 
Jacquemont wrote that Americans ‘are not the sons of this land they inhabit’, connecting this 
to the theme of family.247 Chevalier noted similarly how the possibility of fortune draws sons, 
with ‘little emotion’, from ‘the paternal roof’.248 Chevalier, however, deemed the ‘weakness 
of the family sentiment’ to be ‘merely accidental and temporary’ and a by-product of ‘general 
dispersion’ that would settle; he concluded that family sentiment is upheld by American 
respect for religion, marriage, and paternal authority over property.249 Even though family life 
became warmer and more domestic, ‘[b]y the nineteenth century, families were finding it 
increasingly difficult to pass on their status by bequeathing land or a family craft to their 
offspring’.250 To observers from aristocratic backgrounds, this was noteworthy in terms of 
family bonds. Tocqueville also suggested that family bonds were affectionate, shedding the 
coolness of aristocratic hierarchy. Overall, it seems difficult to glean how warm and strong 
the bonds of typical American families were.251 Various forces drew members together while 
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others drew them apart. Though Tocqueville hinted that the unmoored frontier family worried 
him, his chapter dedicated to family in Democracy in America suggested that democracy did 
not put warm, affectionate bonds at risk.  
 Attitudes in terms of childrearing and education had certainly changed by the 
nineteenth century. Economic changes meant childhood came to be understood as a separate 
period of maturation. The formation of moral character and self-ownership, which equipped 
children with the capacity to resist sin and temptation, became fundamental.252 This related to 
self-governance, which Catherine Sedgwick wrote was ‘the only affective and lasting 
government’.253 The outside observer Marryat reported that in America ‘there is little or no 
parental control’.254 While this may have seemed odd to outsiders, room for self-limitation 
made for adults better able to manage the liberty of democratic citizenship. Martineau 
reasoned from her observations that ‘[f]reedom of manners in children of which so much 
complaint has been made by observers. . . is a necessary fact’ of living in a republic.255 
Beaumont noted that ‘from his tenderest youth’, the young boy ‘is devoted to business’, 
seeing business and manhood as interrelated. Beaumont found the girl’s education more 
‘intellectual’, including history, literature, ‘one foreign language’, and music. 256 Indeed, girls’ 
education had expanded by the time he and Tocqueville visited. Between 1780 to 1840, the 
female literacy rate doubled.257 Tocqueville also discussed the American girl’s education, 
noting the liberty she was afforded. He did not detail the scholarly or literary aspects of girls’ 
education, but in a fragment accompanying the chapters on the girl, he noted that the 
democratic girl could discuss ‘literature, politics, clothes, morals, love, religion, the fine 
arts’.258 
Though he did not mention divorce or elaborate the specifics of domestic chores or 
‘drudgery’, Tocqueville’s account largely accords with American expectations of wives and 
mothers. Apart from his admiration for ‘manly’ intellect among women, his democratic ideal 
overlapped with the ideal American wifehood— a mother who tended to a family life that 
encouraged warm bonds but also encouraged individual responsibility.  
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The American Spinster  
During the nineteenth century, an increasing number of American women were spinsters. 
Tocqueville did not discuss the position of single women, though his friend Beaumont did 
note the presence of many ‘bluestockings’ in cities.259 Changes in transportation, westward 
migration, and overall mobility meant that labour and fortune drew communities apart, 
destabilising the ratio of men to women and the norms of courtship.260 Between 1790 to 1865, 
the pressures of industrialisation, the breakdown of the domestic unit as producer, and the rise 
of households as consumers meant that the unmarried population increased.261 The number of 
spinsters rose throughout the nineteenth century, and they were more common in the 
Northeast.262 Tocqueville focussed on the Northeast, but he made no mention of unmarried 
women. 
 In addition to economic pressures, the serious attitudes towards marriage, as noted 
above, in popular literature and didactic manuals all suggested to women that they ought to 
remain single unless a worthy man presented himself.263 Women were encouraged to wait for 
the best men and a ‘true’ marriage, but some writers like Catherine M. Sedgwick, whose 
family Tocqueville knew, argued that a single women could find happiness.264 She wrote in 
her last novel ‘that there might be golden harvests reaped in the fields of single life, that it 
was not a condition to be dreaded, scorned, or pitied’.265 High expectations for a spouse and 
good marriage meant some women preferred to remain single or postpone marriage. A young 
teacher, Elizabeth Blackwell, wrote to her family that she could not find a suitable match: ‘the 
fact is I cannot find my other half here, but only about a sixth, which would not do’.266 The 
Ladies’ Literary Cabinet summarised: ‘[a] single lady, though advanced in life,/Is much more 
happy than an ill-match’d wife’.267 As discussed, marriage was approached as a grave matter 
of choice, primarily in the hands of the woman. American attitudes concerning singlehood 
actually reflected this.268 Though Tocqueville did not discuss spinsterhood (his ideal 
democratic woman was a wife), his articulation of marriage as a weighty free choice reflected 
the American attitude about the gravity of marriage. 
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 While changing social and economic conditions impacted the expectations placed on 
the nineteenth-century girl, spouse, and spinster, American womanhood never strayed too far 
from a traditional female sphere. Middle class feminine domesticity and motherhood were 
even reinforced by changing economic forces. Examination of this context indicates that 
Tocqueville was in accord with other travellers on several aspects of American womanhood, 
and he gleaned some general norms from his observations. He neglected to comment on some 
aspects of American womanhood that were prevalent and noticed by other observers, such as 
high rates of divorce, and he made some aspects more palatable than other travellers reported, 
such as insisting upon affectionate family bonds. Putting forward a comfortable bourgeois 
family ideal, he did not report on women’s work outside the home or spinsterhood. Altogether, 
this demonstrates his aspiration to suggest particular forms of womanhood and family life 
suited to democracies, rather than report the precise details of American gender and family 
norms.  
 
Tracing Tocqueville’s interest in women, female companions, and the citoyenne  
This section addresses Tocqueville’s lifelong intellectual interest in the topics of women, 
marriage, and domestic happiness, from the perspective of his personal reflections and 
experiences. As noted in the previous section, several aspects of the typical everyday 
experiences of American women are left out of Tocqueville’s final account of women in the 
1840 volume of Democracy in America. This section demonstrates his on-going interest in 
women— from the peculiarities of American women and the position of poor women in 
society to the lives of his close female companions. The women in his personal life indicate 
that he also conceived of another form of womanhood that was quite different from the one he 
put forward in 1840. While some features of the women of his personal life are reflected in 
the womanhood he described in Democracy in America, overall, the disjuncture between the 
women who shaped his thinking about gender in his personal life and the womanhood of his 
democratic theory indicates that he did not draw inspiration from his personal affairs. Rather, 
he meditated on a form of womanhood suited to democracy, which he concluded must 
necessarily be a private womanhood. This theoretical perspective emerged from his 
observations of Americans and from his personal values of an attractive womanhood, but 
ultimately his 1840 account was not an exact record of his initial considerations on American 
women, nor was it an articulation of the elite womanhood exemplified by his closest female 
companions. His preoccupation with women further establishes the plausibility of my 
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argument that Tocqueville’s discussion of domestic life in the second volume can be 
understood as well-considered comments expressing an ideal; he did not exclude details of 
American women’s lives because he was not observant of American women during his travels, 
and later concluded a section on women was necessary for his book. He excluded the 
prevalence of divorce and single women in Jacksonian America for the same reason that he 
excluded the public virtues represented by the women of his personal life: these elements did 
not benefit the model he hoped to put forward for the sake of preserving liberty in the 
democratic age.   
 First, I address Tocqueville’s earliest love affair, before examining his observations, 
complemented by Beaumont’s comments, during his travels in the United States. I also briefly 
speak to his continued interest in the social position of women while studying pauperism in 
England, which followed his travels in the United States and preceded publication of the 
second volume. When he returned from England, he married. I turn to his relationship with 
his with Mary Mottley (hereafter, Marie).269 I also consider Tocqueville’s relationships with 
Mme. Swetchine and Mrs. Childe. All three of these women relate to an alternative vision of 
womanhood. I conclude this section by speculating as to why this type of womanhood, which 
was apparently deeply relevant to Tocqueville’s personal life and intellectual development, is 
not described in Democracy in America.  
 Before Tocqueville travelled to United States in 1831, he spent much of the preceding 
decade preoccupied by a love affair with a woman, Rosalie Mayle, who was not ‘well-born or 
rich’, and therefore wholly unsuitable from his parents’ perspective.270 They were introduced 
in Metz, but the young lovers were separated when Tocqueville’s family relocated to Amiens. 
In spite of the fact that Tocqueville and his friends seemed to know marriage was out of the 
question, he continued to court her. Tocqueville’s friend Kergolay acted as a ‘go-between’ for 
Tocqueville and Rosalie when he moved to Metz for his studies, but ultimately she married in 
1827. Tocqueville’s devotion continued for two years longer, but subsided when Kergolay 
graduated. We may speculate that his experience of profound, yet thwarted, devotion across 
class boundaries affected Tocqueville’s deep appreciation of the freely chosen marriages he 
encountered in the United States two years after his affair ended.271 
 Tocqueville’s observations of American women inspired his version of democratic 
womanhood, discussed in the next chapter, even though it did not precisely mirror the 
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realities of many women’s lives in Jacksonian American. This model womanhood did not 
neglect women in the public sphere or divorced and single women because Tocqueville was 
unobservant during his travels. At lease he aimed to be exacting in his efforts; he wrote to his 
father from America that he and Beaumont had become ‘examining machines’, and to his 
brother, he wrote that ‘our minds are constantly striving for the acquisition of useful 
knowledge’.272 In 1831, he and Beaumont were keenly aware of the beauty, charm, and 
morals of the women they encountered.273 They were certainly not blind to the position of 
women, focusing only on their study of American prisons and political institutions. 
Tocqueville, however, wrote to his brother Édouard that ‘since our arrival in America we 
have practiced the austerest virtue’.274 After insisting to his brother that ‘monks’ could not 
have behaved better than he and Beaumont had, less than a month later, he wrote to another 
friend that ‘our virtue is still intact’, but ‘we are beginning to stare at women’.275 
Tocqueville noticed the ‘good morals’ of ‘young people’ in America during his travels 
and recorded his impressions in his notebooks. 276 Marriage also made an immediate 
impression upon him; he wrote to a friend from New York, ‘[t]he marital bond is more sacred 
here than anywhere else in the world’.277 Beaumont was also struck by women’s chastity, 
commenting on women’s ‘very severe principles’ in a letter to his brother.278 In 1831, during 
their travels, Tocqueville mused as to the causes of such orderly sexual mores. In his 
notebooks, he commented on the ‘rational (not to say argumentative) education’ of American 
girls and considered how this contributed to chastity in America.279 He also related this 
chastity to ‘[s]igns of a very busy life’, and he mused that ‘good morals here are a 
consequence not so much of a severe principle as of the fact that young people find it 
impossible to think about love’.280 Beaumont made similar comments in a letter to his father 
from America that ‘the American people are a people marchand’, and he continued by 
remarking on the proper conduct of women.281 These observations foreshadowed 
Tocqueville’s assertion in Democracy in America that industriousness factored into regular 
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sexual mores, but, as the next chapter examines, he eventually considered chastity and orderly 
sexual mores to be a product of equality of conditions for reasons beyond American 
acquisitiveness and busyness. Even though he noted the ubiquity of ‘good morals’, his 
American notebooks indicate that he knew premarital and extramarital liaisons surely took 
place in America. 282 In the 1840 volume of Democracy in America, however, he presented 
premarital chastity and marital fidelity as features of democracies, rather than acknowledging, 
as his travel notes did, that these liaisons inevitably occur. 
During their travels, both friends wrote to their families about women in America. 
Beaumont noted to his brother that women were very diligent and hardworking, but never 
found doing the hard labour of ‘the work of the countryside’.283 Tocqueville wrote to his 
sister-in-law Émilie about marriage in America. He seemed far more dismayed in 1831 by the 
coldness of American marriage in his more honest musings to his sister-in-law than in his 
sober portrait of American marriage in 1840.284 Grimacing, Tocqueville informed Émilie that 
American wives are primarily occupied by ‘looking up to’ and admiring their husbands.285 A 
few months later he commented that American wives ‘confine themselves to their teapot and 
never leave their homes once they have uttered the famous yes’. He concluded that ‘one can 
almost certainly find perfect happiness here if one has no romantic imagination’. Though his 
later illustration in Democracy in America was hardly as sardonic, this comment reflects 
Tocqueville’s model of the democratic wife (explored in the following chapter), who 
experiences a dramatic shift and is cloistered after marriage and the famous ‘yes’. He said all 
that American women ‘excel’ in is how ‘to make tea’ and ‘raise one’s children’. 286 In 1831, 
he equated American wives with nuns, but not as religious exemplars, as bored recluses, 
living a life with ‘no balls and virtually no society’.287 Contrary to these pessimistic 
comments, however, Beaumont commented to his father in a letter from America that ‘there 
are only happy households’ in America and that he and Tocqueville, upon witnessing the 
domestic happiness so prevalent in the United States, could not help but conclude that if they 
were ever ‘victims of a political event in France’, they would settle in the United States with 
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their wives and children.288 Despite Tocqueville’s disappointment in the coldness of 
American women, he left with an impression of the impact of women in American society. 
He enjoyed a conversation with South Carolina representative Joel Poinsett while travelling 
from New Orleans to Washington, in which Poinsett explained that ‘I think the race of 
women is very remarkable in America. I find them much superior to our men’.289 In 1840, he 
reiterated this superiority. Both Beaumont and Tocqueville were certainly intrigued and 
preoccupied by American women during their travels.  
Tocqueville did not comment extensively on women until the 1840 volume of 
Democracy in America, but his interest in the position of women continued in the meantime, 
as evidenced by his discussion of poor women and families in his notes from his travels in 
England and his Memoir on Pauperism.290 In his 1835 travel notes on England, he recorded 
that he had been opposed initially to the law that prevented French courts from looking into 
‘the paternity of a child’, but he reconsidered his position because of his belief that women 
are the arbiters of social mores. He thought that if the identity of the father were not legally 
protected from investigation, women would be more inclined to resist seduction and sexual 
temptation, thereby, improving overall sexual conduct. 291 He wrote that men will always 
pursue women, so any law that is detrimental to women’s ability to resist men ‘must be 
avoided at all costs’.292 This theme emerged in his 1835 Voyages en Angleterre: ‘good morals 
in a people almost always depend on women and not on men’.293 The idea of women as 
makers of mores became integral to his presentation of womanhood in 1840.  
During his visit to England, Tocqueville also shared a conversation with Lord Radnor 
that was reflected later in the Memoir on Pauperism; Lord Radnor complained that women 
had little shame about having children out of wedlock because they could rely on the Poor 
Law, which created destructive incentives.294 Tocqueville’s interest in these topics of 
women’s poverty, seduction, and family continued into the 1840s, after the publication of the 
Second Volume of Democracy in America, when he wrote several reports on abandoned 
children in hopes of overturning an 1811 law that allowed women to abandon children at 
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hospitals anonymously. Once that law was overturned, he advocated for temporary welfare 
for impoverished women to be able to support their children.295 In 1844, he wrote a letter to 
an English correspondent, Sarah Reeve, highlighting yet again his firm belief that women 
make mores and morals. He wrote that the mother shapes ‘the moral and intellectual 
constitution of her son’, and that ‘it is almost always at his mother’s knee that that man 
becomes who he will be until his death’.296 
 Turning now to the 1850s, after two decades of marriage and long after his writings on 
marriage in Democracy in America, we can glimpse Tocqueville’s thoughts on marriage and 
family during the later years of his life. He had no children of his own, but he advised a 
friend’s children and his nephew on the topic of marriage and domestic happiness, 
demonstrating his lasting interest in the benefits of companionship and domestic peace. 
Tocqueville wrote his American friend Edward Vernon Childe in 1857, that his daughter 
Mary ought to ‘find a husband in America’.297 America would be better than France because 
she would be more likely to find husband who suited her and shared her mores. He warned: 
‘[i]t is rare that marriages turn out well then races are mixed and, above all, when different 
educations and religions are blended’.298 Though this contrasted Tocqueville’s personal 
experience of marrying an Englishwoman, it indicates that he thought the best marriages were 
founded upon shared sensibilities. His insistence on the importance of these commonalities 
reflects the loyal marriage he outlined in Democracy in America, where spouses share a 
‘similarity of tastes and ideas’ that keeps them together.299 Tocqueville also advised Mary’s 
brother, suggesting marriage to ameliorate Edward Lee Vernon’s ‘malaise’.300 According to 
Tocqueville, ‘the ties and obligations of marriage’ would circumscribe ‘the unlimited liberty’ 
that leads to existential angst.301 This paternal advice reflects the theme examined further in 
the next chapters: the role of domestic life as place of rest and relief. To his nephew, 
Tocqueville noted that the choice of spouse should not be taken lightly, lamenting that in 
France too often spouses only know each other after marriage.302 Tocqueville considered it 
difficult to achieve true friendship with one’s spouse, if she is chosen ‘more lightly than 
purchasing a pair of gloves’.303 These fatherly comments underline Tocqueville’s personal 
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commitment to wisely chosen and companionate marriages that provide ‘internal peace’ and 
orderliness.304  
By tracing Tocqueville’s on-going interest in the position of women, his initial 
comments on American women, and his personal valuing of domestic happiness, we can 
speculate that he maintained an interest in women, augmenting the plausibility of my 
argument that his 1840 considerations on women had theoretical significance. They were 
more than poor reporting that neglected certain areas, like women’s factory work, singlehood, 
and divorce. They were the result of considerable intellectual effort regarding a topic of 
lifelong interest. His 1840 comments were also more flattering than his initial observations, 
indicating that he hoped to illustrate an appealing form of womanhood and domestic life. 
Turning now to Tocqueville’s conception of the citoyenne, I examine three personal 
relationships that shaped his life. Welch has argued that we can gain insight into 
Tocqueville’s understanding of gender by reflecting on the similarities and dissimilarities 
between the personal feelings of Tocqueville on women and his published portrait of 
womanhood. We can certainly glean an alternative vision of womanhood from Tocqueville’s 
other writings, but I do not suggest, as Welch does, that this complicates his published 
democratic theory of gender or reveals ‘subtextual reservations and narrative inconsistencies’ 
that deepen our understanding of how ‘gender difference’ plays a role ‘in the world of liberal 
politics’.305 This thesis is primarily interested in understanding Tocqueville’s vision for a 
democratic domestic sphere in order to better understand his democratic theory of 
associationalism. Gender differences may have played a role in the unfolding of his own life 
as a liberal politician, but for the purposes of this thesis, this background analysis serves to 
demonstrate that Tocqueville put forward a particular form of womanhood that was separate 
from the version he experienced in his own life. Rather than valuing a sense of his alternative 
version of womanhood, I use this to better understand his vision of democratic womanhood. 
The benefit here is theoretical, not biographical: it highlights the fact that the private element 
of his democratic womanhood was crucial. This context highlights this feature as important, 
before this thesis then proceeds to investigate this model of private womanhood.  
Welch has argued that Tocqueville conceived of excellent women as having political 
reason and duties, a conception of the citoyenne. According to Welch, ‘Tocqueville uses the 
term citoyenne to express those qualities by which superior women rise above the confines of 
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the bon ménage, exercising independent political judgement’.306 Welch highlighted how this 
is different from the womanhood described in Democracy in America. She saw these as ‘two 
versions of women’s place in the exacting mise-en-scène of liberal democratic politics’.307 
Before concluding that the democratic woman was not a citoyenne, I analyse the brief 
mentions of women in Democracy in America (those not in the main womanhood chapters) in 
order to interrogate the private element of democratic womanhood.  
While Tocqueville believed American women superior to American men, his 
democratic woman was not among the ‘superior women’ of great intellect or social 
prominence that Welch described. As the next chapter shows, Tocqueville offered no 
suggestions that his ideal cloistered and private democratic woman directly influenced the 
public life of her husband or exercised ‘independent political judgement’. Though he thought 
women, in general, could be exceptionally virtuous in democracies, he offered an aspirational 
model, but it was a model for all democrats, not just the exceptionally talented and intellectual 
politician’s wife. 
Some features he admired in the women of his personal life are reflected in his 
conception of the democratic woman. These women, however, were exceptional both 
intellectually and socially, which means that much of what he privately admired in women 
was not applicable to his model democratic womanhood. Disparities between Tocqueville’s 
private considerations and his model of democratic womanhood further indicate that his 
comments on women comprised an ideal type, but this was an ideal that he hoped most 
women in the new, increasingly levelled society could achieve.  
I feature in particular Tocqueville’s wife Marie, his friend and advisor Madame 
Swetchine, and his American friend Mrs. Childe. Welch has examined his relationships with 
Marie and Madame Swetchine. I extend her analysis by integrating insights from his 
American correspondences, in particular highlighting his deep admiration for Mrs. Childe. In 
2009, Welch in fact called for this additional relationship to be investigated in future 
scholarship. 308 
Tocqueville diverged from his portrait of womanhood in Democracy in America by 
investing his close female companions with a more meaningful role as advisors and by 
approving of their more public habits of conducting business or providing salon hospitality. 
As Chapter Three of this thesis explores, Tocqueville’s democratic woman is a spiritual 
                                                
306 Ibid., 33. 
307 Ibid., 37–38. 
308 See note 90: Ibid., 45–46. 
   
 
71 
advisor within the home, but he offered no hint that her counsel has a direct bearing on her 
husband’s public life, political or commercial. His model also never highlights the democratic 
wife as a hostess, though she attends to ‘domestic interests and duties’.309  
Welch highlighted how his comparisons of his wife to the wives of other public 
figures offer a sense of what is expected of the citoyenne. He shared with his wife Marie his 
delight at having an intelligent spouse with discerning political and practical wisdom. For 
example, in 1841, Tocqueville wrote his wife Marie outlining how Lamartine’s wife had 
given her husband irresponsible advice.310 He mused gratefully that she ‘would not have acted 
like that’.311 In another instance, Tocqueville wrote Marie in 1842 to describe a wife of a 
prominent general who supported him when his position in the government was insecure 
because he refused to conform to ‘the government line’.312 Tocqueville admired this woman’s 
‘belle parole’ and delighted in realising Marie would do the same.313 Another example of how 
Tocqueville conceived of the citoyenne lies in his disapprobation of his sister-in-law 
Alexandrine during the upheaval of 1848. Tocqueville wrote: ‘my sister-in-law lost her 
head’.314 He concluded that she was ‘the most honest woman and the worst citoyenne one 
could meet’.315 Tocqueville considered that her inability to maintain a cool head and calm 
judgement disqualified her from being a good citoyenne, no matter how decent a private 
woman she was. The women highlighted in this illustration were all wives of elite men, and 
the expectation to exhibit ‘independent political judgement’ was more incumbent on women 
in those positions.316 Tocqueville clearly believed that women were capable of political 
savoir-faire. Therefore, it was not his underestimation of women’s abilities that relegated 
them to the home in his model. Rather, his pressing anxiety over the problem of making 
women’s lives into men’s (explored further in subsequent chapters of this thesis) shaped his 
traditional conclusions.  
Tocqueville’s relationship with his wife exhibited his great respect for women’s 
political input and advice. Tocqueville shared his concerns about his own weaknesses as a 
politician and his thoughts on contemporary politics with his wife.317 He wrote to Marie: ‘it 
seems that every minute I need to speak to you, to see you, to hear your ideas and show you 
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mine. Your impressions, even on politics, are precious to me’.318 Marie also cultivated 
relationships with Tocqueville’s friends and American correspondents.319 Her relationships 
and correspondences with his contacts give the impression that Tocqueville openly discussed 
the careers of his friends, and Marie was involved in managing his correspondences, acting as 
an advisor. A letter from Tocqueville to his friend Theodore Sedgwick further confirms a 
sense of spousal partnership. Tocqueville wrote: ‘Madame de Tocqueville does not wish me 
to send this letter without telling you that she thanks you as much as I do for your advice 
[concerning railroad bonds] and that she is equally grateful for it’. 320 Elsewhere, 
Tocqueville’s correspondence again suggests Marie’s interest in family finances.321 His 
personal letters indicate his significant dependence on his wife for practical matters, from 
keeping up with correspondences to financial concerns. This differs from his democratic 
woman of Democracy in America, who does not ‘lead matters outside of the family, conduct 
business, or finally enter into the political sphere’.322 As the wife of a prominent political 
figure and aristocrat, Marie’s scope for influence was quite unlike Tocqueville’s model 
democratic wife.  
Tocqueville’s letters and personal reflections also indicate his belief in the possibility 
of profound companionship between spouses, which contrasts with the cool marriages 
featured in his democratic womanhood of Democracy in America. His wife was not French, 
aristocratic, rich, or even young; their friendship was the true basis for their marriage.323 
Though she was not ‘exactly pretty’, he valued her soul and spirit (esprit), and ‘the elevation 
of her soul and her character’ delighted him above all.324 Tocqueville worried that he was ‘un 
loup-garou’ who detested the wider world, preferred a simple life, and was fit only for 
‘distant journeys or the fireside’, but with Marie he discovered the relief of ‘inner 
happiness’.325  
His personal correspondences demonstrate his continued contentment with his choice 
to value friendship in his marriage. Tocqueville wrote his brother in 1839: ‘I believe I would 
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already be dead without the moral and physical care of Marie’.326 To his nephew in 1857, he 
wrote: ‘there is nothing so solid and genuinely sweet in the world as domestic happiness and 
intimacy with a woman who knows how to understand you’.327 He attested to this from his 
own experience, and concluded that only a father or a woman, ‘femme’, could provide for 
‘true and continuous sympathy’; all other friendships fall short.328 The theme continues in his 
letters to Marie. He wrote that he would be lost without her; she was his ‘consolation’, his 
‘support’.329 Marie encouraged him to reach for virtue: ‘I swear to you that I believe that my 
love for you makes me better’. According to Tocqueville, their love had allowed him to 
sample what is ‘noble’, ‘generous’, and ‘virtuous’. He wrote: 
I love that which is good more because of your love, more than anything else. 
Thinking of you, I sense my soul is elevated; I want to make you proud of me and to 
prove to you each day that you have not been mistaken in your choice. Finally, I never 
feel myself more disposed to God, more convinced of the reality of another life, than 
when I think of you.330 
 
Tocqueville believed his wife rooted him during dark times, directed him towards the pursuit 
of the good, and roused him to contemplation of God. His desire to make her proud improved 
him. In an 1848 letter, he wrote that she was his ‘only friend on earth’, and he qualified by 
saying ‘when I say my “only” friend [amie], I do not say enough’. He sought a word to 
encompass the ‘tenderness’, ‘devotion’, and ‘delicacy’ of an ‘amie’, a female friend, as well 
as, the ‘courage’, ‘firm reason’, and ‘good counsel’ of an ‘ami’, a male friend.331 
The joys of Tocqueville’s marriage are not congruent with the charmless, cold 
marriage he described in Democracy in America, and the profound friendship he and Marie 
shared was likely too rare for Tocqueville to hope for or suggest would be possible as a norm 
in democratic society. Additionally, Tocqueville was careful to state his democratic woman 
did not ‘conduct business’, while we have the example of Marie overseeing American stocks 
and investments.332 
The virtues he praised in Marie, manly and womanly, however, do accord with virtues 
of his model for democratic womanhood. Tocqueville’s accolades of his wife are similar to 
his discussion of the virtues of his democratic womanhood. In Democracy in America, 
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democratic woman is gentle and loyal as well as strong and rational, much like Marie. 
Democratic woman also disposes men to contemplate religion, as Marie elevated Tocqueville 
to contemplate God.333 Marie, like Tocqueville’s democratic woman, made use of her manly 
virtues to womanly ends, as a moraliser. Her role as an advisor deviates from the portrait of 
the democratic woman because Marie’s advisory role necessarily had more political 
implications for Tocqueville’s career, which is why he compared her to other wives of 
prominent public men. The status and position of her husband necessitated Marie’s 
‘independent political judgement’ in a way that Tocqueville endorsed, though it was not 
appropriate to a general ideal type of womanhood.334 
Tocqueville’s relationship with salonnière Madame Swetchine also provides insight 
into his thought concerning women, given she was his close spiritual counsellor. Madame 
Swetchine was a woman of profound faith, and she was prominent among conservative 
Catholics of her day.335 She inspired in Tocqueville both ‘respect and trust’, and they shared 
an intellectual friendship.336 Their correspondence ranged across weighty topics from 
‘religion, patriotism, and the formation of the citoyenne’ to the relationship between 
citizenship and Christianity.337 Tocqueville wrote Swetchine that her concerns occupy a 
special place in his mind that is unlike the places reserved for any other.338 Swetchine’s 
intellectual concerns became an important part of Tocqueville’s intellectual and spiritual 
development. He described having a ‘mixture of respect and affection’ for her.339 
His admiration of her, as with Marie, encouraged him to greater feats. Tocqueville 
wrote Swetchine in January 1856 that he wished to be worthy of her kindness and that her 
letter helped him in overcoming his deep discouragement and intellectual loneliness.340 
Feeling these words particularly applied to him, he quoted Genesis in elaborating his 
loneliness: ‘it is not good to be alone’.341 Welch suggests that this quotation ‘evokes the 
presence of Eve’ and indicates Tocqueville’s understanding of ‘the special role of women in 
relieving his permanent existential angst and political isolation’.342 Indeed, this part of 
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Genesis rooted prevailing and longstanding sentiments of gender complementarity and the 
feminine helper. The gendered theme continued, more explicitly, in another letter to 
Swetchine. He lamented that women possessing ‘a thousand private virtues’ fail to recognise 
their responsibility to instil pubic virtues in the men they influence.343 He grumbled that this 
was not the case during the Old Regime, which ‘in the midst of many vices, contained proud 
and manly virtues’.344 In order to demonstrate that it was women who ensured these manly 
virtues, Tocqueville continued by telling the story of a ‘a very holy woman’, his grandmother, 
who, after reminding her son of his private duties, expounded upon the importance of his 
public duties and his responsibility to his ‘homeland’, ‘state’, and ‘king’.345  
Tocqueville’s friendship with Madame Swetchine blossomed long after he completed 
Democracy in America, and therefore their relationship did not influence the conception of 
democratic womanhood he articulated therein. Their friendship and correspondence, however, 
reflect some themes of his democratic womanhood. Tocqueville understood their friendship 
in terms of gender complementarity, which was a major component shaping his earlier 
presentation of democratic womanhood. Additionally, his concern over similarity between the 
sexes in Europe, described in Democracy in America in 1840, is reflected later in his 
earnestness over French women neglecting their moral duties, described to Swetchine in 
1856. His concern for manliness in his letter to Swetchine relates to his earlier anxiety in 1840 
that similarity between men and women will make for unmanly men. At the same time, it is 
important to note Swetchine’s exceptional social and intellectual status. Her prominent salon 
attracted eminent public figures and thinkers.346 Her qualities of the citoyenne were bound up 
with both her exceptional intellectual prowess and her unique social position. Though she 
reflected aspects of Tocqueville’s model womanhood, she was not an example of his 
democratic woman.  
Lastly, Tocqueville admired Mrs. Childe, the wife of his friend Edward Vernon Childe. 
Tocqueville asked Edward Vernon Childe to ‘please remember’ him ‘very fondly’ to his wife 
when she was alive, and he grieved her death profoundly.347 His laments after her death 
indicate the depth of his esteem for her kindness and intellect. To her son, he wrote: ‘[y]our 
mother honored me with a special friendship; I shall never forget her and shall always recall 
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her for the rest of my life with affection and respect’.348 Tocqueville shared with Edward Lee 
his approbation of Childe’s tenderness and ‘motherly tone’.349 Reflecting his admiration for 
his own wife, Tocqueville’s panegyric for Childe demonstrates the attributes and features that 
he valued in women. After noting how ‘[t]he world’ was familiar with ‘the sparkling and 
agreeable qualities’ of Childe, Tocqueville wrote to Edward Lee of her more hidden traits, 
which were known only by her friends: ‘I often admired the vigor and clarity of her mind, the 
soundness of her judgement; nobody gave better advice than your mother… I asked her for 
her opinion on the most serious and confidential matters and I always benefitted from it’.350 
In a later letter to Edward Lee, Tocqueville again raised Mrs. Childe’s caring 
devotedness for her son.351 Again, six months later, Tocqueville wrote Edward Lee still 
racked with sorrow.352 Once again, he shared a summary of her outward ‘witty and likeable’ 
features and her deeper qualities her ‘very few’ intimates witnessed, such as ‘what was 
serious, noble, and right in her heart, what was sound and singularly powerful in her mind’.353 
He went on to praise her salon, which ‘formed a center that was extremely conducive to the 
kind of life that you wanted to live’.354 Tocqueville apparently had a deep friendship with Mrs. 
Childe. His letters demonstrate that he admired her virtues: her nurturing motherly care and 
her hospitality that drew ‘distinguished people’ to her.355  
Most seriously, he valued her reason and her judgement. Tocqueville mourned the loss 
of the ‘many conversations’ with her that would have benefitted his recent writings: ‘How 
much I would have wanted to have her opinion and to profit from the sound judgement that 
she had on all the works of the mind!’.356 The esteem Tocqueville had for Mrs. Childe 
mirrored that which he had for his wife and his counsellor Madame Swetchine.357 Again, 
while Tocqueville’s admiration of her gentleness and her reason reflected his hopes for 
democratic womanhood, his reliance on her as a counsellor and his enjoyment of her salon, 
again, suggest a relationship beyond ordinary companionship between men and women. Her 
position as the hostess of a salon and her engagement with Tocqueville’s career gave her role 
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a scope and a relevance to the public sphere that is not apparent in Tocqueville’s vision of 
democratic womanhood.  
 Tocqueville’s personal correspondences reveal some themes that are reflected in his 
model of democratic womanhood. First, Tocqueville valued reason in women; secondly, he 
valued women who rooted and encouraged him; and lastly, he valued gender 
complementarity. His personal considerations, however, also indicate a gap between his 
private thoughts and his published theory concerning gender. Even though he consistently 
valued women’s reason, a heartening domestic life, and gender complementarity, from 
personal reflections to published philosophy, his version of womanhood in 1840 prised 
domesticity among wives. Tocqueville’s personal meditations evoke a sense of the citoyenne 
and the value of deep intellectual companionship between men and women. These elements 
flirt with the public sphere in a way that Tocqueville’s democratic woman did not. These 
women of Tocqueville’s personal life are unlike his model democratic woman, underscoring 
further the strictly domestic nature of his democratic womanhood. 
Perhaps, suggesting the democratic woman could be like the excellent (and more 
public) women in his own life put too much at risk for his democratic theory. The privacy of 
the domestic sphere and the wife therein was an essential component of his thought on gender 
roles. Tocqueville’s understanding of women’s capacity to express themselves as citoyennes 
may have been inappropriate within his chapters in Democracy in America, which insist upon 
a private womanhood.  
Curiously, in the 1835 volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville noted how 
Americans are always preoccupied by ‘political concerns’, thinking it ‘the greatest business’ 
and ‘the only pleasure’.358 He reported that ‘women themselves’ attend ‘public assemblies’ 
and ‘political speeches’ to ‘relax from household cares’.359 This observation does not reappear 
in Tocqueville’s 1840 chapters on women. Suggestions of public engagements and even 
leisure for women are absent from Tocqueville’s chapters on womanhood in the second 
volume. Elsewhere, in the second volume, there is only one mention of women attending a 
public event; he observed that ‘families, old people, women and children cross difficult places 
and go through uninhabited woods’ to attend spiritualist revivals.360 His description of 
womanhood itself offers no hint at public life, and the only instance of women attending 
public events in the second volume pertains to religious, not political life.  
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As noted in the introduction of this thesis, an important shift occurred between the two 
volumes. This is helpful in understanding Tocqueville’s normative motivations behind his 
articulation of womanhood. While mention of women’s involvement in political ‘clubs’ in the 
first volume was not an elaborate discussion, no references to these activities were made in 
the second volume.361 One plausible explanation is that details of women’s recreation would 
draw attention away from his assertion that democratic womanhood ought to be private. 
Activities involving politics and elite hospitality, like the activities of his wife and salonnière 
friends, were left out. Subsequent chapters of this thesis indicate the necessity of the private to 
the maintenance of gender roles and the moral work of Tocqueville’s womanhood. Given the 
importance of privacy as well as his increasingly gloomy perspective on democracy, it is 
likely that setting aside women’s fondness for ‘political concerns’ in the Volume Two was a 
purposeful intellectual development rather than an instance of forgetful reporting.  
The next chapters demonstrate that Tocqueville ensured that womanhood is private for 
the sake of the mores that kept society free.362 The sequestered nature of womanhood is 
contrary, however, to the inherent impulses of democracy. She does not seek a free and public 
life, even though all Americans (even women) are endlessly interested in ‘political 
concerns’.363 The sacrifice of her liberty for the sake of husband and home, and for the 
ultimate sake of mores, allows Tocqueville’s democratic woman to retain the excellence of 
her sex, demonstrate moral exemplarity, and undertake moral work that democratic man is not 
suited to do. His conscious redirection of womanhood, into the private sphere, indicates his 
normative motivation.  
As subsequent chapters in this thesis show, this womanhood is in tension with the 
expectations of democracy, and, as this section has shown, the version of womanhood does 
not map onto Tocqueville’s much-valued personal experiences with women. These tensions 
suggest that he forged his ideal womanhood for a theoretical purpose. This purpose is political, 
but Tocqueville’s democratic woman was not truly a citoyenne. This womanhood was 
articulated as a general model, applicable to all or most women within a flourishing 
democracy. As studying his personal relationships indicates, this was not because he believed 
women incapable of intellectual, political insight, and it was certainly not because he had 
never witnessed features of a feminine citizenship. 364 Instead, Tocqueville’s concern that men 
                                                
361 Tocqueville, DA1, 397. 
362 For more on the necessity of the private, see: Mathie, ‘God’, 27–29. 
363 Tocqueville, DA1, 397. 
364 As noted, he developed his friendship with Madame Swetchine after Democracy in America was written, but 
he met Marie before his journey to the US and met Mrs. Childe during his travels.  
   
 
79 
and women may ‘mix’ in public life, in an attempt to make women’s lives more like men’s, 
caused him to intensify his theoretical commitment to the private nature of womanhood.  
By tracing biographical details of Tocqueville’s life, this section indicates that 
Tocqueville wanted to ‘get’, to understand, women in a democracy. He was continuously 
concerned with the status and habits of women and with themes like gender complementarity. 
This augments my reading that his discussion of women in the 1840 volume of Democracy in 
America was an especially well-considered commentary. As he wrote while revising those 
comments: ‘my mind is exhausted’.365  
Much like the previous context sections, this section invites questions about what 
Tocqueville was doing when he articulated a conception of a cloistered womanhood. If the 
ideal womanhood he posited for the coming democratic age, the future that he believed 
inevitable, did not capture the entire nature of his closest female companions, then what was it 
for? He chose these clear gender roles against evidence and examples from America and his 
personal life of women blurring the boundary between private woman and citoyenne. His 
presentation of womanhood was both not specifically American and not his personal 
preference. It was democratic. 
 
Conclusions from Contexts 
The first two sections of this chapter provided contextual illustrations of the two 
conversations to which Tocqueville contributed with his comments on women and family in 
Democracy in America— a philosophical conversation about women’s place in a changing 
society, and a body of observations of women’s place in nineteenth-century America. The 
final section has described Tocqueville’s continuing interest in women and his personal 
relationships. My argument that he formulated a domestic sphere that served his wider 
democratic theory will be primarily established by analysing his comments on womanhood 
and family within Democracy in America. The contexts explored in this chapter complement 
this.  
Textual analysis read against the background of these contexts demonstrates four key 
insights. First, Tocqueville used well-worn norms of separate spheres, adapted somewhat to 
make room for a free girlhood, in articulating his normative democratic ideal. Second, this 
ideal did not match the diversity of real experiences of women in nineteenth-century America, 
even if it did happen to overlap with the lofty aspirations of American didactic literature. 
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Third, in spite of this mismatch, given his interest in understanding women, marriage, and 
domestic happiness during his travels and throughout the rest of his life, we cannot conclude 
that his neglect of key aspects of womanhood in Jacksonian America amounted to a lack of 
curiosity. Fourth, examining his relationships with elite women underscores the value he 
placed on the private, domestic component of his model womanhood. These contexts 
reinforce the plausibility of my argument that Tocqueville’s constructed normative 
democratic models when discussing womanhood and family life in Democracy in America. 
These models are instances of his seeing ‘more than America’ and delivering ‘an image of 
democracy itself’.366   
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Chapter 3. Tocqueville’s Model of Democratic Womanhood  
Introducing Tocqueville’s Models 
The previous chapter presented and analysed the contexts that support the argument that 
Tocqueville’s discussion of American women and family are democratic models. This chapter 
and the next chapter present and analyse these models. As noted in the previous chapter, 
Tocqueville ‘sought’ in America ‘an image of democracy itself’.1 His project aimed at 
delivering the best version of a social life suited to the success of free democracies. He 
reminded readers ‘that the author who wants to make himself understood is obliged to push 
each of his ideas to all of their theoretical consequences, and often to the limits of what is 
false and impractical’.2 Alerting his readers to his own normative motivations, he warned that 
not all aspects of Democracy in America should be read as factual reporting. His domestic 
sphere is based on ‘models’ because they represent what he desired for democracy, yet his 
commentary on American women and family life has not previously been conceptualised this 
way.3  
Following Montesquieu and the travelogue norms of the day, Tocqueville thought that 
to understand a nation one had to examine the condition of its women.4 At the same time, he 
was motivated to present an ‘American’ womanhood that could serve as an example of a 
well-functioning democratic womanhood, a womanhood transformed by democracy yet 
suited to attend to democracy’s defects. Likewise, family life also served a function within his 
theory. The interesting question about ‘American’, that is democratic, womanhood and family 
life is not how accurate a report it was, but rather why Tocqueville modelled his democratic 
domestic sphere in this way. What did these model look like? What features mattered to him? 
The following two chapters answer these questions by presenting Tocqueville’s models of 
democratic womanhood and family life, followed by his hopes for a democratic domestic 
sphere informed by these models. I show that democracy, nature, and authority were all 
essential elements shaping each model. I first present these models and analyse the interplay 
of democracy, nature, and authority, before then addressing the following questions: How is 
womanhood and family life representative of his logic of the democratic social state? If his 
domestic sphere is a largely normative construction, what theoretical function does it serve? 
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Chapters Five and Six answer these questions by examining the impact of democracy on 
womanhood and family and the impact of womanhood and family on democratic society.  
Pierre Manent discusses how Tocqueville made use of ‘what we would today call two 
broad “anthropological types”’ in ‘aristocratic man and democratic man’, each produced by 
their respective social states.5 Manent explains that ‘[t]he former sets himself lofty goals; his 
soul orients itself toward what is “great”; his is moved by the idea of “grandeur” and 
“superiority.” The latter turns his back on grandeur and rejects the very idea of superiority; he 
aspires to equality because his basic emotion is the “feeling of human similarity”’.6 
Aristocratic and democratic woman are also shaped by their social state; however, in spite of 
the universal levelling tendency of democracy, Tocqueville’s democratic woman curiously 
did not neglect grandeur. As this chapter and Chapter Five demonstrate, democratic woman 
did not disdain superiority. She did not aspire recklessly to universal equality, though she 
enjoyed a moderate form of equality with men and (we may assume) she sought similarity 
with fellow women.  
I argue that Tocqueville’s discussion of women in democracies suggests an ideal type, 
rather than strictly an ‘anthropological type’. The family life that Tocqueville presented is 
also aspirational, though some features of the family seem less incongruous with his 
expectations of equality of conditions than those of womanhood, as the next chapters explore. 
Together, womanhood and family give shape to a democratic domestic sphere that is unlikely 
in the face of the unfolding of equality of conditions, and it is ‘artificial’, like all of 
Tocqueville’s moderating forces.7 These models of womanhood and family provide for order, 
which Tocqueville deemed advantageous within the domestic sphere for the sake of the public 
sphere. 
I show that Tocqueville’s models of democratic womanhood and democratic family 
life feature attentiveness to nature, deference to authority, and, of course, democratisation of 
social status. Tocqueville’s models are shaped by democracy. They are also shaped for 
democracy. They are formulated to resist the inherently negative drawbacks of democracy, 
and they are positioned to moderate these drawbacks. In so doing, Tocqueville’s orderly 
domestic sphere bolsters a moderated and free democracy.  
In this chapter, democratic womanhood is examined. Tocqueville’s considerations on 
family life are examined in the next chapter, which concludes with a description of the 
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domestic sphere and how it relates to wider political society. This chapter and the next explain 
his models primarily using the account in chapters eight through thirteen of the second 
volume of Democracy in America, with some additional references to other chapters.8 I 
conclude that, for Tocqueville, the well-ordered democratic domestic sphere is one that 
attends to authority, nature, and democracy, and the orderly domestic sphere supports political 
life within democracies, by rooting restlessness and generating mores.   
As noted in Chapter One, scholarship concerning the balance of nature and custom in 
Tocqueville’s formation of gender roles is divided, and in some instances, interpretations do 
not capture Tocqueville’s original meaning. Some conservative scholars emphasise 
Tocqueville’s use of nature his discussion of gender roles.9 However, other scholarship 
misunderstands Tocqueville’s balancing of nature and convention.10 By showing that 
Tocqueville balanced nature, authority, and democracy in modelling an ideal womanhood, 
this chapter intervenes in this discussion to address the interpretations that undervalue the 
significance of nature in his portrayal of womanhood.  
In this chapter, I begin by examining democratic girlhood, which features a 
democratic education that cultivates the individual reason and self-reliant independence 
expected of all members of democratic society. The chapter then turns to wifehood, the core 
of democratic womanhood, exploring the mediocrity and fidelity of democratic marriage, and 
the importance of the wife’s free choice of her ‘cloistered’ dedication to the home. I explain 
how the democratic woman emerges as a moral exemplar in his description of the woman’s 
transformation from an independent girl to a dutiful wife, a process that draws upon the 
boldness of spirit she cultivated in childhood. The following sections clarify his account of 
how democracy affects sexual morality and equality of the sexes, and in turn, I suggest how 
these standards of sexual morality and equality shape his democratic womanhood. The sexual 
morality of democracies delivers chaste and faithful women, while his version of equality of 
the sexes avoids making men and women similar by assigning them gender roles based on 
separates spheres. The chapter then turns to a discussion of how nature, in particular, as well 
as custom informs these gender roles, in order to intervene in the scholarly debate concerning 
nature and gender roles in Tocqueville. After making my case for the significant role of nature 
in his conception of womanhood, I elucidate how his democratic woman, who is naturally 
different from men and naturally domestic, can also express ‘manly’ qualities. I conclude the 
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discussion of the key chapters in Democracy in America by explaining how this democratic 
woman is both held in high-esteem and subordinate to the authority of her husband. I discuss 




In Democracy in America, Tocqueville began his discussion of ‘the condition of women’ and 
‘their habits and their opinions’ matter by framing it in terms of his overall considerations on 
democracy.12 Tocqueville contended that ‘[t]here have never been free societies without 
morals, and … it is the woman who molds the morals’.13 I argue that women and family, and 
thereby the domestic sphere, are at the forefront of Tocqueville’s thought on mores and the 
moderating forces that keep democracies free and their people virtuous.14 His assertion that 
women make the mores is the cornerstone of his model of womanhood. For Tocqueville, 
mores were essential to the maintenance of liberty in democracies. He was motivated to keep 
democracies free, so understanding womanhood in democracies was of ‘great political 
interest’.15 This chapter articulates Tocqueville’s democratic womanhood and begins to 
suggest that a traditional womanhood was threatened by the logic of democracy itself.16 He 
modelled a form of womanhood that was resilient and rare amid the ‘defects of democracy’.17    
To describe this womanhood, he began his key chapter in Volume Two with the 
childhood of the democratic girl. Protestant attitudes and equality of conditions together 
meant the American girl ‘quickly’ becomes autonomous, and before puberty, she already 
‘thinks’, ‘speaks’, and ‘acts’ according to her own will.18 The role of Protestantism here 
relates to a specifically American girlhood, but the logic of equality of conditions would have 
been relevant to all nations turning towards democracy, and we can therefore understand the 
American girls’ liberty and independence as features of democratic girlhood.  
As noted in the previous chapter, Tocqueville commented on the ‘rational’ and 
‘argumentative’ aspects of the ‘education’ of American girls during his travels and he 
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wondered how this education contributed to chastity in America.19 By the time of the second 
volume of Democracy in America, he appeared to relate the education of the young girl to the 
nature of democracy itself. Democracy itself, not simply American parents, encourages 
individual reason.20 The girl raised according to democratic norms boldly faces ‘the great 
world scene’, with its ‘vices and perils’. With clear-sighted and courageous judgment, she 
evaluates the world confidently. Tocqueville noted that this contrasts the old-fashioned, 
sheltered education of the naïve European girl, who is unprepared for the hazards of 
democratic life.21 He praised the Americans, and in so doing, he suggested they had 
discovered a form of girlhood appropriate to the democratic social state in which ‘individual 
independence’ is prevalent, ‘youth precocious, tastes badly restrained, custom changeable, 
public opinion often uncertain or powerless, paternal authority weak and marital power in 
question’.22  
In such a turbulent environment, the preservation of a girl’s chastity depends more on 
‘the free effort of her will than on weakened or destroyed barriers’.23 Democrats can no longer 
rely on the durability of customs and authority; they must rely on the individual. Though he 
referred to Protestant norms, Tocqueville acknowledged that custom is variable in 
democracies, and therefore individual reason is paramount. This is an additional reason why 
his vision of girlhood can be seen as democratic, not only American. Accordingly, 
Tocqueville’s democratic girlhood is defined by reason and strength, and the American 
democratic girl is better equipped ‘to defend her virtue’ than the unwitting European girl.24 It 
seems that he thought the Europeans had not yet formulated a girlhood suited to democracy.  
Tocqueville noted that, though religious morality also plays a role in how Americans 
protect the virtue of the young girl, reason is primary; ‘[t]hey first made incredible efforts to 
get individual independence to regulate itself, and it is only after arriving at the farthest limits 
of human strength, that they finally called religion to their help’.25 Girls are not exempt from 
what he termed the ‘philosophical method’ of the Americans—that truly democratic attitude 
to decide matters and to reason for oneself.26 In his chapter on the ‘philosophical method’ of 
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the Americans, Tocqueville contended that the democratic social state naturally disconnects 
the individual from ties of received authority or inherited wisdom. The individual intuitively 
seeks his own answers and trusts only his own authority.27 The chapter on the philosophical 
method puts readers in mind of male citizens of democracies, but it is clear from his 
discussion of girlhood that he thought no member of a democracy escapes the effects of 
equality of conditions on their modes of reasoning.28 Cultivating the same free judgment in 
their daughters as their sons, Americans both accommodated a democratic impulse and 
encouraged a skill necessary for democratic life.29  
Tocqueville admired the wisdom of the Americans to equip their daughters with skills 
that protect their chastity successfully. His ideal democratic girlhood included the 
preservation of sexual morality because sexual morality related to order and stability within a 
political society. For example, he discussed sexual ‘disorderliness’ in relation to the post-
revolutionary tumult in France.30 Also, in the first volume, he lamented that the ‘disorders of 
society’ in Europe were bound up with the ‘tumultuous passions’ and disorderliness of the 
European private life.31 Tocqueville noted that chaste habits complemented industry and 
commerce.32 For him, an orderly domestic sphere is one that is not plagued by deceitful 
affairs and sexual indiscretions. This orderly home and how it benefits the public sphere is 
discussed in the section on the domestic sphere in the following chapter. Because he deemed 
sexual morality relevant to a peaceful home and, ultimately, a flourishing political society, he 
was sure to attend to chastity in his considerations on girlhood. The democratic girl was 
rational, bold, and chaste. 
 
Democratic Wifehood 
Tocqueville acknowledged that raising girls in this way presented some shortcomings. 
Because democratic life demands that girls are raised to cultivate their ‘judgment’, the realm 
of ‘imagination’ suffers, and women are ‘honest and cold’ instead of ‘tender’ and ‘amiable’. 
This means ‘private life often has fewer charms’ but ‘society is more tranquil and better 
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ordered’. He admitted an unpleasantness that must be accepted along with democracy. These 
‘secondary evils’ are tolerated for the sake of the common good. 33 
 Girls raised in this way made marriage charmless and mediocre. Tocqueville’s idea of 
marriage within democracies, though spouses are suited as companions, is less suggestive of 
natural warmth than his description of the bonds of family life.34 Marriage is faithful, while 
family is tender. Possibly, while gender roles are natural, the burden of marriage, which he 
thought required ‘vigor of will’ came less naturally to women than the love between 
siblings.35 Perhaps, even though spouses are brought together by ‘similarity of tastes’, gender 
roles prevent them from being truly ‘sembable in one another’s eyes’.36 At the same time, 
gender roles prevent competition. Thus, steadiness is valued over ‘violent and capricious’ 
passions. Democrats, Tocqueville hoped, aspire to ‘the kind of profound, regular and peaceful 
affection that makes the charm and the security of life’.37 In matters of sex, love, and marriage, 
charm is found in orderliness.  
 Some scholars have misinterpreted Tocqueville’s description of the charmless 
democratic marriage. Koritansky contends that the girl brings fewer charms to married life 
because she ‘is steeling herself against the prospect of life-long boredom’.38 Indeed, she may 
become bored, but the education that makes her charmless prepared her primarily for an 
orderly domestic sphere. It may also be boring, but her education equips her for order, not 
boredom. Elsewhere, Vetter mistakenly attributes the lack of warmth in the democratic 
marriage to the inevitable ‘erosion’ of all compassionate ‘ties’ in democracies.39 In fact, the 
breakdown of the ‘relations between male American citizens’, to which she compares 
marriage, is largely related to a selfish competitive spirit, and Tocqueville explicitly removed 
the wife from the competitive arena by placing her strictly within the home.40  
The free democratic girl becomes the cloistered democratic wife. In a fragment 
accompanying the chapters on women, Tocqueville noted his admiration of how the young 
girl holds her own discussing ‘literature, politics, clothes, morals, love, religion, the fine arts’, 
but his ideal democratic woman does not become a writer, activist, seamstress, philosopher, 
or artist.41 Tocqueville discussed the adult American woman as a wife only, indicating that his 
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democratic womanhood is principally associated with fulfilling wifely and motherly duties. If 
the adult woman in democracies is apparently synonymous with ‘wife’, it seems that, for 
Tocqueville, democracy demands a womanhood that is defined by wifehood. This suggests 
that democracy does not just need women; it needs wives.  
The democratic wife ‘lives in the house of her husband as in a cloister’, forgoing the 
liberty of her youth to occupy herself with domestic responsibilities.42 Tocqueville noted that 
Puritan and commercial norms in America shape ‘public opinion’ and urged young women to 
marry.43 The intelligent young girl reasoned that she cannot ‘escape’ the shaming watch of 
‘public opinion’ or the ‘the customs of her contemporaries’.44 Here, Tocqueville’s admiration 
of the woman’s self-sacrifice in choosing marriage may seem to contradict his anxiety 
elsewhere over the power of majority opinion.45 However, he was intent upon tempering this 
observation about American culture by emphasising the free choice of the woman.46  
This element of freely chosen self-sacrifice born of a democratic liberty helps readers 
to understand Tocqueville’s democratic womanhood. This sacrifice is exemplary of a 
womanhood shaped by democracy and made for democracy. By allowing women to exercise 
liberty, the Americans cede something to the inherent impulses of the democratic social state; 
at the same time, by expecting her act of self-sacrifice, ‘public opinion’ helps establish the 
basis for conjugal and family life, which serve wider society. Womanhood is therefore free, 
by virtue of the democratic social state, and selfless, for the sake of the democratic social state.  
Tocqueville’s democratic woman must marry only after her capacity for reason is 
mature in order to avoid poor or precipitous decisions in choosing her spouse. Using her cool 
reason, ‘it is by herself and freely that she puts herself under the yoke’.47 Furthermore, 
Tocqueville stated that it is not only custom that compels women to alter their condition so 
dramatically from free girlhood to ‘a monastic life’.48 He wrote: ‘[o]ften they impose it on 
themselves solely by the effort of their will’.49 The woman’s reason, courage, and 
independent will, cultivated by her democratic upbringing, also contribute to women’s choice 
to marry. For Tocqueville, free choice defines democratic marriage and the democratic 
woman’s domestic stewardship.  
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As the previous chapter indicated, Tocqueville was initially dismayed by passionless 
marriages in America. The difference in tone between his 1831 musings and his published 
comments also demonstrates that, by the time of writing the second volume of Democracy in 
America, Tocqueville had reconciled himself to the ideal of the charmless democratic wife. 
Perhaps, she was the best wife democracy could offer, and this cool, calm wife was best 
suited to bettering democracy. In 1831, Tocqueville was trying to understand how American 
women were so ‘flirtatious’ until one day they abruptly ‘cease to be’.50 In the 1840 volume of 
Democracy in America, he presented his explanation. His discussion of how the free-spirited 
girl becomes the reliable wife parsed this transformation. Tocqueville’s views on marriage in 
democracies had matured. Maybe privately, he still dreaded this type of dull marriage, but he 
softened his attitude for the sake of suggesting in Democracy in America his vision of the 
right kind of womanhood for democracies. Or, he simply resigned himself to the logic of the 
democratic social condition, and he simply did not wish to make his version of a reliable 
democratic marriage seem too unappealing to his French audience.  
Nevertheless, in the second volume of Democracy in America, it seems that 
Tocqueville remained aware of the contradiction between the liberty of the young girl and the 
dutifulness of the adult wife. He argued that the spirit of the girl is found in the sturdy 
resilience of the wife: ‘the role has changed, the habits differ, the sprit is the same’.51 With the 
‘same vigour of will’ of her youth, the American wife braves the flux of democratic life; she 
weathers financial instability and the lonely wilderness of the frontier.52 The promise of the 
frontier was a uniquely American experience that the democratic wife faced. However, 
Tocqueville understood the interrelatedness of commercial and democratic society and that in 
democracies fortune is not protected by name or lordly status. Therefore, the changeability of 
fortunes was an inevitable challenge facing the democratic wife. The features of ‘resolute’ 
courage and ‘internal strength’ in the example of the American wife translate to democratic 
wifehood.53 The ‘vigour of will’ among women, produced by their democratic upbringing, is 
not unique to American experiences. Wifehood itself is reshaped by democracy. According to 
Tocqueville, wives ought to bear the tumult of democratic life resolutely and calmly.54  
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Setting aside the frivolities of her youth, Tocqueville’s democratic wife heroically 
submits to ‘the austere duties’ of ‘the conjugal home’.55 Her freely chosen, courageous self-
sacrifice reflects Tocqueville’s characterisation of women as having a special relationship 
with religion.56 Her choice is spiritually compelling. I argue that, for Tocqueville, these 
‘larger-than-life, selfless qualities’ were features of the democratic woman.57 She becomes a 
moral exemplar, courageously sacrificing her liberty and pleasures for the sake of ‘domestic 
felicity’ and the success of associations greater than herself.58 Tocqueville’s great worry for 
democracies was inward looking citizens, unable to commit to something outside themselves. 
In light of that concern, the moral exemplarity of the democratic woman is manifest. She is an 
example for all. Allen neatly summarises that her moral exemplarity made men ‘fit for self-
government. With their egos sculpted by their mothers and wives, American men were 
capable of sacrificing narrow interests for the broader ideals of the common good’, which did 
not come naturally to the democratic (male) soul.59 Though she does not discuss womanhood 
extensively and refers to ‘Americans’, Allen’s comment captures the power of the democratic 
woman. 
This admiring portrait of grand self-sacrifice contrasts with his earlier impressions of 
American wives and their dedication to domestic duties that I noted in Chapter Two. This 
sacrifice is noble whereas the tea-making, childrearing ‘nuns’ of his 1831 impressions were 
dull and far from extraordinary.60 In 1840, he presented an illustration of honourable, virtuous 
democratic wifehood. A self-sacrificing womanhood was essential to the wider theoretical 
goals of his work, and we can speculate that he concluded that the disparaging of American 
wives’ commitment to a domestic existence would have been counterproductive to the model 
womanhood he wished to set forth.  
From her position within the home, the woman makes the mores that benefit freedom 
in democratic society. By the sacrifice of her own liberty, she supports the preservation of 
liberty for society as a whole. Tocqueville was alert to the tension between his observation 
that democracy compels girls to be free and his hope to sustain traditional marriage, which he 
saw as important to the flourishing of democracy. He tried to overcome this by keeping the 
spirit of the girl alive in the wife. The young girl was largely shaped by democracy, receiving 
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a democratic education and honing independent reason, whereas the wife was made to protect 
democracy. Tocqueville’s ideal of the democratic wife appears less affected by democracy’s 
defects than men and was made to contribute to the flourishing of liberty in a democracy 
through her moral work in the domestic sphere.  
 
Sexual Morality and Fidelity 
Tocqueville also discussed how democracy shaped sexual morality in America. These norms 
of sexual morality inform his vision of democratic womanhood. Tocqueville considered the 
social state fundamental to the tempering or unleashing of sexual passions; the social state 
influences norms of sexual morality.61 He observed that American sexual mores were strict.62 
He attributed this partly to the cultural peculiarities of ‘country’, ‘race’, and ‘religion’, but he 
remained adamant that these ‘causes’ cannot fully account for such exceptional ‘regularity’ of 
sexual morals. For Tocqueville, equality of conditions ‘augments’ sexual morality by creating 
new dynamics between the sexes. This is in contrast to aristocracy, where ‘birth and fortune’ 
regularly separate lovers, making them too ‘different’ to come together in a socially 
acceptable fashion.63 Secretive and short-lived affairs result, dragging disorder into the private 
sphere. Tocqueville noted that these affairs, though forbidden, are somewhat tolerated 
because aristocracies are rife with ill-suited, property-motivated unions.64 Democracies are 
conducive to the opposite.  
Democracy fosters marriages that are entered freely. This in turn promotes chastity, 
conjugal fidelity, and family stability. No social ‘barriers’ separate the young woman from 
her suitors. Tocqueville’s shrewd democratic woman is well aware she can marry ‘the man 
she prefers’. She is therefore able to discern devotion from seduction, as she cannot be 
‘persuaded that someone loves her when he is perfectly free to marry her and does not do 
so’.65 According to Tocqueville, equality means that women can demand a legitimate 
commitment, so there is no need for affairs, and chastity is preserved before marriage.  
He explained further that, unlike the fairly tolerant attitude in aristocracies, public 
opinion in democracies judges harshly the sexual misconduct of a woman who is empowered 
to make a free and educated choice of a husband. Public opinion demands strict fidelity 
between spouses, who were aware of the nature of the ‘onerous contract’ and ‘enjoyed 
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complete liberty not to commit’. Tocqueville noted that the liberty preceding marriage, which 
makes public opinion so critical of infidelity, also makes for well-suited companions.66  
Freely chosen spouses are drawn to each other in democracies by ‘similarity of tastes and 
ideas’, which ‘holds and settles them next to one another’.67 He implied that loyalty comes 
more easily to companions than to strangers compelled to marry. For Tocqueville, marriages 
in democracies, which ‘facilitate’ choosing a truly compatible spouse, foster ‘the internal 
peace of families’ and ‘conjugal faith’.68 In turn, he hoped that despite the defects of 
democracies, the domestic sphere could remain orderly, and therefore, in turn, it could benefit 
the public sphere.69 
In discussing marriage, Tocqueville again emphasised democratic woman’s earlier 
education, which equips her well to make this critical choice of husband.70 Tocqueville’s ideal 
democratic woman is emboldened by the democratic social state. She directs sexual morality 
and she determines her choice of spouse.71 Tocqueville’s democratic woman makes the rules 
in matters of sex and marriage. It seems that the burden is upon women to make the mores 
that govern intimate life as well as the mores that maintain liberty in a democracy writ large. 
This is why Tocqueville was so adamant that the girls of democracies must be well educated. 
Rule-makers must be rational and wise.  
 In addition to freely chosen marriages promoting chaste and loyal sexual mores, the 
daily occupations of men and women in democracies promote the ‘regularity of morals’.72 
Tocqueville asserted that ‘men of democracies’ typically pursue ‘a political career’ or ‘a 
profession’, while ‘the mediocrity of fortunes obliges the woman’ to remain home ‘to preside’ 
carefully ‘over the details of domestic administration’.73 Here, it seems Tocqueville’s vision 
of the democratic couple was middling in terms of wealth. Congruent with the levelling 
Tocqueville believed inevitable in democracies, this section suggests that equality of 
conditions diminishes the number of grand ladies with several servants to administer 
household chores as well as the number of very poor wives required to work outside their 
homes.  
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Accordingly, the separate spheres of gender-based areas of work act as ‘natural 
barriers’ that curtail the advances of men and make self-control ‘easier’ for women.74 
Commercial, industrial, or political pursuits consume democratic man; he has neither ‘the 
leisure’ nor ‘the occasion’ to seduce women.75 Furthermore, democratic people are not 
‘dreamer[s]’.76 For Tocqueville, ‘men who live in democratic times contract more or less the 
intellectual habits of the industrial and commercial classes’, making them practical and 
disinclined to the idle fantasy that leads to affairs.77 Male mediocrity and, what Mathie terms 
the ‘sober materialism’ of men, that actually augments sexual morality.78 Men are busy with 
their mediocre pursuits, so women are less frequently pursued, thereby making it easier to 
preserve their chastity. As noted in the previous chapter, Tocqueville initially related 
industriousness to into regular sexual mores, but, by 1840, he tied chastity more directly to 
the inherent results of democracy, such as freely chosen marriages, rather than simply the 
business (and busyness) of specifically American life.  
While Tocqueville contended that democracy promotes orderly sexual morality among 
women and married couples, he included a caveat. Democracy cannot ‘succeed in making 
men chaste’.79 Democracy does, however, succeed in making the impulses of men ‘less 
dangerous’. Men do not have time to pursue impulsive affairs and they value the orderly 
home; this means democracies have chaste women, faithful wives, and some prostitutes.80 
This is because democracy eliminates the secretive affairs of aristocracy, but because men 
cannot be made chaste, prostitution is inevitable. His discussion appears to suggest that 
prostitution is far less worrisome than premarital and extramarital sex in terms of the integrity 
of the domestic sphere. Men’s ‘disorderliness’ is relegated to the brothel, and ‘clandestine 
unions’ do not disrupt domestic life.81 Most women remain chaste and loyal; and from that 
position of virtue, they are suited to the task of making mores.82 Clearly, Tocqueville 
expected more sexual restraint from women than from men.83  
By promoting free marriages and making citizens practical, the democratic social state 
fosters orderly sexual morality. Steady sexual mores, in turn, related to social stability and the 
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orderly homes that ultimately protect liberty. Women’s sexual restraint encourages virtue in 
men, who work towards marriages, not affairs. Self-restraint and virtue are essential to the 
mores that maintain liberty in a democracy. Sexual morality maintains a stable family life and 
domestic sphere, which produces the habits necessary for liberty.  
Tocqueville’s democratic sexual mores maintain, in practice, religious standards of 
sexual morality without either relying on religious dogma or referring explicitly to self-
interest, though he mentioned the practical spirit of democratic people.84 He showed that 
religion does not dictate the ‘good morals’ of sexual conduct in democratic society. 
Democracy does. Primarily, equality allows for the freely educated young women and the 
freely chosen marriages that produced ‘good morals’. The religious component in sexual 
morality is secondary to the impact of democracy.85 
 Referring to the relationship between sexual morality and the democratic social state, 
Tocqueville noted that his analysis did not ‘for now’ apply ‘in a general way to Europe’.86 
This may seem curious because, in this section on sexual morality, he stated that he largely 
set aside ‘country’, ‘race’, and ‘religion’ to focus on equality of conditions. He formulated a 
hopeful picture, that though democracy brings about a ‘tumultuous and fretful life’, it also 
brings about ‘good morals’.87 The fact that this analysis did not yet apply to Europe can be 
explained by the transition from aristocracy to democracy, and not the particularities of 
‘country’, ‘race’, and ‘religion’. He outlined the confusion of Revolutionary and post-
Revolutionary France to demonstrate that new democratic norms blended with the relics of 
aristocratic norms, which means the impact of democracy on sexual morality cannot yet be 
seen in France.88 Speaking of ‘the type of morality that is reasonable to be expected of 
democracy’, Tocqueville concluded that once the French have ‘gained all the effects of the 
democratic revolution’ and moved past ‘the tumult’, these phenomena  ‘will little by little 
become true of all [democratic nations]’.89 Tocqueville seemed to be articulating a sexual 
morality made by and for democracy. This implies that the norms of chastity and fidelity 
shaping Tocqueville’s presentation of womanhood are features of a democratic, not solely 
American, womanhood. In addition to courage and reason, cultivated by an independent 
youth, chastity and faithfulness are also features of Tocqueville’s model womanhood.  
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Equality of the Sexes and Gender Roles 
Equality of conditions also radically affects equality of the sexes, further shaping the 
character of Tocqueville’s democratic womanhood. His considerations on the equality 
between men and women troubled him. He was tentative about publishing his chapter on 
equality of the sexes and during his revisions of this chapter, he wrote: ‘I no longer 
understand anything; my mind is exhausted’.90 This suggests that Tocqueville was keenly 
aware of the tension between the logic of equality of conditions and the gender dynamic that 
he hoped for in democracies. This tension is examined further in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
In the second volume of Democracy in America, he stated that ‘more than ever’, on this 
topic—how democracy alters the ‘great inequality of man and woman’—he wished ‘to be 
well understood’. He signalled the subtlety of his analysis. Tocqueville held that inequality 
between the sexes ‘has seemed, until today, to have its eternal foundation in nature’, yet ‘there 
is no subject on which the coarse and disorderly imagination of our century has been given 
freer rein’.91 He was concerned with getting this right.  
 He stated that as ‘the son and the father, the servant and the master’, and ‘the inferior 
and the superior’ are brought ‘closer’ by democracy, so too is the status of the woman raised 
nearer to the man’s. This ‘social movement’, which refers to equality of conditions, ‘must 
more and more make [the woman] the equal of the man’.92 This movement, this logical 
unfolding of equality of conditions, acts like a force, drawing woman nearer to man, but she is 
akin to the son, servant, and inferior. Tocqueville was careful to make women distinct from 
men and, in marriage, answerable to male headship. Equality between the sexes, therefore, 
entails a levelling of social status and a softening of authority. Though he did not explain 
explicitly what moral and intellectual equality entails precisely, it seems that he thought men 
and women could share equal status in these matters relating to spirit and intellect without 
being entirely equal socially and politically. Relegating free young women to the private 
sphere is more fitting if inequality in this social and political sense remains. If she has no 
rights and duties in the public sphere as a citizen, she is focused on her rights and duties in the 
private sphere.  
 Tocqueville derided Europeans who muddle ‘the different attributes of the sexes’ and 
seek not only equality but also similarity between men and women. For him, similarity here 
means bestowing on men and women the same roles and rights and allowing them to mingle 
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‘in everything, work, pleasures, public affairs’. Tocqueville contended that no good could 
come of trying to make men and women more equal by making men and women’s lives more 
similar. This degrades both sexes: ‘from this crude mixture of the works of nature only weak 
men and dishonest women can ever emerge’.93 The responsibilities, rights, and even social 
spheres of each sex ought to be different. Men must be strong, and women must be virtuous. 
Tocqueville’s gender roles are clearly established in opposition to the moral mediocrity that 
he feared accompanies democracy. Not only does similarity between the sexes make both 
men and women mediocre, it also imperils the moral work of women in the domestic sphere. 
Similar ‘attributes’ do not demonstrate equality: they demonstrate disorder.  
 A form of equality realised through similarity sabotages women’s moral 
responsibilities within the home. If the woman has professional or public responsibilities and 
she mixes with men in public life, who is responsible for mores made at home? If the woman 
indulges in an insatiable love of equality that can only be fed by making her life more similar 
to a man’s, she will be increasingly drawn away from her moral duties.94 Tocqueville was 
anxious about this because this tendency endangers his ideal of womanhood, which he 
considered a moderating force against democratic defects.95 As discussed in the previous 
chapter, a man of his time, Tocqueville held the commonplace view that women have a nature 
peculiar to their sex. This nature was defined by a natural gentleness that lends itself to 
domestic and moralising talents. His fear was that equality of the sexes, expressed by 
similarity, reduces women to the level of men. This form of equality ‘would have the effect of 
“lowering” women to the same level of moral competency as men’.96 Tocqueville needed 
women, as women, to supply a key component of his democratic theory—mores. Religious 
and moralising capacities are essential to combatting the democratic defects he feared. For 
Tocqueville, man can be made morally mediocre by democracy. He hoped that, by preserving 
gender roles, women could remain virtuous.  
 As the previous chapter indicated, not all women of nineteenth-century America were 
wives confined to the private sphere, occupied only with domestic duties. The ‘American’ 
approach to equality of the sexes was actually Tocqueville’s approach to equality of the sexes. 
He deemed this arrangement optimal for democracy. His exemplary Americans follow ‘nature’ 
which ‘established such great variation between the physical and moral constitution of the 
man and that of the woman’. The Americans conclude that nature intends ‘to give a different 
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use to their different faculties’. For Tocqueville’s Americans, ‘progress’ requires each 
member of society to realise the ‘task’ set to him/her by nature ‘to the best possible degree’. 
They do not compel similarity between ‘dissimilar beings’.97 Rather by allocating different 
roles to men and women, Americans practise ‘the great principle of political economy that 
dominates industry today’.98  
Though Tocqueville relied heavily on ‘nature’ in his justification of gender roles, it 
seems that here he was inclined to appeal to the practical, utilitarian sensibility of democrats. 
By tying natural gender roles to the division of labour and modern industry, he attempted to 
put a longstanding norm of gendered separate spheres into a modern idiom. He relied on 
nature supplemented by useful custom, rather than dogma supplemented by religious custom. 
Americans ‘carefully divided the functions of the man and the woman, in order that the great 
work of society was better accomplished’.99 Avoiding morally degrading similarity, his 
democratic men and women find themselves not only more virtuous but also more useful.100 
Though he did not elaborate specifically how this usefulness was an expression of equality, he 
thought men and women could be understood as equal if they both contribute to ‘the great 
work of society’ and if those contributions are valued equally by society. 
 Tocqueville’s Americans maintain ‘clearly separated lines of action for the two sexes’, 
and they walk ‘with an equal step, but always along different paths’. His ideal democratic 
woman confines her responsibilities to family life; she does not ‘conduct business’ or ‘enter 
into the political sphere’. To balance this, Tocqueville noted that American women are never 
‘forced to give themselves’ to hard physical labour. He said ‘[t]here are no families so poor 
that’ women must take up men’s labour.101 Once again, in his illustration of American women, 
Tocqueville put his readers in mind of families of middling fortunes. Notably, in this 
discussion, he did not refer to slavery, which accounted for much of the hard labour in 
Jacksonian America. Here, it appears that he preferred to rest a purely domestic version of 
womanhood on natural gender roles, rather than the institution of slavery, which he 
condemned and which was especially relevant to American society, rather than the 
democratic social state.  
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Tocqueville’s democratic woman is ensconced in ‘the peaceful circle of domestic 
occupations’, but ‘there she rules’.102 As the domestic sphere is her own ‘separated line of 
action’, she is expert in her own domain. In a variation in the manuscript, Tocqueville 
suggested that no American ‘has ever imagined joining the sexes in the same careers or 
making them contribute in the same way to social well-being’. He approved of the fact that 
Americans have not made the mistake of Europeans who wish to make the lives of men and 
women increasingly similar. Tocqueville stated that he did not come across anyone who 
thought ‘that the final consequence of democratic institutions and principles was to make the 
woman independent of the man and to transform her into jurist, judge or warrior’.103 
Tocqueville’s urgent concern for the problem of similarity between the sexes is 
apparent in the way he praised Americans for avoiding sexual similarity. Here, he proffered a 
theory of equality of the sexes that he deemed best for democracy—separate yet equal. His 
own logic of equality of conditions and how it can lead to homogeneity and insatiable envy 
actually does suggest ‘that the final consequence’ of democratic life can be that all members 
of democratic society become increasingly similar.104 In the case of gender, however, he 
avoided this. His hope was that by establishing gender roles, women could remain above the 
fray of these democratic defects of mediocrity, homogeneity, and insatiable envy. He 
advocated for this using the ‘American’ example, which served as an illustrative tool in his 
normative prescriptions for an ideal democratic womanhood.   
 
Nature, Custom, and Gender Roles 
Tocqueville’s case for gender roles relied on nature and usefulness. Because democrats 
readily favour utility, readers may risk neglecting his none-too-exceptional belief, for his time, 
that men and women are distinct by nature.105 Many readings downplay the role of nature in 
his account. This section addresses this point of contention in the literature in order to clarify 
the role that nature played for Tocqueville in his account of womanhood. Usefulness, custom, 
and free choice are all elements of his gender roles, but he insisted that attention to nature is 
the starting point.  
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Winthrop notes that Tocqueville overlooked ‘natural differences’, which implies ‘that 
women’s designated place in the home is a matter of convention, not nature’.106 She is correct 
that he did not specifically name childbearing in identifying women’s difference, but he stated 
that ‘nature’ assigned ‘a great variation between’ men and women.107 She relies on his lack of 
specificity about these differences for her conclusion that convention was primary. I argue 
that we cannot make such a leap; it seems more likely that these differences (childbearing, 
physical strength) were obvious to Tocqueville and therefore encompassed in this ‘great 
variation’.108 
Allen thinks that choice ‘rather than nature’ was the main factor defining these gender 
roles.109 She draws this conclusion simply by emphasising Tocqueville’s discussion of choice. 
Choice was primary in becoming married, but, for Tocqueville, the separate spheres and 
gender roles of the married state were guided by nature. She argues that a woman’s choice to 
step into that gender role was ‘Tocqueville’s vindication’ of gender roles.110 Free choice 
certainly made the arrangement more palatable to the democratic sensibility, but it does not 
follow that her choice justifies the very existence of these roles.111 It merely perpetuates them. 
Tocqueville defended marriage as a free choice. He defended gendered ‘paths’ as natural.  
Janara concludes that Tocqueville did not think that this ‘gender, familial ideology’ 
was ‘a natural arrangement’, but rather it was useful ‘as a bulwark against flux’.112 Her 
justification for this conclusion is unclear. She has misread his statements about nature and 
gender roles. For Tocqueville, gender hierarchy does not replace the role played by 
aristocratic hierarchy.113 While each hierarchy may seem to serve similar stabilising functions 
in his thought, the former was natural and the latter was arbitrary. Indeed, gender roles work 
within Tocqueville’s theory ‘to counter’ the worst of democracy, but his hope to channel 
nature in this way does not negate his belief in natural gender roles and familial hierarchy.114  
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Hadari states that here ‘Tocqueville is simply resorting to the most powerful rhetorical 
trope available’— nature.115 Hadari continues that Tocqueville’s anxiety ‘to stem this new 
wave of equality, which he fears threatens the moral foundations of society’ leads him to 
venture ‘a translation from biological to moral spheres he knew to be slippery’. Hadari 
considers Tocqueville’s ‘discussion of sexual equality’ to have a ‘strong rhetorical flavour’.116 
This relates to Hadari’s conclusion that Tocqueville indulged in a ‘lapse into absolutism’ by 
citing ‘some “natural order” in human affairs, possibly impervious to changing mores’.117 
This is puzzling because if a thinker addresses a ‘natural order’, it would follow that ‘nature’ 
is fixed regardless of mores. Hadari says that Tocqueville’s awareness that this was a 
‘slippery’ matter is evident in Tocqueville’s statement that sexual inequality ‘has seemed, 
until today, to have its eternal foundation in nature’.118 Hadari interprets this to mean that 
‘[c]learly, then, the human understanding of the of these “eternal foundations” might be 
changing’.119 Hadari, however, has not caught Tocqueville in an intellectual inconsistency 
here; indeed, that was precisely what worried Tocqueville in contemplating the shifting 
culture concerning gender roles. Acknowledgement of the change in understanding, 
represented by misguided Europeans, does not mean he did not believe in nature or ‘some 
“natural order”’. Hadari links the matter of gender to ‘the powerful normative commitment 
informing Tocqueville’s analysis’, but he sees Tocqueville’s understanding of gender as ‘the 
most prominent case in point’ of his ‘more problematic lapse into absolutism’, appeals to 
nature.120  
Instead, I argue that what Hadari calls Tocqueville’s ‘normative commitment’ is 
revealed uniquely in the case of womanhood because of its important role within 
Tocqueville’s theory. Natural gender roles are ‘prominent’ not because they represent an 
intellectual ‘lapse’ or slipshod rhetorical appeal to shore up morality. Gender is prominent in 
Tocqueville because gender roles play an essential part in how mores maintain liberty in a 
democracy. Additionally, this understanding of gender shows that Tocqueville believed mores 
could accord with nature or transgress it.  
Nature is more than a rhetorical device. In the nineteenth century, a belief that men 
and women were different by nature was an ordinary assumption, as discussed in the previous 
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chapter. For Tocqueville, it was more than a ‘trope’. 121 He did indeed find the matter 
‘slippery’, but this was because of his concern that democracy would seek to overturn 
nature.122  Throughout Democracy in America, Tocqueville suggested that an excessive love 
of equality would seek urgent validation through material gratification or similarity with 
fellow members of society. That lust for similarity, as an expression of equality, could 
overturn natural gender differences by making men and women’s lives, careers, and domains 
similar or the same. 
 We can determine that this attention to nature was not unique to the case of gender 
roles by noting that Tocqueville’s attentiveness to human nature runs throughout Democracy 
in America. For example, as the next chapter demonstrates, he included nature in his 
understanding of the democratic family.123 He referred to the ‘commune’, as ‘a part of 
nature’.124 Elsewhere, he discussed the natural human capacity and longing for religion.125 Of 
manners, Tocqueville wrote: ‘[t]hey are at the same time natural and acquired’.126 In his 
articulation of democratic womanhood, the attentiveness to nature was by no means an 
aberration in his thinking. His theory accounts for what he considered natural to women— 
shouldering the burden of domestic duties. He theorised gender to reflect nature, useful habits, 
and the impact of democracy. This understanding of equality of the sexes, which determines 
the scope of democratic womanhood, is postulated to balance the new impulses of democracy 
with what he considered natural.  
Kahan is instructive on this matter. Writing of Tocqueville as moralist, not specifically 
about gender, he notes Tocqueville’s tendency to allow ‘society the final word’ in weighing 
up the interplay between ‘human nature’ and ‘the social state’.127 Because of this, Kahan 
admits that ‘references to human nature in Tocqueville may thus appear trivial, mere hand-
waving in the direction of common platitudes that moralists are supposed to acknowledge’.128 
But, he warns: 
Tocqueville’s approach to democracy and democratic grandeur was shaped in 
important ways by his views about human nature. Certain permanent elements in 
human nature are the very foundation of his theory of democracy. The social state 
must adapt to them, rather than the other way around. 
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Kahan goes on to discuss the ‘views about human nature’ that inform Tocqueville’s moral 
science, but here I argue that Tocqueville’s understanding of gender was one such ‘permanent 
element’ in his theory. Accordingly, he was concerned that the social state of democracy may 
not adapt to a fixed point of nature. He was not nodding or ‘hand-waving’ to tropes, as Hadari 
suggests, nor celebrating a useful convention, as Janara supposes. Rather, he lauded 
Americans for creating mores that are indeed useful and democratic, and that also adapt to, 
rather than overturn, nature. 
 
Democratic Woman and Manliness 
Curiously, Tocqueville’s democratic woman, though subject to gender roles that shape her 
daily occupations, is also ‘manly’. Tocqueville noted that American women possess ‘male 
reason’ and ‘manly energy’. Their education shapes them as courageous and rational. 
However, these virtuous women ‘conserve in general a very delicate appearance, and always 
remain women by manners, although they reveal themselves as men sometimes by mind and 
heart’.129 Tocqueville was careful to note that American women, while courageous like men, 
do not use their courage in the same way.130 Likewise, the ‘intelligence’ and ‘reason’ of 
spouses, though equally ‘certain’ and ‘clear’, are not always put to the same use.131  
This formulation makes Tocqueville’s democratic woman both the best of 
womanliness and the best of manliness, without making her life – that is, her duties, rights, 
and occupations – look like a man’s. 132 The virtues of courage and reason that define 
manliness for Tocqueville are not exclusive to virtuous men; they are invaluable traits of a 
virtuous woman made for the democratic age.133 Tocqueville was not worried about ‘manly 
women’ when he decried equality of the sexes realised through similarity. In fact, manly 
women were praised. Rather, he worried that similarity between men and women makes both 
less virtuous. Men become weak, losing the manly virtues of courage and strength, while 
women become ‘dishonest’, losing womanly virtues of purity and faithfulness. 134  
Addressing Tocqueville’s manly women, Mansfield comments: ‘[w]omen with the 
best of manliness, yet remain women, and democratic too!’.135 Mansfield calls this ‘a nice try’ 
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that does not ring true in our modern era.136 This is accurate; we twenty-first-century 
democrats find this unpalatable, but the summary is instructive: manly virtue helped combat 
‘democratic despotism’, and Tocqueville therefore invested both men and women with 
manliness.137 The preservation of liberty in a democracy is demanding, and all members of 
society must have active, manly habits.  
It is also worth considering that intellectual and moral wisdom within democracies is 
transmitted less and less by old aristocratic means. Implicitly, this places a burden on both 
individual reason and the moral work of the woman at home. Sources of guidance such as 
‘tradition’, ‘custom’, and ‘the rule of example’ permeate society less in a democracy.138 This 
may suggest that womanhood, if sustained, emerges as even more prominent in the formation 
of tastes, opinions, and ultimately habits. This is not only suggested by Tocqueville’s 
statement that ‘women make the mores’, but also by his discussion elsewhere of the decline in 
other modes of opinion formation. Tocqueville seems to have set women an enormous moral 
task, comparable only to the role of religion in democracy.139 It is unsurprising that 
Tocqueville’s womanhood is ‘manly’; her burden is not easy, and it requires manly and 
womanly traits. She is strong, resolute, courageous, and rational, while at the same time, she 
is religious, nurturing, delicate, and pure. She is remarkable. Morton notes that the ‘character 
attributed to women in democracies is even more significant when compared to the parallel 
decline of male character’, and he relates this to the decline in paternal authority.140 In a tome 
so concerned with the moral mediocrity instigated by the democratic condition, Tocqueville’s 
democratic woman proves to be morally extraordinary.  
   
Valuing and Subordinating Virtuous Women  
Tocqueville noted that these remarkably virtuous women were respected and held in high 
esteem. He discussed the profound concern of Americans for women’s honour by 
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highlighting that, though most criminal penalties were more lenient in America, rape was 
punishable by death.141 Marking the unique position of women in democracies, he stated: 
‘since the Americans imagine nothing more precious than the honor of the woman, or nothing 
so respectable as her independence, they consider that there is no punishment too severe for 
those who take them away from her against her will’.142  
In addition to strict legal provision protecting women in terms of their bodies, 
American men honoured women in terms of their spirits. They respected women’s reason and 
liberty, ‘thinking her mind is as capable as that of man of discovering the naked truth, and her 
heart firm enough to follow the truth’.143 American men did not shower women with 
‘flatteries’ as in Europe, but they respected women.144 Tocqueville’s form of free and rational 
womanhood was secured by a culture of honouring and respecting women. He suggested that 
by honouring such moral exemplars, democratic man is bettered himself. Kristol describes 
that ‘in respecting’ women, ‘American men are forced to respect themselves, whom they 
assume superior to women; they come to judge themselves, to a degree, by “womanly” 
standards of morality rather than simply by male standards of conquest and material well-
being’.145 
 While Tocqueville found the great respect American men have for women noteworthy, 
he also admired Americans because they did not make the mistake of toppling male headship 
within marriage and the family. In a formulation similar to his discussion of equality of the 
sexes, he stated that Americans have not ‘imagined that the consequence of democratic 
principles’ is to usurp male authority. Again, he set up his hope for democratic womanhood in 
opposition to his own logic of the excesses of the equality of conditions. He wrote that the 
Americans, ‘in the small society of husband and wife, as in the great political society’, have 
correctly found that ‘the goal of democracy is to regulate necessary powers and make them 
legitimate, and not to destroy all power’.146 For Tocqueville, a well-moderated democracy 
cedes the necessity of some forms of legitimate, rather than arbitrary, authority. In this case, 
nature (natural differences between men and women) provide legitimacy. A well-moderated 
democracy does not indulge in the impulse, generated by equality of conditions, to abolish 
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authority, even though authority is inherently injurious to the democratic sensibility that the 
individual ought to be the final authority.147  
Tocqueville’s democratic woman understands her surrender to this authority as 
achieving ‘grandeur’. She does not ‘noisily claim the rights of woman, while trampling her 
most holy duties under foot’.148 Tocqueville’s democratic woman does not seek to make her 
life similar to a man’s life because she recognises the responsibility of the work before her, 
which belongs to her and her alone. Tocqueville’s democratic woman knows that if she 
abandons her ‘holy duties’, men will not pick up the slack. Men will not step in to attend to 
the making of mores and the comforts of the domestic sphere. She knows that is not in men’s 
nature, but it is in hers. We see again that his vision for womanhood is formed in moderation, 
balancing the democratic tide with the necessity of authority. This means his form of 
womanhood is representative of moderate democracy as well as a moderating force in itself. 
 Tocqueville approved of the American arrangement of equality of the sexes and how it 
shapes womanhood. He stated: ‘the Americans, who have allowed the [<natural>] inferiority 
of the woman to continue to exist in society, have with all their power elevated her, in the 
intellectual and moral world, to the level of the man’.149 The word ‘natural’ is here in brackets 
to indicate a variation in the manuscript. Does his hesitation here reflect anxiety and 
confusion over the formulation of a theory of gender, or was he merely searching for the most 
eloquent articulation? Considering his emphasis on nature throughout Democracy in America 
and, in particular, in his articulation of womanhood, this ‘natural’ is important to 
interpretation. Perhaps, it did not appear in all versions because his message about nature had 
been established earlier in the chapter, or because he decided the inferiority of women was 
evident, without relying on nature. It is clear, however, that Tocqueville believed that women 
were inferior to men in some ‘natural’ ways, like the ‘son’, ‘servant’, and ‘inferior’, as noted 
above.150 Women’s distinctive nature, including her natural inferiority, had to be balanced 
with the influences of democracy. He concluded that, by balancing natural inferiority with 
intellectual and moral equality, Americans ‘have understood admirably the true notion of 
democratic progress’.151  
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Winthrop has interpreted this as an ‘ironic’ evaluation, revealing Tocqueville’s belief 
that democracy is limited and cannot ‘further moral and intellectual improvement’.152 
Winthrop is right to claim that Tocqueville’s considerations on womanhood as the ‘true 
notion of democratic progress’ related to ‘his prognosis for democracy as a whole’, but she is 
incorrect that this is a lamentation.153 He was not pointing to the ugly limitations of 
democracy here. Rather, he was indicating the best way to cope with democracy. Kessler 
concludes that this form of sexual equality stood out as a ‘true notion’ because it ‘protected 
the integrity of the family and gave women a unique opportunity to shape America’s character 
in ways that promoted freedom’.154 Indeed, this is why Tocqueville favoured it, but this is too 
specific to explain why this form of equality exemplified ‘the true notion of democratic 
progress’.155  
In fact, Tocqueville suggested with this comment that moderating forces within 
democracies, like womanhood, ought to balance nature, authority, and democracy. Capturing 
the best of these elements is the ‘true notion of democratic progress’ in general, not simply in 
gender roles. As Manent writes, ‘they [Americans] are prudent because they have respected 
nature’.156 Tocqueville considered this form of democratic womanhood to be the best 
conceivable womanhood for democracy. Womanhood could be shaped by, sustainable in the 
face of, and useful to democracy.  
 Tocqueville concluded his chapters on American women by stating: ‘if… you asked 
me to what I think the singular prosperity and growing strength of this people must be 
principally attributed, I would answer that it is to the superiority of their women’.157 An 
unpublished note to the chapter reveals that Tocqueville thought ‘the women seem to me very 
superior to the men in America’.158 These comments may seem to pertain to the peculiarity of 
American women, rather than Tocqueville’s model of an ideal democratic womanhood. The 
distinction, however, between the American and the democratic is blurred. Given 
Tocqueville’s preceding comments, women’s superiority to men in America is attributable to 
their natural womanly features and to those features bestowed by democratic conditions, such 
as democratic education and equal moral dignity. Given the exceptional virtue Tocqueville 
described in American women and hoped for in democratic woman, I argue that it follows 
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that he believed that successful democracies need women to possess superior virtue to men. 
Given the admiring picture of virtuous American women he painted (for the purpose of 
proposing the best democratic womanhood), it is hardly surprising he concluded that the 
‘superiority of their women’ is a principal cause for the flourishing of a society. 
 
Conclusion: Virtues of the Democratic Woman  
Tocqueville’s ideal woman, made by and for democracy, is the best of womanly and manly 
virtues. She is naturally religious. She makes the mores that keep democracy free. She is 
superior to democratic man. Though her girlhood is shaped by democracy, and her marriage 
made more equal, Tocqueville’s ideal democratic woman, however, emerges as impervious, 
for the most part, to the morally dulling effects of democracy. Woman is not made more 
mediocre by democracy. In fact, she is made more virtuous, as her democratic education 
allows her to avail herself of male virtues like courage and reason. This imperviousness to the 
logic of democracy is explored further in Chapter Five of this thesis. For Tocqueville, the 
success of the democratic experiment relies in large part on a womanhood forged in youthful 
liberty and defined by great virtue. Democracy, nature, and male authority all shape this 
model of free and virtuous womanhood to the end of moderating democracy and augmenting 
its flourishing.  
As the previous chapter of this thesis showed, Tocqueville’s vision of democratic 
womanhood was not comprised of a set of features he admired in women, gathered from 
personal experience in France and the United States. It was both less and more than this. He 
made something that could serve as a more universal example and protected the integrity of 
the domestic sphere, balancing the impact of democratisation with nature and authority. 
Adherence to nature was the surest route to a generalisable ideal.  
Perhaps it could be said that he was repeating a convenient, conservative perspective, 
even though it contradicted examples of women in Jacksonian America and in his own life, 
but this model of womanhood, while akin to a plethora of attitudes on gender roles, was not 
convenient. In light of how womanhood serves his associationalism and in light of how 
womanhood is in tension with his expectations of democracy, it is unlikely that this form of 
womanhood was a lazy rehashing of pre-existing norms. It is both too important to his project 
and too unusual in the context of democracy’s defects to be anything other than a well-
considered model. It follows that his insistence on the private, domestic existence of women 
was likely a conscious, rigorous choice. Tocqueville’s model of womanhood is his preference 
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for democracy. Using the well-worn language of separate spheres that was typical of the both 
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Chapter 4. Tocqueville’s Model of the Democratic Family and the 
Democratic Domestic Sphere 
Democratic Family and Domestic Sphere 
Having established Tocqueville’s model democratic womanhood, this chapter turns to his 
model democratic family. Overall, Tocqueville had fewer lofty aspirations for the family in 
the democratic age than womanhood, but he did hope that, in the face of individualism, the 
natural affection of families could sustain warm bonds between members, and thereby the 
order and unity of family life could benefit democratic society. The model of family life 
resembles the model of womanhood, indicating an underlying structure to Tocqueville’s 
thinking on both women and family. The same themes discussed in the previous chapter are 
apparent; democracy, nature, and authority shape Tocqueville’s model democratic family.  
Though the features of his version of womanhood are more morally extraordinary than 
his version of family, Tocqueville’s portrait of democratic family life is no less of a normative 
model. In his analysis of family life, Tocqueville expanded his examination of ‘aristocratic 
man and democratic man’ to the family unit, and he compared ‘two types of family’ as 
artefacts of each social condition.1 Matsumoto concludes that ‘Tocqueville has no polemical 
intention in contrasting the two concepts of the family with each other’ and that these 
‘concepts were value-free’. However, studying ‘two types of family as the products of two 
different kinds of social state’ does not mean his analysis was value free. 2 This chapter shows 
that the democratic family is more desirable than the aristocratic family and that the domestic 
sphere plays an important normative role in Tocqueville’s democratic theory. His democratic 
family is an ideal, not simply a description. Too much of Tocqueville’s hopes for democracy 
rest on the domestic sphere for the family to be value neutral in his thought.  
Tocqueville noted that this transformation in paternal authority was taking place 
among his contemporaries, and he used the ‘striking’ American example to discuss the fully 
democratised family.3 As with womanhood, this example had a normative purpose. In notes 
on the jacket of the manuscript for his chapter on family, Tocqueville wrote: ‘it was done by 
fits and starts, languidly and slowly. It demands to be reviewed all at once in order for the 
thought to circulate more easily’.4 This hints that this chapter was more than a summary of 
observations, but rather a considered meditation on preserving and making use of the family 
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in democratic society. He also jotted a reminder to ‘[r]eview the rubish carefully’.5 In the 
notes in the rubish, Tocqueville admitted ‘[t]he difficulty is that I do not know well what the 
intimate relationships of father and sons and of brothers among themselves are in America 
and that I can hardly speak except about France. I believe these relationships not hostile, but 
very cold in America’.6 Importantly, Tocqueville had observed family life in America to some 
extent, but he remained unsure of the actual details of intimate life. These notes indicate that 
he was using the ‘American’ example to express his own expectations of and hopes for 
democracy because, as this chapter shows, he actually painted a picture of a warm family life.  
This chapter begins by discussing Tocqueville’s thought on how the two types of 
social state, aristocracy and democracy, affect the family, and, in particular, how they affect 
authority within the family. His discussion of these family types reveals an understanding of a 
natural family, featuring natural paternal authority and natural bonds. Next, the natural family, 
the effect of democracy, and the place of moral and intellectual authority are discussed in 
conjunction. I demonstrate how the democratic family balances natural paternal authority with 
the democratic ‘philosophical method’, or the democratic way of reasoning moral and 
intellectual truths. I discuss natural authority using Tocqueville’s main discussion of family as 
well as other references to family authority throughout Democracy in America, such as in the 
introduction and the chapters on ‘the Government of the States’ and the ‘Principal Causes 
That Maintain the Democratic Republic’. Especially instructive, his chapter on the three races 
at the end of Volume One of Democracy in America is used, for the first time in this context, 
to improve our understanding of the relationship between authority and family in 
Tocqueville’s thought. Thus, this chapter also contributes to correcting a gap in the existing 
scholarship. Typically, scholarship has focussed on the chapter in the second volume of 
Democracy in America that is specifically ‘on family’. Instead of focussing solely on that 
chapter in the second volume of Democracy in America, as Matsumoto and others do, I 
include other references to the family, and I connect all of his comments on the family to his 
comments on the tranquillity of the domestic sphere.7 I examine the intersection of the themes 
of race and family in order to deepen our understanding of Tocqueville’s conception of family. 
By using Tocqueville’s comments on family in his chapter on ‘the three races’ in order to 
augment our understanding of how he thought about family, I contribute to existing 
scholarship on family and on race because, though much attention has been given to the topic 
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of race in Tocqueville’s thought, it has not yet been discussed in relation to the theme of the 
family.8 
 The chapter then turns to the ‘sweet pleasure’ of the tender family life that Tocqueville 
illustrated. Because of the effects of social levelling, intimacy between father and son is 
heightened and siblings are naturally affectionate. I then discuss the democratic domestic 
sphere and how it relates to public life though rooting restlessness and providing mores. In 
describing the domestic sphere, I look to Tocqueville’s admiration of the tranquil home and 
family across both volumes of Democracy in America. I cover the role of religion, 
womanhood, and sexual morality in establishing an orderly domestic sphere that affects wider 
political life. Finally, I discuss how Tocqueville lamented the loss of an aristocratic sense of 
‘family spirit’ in the domestic sphere that buffered individuals from the reach of despotism, 
and how he aimed to preserve a form of this spirit by establishing family unity as a feature of 
the democratic domestic sphere. This unity in the domestic sphere contributes to the mores 
conducive to the maintenance of liberty in a democratic society. This chapter concludes by 
underscoring how democracy, nature, and authority are all relevant to womanhood and family, 
and therefore, Tocqueville’s vision of a democratic domestic sphere.  
 
Social States and Familial Authority 
The primary difference that Tocqueville pointed to between aristocratic and democratic 
families lay in how individual members of each relate to the government or state ‘power’; the 
government ‘addresses’ the people differently in each social state, and this has a bearing on 
the shape of the family. In aristocracies, ‘men depend on each other’, and these hierarchical 
bonds mean that all people ‘follow’ whoever leads them. Thus, government only appeals to 
the ‘head’ of ‘associations’, and in the case of the family, this is the father. In aristocracies, 
‘power’ can touch ‘the sons only by the hands of the father’. The father is governed, and the 
father, in turn, ‘governs them’. According to Tocqueville, the aristocratic social state gives the 
father ‘a political right to command’ the family.9  
For Tocqueville, this is in addition to his ‘natural right’ to command the family. This 
is important. I argue that this description indicates that Tocqueville thought that paternal 
leadership within the family is inherent to the natural family. That is unchanging, regardless 
of social state. Recall his assertion of male headship in the conjugal association. He stated that 
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the husband is ‘the natural head of the conjugal association’.10 The father’s authority within 
the family is similarly natural. Aristocracy only adds to this command by making the father 
responsible for the family’s relationship to political society and the state. Here, we may 
remember my discussion of Hadari’s claim and Kahan’s analysis in the previous chapter; like 
gender, paternal authority is natural, regardless of social changes. By nature, the father ‘is the 
author and the sustainer of the family’, and in the aristocratic social state, the father ‘is also its 
magistrate’.11  
Tocqueville then turned to the family in democracy. In democracies, ‘the arm of the 
government goes to find each man in particular in the middle of the crowd in order to bend 
him separately to the common laws’. In this context, the ‘intermediary’ of the paternal 
‘magistrate’ is not necessary. In democracies, ‘the father is, in the eyes of the law, only a 
citizen older and richer than his sons’.12 From this description it appears that Tocqueville 
contended that the father naturally commands the family as its natural ‘author’ and ‘sustainer’, 
no matter the social state. In the case of the democratic family, he merely discussed the 
dissolving of the political right, not the natural right. Authority in the democratic family 
certainly has a different character from authority in the aristocratic family, but it is not 
entirely dissolved.  
Tocqueville’s discussion also reveals his understanding of natural superiors and 
inferiors, who are affected by the two social states. In aristocracies, ‘when inequality of 
conditions is permanent, the idea of the superior grows in the imagination of men’, and even 
if the superior is not granted specific legal privileges over inferiors, ‘custom and opinion’ 
do.13 Under equality of conditions, ‘the general notion of the superior becomes weaker and 
less clear’, and laws cannot place the inferior very ‘far below the one who commands’.14 
Democratic ‘mores’ bring the superior and inferior ‘every day toward the same level’. In case 
of the family, the father is the natural superior, and the child is the natural inferior. Therefore, 
Tocqueville concluded that aristocratic peoples, whatever their laws, by custom, ensure the 
‘the head of the family’ has extensive authority within the family, simply because the ‘notion 
of the superior’ is emphasised in aristocracies. Tocqueville stated: ‘I know that, whatever the 
laws, the superior will always seem higher and the inferior lower in aristocracies than among 
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democratic peoples’.15 Akin to his discussion of the effect of democracy on gender, 
differences between father and child remain. Democracy does not erase what Tocqueville 
considered natural dissimilarity or disparity; it merely softens them. 
 
Natural Family, Democratisation, and Authority 
Tocqueville’s description of the differences between the aristocratic and democratic family 
reveals a sense of the natural family, which is comprised of natural authority and hierarchies 
and natural gender roles. Tocqueville’s understanding of the natural family within the 
democratic social state determines his model of the democratic family. He understood gender 
roles as natural and posited a model of womanhood that accounts for nature and democracy, 
and he did something similar with the family. In contrast to the reading of Matsumoto who 
assumes each of Tocqueville’s conceptions of family life are ‘value-free’, my conclusion is 
that Tocqueville’s version of family life is not simply descriptive of families in democracies. 
It is also prescriptive for a moderated democracy, aiming to balance nature and democracy.  
While Tocqueville maintained his understanding of a natural family within his vision 
for the democratic family, he nevertheless accounted for the effect of democracy. The family 
in a democracy is de-politicised as a unit without a political head, a ‘magistrate’. Instead, each 
member is political, as an equal citizen. Furthermore, the father’s authority over ‘opinion’ 
changes between aristocracy and democracy. Aristocratic peoples ‘live in the memory’ of the 
past ‘rather than in the preoccupation’ of the present; this makes them care more ‘about what 
their ancestors thought than about trying to think for themselves’. They rely more on 
‘traditions’ and ‘customs’ than the ‘individual reason’ that becomes dominant in democracies. 
This means that the father plays an important role as ‘the organ of traditions, the interpreter of 
customs, the arbiter of mores’ because he ‘is the natural and necessary bond between the past 
and the present’. Here, the aristocratic social state builds upon ‘the natural’ and makes the 
father authoritative in moral and intellectual matters. He is met with ‘deference’, ‘respect’, 
and a ‘love’ that is ‘tempered by fear’.16  
In democracies, the father is no longer such a certain intellectual and moral authority, 
transmitting ancestral wisdom to his sons. Sons ‘judge everything’ for themselves.17 As we 
encountered with the democratic girl, the philosophical method of democrats is relevant 
within the family too, softening the authority of the father. Tocqueville did not name the 
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philosophical method in this chapter on family, but he described it in this chapter as ‘a general 
principle that it is good and legitimate to judge everything for yourself while taking ancient 
beliefs as information and not as a rule’.18 This mirrors the definition he provided in the 
chapter on the philosophical method.  
Because individuals reason and make moral and intellectual decisions this way in 
democratic society, the ‘power of opinion exercised by the father’ is lessened.19 The paternal 
authority over mores abates. This is crucial. Women ‘make the mores’.20 According to 
Tocqueville, in democratic societies, the wife’s role in the inculcation and promotion of 
mores within the domestic sphere becomes even more prominent. She is now sole ‘arbiter’ of 
mores, which he deemed essential to the preservation of liberty.  
 Tocqueville stated that the family in the ‘Roman and aristocratic sense, does not exist’ 
in democracies.21 He assumed a previous familiarity with the ‘Roman and aristocratic sense’ 
of family, but we can suppose that Tocqueville meant that, in this sense of family, the father 
has total authority and control over his children. He explained that ‘remnants’ of that older 
type of family remain in the democratic family ‘only during’ the children’s infancy when ‘the 
domestic dictatorship’ of the father is entirely justified by ‘the weakness of his sons’ and the 
father’s ‘incontestable superiority’.22 Only the most naturally and physically incontrovertible 
superiority of the father justifies his total authority in democracies. Where superiority is less 
physically obvious and more contestable, the democratic spirit surely will contest it. In more 
ambiguous moral and intellectual domains , the father’s superiority and his corresponding 
authority are threatened by the democratic condition.   
 Tocqueville described how, as the young American son grows, ‘filial obedience’ 
lessens. Recalling again the philosophical method of the Americans, Tocqueville explained, 
as ‘[m]aster of his thoughts’, the son quickly becomes ‘master of his conduct’. He added that 
Americans do not have an ‘adolescence strictly speaking’.23 Manhood quickly follows from 
childhood. Though this follows from the democratic need to be master of oneself that 
Tocqueville highlighted, accounts of other travellers also noted this absence of adolescence in 
America and described surprise at how quickly American children embarked on adulthood.24  
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 Tocqueville reassured the reader that this mastery of self and liberty found in 
American sons was not a product of ‘moral violence’ against fathers. According to him, ‘[t]he 
same habits, the same principles that push the son to seize independence, dispose the other to 
consider the use of that independence as an incontestable right’.25 He asserted that the 
American father and son are in agreement. This is relevant to Tocqueville’s belief in natural 
superiorities within the family. He carefully noted that the democratic son does not gain 
liberty through a defiance of a natural authority, but rather the same mores govern all family 
members. All, in concord, encourage the son to make his own way in the world. Here, 
Tocqueville addressed an inherent democratic instinct to defy authority, while also 
demonstrating how mores allow for peace between family members. Because all members of 
a family in democracy possess habits of independence (except notably the wife who is bound 
to the home), members exist in harmony. There are no rules of decorum to break and 
therefore fewer reasons for offense between members. The father and son hold no resentment 
towards each other because both transition seamlessly to the state of equality brought about 
by the liberty of the adult son.26 This contributes to the order of the domestic sphere.  
 Tocqueville described the character of the authority of the father, which has been 
refashioned by democracy, more precisely:  
In the democratic family, the father exercises hardly any power other than the one that 
you are pleased to grant to the tenderness and experience of an old man. His orders 
would perhaps be unrecognized; but his advice is usually full of power. If he is not 
surrounded by official respect, his sons at least approach him with confidence. There 
is no recognized formula for speaking to him; but he is spoken to constantly and 
readily consulted every day. The master and the magistrate have disappeared; the 
father remains.27  
 
In his model democratic family, Tocqueville preserved a softened, yet certain, form of 
paternal authority. The commands of the democratic father are not socially or legally binding, 
but his ‘advice’ naturally possesses the ‘power’ that comes with age. In Tocqueville’s vision 
for democratic family life, the democratic father is wise, and his children respect his wisdom. 
Without ceremony, the children rely on him. Though paternal authority is not absolute, 
Tocqueville’s description preserves some degree of moral and intellectual authority on the 
part of the father by suggesting it is natural to fatherhood. This preserves a form of 
intergenerational regard, esteem or respect between generations, in the democratic family that 
allows for education and the transmission of wisdom; ‘natural’, not ‘political’, right gives the 
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authority to this conduit for moral and intellectual transmission. The aristocratic positions of 
‘master’ and ‘magistrate’ are shed and something natural persists. This is because the roles of 
‘master’ and ‘magistrate’ are conferred upon the man by aristocratic norms, but, clearly, the 
role of ‘father’ is not conferred upon the man by democratic norms, but by nature. Thus, 
Tocqueville asserted that natural superiority could flourish with a degree of authority within 
democracy without being considered oppressive.  
 In a section that he eventually excluded from the published version of Democracy in 
America, Tocqueville addressed the ‘excesses’ that ‘the democratic revolution’ can 
sometimes bring into family life.28 The democratic excess that worried Tocqueville was the 
perversion of this gentle paternal authority. ‘When the barriers that separated the different 
members of the family go down, before new limits are yet fixed and well-known’, he wrote, 
‘it often happens that the father and the children mix in a kind of unnatural equality and gross 
familiarity’. Democracy separates and equalises family members, but democracy also requires 
some ‘new limits’, some new mores to govern family relationships, so that the democratic 
family avoids falling into ‘anarchy and corruption’. Here, mores and customs complement 
nature, as they do in shaping womanhood. If the father mixes with his children in ‘unnatural 
equality’, he foregoes his role as ‘a tender, but grave and a bit austere friend’. Again, 
Tocqueville suggested there is a natural form of equality appropriate to the family that makes 
the father both affectionate and worthy of respect. With no ‘fixed and well-known’ 
boundaries regulating the family, the father becomes ‘a joyful companion of pleasure and 
sometimes a vile comrade of debauchery’. Hardly a role model, the father also loses his 
natural status as a moral and intellectual authority: ‘[h]e does not work to elevate the reason 
of his sons to the level of his’. Instead, democratic excess levels the natural superiority of the 
father. The father indulges his children, and ‘he reduces his maturity to the level of their 
juvenile passions’. This relates to the democratic defects Tocqueville worried about in many 
areas of social life, and he stated that this perverted paternal relationship is ‘not democracy’. 
This means that the levelling within the paternal relationship is not representative of a well-
moderated democracy. It represents a democracy without mores. Tocqueville hoped ‘new 
limits’, that is norms that govern behaviour, once ‘well-known’ and established, could protect 
what he saw as the natural family. 29 The family requires mores that respect nature, that is, the 
natural superiority and authority of the father, to fortify against the worst in democracy.  
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Tocqueville did not include this discussion in the final text ‘because it reproduces in a 
monotonous way the idea of the transitional period that is found’ elsewhere in the work.30 
These comments on the possibility of an ‘unnatural equality’ between father and son refer to a 
young and poorly moderated democracy, so they are tangential to his primary discussion of 
the model of the democratic family. However, they are useful for understanding what 
motivated Tocqueville in his presentation of the democratic family. His concern for nature is 
reiterated. Additionally, this description of an anarchic family order that defies nature is akin 
to his disapprobation of the ‘European’ mixing of the sexes. His concern for unnatural 
levelling in paternal relationships parallels his concern, which I discussed in the previous 
chapter, about unnatural similarity between the sexes.  
In the first volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville also demonstrated that he 
considered authority natural within families. In discussing the attitude of early American 
colonists towards public education, Tocqueville noted that ‘magistrates’ monitor the 
attendance of students at school and took ‘from the fathers the rights that nature had given to 
them’ if families did not ‘send their children to school’.31 Nature gives a father the right to 
direct his children. Additionally, in explaining ‘the sovereignty of the Union’ versus the 
‘states’, Tocqueville stated that ‘[t]he sovereignty of the states is natural’, unlike the artifice 
of the union. The Union is ‘abstract’, but the ‘sovereignty of the states is felt by all the senses’ 
and ‘it exists by itself, without effort, like the authority of the father of a family’.32 The 
naturalness of the state arrangement, which demands a loyalty to a locality that is more 
proximate to the citizen than the Union, reflects the naturalness of family authority. 
Tocqueville also placed the authority of the father foremost ‘in a chain of opinions’ shaping 
the ‘dogma of the sovereignty of the people’ in America, which was scaled up from the 
paternal authority through the town, to the state, and finally the Union.33  
Tocqueville’s discussion of the three races also reveals the significance of paternal 
authority within his idea of the family.34 When discussing race in America, Tocqueville 
suggested that authority defines the family and this authority is integral in the production of 
mores. He wrote: ‘[t]he Negro has no family; he cannot see in a woman anything other than 
the temporary companion of his pleasures and, at birth, his sons are his equals’.35 Indeed, the 
circumstances of slavery meant families were torn apart and could never thrive, but 
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Tocqueville suggested here that pure equality (in this instance, in slavery) between father and 
son destroys the family. The ‘Negro’ father has no rule over his son, who is immediately his 
equal under conditions of slavery, and, for Tocqueville, this is related to the making of a 
family. If the father has no rule over his son, and authority over his son belongs to another, 
there can be no sense of a family unit. Authority, which acknowledges the natural superiority 
of the father, defines a family as a family, rather than a collection of individuals.  
In the same chapter concerning the three races, Tocqueville spoke of the Native 
American who lived ‘at the extreme limits of liberty’. Considering ‘the effects of 
independence’ to be ‘harmful’, Tocqueville believed that the Native American  
has hardly known the authority of family; he has never bent his will to that of his 
fellows; no one has taught him to distinguish a voluntary obedience from a shameful 
subjection, and he is unaware of even the name of law. For him, to be free is to escape 
nearly all the bonds of society. He delights in this barbarous independence, and he 
would prefer to perish rather than to sacrifice the smallest part of it.36 
 
Here, Tocqueville linked ‘the authority of family’ to a series of self-sacrificial, other-
regarding mores that are reminiscent of those that he hoped would tame democratic defects.37 
The Native Americans were pitiable according to Tocqueville because they lived without the 
benefits that the authority of the family taught—namely, the habit of submitting to a larger 
association. Tocqueville’s examination of the ‘Negro’ and the Native American shows how 
the family cannot be realised in slavery or extreme liberty because neither state allows for 
paternal authority.   
As in the case of womanhood, Tocqueville’s model of family life was formulated in 
opposition to what he saw as the potential pitfalls of democracy. The comparison is not exact, 
but Tocqueville’s profound concern for authority and education is relevant to both models. In 
formulating his model womanhood, Tocqueville’s attention to authority is evident in his 
understanding of the relationship between spouses. In formulating family life, it is evident in 
the relationship between father and child. In womanhood, gender roles, which both separate 
and subordinate women, safeguard the woman’s moral work as the maker of mores. In the 
family, the father’s ‘natural right’ to command safeguards the paternal role of counsellor. His 
vision of the affectionate and wise father maintains a hierarchy, albeit softened, that he 
deemed natural, and it preserved intergenerational transmission of knowledge, albeit less 
authoritative. Correspondingly, his vision for democratic womanhood subordinates the wife 
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to ‘the natural head of the conjugal association’, and, undistracted by making her life like a 
man’s, his vision protects her position as the maker of mores.38 In both instances, 
democratisation is balanced with natural disparities, and, in both instances, Tocqueville’s 
models preserve some scope for moral authority. The father, naturally superior, remains a 
wise advisor. The wife, naturally womanly, remains a moraliser. This comparison of family 
and womanhood further demonstrates Tocqueville’s hope to attend to nature, authority, and 
democracy in his models. Like womanhood, family life is both illustrative of moderation in 
and of itself and a moderating force in society writ large.  
 
The ‘sweet pleasure’ of Democratic Family Life 
Though Tocqueville sought to preserve natural authority within his model democratic family, 
he described a family life that was tender and intimate. To begin with, he wrote that the ‘[t]he 
division of patrimonies that democracy brings contributes perhaps more than all the rest to 
changing the relationships of father and children’.39 Tocqueville explained ‘[w]hen the father 
of the family has little property, his son and he live constantly in the same place and are busy 
together with the same work’.40 Their proximity and shared habits leads to the cultivation of 
‘a sort of familial intimacy’ between father and son.41 In this exemplary family, Tocqueville 
described neither a specifically democratic nor aristocratic family, simply a family in which 
the father has less land and wealth to his name. In the introduction to Democracy in America, 
Tocqueville addressed the movement ‘toward universal leveling’ of the democratic age; all 
the features of this levelling ‘work in concert to impoverish the rich and to enrich the poor’.42 
In his chapter on family, he illustrated the impact of a smaller patrimony on family relations 
in order to suggest some of the features readers could expect of a democratic family because a 
family in a democracy is more likely to possess a smaller, moderate patrimony. This indicates 
that Tocqueville thought that in wealthy families with a grand patrimony, the distance 
between fathers and sons was greater, reinforcing paternal authority and formality between 
family members.   
 Tocqueville noted that in democracies, the middling class, comprised of these families 
with moderate wealth and correspondingly tender filial relations, have a great deal of control 
over ‘ideas’ and ‘mores’ of the society. Given Tocqueville’s prediction of mass levelling, he 
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thought the size of this middling class would steadily increase. He explained the almost 
domineering influence of public or mass opinion in democracies, and in the chapter on family 
he stated that this large middling class ‘makes its opinions, like its will, prevail everywhere’. 
The power of these families of ‘small fortune’ is so great that even the ‘fiery enemies of 
democracy’ insist ‘their children address them with tu [the familiar form]’.43 Even members 
of a vestigial aristocracy among a democratic people adopted the habits of tender familial 
intimacy.  
The ‘austere, conventional and legal’ aspects of ‘paternal power’ dissipate, as ‘power 
is escaping from aristocracy’. As power escapes the aristocracy and ruling elites within 
society, it also escapes the father within the family. Tocqueville wrote that ‘a kind of equality 
becomes established around the domestic hearth’.44 This is not a complete equality, not a 
perfect equality of conditions, but a particular form of equality appropriate to the family.  
Tocqueville also observed, later in the chapter on family, that aristocrats embrace this 
new democratic form of family dynamics thrust on them by democracy because ‘the sweet 
pleasure of these democratic mores is so great’.45 This new form of family intimacy is so 
enjoyable that ‘they are not tempted to return to the respectful and cold forms of the 
aristocratic family’. These aristocrats may try to enjoy the ‘domestic habits of democracy’ 
while they ‘reject its social state and its laws’, but Tocqueville asserted ‘you cannot enjoy the 
first without undergoing the others’.46 From this illustration, it appears he favoured the habits 
of the warm democratic family.  
 Tocqueville wondered ‘if, everything considered, society loses with this change [in 
family dynamics]’, but he ‘believe[d] that the individual gains’.47 Here, it appears that the 
individual gains because under democratic conditions, Tocqueville’s conception of the natural 
family is free to emerge because it is unrestrained by aristocratic formality, and this natural 
family is more appealing, offering ‘sweet pleasure’. Tocqueville presented the ‘natural bond’ 
of father and son as warm and good-natured.48 The ‘domestic correspondence’ of aristocracies 
does not speak to this natural bond; instead it demonstrates a way of communicating that is 
‘correct, ceremonial, rigid, and so cold that the natural warmth of the heart can hardly be 
felt’.49 In aristocracies, ‘natural warmth’ within the family is stifled by austere customs that 
                                                
43 Tocqueville, DA2, 1037. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 1039. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 1037. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 1037–38. 
   
 
121 
accompany the political and legal authority of the father. Conversely, in democracies, there is 
a prevailing sense of ‘something free, familiar, and tender’ in the way a son speaks to his 
father.50 He asserted that in democracies, ‘the relationships of father and son become more 
intimate and milder’ and ‘confidence and affection are often greater’.51 He again stated that 
‘rule and authority’ less frequently colour the relationship between father and son. For 
Tocqueville, in democracies, ‘the natural bond tightens, while the social bond loosens’.52 
Social norms or customs do not bind the father to his children in democracies, but it seems 
Tocqueville suggested that democracy allows for something natural to flourish, and what is 
natural to the family is a ‘sweet pleasure’.53 
Tocqueville contended that ‘an analogous revolution’ softens hierarchy and promotes 
tenderness between siblings.54 In the aristocratic family, ‘the children themselves are not 
equal to each other; age and gender fix irrevocably for each his rank and assure him certain 
prerogatives’. The eldest brother is ‘the head and to a certain point the master of his brothers’; 
and he is defined by ‘[g]reatness and power’, while his brothers are defined by ‘mediocrity 
and dependence’. This structure fosters ‘envy and hate’ between brothers, even though they 
share goals.55 Aristocratic brothers ‘are very tightly bound together’ around shared ‘interests’ 
concerning ‘the general splendor of the house’. 56 Thus, ‘their minds are in agreement; but it is 
rare that their hearts understand each other’.57  
Tocqueville contended that ‘[d]emocracy overturns or reduces most of these barriers’ 
that separate and designate roles for siblings.58 At the same time, Tocqueville argued that 
democracy also ‘joins the brothers to each other’, but it does so differently from aristocracy.59 
In democracy, siblings are ‘equal’ and ‘independent’.60 The democratic children have no 
formal bonds akin to the hierarchies and the shared interest in family honour that aristocratic 
families possess, ‘but also nothing pushes them apart’. Instead, ‘since they have a common 
origin, grow up under the same roof, are the object of the same concerns, and since no 
particular prerogative differentiates or separates them, you see arising easily among them the 
sweet and youthful intimacy of childhood’. Tenderness and understanding between siblings 
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are fostered by a shared home where all children are educated and cared for equally. 
Tocqueville asserted that, once this ‘bond’ was formed in childhood, ‘occasions for breaking 
that bond hardly present themselves, for fraternity draws them closer each day without 
hampering them’. This bond becomes habitual. In Tocqueville’s democratic family, ‘the 
community of memories and the free sympathy of opinions and tastes’ join ‘brothers to each 
other’. Siblings joined ‘by interests’ do not represent the ‘sweet pleasure’ of the natural 
family, but rather the ‘respectful and cold forms’ of the aristocratic past. Contrastingly, 
democracy ‘divides their inheritance, but it allows their souls to blend’.61 This attractive 
illustration of a loving family life contrasts with the ‘envy and hate’ between aristocratic 
siblings. Again, according to Tocqueville, democracy allows for something natural and ‘sweet’ 
to emerge within the family.62    
Tocqueville related family life to nature: ‘[w]hat I have just said about filial love and 
fraternal tenderness must be understood about all the passions that spontaneously have their 
sources in nature itself’.63 Tocqueville claimed that there is something special and natural 
about family relations. He explored this by comparing family relationships to relationships 
more reliant on ‘a particular state of humanity’, such as that of vassal and lord in the 
aristocratic social state.64 The relationship and the feelings between vassal and lord were ‘the 
product of’ feudalism, and ‘once this state changes, nothing remains’. There is no natural 
affinity or passion between these two members of society. For Tocqueville, ‘the law can tie 
two citizens very closely together’, but once this law is no longer in effect, the citizens 
‘separate’.65 He contended that the vassal and lord were united by a tight ‘knot’, and ‘[t]he 
fear, the recognition and the love that formerly bound them have disappeared’.66 Tocqueville 
suggested here that these sentiments, such as fear and love, do not arise naturally. Fear of lord 
and love of vassal are not ‘passions that spontaneously have their sources in nature’. He 
thought that natural family sentiments worked differently. Regard for the father’s authority, 
love of son, and love of siblings emerge naturally, according to Tocqueville’s illustration. For 
him, ‘the natural sentiments of the human species’ are rarely intensified with the help of the 
law, and, in fact, ‘natural sentiments’ are ‘stronger’ when ‘left to themselves’.67 He thought 
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that democracy equalises father and son, and, for the most part, democracy leaves family 
sentiments to emerge naturally.  
In his discussion of family sentiments, Tocqueville admitted that democracy ‘destroys 
or obscures nearly all the old social conventions’ and it does not incline citizens to ‘new 
ones’.68 Therefore, ‘most of the sentiments that arise from these conventions’ vanish within 
the democratic social state. Family sentiments survive; democracy ‘only modifies the others, 
and often it gives them an energy and a sweetness that they did not have’. Tocqueville 
summarised his considerations on the family, as well as the preceding chapters on 
interpersonal relations within democracies, by addressing social life broadly: ‘[d]emocracy 
loosens social bonds, but it tightens natural bonds’. In particular, he concluded that 
democracy ‘brings family members closer together at the same time that it separates 
citizens’.69 Tocqueville ceded to the tide of democracy the inherently atomising effect of 
equality of conditions in individuals, but maintained family unity by offering a conception of 
the natural family as affectionate and tender. His model of democratic family life balances 
democratisation, authority, and nature in order to maintain a cohesive family within the 
domestic sphere.  
Tocqueville hoped democracy or democratic excesses would not overturn paternal 
authority and the natural superiority of the father, and he also hoped individualism would not 
infiltrate family life. Curiously, as noted above, Tocqueville admitted he knew little of 
American family life, but his superficial impression led him to suppose that filial and fraternal 
relations were ‘very cold in America’. 70 This does not match the illustration of a tender 
family life that he set forth in the chapter on family in Democracy in America, indicating he 
did not report democratic family life as he found it in America, but rather he suggested a 
model of democratic family appropriate to and useful to a well-moderated democracy.  
Because the family is a normative model that serves democracy, Tocqueville’s 
conception of the family is political, as it plays a role in his political theory. However, it was 
not a microcosm of political life made for the sake of socialisation into that political life; it 
was made to counteract the negative aspects of that social state.71  It was not fully democratic, 
reflecting wider society, but rather it was somewhat democratised, eschewing the defects of 
democracy and preparing members for wider society. The democratic family, of course, 
reflected aspects of the social state, but it was the non-democratic elements (authority and 
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nature) of our three-part model that worked to counteract the social state.72 It was parental 
authority and loving bonds that taught members how to compensate for the worst of 
democracy. This model treads a fine line between the inherent logic of the progression of 
equality of conditions and the necessity to maintain some forms of authority and social 
cohesion within democratic life. Tocqueville balanced these elements for the sake of 
democratic society as a whole. 
 
Democratic Domestic Sphere   
Tocqueville’s models of democratic womanhood and family life together provide for a sense 
of a democratic domestic sphere, where the gentle authority of husband and father is 
respected, tender bonds draw individuals together, and mores are cultivated. I contend that 
Tocqueville offered these models of womanhood and family because he hoped that the home 
could contribute to the aims of his overall democratic theory. He did not use the term 
‘democratic domestic sphere’, but I use this term to encompass the private life that is 
informed by his democratic womanhood and family. It is apparent that Tocqueville was 
meticulous in his conceptions of womanhood and family because, for him, the domestic 
sphere needed to endure amid the atomising effects of the equality of conditions.  
An orderly, cohesive domestic sphere benefitted political society, by rooting 
inherently restless democratic citizens and by providing for the mores necessary for public 
life and the preservation of liberty in a democracy. The domestic sphere required, for 
Tocqueville, a set of components: a wife and mother entirely committed to domestic duties 
and the cultivation of mores, a husband and father who retained a degree of natural authority 
over his wife and children, a companionate and faithful marriage, and tender bonds between 
all family members. In his democratic domestic sphere, nature establishes tenderness between 
family members and determines gender-based division of labour that shapes the life of the 
democratic woman. Deference to authority determines the male headship that shapes 
democratic marriage and family life. These features altogether allow for order and unity 
within the domestic sphere, and this respect for authority and cohesion made the home a 
peaceful place where mores are inculcated.  
 Examples of the influence of the domestic sphere recur throughout Democracy in 
America, not only in the chapters on women and the family. He hinted at his disdain for 
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‘adventurers without families’. 73 Instead, he lavished admiration on New Englanders, who 
were well-educated, demonstrated ‘admirable elements of order and morality’, and ‘went to 
the wilderness accompanied by their wives and children’.74 Tocqueville suggested that 
frontiersmen benefitted from the mores they learned within their families. He also noted that 
the ‘sons’ of educated Americans with good customs ‘carry into the wilderness, with their 
dwelling-place, knowledge already acquired and respect for learning’.75 Later, Tocqueville 
offered a different perspective on the frontiersman. He discussed the pioneers ‘in the middle 
of the wilderness’ who are detached from ‘traditions’, ‘family support’, and ‘examples’; there, 
‘mores’ have little power over citizens.76 This lonelier pioneer is reminiscent of Tocqueville’s 
discussion of the ‘savage’, the Native American, who living ‘at the extreme limits of liberty’ 
without ‘the authority of family’ was incapable of other-regarding mores.77 Regardless of 
whether the support of family is sustained in the wilderness or not, both images suggest a 
conception of the domestic life as useful in rooting citizens and providing for their mores. 
 Tocqueville certainly thought there was an important link between the domestic 
sphere and public life. He suggested throughout Democracy in America that the private and 
public spheres shape each other. There is a ‘“spillover” effect’ between the two; ‘the habits 
and sentiments contracted in one sphere of social life spread into others’.78 Primarily, he 
suggested that the order and mores of the home feed into public life. Tocqueville relied on the 
individual’s instinctive interest in locality and family in describing the ‘sovereignty of the 
states’, which ‘rests on memories, on habits, on local prejudices, on the egoism of province 
and of family’.79 He summarised these as ‘all the things that make the instinct for native land 
so powerful in the heart of man’.80 Tocqueville linked the love of home, both natural and 
innate as well as habituated and learned, to the wider public level of the states. 
Correspondingly, Tocqueville considered localism to be valuable for a number of reasons, 
primarily because the decentralised system interested citizens in their fellows.81 But he also 
thought localism and town life moralised the political ‘passions’ of men simply through 
proximity to the domestic sphere.82 The ‘passions’ such as ‘the desire for esteem, the need for 
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real interests, the taste for power and notice’, which usually ‘trouble society’, are softened and 
tempered ‘when they can operate thus near the domestic hearth and, in a way, within the 
family’.83 These comments taken together indicate that, according to Tocqueville, the 
domestic sphere has the power to root public-spirited love of nation and to moderate political 
passions exercised in public life.  
 In his description of how religion influences the public sphere, Tocqueville noted that 
religion does not sway American ‘laws’ and ‘the detail of political opinions’. Rather, religion 
‘directs mores, and it is by regulating the family that it works to regulate the State’. For 
Tocqueville, ‘the woman’ ensures that religious mores impact and flourish within the family, 
which in turns feeds into the mores of public life. Religion ‘rules with sovereign power over 
the soul of the woman, and it is the woman who shapes the mores’.84 Here, referring to 
women’s souls, Tocqueville addressed the nature of womanhood, rather than the ‘American’ 
woman.  
He then immediately cited American marriage, suggesting that the Americans 
particularly benefit from the moralising and religious aspects natural to womanhood because 
of their profound respect for conjugal relationships.85 As noted in the previous chapters, in 
writing to his sister-in-law in 1831, Tocqueville was unimpressed by American marriage.86 
By the time of writing of Democracy in America, Tocqueville was more impressed, finding 
that wives were essential to the transmission of religious mores through the sacred marriage 
bond and the domestic sphere, both of which benefit the public sphere. 
After noting the American respect for marriage, Tocqueville turned to a comparison 
with Europe to describe this connection between the private and public spheres: 
In Europe, nearly all of the disorders of society are born around the domestic hearth 
and not far from the marital bed. That is where men conceive scorn for natural bonds 
and permitted pleasures, taste for disorder, restlessness of heart, instability of desires. 
Agitated by the tumultuous passions that have often troubled his own dwelling, the 
European submits only with difficulty to the legislative powers of the State.87  
 
Tocqueville suggested that something was amiss in domestic life in Europe, and this had a 
negative effect on the public sphere. Here, he referred to the ‘natural bonds’ that are so 
important in his illustration of family life in the second volume. The domestic sphere appears 
to be a place where ‘natural bonds’ could flourish, but in Europe they did not. Perhaps, his 
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later chapter on sexual morality explains these comments in volume one: the aristocratic 
social state was more prone to premarital and extramarital affairs that are disruptive to 
peaceful domestic life. 
Tocqueville contrasted aristocratic disorderliness with the American example, which 
offered a sense of the home as respite. The American man retreats ‘from the agitation of the 
political world’ to ‘the bosom of his family’. There he finds ‘order and peace’. Within the 
American home, ‘all his pleasures are simple and natural, his joys innocent and tranquil; and 
as he achieves happiness by the regularity of life, he easily gets used to regulating his 
opinions as well as his tastes’. In the properly ordered home that avoids ‘disorders’, the home 
that Tocqueville admired, nature, morality, and peace reign. The ordered home also makes the 
habits of citizens. Habits of home tame ‘opinions’ and ‘tastes’. The home feeds and fosters 
well-moderated public life. The ‘American draws from his home the love of order that he then 
carries into the affairs of the State’. This contrasted with how ‘the European seeks to escape 
his domestic sorrows by troubling society’.88 The American is restored and moralised by the 
domestic sphere. His home is a retreat and a school. The European is drained by his home. It 
depletes him rather that adds to his character.  
In the chapter on equality and ‘good morals’ in the second volume of Democracy in 
America, which concerned womanhood and sexual morality, Tocqueville suggested that 
democracy taught the Europeans what the domestic sphere could offer. He wrote that the 
Revolution of 1789 compelled aristocrats to turn ‘assiduously’ to personal matters and family 
life.89 Within family life, ensconced ‘with their children under the same roof’, they found the 
profits of domestic life, and this new private life habituated them to ‘respect for religious 
beliefs, love of order, of peaceful pleasures, of domestic joys and of well-being’.90 Nobles in 
Europe also began to find the domestic sphere to be a place of mores and comforts. 
Two of these themes are reflected in an 1836 letter to Basil Hall: first, the influence of 
the domestic sphere on public life, and, secondly, the primary place of the wife who 
contributes to that influence on public life. Tocqueville noted Hall’s critique that his 
illustration of domestic life had ‘painted the domestic happiness of the Americans too 
beautifully’.91 Tocqueville felt it was ‘very important’ for him ‘to clarify a delicate point’, 
which he knew he would return to in later volumes.92 We can assume this would be in his 
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more specific 1840 articulation of the democratic family. Again, much like his desire ‘to be 
well understood’ on the topic of gender, he wished to be clear on these nuances of the 
domestic sphere.93 He explained to Captain Hall that he did not intend to suggest ‘a great 
tenderness reigned in the interior of the households in the United States’, but rather that he 
‘meant to say that there reigned much order and purity, an essential condition for order and 
tranquillity of the political society itself’.94 The ‘order and purity’ of households ‘was partly 
due to the principles and character that American women brought into the conjugal union’, 
and ‘in this sense’, Tocqueville concluded, ‘women had a great indirect influence on 
politics’.95 Tocqueville also observed in this letter that Americans agree ‘by unanimous 
consent, that the wife, once married, committed herself entirely to her husband and children’. 
The commitment of the woman to the domestic sphere prompted Tocqueville to declare ‘no 
one had ever known a higher and more just idea of conjugal happiness’.96 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, American marriages lack tenderness, but they are faithful, and this loyalty 
appears to define domestic happiness, for Tocqueville. He believed ‘extreme purity of 
manners in marriage’ to be a prerequisite of domestic happiness. He went on to describe the 
Americans’ ‘advantage’ over the English on this matter, remarking how American culture as a 
whole ‘unanimously’ and coherently took for granted the purity of morals among married 
women.97  
He picked up this observation in the 1840 volume of Democracy in America in the 
chapter on ‘How Equality of Conditions Contributes to Maintaining Good Morals’, even 
mentioning in notes accompanying the chapter: ‘[r]ecall on this subject the remark that I made 
in a letter to Basil Hall’.98 In the second volume, Tocqueville summarised this comparison 
between England and America. He highlighted in particular how American literature always 
took for granted the chastity of women, whereas English ‘philosophers and statesmen’ worry 
about the state of morals and English literature ‘assumes’ irregular morals among women.99 
He concluded that the equality of conditions, as I discussed in Chapter Three, was the root 
cause of the regular morals of the Americas. This letter to Basil Hall indicates Tocqueville’s 
continuing preoccupation with how the domestic sphere, and its stability based on the 
conjugal bond, affected political life. He knew he had to return to the topic, and he most fully 
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developed the details of the domestic sphere in his 1840 illustrations of womanhood and 
family life.   
Indeed, for Tocqueville, ‘the bonds of family’, based on stable sexual mores and 
faithfulness, related to the mores of public life.100 As I noted previously, Tocqueville’s 
perspective on prostitution can provide insight. In discussing the prevalence of prostitutes as a 
feature of democratic life, Tocqueville stated that this feature of democracies ‘does not 
prevent the social body from being in good form and strong’, suggesting that the sordid 
affairs and liaisons of aristocratic times were much more detrimental to society as a whole. 
Because prostitutes do not break down family bonds as affairs do, prostitution does not put 
social mores at risk. Here, Tocqueville linked the unified family to robust ‘national mores’.101 
Elsewhere in Democracy in America, in his chapter on honour, Tocqueville similarly 
remarked upon the value of chastity to family order and unity. He wrote that ‘[p]ublic opinion’ 
denounces ‘bad morals, which distract the human mind from the search for well-being and 
disturbs the internal order of the family, so necessary to the success of business’.102 Orderly 
sexual morality was integral to family stability, which he deemed influential to the wider 
public sphere of commercial life. 
Lastly, Tocqueville also described how public life fed into private life in America. 
Because in America, ‘education of men is directed toward politics’, Americans ‘almost 
always carry the habits of public life into private life’.103 He contrasted this with the 
Europeans, whose education readies them ‘for private life’, and thus they ‘bring the ideas and 
habits of private existence into public life’. In America, ‘the idea of the jury is found in school 
games, and you find parliamentary forms even in the order of a banquet’.104 American mores 
revolve around participation in public life. They are the habits of community-orientated, 
other-regarding social negotiation. They are habits of self-governance that rely on 
neighbourly attitudes. These mores are clearly relevant to political and public life, and, at the 
same time, a habituated preoccupation with political life shapes daily domestic tastes, from 
the games children play to dinner party conversation. Thus, public and private seem to have a 
circular relationship, for Tocqueville. Overall, however, he predominantly attended to the 
effect of the internal domestic order on external public life. His attentiveness to establishing 
cohesion and order in the domestic sphere, through his models, suggests that he was deeply 
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invested in the impact of the private sphere. The impact of the democratic domestic sphere is 
elaborated further in Chapter Six.  
 
Family Spirit and Freedom in the Democratic Social State 
Despite Tocqueville’s disdainful tone concerning the domestic sphere of aristocracy, 
throughout both volumes of Democracy in America, he also offered a nostalgic interpretation 
on the function of the aristocratic family as in intermediary body that acted as a buffer 
between the individual and the potentially despotic power of the state. His nostalgia for 
‘family spirit’ relates to the internal domestic cohesion he hoped to preserve in democratic 
families.  
This concern features from the very start of Democracy in America. The introduction 
laments how the age of democracy has ‘destroyed the individual existences that could 
struggle separately against tyranny’, and in a variant draft, Tocqueville wondered if new 
forms had taken shape ‘to fulfill their function’.105 He asked: ‘while giving up the social state 
of our ancestors, while throwing pell-mell their institutions, their ideas, and their mores 
behind us, what have we put in their place?’. He worried that the government had absorbed 
‘all the prerogatives wrenched from families, from corporations or from men’. Tocqueville 
suggested this older power belonging to a few was ‘sometimes oppressive but often 
conservative’, and the democratic transformation had made ‘all’ weak in the face of 
governing power.106 Tocqueville counted families (albeit here he likely referred to lordly, 
aristocratic families) as among the institutions that dispersed power. Later, in Chapter Nine of 
Volume Two, on the principal causes that maintain the American democratic republic, 
Tocqueville returned to his nostalgia for the role of ‘family spirit’ in aristocratic ages. The 
‘opinion and mores’ of the aristocratic age were ‘powerful barriers around royal power’; these 
were sentiments and habits like ‘[r]eligion, love of subjects, the goodness of the prince, honor, 
family spirit, provincial prejudices, custom and public opinion’.107 He thought these mores 
checked royal ‘power’ and bounded royal ‘authority’ within a limited sphere.108 The family 
again appeared among ‘the barriers that formerly stopped tyranny’.109 Later in the same 
chapter, Tocqueville elaborated further: 
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As long as family spirit lasted, the man who struggled against tyranny was never 
alone; he found around him clients, hereditary friends, close relatives. And if this 
support were missing, he still felt sustained by his ancestors and roused by his 
descendants. But when patrimonies are dividing, and when in so few years races are 
merging, where to locate family spirit?110 
 
He added that not only the living family, but the aristocratic mores, that teach citizens to value 
the memory of ancestors and the hope of descendants, also provided the individual with 
vigour and support.  
One way the family offered support to the individual was through giving voice to 
opinions. Tocqueville asked how ‘can public opinion’ exert any sway ‘when there is neither a 
man, nor a family, nor a body, nor a class, nor a free association that can represent and get 
this opinion to act?’.111 Again, he counted the family in aristocratic society as among the 
institutions that moderated power by shaping public opinion.  
In the second volume, his nostalgia continued. Though Tocqueville repeatedly 
commended the Americans for their intermediary institutions, he always thought them to be 
artificial among democratic peoples. Contrastingly, ‘[t]he idea of secondary powers, placed 
between the sovereign and the subjects, presented itself naturally to the imagination of 
aristocratic peoples’. During the aristocratic age, ‘individuals or families’ naturally ‘seemed 
destined to command’ because of attributes like ‘birth, enlightenment, wealth’. In the 
democratic age, ‘[t]he idea of secondary powers’ does not come as easily to ‘the minds of 
men’.112 The notion of intermediary bodies must be suggested ‘to their minds artificially, and 
you can only maintain it there with difficulty’, which is why democratic people are more 
prone to centralisation.113 Tocqueville contended that families acted as buffers during the 
aristocratic age, and the social state encouraged this. In the foreword to the twelfth edition of 
Democracy in America, published in 1848, Tocqueville highlighted the respect for ‘the sacred 
rights of property and of family’ as a marker of the ‘tranquil’, ‘regular’, and ‘liberal’ republic 
that he hoped for in France. He believed that France led the world on a course for ‘democratic 
liberty or democratic tyranny’, and he hoped that France would pursue the former.114 For 
Tocqueville, family spirit and esteem for the family institution were bound up with questions 
of liberty and despotism. His urgent longing for the disappearing intermediary body of the 
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aristocratic family suggests he longed to preserve some semblance of this within democratic 
life. How would this family spirit be maintained in the democratic age? 
 In 1831, however, he wrote to his friend Ernest de Chabrol that ‘amid the universal 
movement’ of democratic life, you cannot ‘seek family spirit, nor those ancient traditions of 
honor and virtue, which distinguish so eminently many of our old societies in Europe’.115 
According to Tocqueville, peoples who are ever in pursuit of wealth, as democrats are, ‘could 
never be virtuous in the strict sense of the word’, but a democratic people could be orderly 
(rangé). Even though the equality of conditions makes family sprit more difficult, some order 
remains. He explained that ‘[t]heir habits are regular’ and men avoid sexual misconduct, as 
they have ‘little or no time to sacrifice to women, and they seem to respect them only as 
mothers of families or the directors of the household’. He suggested that equality of 
conditions preoccupies men with industry, and therefore these practical democrats only think 
of women as mothers and domestic managers, not as seductive distractions. With 
incontestably pure morals, the ‘rogue of Europe is absolutely unknown in America’. 
Tocqueville related this absence of rogues to how ‘the passion for making a fortune drives 
and dominates all others’.116 Tocqueville refined this theme in his 1840 discussion of good 
morals. In his letter to Chabrol, chastity and fidelity are part of the orderly and pure morals 
that Tocqueville offered in answer to his lamenting observation about the lack of ‘family 
spirit’. Unity and stability within the home were his solution to the traditional and ever 
receding family spirit of the aristocratic age.117 By the time of writing the second volume, 
several years following this letter, Tocqueville attempted to articulate some degree of family 
unity, which was ensured by the ‘sweet pleasure’ it offered, within the democratic family. 
He insisted on authority that maintains domestic order, on marriages of companions 
that ‘settles’ spouses next to each other, and on nature that makes for gender complementarity 
and familial warmth. All of these contribute to a strong domestic sphere that can operate as a 
centre of mores and comfort. Tocqueville’s democratic family maintains ‘family spirit’ in a 
moderated form, which is less preoccupied by generations past or those yet to come, while 
also retaining familial hierarchy and intergenerational regard among the living. Through 
authority, it maintains unity. A model democratic family would not ‘introduce confusion of 
authority into the family’.118 The democratic family is well ordered and loving. Tocqueville 
assured readers that nature fortified bonds, where custom had previously reigned. Something 
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like family spirit and sentiment is maintained in Tocqueville’s model. It is less ceremonious 
and relies on interpersonal, immediate habits and memories that do not reflect a long legacy 
of traditional family honour. These bonds instead reflect shared childhoods. The family 
timescale is shorter in democracies, but Tocqueville’s model suggests this is compensated for 
in tenderness. The ties that bind are not grand, but they are heartfelt.  
Like the aristocratic family of old, Tocqueville’s democratic domestic sphere relates to 
the threat of despotism. As a place of mores and of orderly calm, the domestic sphere shapes 
the habits of the heart and mind, the ‘moral and intellectual state’ of citizens, and thereby 
contributes to the artificial habits necessary to associative life and the maintenance of 
liberty.119 As a strong unit, it forms the most proximate, accessible association for the 
individual.  
Thus, the domestic sphere contributes to associative life in two ways: first, as a place 
of instruction, thanks to the moral and intellectual authority of women as makers of mores 
and fathers as respected older and wiser citizens, and, second, as an association itself, thanks 
to warm family bonds. The family cannot operate as a buffer to tyranny as it once did during 
the aristocratic period, but Tocqueville advocated a democratic domestic sphere that suggests 
a link between family and freedom akin to the link between family spirit and resisting 
despotism that he attributed to the aristocratic social state. In democracy, Tocqueville’s model 
domestic sphere preserves liberty by providing the mores and habits necessary for the 
associative life that keeps democrats free.  
 
Domestic Order: Democracy, Nature, and Authority  
This chapter and the preceding one have examined womanhood, family, and the domestic 
sphere as models within Tocqueville’s democratic theory. Both womanhood and family were 
shaped by equality of conditions, but Tocqueville included attention to nature and authority. 
He was similarly concerned with a democratic disregard for nature within the family, as he 
was for womanhood. A major difference must be noted: in order to preserve nature in his 
vision of womanhood, he demanded much of the democratic woman. He resolved his concern 
for the breakdown of natural intergenerational regard and unity within family life by 
highlighting the bonds of intimacy, love, and affection that naturally sustain family cohesion. 
In the case of womanhood, he addressed this concern regarding womanhood by constructing a 
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model that, though natural, demanded much ‘vigour of will’ on the part of the woman.120 The 
mores that sustain warmth and comfort between family members are readily appealing to all 
members. It is also often readily appealing for children to take the advice and accept the 
authority of a citizen who is ‘older and richer’ and who cares for them.121 Conversely, the 
burdens of self-sacrificial womanhood are more demanding. Natural family order primarily 
requires love and respect. As examined in Chapter Three, natural gender order primarily 
requires courage and sacrifice on the part of women. Though Tocqueville deemed particular 
forms of family and gender order to be natural, gender order requires more effort to maintain 
in the face of democratic sensibilities. Tocqueville was therefore more urgently anxious about 
how democracy could affect gender than family life.  
Nevertheless, democracy, nature, and authority are relevant to both models, and all 
three make for orderliness within the home. Equality of conditions makes for orderly sexual 
morals between men and women, and equality lessens rivalries between siblings.122 Equality 
aids in marital and family cohesion. Nature allows for a clear, gendered division of labour, 
which makes the woman uncompetitive with the man.123 Nature also makes for tender filial 
and fraternal links.124 Overall, nature reinforces marital and family cohesion. Authority is 
preserved in the conjugal and the familial association, again providing for order.125 By 
dispelling the potential chaos of a female head of the family or an impudent son, family 
cohesion is maintained. Tocqueville was increasingly worried about the atomising effects of 
democracy, but his domestic sphere emerged as a place of deep social bonds and ordered 
unity. The habits of a peaceful, orderly private life translated into public habits.126  
Tocqueville’s attentiveness to nature and authority also related to his belief that 
women, family, and the home are central to the making of mores. Natural gender differences 
charge women solely with the management of a peaceful, restful home and the making of 
mores. While less significant than the clearly delineated feminine task of making mores, 
Tocqueville’s discussion of natural paternal authority also suggests a sense of the 
transmission of moral and intellectual wisdom. Lastly, Tocqueville did not write about 
childhood in an especially detailed fashion, but readers may speculate that the natural bonds 
                                                
120 Tocqueville, DA2, 1050. 
121 Ibid., 1035. 
122 Ibid., 1039, 1052–61. 
123 Ibid., 1064. On competition, see: Morton, ‘Equality’, 319–22; Alan S. Kahan, ‘Tocqueville and Gender 
Distinctions’, Essais de Philosophie Pénale et de Criminologie 7 (2008): 126; Allen, Covenant, 206. 
124 Tocqueville, DA2, 1037–40. 
125 Ibid., 1037, 1064. 
126 See: Tocqueville, DA1, 474. 
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between siblings, which he described as affectionate, provide for children’s first associative, 
other-regarding links. Habituated to other regarding mores, children are better equipped for 
democratic life. Barbara Allen states that the domestic sphere provided experiences of 
empathetic social negotiation requisite for ‘character development’, and ‘the mores’ that are 
‘supposed by kinship were transported into the public sphere’; these are the other-regarding 
habits of ‘sympathy and a proper understanding of self-interest’ that facilitated ‘self-
government’.127 Tocqueville most explicitly highlighted the role of mothers, but paternal and 
fraternal bonds also gently habituate citizens to mores. Jean Bethke Elshtain contends that 
‘[f]amilies were the site of the most intense and important human relationships, and women 
were their arbiters’.128 This chapter concurs with the conclusions of both Allen and Elshatin 
on these points, but the accounts of both scholars are limited, as neither delves into how 
nature, authority, and democracy all give shape to the environment in which habits of intimate 
relationships flourish. The unity of family life makes for a cohesive domestic sphere, which 
serves the woman as an orderly backdrop for her moral work. She does not battle domestic 
chaos while trying to inculcate mores. The peace of family life supports her task.  
Tocqueville modelled womanhood and family life carefully. First, he combined his 
observations about Americans with his desires for democracies. Second, he balanced 
democracy, nature, and authority in his model by yielding somewhat to the pressures of 
democracy, maintaining what he considered natural, and preserving a moderated degree of 
moral and intellectual authority. Understanding the formation of these models augments our 
understanding of how they fit into his wider democratic theory.  
Even though womanhood appears old-fashioned and the family appears almost pre-
political in its ‘naturalness’, these models were actually formed with the new problems of 
democracy in mind. As Schliefer notes, Tocqueville generally spurned ‘standard models’ that 
gleaned ‘lessons about democracy from the ancient and Renaissance republics’, but rather he 
‘reminded himself that the modern democratic world was entirely unprecedented’.129 Even if 
Tocqueville’s models of womanhood and family do not seem modern from a twenty-first-
century perspective, the traditionalism of gender roles and paternal authority should not 
distract readers from recognising that he attempted to offer a domestic sphere prepared to 
cope with the future of democracy. These two chapters have demonstrated how Tocqueville 
                                                
127 Allen, Covenant, 202–4.  
128 Elshtain, ‘Women’, 160.  
129 James T. Schleifer, ‘Tocqueville’s Democracy in America Reconsidered’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Tocqueville, ed. Cheryl B. Welch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 125. 
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crafted the models that promote democratic domestic order and facilitate the transmission of 
mores, for the sake of free democracies.   
  These models are intriguing in how they are shaped by, yet also defy the impulses of 
equality of conditions, and this is explored further in the following chapter. By noting the 
ways in which the domestic sphere deviates from the expectations of democracy, I 
demonstrate further the normative motivations behind Tocqueville’s analysis of the 
democratic domestic sphere.    
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Chapter 5. Impact of Democracy on Womanhood and Family 
Introduction 
This chapter and the next turn to understanding the role of the domestic sphere (encompassing 
womanhood and family) within Tocqueville’s broader democratic theory by probing the 
relationships between the domestic sphere, equality, and liberty, and by comparing 
womanhood and family to other aspects of his theory. Democratic womanhood and family are 
articulated across a short section within an extensive two-volume tract. The following 
chapters explore how this smaller part of Tocqueville’s thought fits within his wider theory, 
by analysing (1) the impact of democracy on womanhood and family, examined in this 
chapter, and (2) the impact of womanhood and family on democracy as moderating forces, 
examined in the next chapter. I submit that the role of the domestic sphere within 
Tocqueville’s democratic theory is just as prominent as the often-studied themes like 
decentralisation, associations, self-interest well understood, and religion. Consequently, it 
ought to be considered as central to understanding how Tocqueville believed liberty could be 
preserved in democracies.  
This chapter considers the domestic sphere against the backdrop of how democracy 
affects society outside the domestic sphere. This reveals the unusualness of the domestic 
sphere within democratic society. Deciphering this unique status of the domestic sphere, this 
chapter focuses on the three negative side-effects inherent to democratic society – 
individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity – and how these ubiquitous tendencies have an 
impact on womanhood and family. These tendencies all relate to Tocqueville’s balancing act 
between democracy, nature, and authority described in the previous chapters. Curiously, the 
domestic sphere, and especially women, retains a remarkable immunity to the powerful 
influences of equality of conditions. This chapter explains why. 
This chapter addresses two significant shortcomings in the existing literature. First, 
though scholars often note that women prove morally superior within Tocqueville’s system, 
few commentaries contextualise the topics of gender and family with regard to the themes of 
individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity. This chapter presents the first extensive 
commentary on how unusual Tocqueville’s womanhood is in the context of his wider logic of 
equality of conditions. Some scholars have noted that the logic of equality would eventually 
be ‘brought to bear against’ Tocqueville’s gender roles because they are incongruous with the 
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logical unfolding of equality itself. 1 However, these comments are few, brief, and suggestive 
of the reflective distance of a modern interpreter, who indeed knows that a desire for equality 
has altered gender roles. They do not place these themes in the context of individualism, 
uniformity, or mediocrity.  
The second gap in the literature relates to individualism, which is usually discussed in 
relation the breakdown of civic participation and social ties. This chapter emphasises instead 
that Tocqueville considered individualism to be especially bound up with issues of family and 
intergenerational bonds, not only interpersonal bonds. Scholarship on individualism rarely 
addresses the decline of familial links and intergenerational regard or Tocqueville’s solutions 
to this decline, such as the ‘natural’ moral and intellectual authority of parents.2 This chapter 
fills these gaps by placing his vision for the domestic sphere into the context of prevailing 
democratic defects and by contributing an extensive account of the impact of each defect on 
the domestic sphere.  
Additionally, this chapter adds to existing interpretations. Some scholarship interprets 
Tocqueville’s comments on women and family as a nostalgic assertion of family structure and 
hierarchy in order to manage the chaos of democracy and provide stability.3 Janara charges 
‘Tocqueville’s Americans’ with undemocratic behaviour, saying they ‘let their fear of flux 
temper equality with structured relations of inequality’ and ‘practices of hierarchical radical 
differentiation among humans’.4 Locke insists that Tocqueville attempted to maintain 
aristocratic features through his theory of gender dynamics.5 Janara and Locke understand 
that the domestic sphere was integral to a flourishing democracy, but, in emphasising his 
post-aristocratic anxiety, they miss the observation that a lot more than fear and nostalgia 
motivated his models.  
                                                
1 Elshtain, ‘Women’, 160. See also: Kristol, ‘Liberation’; Janara, ‘Family’, 52.  
2 Shleifer refers to the family only in the context of private retreat: Schleifer, Making, 305–22.Villa neglects 
generations: Villa, ‘Hegel, Tocqueville, and “Individualism”’. Hebert mentions only family spirit: Hebert, More 
Than Kings and Less Than Men. Morton only addresses private family retreat: Morton, ‘Equality’. Jankovic and 
Wolfson also neglect the dissolution of intergenerational regard: Jankovic, ‘Problem’; Wolfson, ‘Tocqueville on 
Liberalism’s Liberation of Women’.  
3 See: Janara, Democracy, 187; Janara, ‘Family’, 51–52; Locke, ‘Mourning’. Though I do not contend that 
Tocqueville’s womanhood was an aristocratic holdover, it remains curious that there has been little discussion of 
women in the context of Tocqueville’s ‘aristocratic liberalism’, as an aristocratic feature, a higher ideal of 
character, e.g. Alan Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John 
Stuart Mill, and Alexis De Tocqueville (New York: Routledge, 2017); Lucien Jaume, Tocqueville: The 
Aristocratic Sources of Liberty, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); 
Annelien de Dijn, French Political Thought from Montesquieu to Tocqueville: Liberty in a Levelled Society? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 143–53. 
4 Janara, ‘Family’, 52. 
5 Locke, ‘Mourning’. 
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Tocqueville referred to nature as the basis for what Janara terms ‘radical 
differentiation’. He was concerned with the changeability of democratic life, but also the 
possibility that democracy could overturn what he considered natural, such as gender and 
paternal hierarchy. He was also aware that the past could not be reconstructed. He was 
looking forward. This becomes apparent when we understand the domestic sphere in the 
context of his logic of the unfolding of equality of conditions. My interpretation is more 
comprehensive than Janara’s or Locke’s because I look more deeply into the democratic ills 
that define the side of democracy that worried Tocqueville, rather than using the catchall of 
democratic ‘flux’. He thought these ills were increasingly the problems of the future, and he 
was not reminiscing when he made his models. It was not as simple as imposing an old 
gender order on a new gender chaos because the new version was frightening.  
Without extensive analysis, scholarship occasionally notes that Tocqueville’s 
portrayal of womanhood is peculiar, either because it seems incongruous with the logic of 
equality or because it appears to belong to a previous age. I develop this observation further 
by providing a detailed interpretation that this womanhood was peculiar for a reason. As this 
chapter shows, Tocqueville constructed democratic models of womanhood and family with a 
view to the problems of democratic society and to nature, hoping to preserve natural 
differences and natural authority in the face of the democratic current and its ills of 
individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity. He did this to avoid what he truly feared— 
despotism. The domestic sphere, conceived in this way, supports the associationalism that 
combats despotism, as Chapter Six explains. 
 In order to examine the effects of equality of conditions on the domestic sphere, this 
chapter addresses the three main ‘defects of democracy’ that Tocqueville worried would 
accompany increasing equality. This chapter addresses individualism, which manifests both 
as intellectual individualism (the democratic way of reasoning or the ‘philosophical method’ 
noted in preceding chapters) and as social individualism (the atomisation that draws the 
family away from community and individuals away from each other). I use Tocqueville’s 
discussion of the frontier family as a case study of this extreme atomised version of the family 
because he considered the frontier to be a place where one could study extreme versions of 
social phenomena. The interplay of independent reason and intergenerational regard is then 
discussed. This chapter also examines the effect of democratic individualism on property and 
the breakdown of the connection between family spirit and patrimony.  
 I next address uniformity, noting that democracy brings homogeneity in three ways: 
making people similar, making people want to be similar, and making people think similarly 
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and think in terms of similarity. The domestic sphere is unusual on all three counts. Next, the 
theme of mediocrity follows from the issues raised in the previous section. This chapter 
shows how Tocqueville thought democratic life led to mediocrity in all facets of life, from the 
arts and sciences to martial courage and morality. The domestic sphere, in resisting 
individualism and uniformity, managed to avoid moral mediocrity, especially on the part of 
the woman.  
The chapter then analyses how sacrifice and courage among women and men relate to 
the pervasive moral mediocrity that Tocqueville identified. The section demonstrates how the 
liberty and independence, that equality often brings, affects many aspects of social life. I note 
how he thought that, with liberty and rights, people could be ‘submissive without servility’, 
and I connect this to women’s liberty and unique moral excellence. This chapter demonstrates 
how the domestic sphere, while somewhat affected by the changes that equality brings, also 
resisted the negative side effects of democracy. The domestic sphere was modelled on nature, 
which Tocqueville believed justified gender differentiation, family authority, and bonds of 
affection. This formulation meant that the domestic sphere does not fall prey to devastating 
forms of individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity  
  
Individualism and the Domestic Sphere 
Individualism undermined both social bonds between members of society and traditional 
moral and intellectual authorities. By the time of writing the second volume of Democracy in 
America, Tocqueville was preoccupied with the theme of individualism, and the materialism 
closely linked to it. He considered beginning the second volume with a chapter on 
individualism.6 In notes to a rough draft, he wondered: ‘[p]erhaps … begin the whole book 
with the chapters on individualism and the taste for material enjoyments’.7 His reason was 
that ‘[n]early everything flows from there in ideas as well as in sentiments’.8 Even though he 
ultimately began the second volume of Democracy in America with a chapter on the 
philosophical method of the Americans (a facet of individualism) Tocqueville understood 
individualism as an urgent concern that permeated and loomed large over many aspects of 
society.  
                                                
6 See: Schleifer, Making, 366. 
7 Tocqueville, DA2, 697 note a. 
8 Ibid. 
   
 
141 
Individualism at the social level causes the individual to direct ‘all his sentiments 
toward himself alone’.9 Intellectual individualism causes the individual to reason 
independently. Both social and intellectual individualism have the potential to affect the 
domestic sphere in damaging ways by encouraging private retreat, making the family a unit 
that is atomised from society, and by breaking down regard and links within the family, 
making individual members more solitary. 
In terms of the wider form of social individualism, family was at the centre of 
Tocqueville’s anxiety; he referred to the changing nature of family in describing 
individualism. Tocqueville did not believe the domestic sphere was entirely impervious to the 
serious problems of individualism brought by equality of conditions. His concern for 
individualism centred on the private sphere becoming too private, and he worried for the 
breakdown of family spirit in the face of individualism. Thus, he feared that democracy had 
an impact on the family on two fronts: the unit and the members. The following three sections 
show that the family itself, as well as individual citizens, could potentially become atomised.  
Though it was useful for the domestic sphere to be private, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, Tocqueville worried it could become introverted and materialistic in 
democratic society. His discussion of individualism in democracies describes a private retreat 
of the citizen ‘with his family and his friends’.10 In a later chapter on despotism, he also 
discussed his fear of a homogenous citizenry comprised of materialistic individuals detached 
from the wider community and country, who ‘spin around restlessly, in order to gain small 
and vulgar pleasures’.11 In this context, the individual is ‘withdrawn apart’ and he ‘is like a 
stranger to the destiny of all the others; his children and his particular friends form for him the 
entire human species’.12 Tocqueville worried that family life itself could be made more 
insular by democracy. This is a legitimate worry in the context of his own discussion of 
family: as the previous chapter described, he indicated the usefulness of the private element of 
the domestic sphere and described the pleasures of the domestic sphere. A private retreat 
under those circumstances would tempt any democrat already prone to egoism.  
Within the family, Tocqueville also thought that democracy drastically diminished a 
sense of family spirit and intergenerational regard, as intellectual individualism undermined 
the moral and intellectual authority of parents and the traditions of ancestors. He worried 
about the effect of individualism on gender roles and family life. Tocqueville acknowledged 
                                                
9 Ibid., 881. 
10 Ibid., 882. My italics.  
11 Ibid., 1249. For passion for material well-being and ‘private virtues’ e.g. ‘love of one’s family’: ORR, 178. 
12 Tocqueville, DA2, 1249–50.   
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the intellectual liberty of members of a family, but he ultimately defended clear gender roles 
and paternal authority. This was contrary to the erosion of moral and intellectual authority 
that he deemed inherent to democratic society. Thus, in terms of intellectual individualism, as 
in other cases, his model womanhood and model family defy the encroachment of an inherent 
democratic ill by maintaining the authority of these gender and familial roles. In some 
instances, Tocqueville accepted the inevitable dangers of individualism. For example, he 
knew American frontier families would retreat to pursue wealth, and he knew democracy 
inevitably led to the breakdown of patrimonies and the sentiments that corresponded with 
family land. In response to the decline of family spirit, he asserted the loving natural bonds of 
his model democratic family, as described in the previous chapter. 
 
Individualism and the Family Unit: the case of the frontier 
This section turns to Tocqueville’s frontier family in order to understand how individualism 
could affect the family as a unit detached from society. The frontier family represents an 
extreme version of this manifestation of individualism. I am not the first to look to the frontier 
in grappling with his perspective on the family. Scholars have directed attention to the frontier 
families that Tocqueville described in a note to the chapter discussing the young girl’s 
transformation into the courageous wife and in his A Fortnight in the Wilderness.13 Boryczka 
used the frontier couple to explore gender equality.14 Kristol referred to the frontier in order to 
flesh out the work of the woman who ‘preserves civilization in the wilderness; the cabin in 
which they [the frontier family] live had a Bible, some Milton, and some Shakespeare’.15 
Sullivan incorrectly used ‘the frontier experience’ to account for the woman’s role as 
submissive wife and active mother.16  
Instead of finding this useful for understanding Tocqueville’s main comments on a 
model family life, this chapter argues that the frontier, which was an American, not 
democratic, experience actually represents an extreme form of the isolated family. This is 
useful in understanding the problem of the individuated family and private retreat that he 
                                                
13 Ibid., 1287–90; Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘A Fortnight in the Wilderness’, 1303–59. 
14 Boryczka, ‘Paradox’, 287. 
15 Kristol, ‘Liberation’, 488. 
16 Sullivan, ‘Generative Theory’, 211–13. She writes: ‘The puzzling end of the sprightly American girl’s descent 
into passive wife can be explained not by the hierarchy of the marital relation but by this account of the frontier 
experience of new settlers’. While Tocqueville did relate the women’s courage to the frontier in America, it by 
no means gave shape to his entire account of gender. Tocqueville’s account explains that nature, her sacrifice, 
and marital authority define her role. I contend that the transition Tocqueville described was the one he hoped 
for in democratic society. The frontier was a uniquely American experience, and therefore cannot fully explain 
Tocqueville’s normative hopes for gender in democratic society.  
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described in his main discussion of individualism. I follow Tocqueville here, who wrote to his 
mother that on the frontier all aspects of society are shown ‘in such relief’.17 He compared it 
to ‘one of those books published in large type to teach children to read’.18 In the western 
states, ‘[e]verything there is jarring and exaggerated … Consequently democracy, without this 
final barrier, appears with all of its distinctive characteristics, its fickleness, its envious 
passions, its instability and its restless character’.19 The frontier family life offers readers a 
‘large type’ portrait of the democratic defect of individualism. 
Though Tocqueville highlighted the admirable courage of both pioneer spouses in his 
illustrations of the frontier, he hoped democratic societies would avoid this isolated, 
introverted version of the family. In A Fortnight in the Wilderness, written during his visit to 
America, Tocqueville described the lonely frontiersman: 
Concentrated on this sole goal of making a fortune, the emigrant has finished by 
creating an entirely individual existence; the sentiments of family have themselves 
merged into a vast egoism, and it is doubtful that in his wife and his children he sees 
anything other than a detached portion of himself. Deprived of habitual relationships 
with his fellows, he has learned to make solitude a pleasure.20  
 
The frontiersman’s understanding of his family as an extension of himself reflects an extreme 
version of the individualism Tocqueville addressed in Democracy in America. The drive to 
pursue wealth and the materialism brought about by equality of conditions were taken to an 
extreme on the edge of the wilderness. He thought that the man’s natural sentiments of 
tenderness towards his family had become distorted by isolation; his love for his wife and 
children became selfish. The family ‘dwelling by itself alone forms like a small world’.21 
When describing frontiersmen, Tocqueville put his readers in mind of men of mixed virtues. 
They are courageous, and they have not forgotten their origins, but they follow the ‘ardor of 
passions’ and ‘an insatiable need for violent emotions, vicissitudes and dangers’.22 They 
transplant and proudly maintain aspects of their civilisation, but they no longer appreciate 
‘hospitality’ and ‘the charms of social life’.23 Tocqueville’s frontier family, while admirable 
in terms of courage, represents the individualistic family that he feared democracy would 
bring— a family that understood itself in isolation, atomised, lonely, greedy, and increasingly 
poorly habituated to other-regarding mores.  
                                                
17 Quoted in: Eduardo Nolla, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in DA1, cxiii. 
18 Quoted in: Ibid. 
19 Quoted in: Ibid. 
20 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘A Fortnight in the Wilderness’ in Tocqueville, 1317. 
21 Ibid., 1319. 
22 Ibid., 1289;  Tocqueville, ‘A Fortnight in the Wilderness’, 1348. 
23 Tocqueville, DA2, 1288–1289; Tocqueville, ‘A Fortnight in the Wilderness’, 1349. 
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Tocqueville understood the democratic problem of individualism as a seemingly 
innocuous misjudgement that ultimately ‘destroys’ both public and private virtues.24 An 
isolated family, led by the father to indulge in individualism and materialism, has no 
opportunities to practise the habits of neighbourliness. In the wilderness, the circumstances, 
opportunities, and institutions that provide for the ‘habit and taste of serving’ others and 
which work to ‘draw a man out of himself’ are extremely few.25 He even noted one 
frontiersman’s awkwardness when Tocqueville and Beaumont’s visit required his 
hospitability.26 The frontier family helps readers glimpse an extreme version of the 
individualised family and why Tocqueville considered the atomised family to be detrimental 
to mores. A family that is isolated from society loses virtuous habits. This matters because, as 
we have seen, he thought these mores help keep citizens free.   
 
Family Members and Individualism: Intergenerational Regard and Independent Reason 
Tocqueville’s chapter ‘Of Individualism in Democratic Countries’ also parses his second 
concern about individualism and the family. Individualism ‘threatens to develop as conditions 
become equal’.27 The independent reason embedded in individualism damages 
intergenerational regard. Democrats are not bound to each other in formal ways, like 
aristocrats, and democrats have faith in their own reason and rely less on traditional moral and 
intellectual authorities. In describing how democracy brings about individualism, Tocqueville 
referred to the transformation of the family in the democratic age (mirroring his description in 
his chapter on the family, discussed in Chapter Four). He explained that individualism 
plagues democratic people because the family and sensibilities about intergenerational duties 
no longer have ‘the effect of tying each man closely to several of his fellow citizens’.28 
Correspondingly, ‘[a]ristocratic institutions’, like the family, do have this effect.29 
Tocqueville approached individualism in democracies with reference to how the aristocratic 
family readily suggested to citizens their duties and responsibilities to others. 
Among aristocratic peoples, families remain for centuries in the same condition, and 
often in the same place. That, so to speak, makes all generations contemporaries. A 
man almost always knows his ancestors and respects them; he believes he already sees 
his grandsons, and he loves them. He willingly assumes his duty toward both, and he 
                                                
24 Tocqueville, DA2, 882. 
25 Ibid., 893, 891. 
26 Ibid., 1289. 
27 Ibid., 883. 
28 Ibid., 883–84. 
29 Ibid., 883. 
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often happens to sacrifice his personal enjoyments for these beings who are no more 
or who do not yet exist.30  
 
This demonstrates that he considered the aristocratic family to be useful in habituating 
individuals to other-regarding norms. Contrastingly, democracy breaks down familial 
intergenerational regard, as I noted in the previous chapter. However, it is important to also 
consider the breakdown of familial intergenerational regard in the context of the problem of 
individualism. The impact of democracy on the relationships between generations informs 
Tocqueville’s understanding of individualism. In democracies, ‘the thread of time is broken at 
every moment, and the trace of the generations fades. You easily forget those who preceded 
you, and you have no idea about those who will follow you. Only those closest to you are of 
interest’. Fellow citizens who are not the ‘closest’ become ‘strangers’, and this dynamic 
exacerbates individualism. Tocqueville wrote that ‘[a]ristocracy had made all citizens into a 
long chain that went from the peasant up to the king; democracy breaks the chain and sets 
each link apart’.31 This breakdown among citizens can infiltrate the family itself, and in that 
case, the family is then less robust in terms of combatting selfishness.   
 Intergenerational regard, a component of what Tocqueville called family spirit, is 
under threat in democracies. I argue that Tocqueville considered the waning of 
intergenerational regard in families to be as significant as the threat of the decline in the 
interpersonal regard among atomised citizens in democratic society. He wrote that ‘not only 
does democracy make each man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants from him 
and separates him from his contemporaries; it constantly leads him back toward himself 
alone’.32 Here, it appears that the decline in intergenerational regard is the starting point from 
which the individual is accustomed to a life without interpersonal regard. In a plan for the 
second volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville noted that ‘individualism again greatly 
modifies the relationships of those people’, referring to family members.33 He thought that 
democracy ‘separates citizens’ because of the changed relationship between individual family 
members and ‘the arm of the government’.34 Democratic society is disposed to individualism, 
inside and outside the family.  
  The theme of the breakdown of intergenerational regard and family spirit appears 
throughout both volumes of Democracy in America. In the first volume, Tocqueville noted 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 884. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Quoted in: Editor's Introduction, Tocqueville, DA1, c. 
34 Tocqueville, DA2, 1035, 1040. 
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that among the French ‘simplicity of tastes, tranquillity of mores, spirit of family and love of 
birthplace’ all maintain ‘tranquillity and happiness’.35 He observed that the reverse was true 
‘in America’, where ‘nothing seems more prejudicial to society than such virtues’.36 To 
emphasise this point, he used the Canadian frontiersman spirit. He wrote that among 
Canadians, enlightened figures encourage ‘human passions’ rather than these steady family 
oriented and domestic virtues.37 They think it praiseworthy  
to exchange the pure and tranquil pleasures presented by the native country to the poor 
man for the sterile enjoyments provided by well-being under a foreign sky; to flee the 
paternal hearth and the fields where his ancestors rest; to abandon the living and the 
dead in order to run after fortune.38 
 
This illustration reflects the detached, materialistic frontiersman of A Fortnight in the 
Wilderness, discussed above. Tocqueville was distressed that family spirit, including 
attachment to an ancestral home, seemed to dissolve in democratic societies. For Tocqueville, 
an individualistic pursuit of wealth distracted the citizens from a proper intergenerational 
respect for ‘the living’ as well as ‘the dead’.  
Tocqueville first used the term individualism in the second volume of Democracy in 
America, though his considerations on individualism link to issues of family spirit raised in 
the first volume.39 In the second volume, his anxieties concerning intergenerational regard and 
family spirit cohered around individualism, especially the themes of individual reason and 
private family retreat. In both instances, he highlighted that regard for past generations and 
future generations (beyond the immediate one) are no longer a priority. From his 1835 
observation about Canadian frontiersmen, Tocqueville developed his thoughts on how 
democracy affects family spirit.  
Described in the second volume of Democracy in America, the ‘maxims of family’ are 
among the avenues to moral and intellectual authority that democratic people abandon, when 
they opt instead for the authority of individual reason.40 In a similar iteration used to describe 
the democrat’s taste for general ideas, Tocqueville explained that the democratic citizen 
‘repudiate[s] the traditions of class, of profession and of family’ and ‘escape[s] from the rule 
of example in order’ to instead rely only on individual reason.41 In both instances, ‘family’ 
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here operated in the ‘aristocratic sense’ because this is an element of family life Tocqueville 
claimed was waning.42  
The capacity for the family to offer wisdom is blunted in democracies by equality 
because the father is not an absolute authority and children exercise individual reason. As 
intellectual individualism increases, intergenerational regard decreases, and as 
intergenerational regard wanes, a reliance on intellectual individualism is all the more 
necessary. Indeed, as previously demonstrated, Tocqueville appears to have hoped that the 
democratic domestic sphere could offer guidance through the cultivation of orderly and other-
regarding mores. However, references to family spirit or family tradition in his discussions of 
the democratic intellectual process are slightly different. Here, family refers to a more 
absolute moral or intellectual authority that could provide meaning or duties that shape lives 
of individuals. In aristocratic society, ‘family’ operated as ‘class’ or ‘profession’; various 
types of families provided individuals with various truisms appropriate to their family context, 
as professions have moral and intellectual knowledge that is conferred on members of a 
profession. 43  
Families and fortunes are levelled in democracies, and the model of the father as 
magistrate diminishes, as families are comprised of equals. In a later chapter on the 
‘Appearance of Society in the United States’, Tocqueville explained again that as conditions 
become equal, citizens set ‘aside more and more the ideas and sentiments particular to a caste, 
to a profession, to a family’.44 This means that family spirit no longer guides the actions of 
individuals in the same way. Tocqueville hoped the democratic domestic sphere could 
habituate citizens to virtue in a broad sense, but he knew citizens would not be guided by 
responsibilities to family tradition and honour as they had been in aristocracies. The 
democratic family may guide individuals to be virtuous, but it cannot make individuals 
committed to particular values simply because they are associated with their family and 
therefore rest on the authority of family spirit. Individual reason is the surest authority in 
democracies, and thus it undermines the hold of family spirit on the hearts of citizens.  
This is quite unlike the family of the feudal era that Tocqueville described in the 
chapter on honour in the United States. During that period, the family ceaselessly provided 
ideas and sensibilities about honour. He wrote that ‘[a]mong the aristocratic nations of the 
Middle Ages the generations succeeded each other in vain; each family was like an immortal 
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and perpetually immobile man; ideas varied scarcely more than conditions’.45 Ideas were 
family-based and seemingly eternal. For the individual, this provided for an extremely clear 
sense of truth, in terms of how to be, how to act, and how to maintain honour. Those lasting 
family ideas meant ‘each man had always before his eyes the same objects, which he 
envisaged from the same point of view’.46 Thus their ideas about honour were not only grand, 
they were ‘clear-cut and precise’ because the immobility of family status gave immutable 
certainty to the truth of those ideas.47 In democratic societies ‘the immortality of families’ 
does not exist, and social status and circumstances do not ‘seemed fixed forever’.48 In 
addition to the democratic preference for individual reason, this changeability of family status 
also undermines the capacity of the family to confer wisdom authoritatively. Individual 
reason reigns, and this certainly shaped womanhood and family life.  
Democrats, ‘having become more or less similar… and, not noticing in any one of 
them the signs of incontestable greatness and superiority’ seek truth via ‘their own reason’.49 
Equality of conditions to a certain extent liberates and distances citizens from typical modes 
of obtaining ideas, opinions, or truths, such as ‘the yoke of habits’, ‘the maxims of family’, 
and ‘the opinions of class’.50 Tradition is not binding, facts are only ‘useful’, and ‘form’ is 
secondary to ‘substance’.51 This intellectual individualism and attitude of ‘individual effort’ 
in forming opinions or pursuing truth has an impact on the lives of daughters and sons. 
As previously described, girlhood is made freer by democracy, including a norm of 
allowing young women to think for themselves. Tocqueville’s girlhood is shaped by the 
philosophical method that is attributed to equality of conditions. She reasons, judges, and 
forms opinions fairly independently.52 Her girlhood forms her capacity for reason, but her 
liberty does not overrun the structured quality of her womanhood. Once a wife subordinates 
her will to her husband, her individual reason never leads her to resist what Tocqueville 
deemed to be ‘natural’— her domestic gendered ‘path’. Tocqueville’s assertion that the 
Americans are correct in consulting nature (a traditional mode of determining truth) means 
that his model womanhood resisted an extreme form of individual reason that he described in 
the chapter on the ‘philosophical method’.  
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Interestingly, Tocqueville demonstrated why the rampant use of this intellectually 
atomising method is tempered in the United States. Tocqueville noted that ‘this same method 
is followed more rigorously and applied more often among the French than among the 
Americans’, even though ‘equality is nonetheless as complete and older’ among Americans.53 
He thought this was due to the unique role of religion in America and the fact that Americans 
had not suffered a democratic revolution as the French had. The American approach to 
religion circumscribed ‘the work of individual analysis’.54 Avoiding a democratic revolution 
meant avoiding the excessive ‘independence of mind that equality suggests’.55 France, by 
contrast, had established equality ‘following a prolonged struggle between the different 
classes that formed the old society’.56 In the French, this amplified ‘envy, hatred and 
contempt for neighbor, pride and exaggerated confidence in self’, which in turn separated 
citizens and encouraged them to ‘mistrust each other’s judgment and seek enlightenment only 
within themselves alone’.57  
This conclusion corresponds with his discussion of women in Democracy in America. 
It is the Europeans, according to Tocqueville, who defy nature, tradition, and custom in order 
to try to make women similar to men.58 That discussion indicates that he worried that 
womanhood could easily be remade, in a new democratic fashion that celebrated similarity, 
by the democratic tendency to defy intellectual authorities. His model of democratic 
womanhood is formed in opposition to that intellectual individualism. Tocqueville’s praise of 
how the Americans consult nature in shaping gender roles is a fundamental aspect of his 
theory of gender. Members of democracies should temper the democratic instinct to decide all 
things for oneself. Thus, democratic women avoid the atomising distrust of authority in 
pursuing truth.  
As the next chapter explores further, women, as women, are too integral to 
Tocqueville’s wider hopes for mores and associationalism for womanliness to be lost to an 
individualist philosophical method that would overturn natural gender roles. By defying the 
democratic instinct for individual reason, this appreciation for nature not only maintains the 
order of gender roles; it also maintains the hierarchy of gender roles and male authority within 
marriage. He understood the ‘natural head’ is the husband, who has ‘the right to direct his 
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companion’.59 Tocqueville thought that nature and a degree of authority can be maintained in 
a democratic understanding of the position of women, despite the individual reason 
necessarily exercised by a free girl in a democratic society. 
Like womanhood, family structure, authority, and interpersonal dynamics are altered 
by the democratic reliance on individual reason. As discussed in Chapter Four, equality 
softens authority, and family members think more independently. The son in a democratic 
family is a ‘[m]aster of his thoughts’, akin to the rational democratic girl.60 The democratic 
father does not have the moral and intellectual authority as an ‘arbiter of mores’ that the 
aristocratic father has.61 The aristocratic father was the wellspring of custom, tradition, ‘the 
yoke of habits’, ‘the maxims of family’, ‘the opinions of class’, and other such modes of 
understanding truth that diminish in the democratic age.62 The democratic father does not 
hold this position, and his word is not treated with deference. However, as in the case of 
womanhood, Tocqueville insisted that nature played a role. An ideal democratic family 
maintains the father’s ‘natural right’ over the family.63 Additionally, the father’s ‘advice is 
usually full of power’ and is respected and ‘readily consulted every day’.64 Tocqueville 
preserved an element of moral and intellectual authority within the family. I noted this in the 
previous chapter, but it is also important to consider this in this context of pervasive 
intellectual individualism. Tocqueville’s thought concerning gender and family within 
democratic society both makes way for individual reason and also combats an extensive form 
of intellectual individualism that would overrun order and authority. The features of order and 
authority benefit the solidarity of the domestic sphere.  
 
Individualism and Land: Property, Belonging, and Family Unity 
Lastly, in addition to the inherent tendency towards individualism, Tocqueville also thought 
that much of the destructive effects of democracy on family unity related to democratic norms 
around property and land. In the first volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville stated 
that wherever the law ‘establishes equal division, property and particularly territorial fortunes 
necessarily have a permanent tendency to grow smaller’.65 This is ‘the material effect of the 
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law’, but he contended that this practice has a spiritual effect as well. Tocqueville thought that 
‘the law of equal division exerts its influence not on the fate of property alone; it acts on the 
very soul of the proprietors, and calls their passions to its aid’. He believed that some moral or 
spiritual benefit was lost as ‘landed estates’ were divided. Among aristocratic peoples 
practising primogeniture, ‘family spirit’ was ‘in a way, embodied in the land’. This gave 
family spirit and its related merits a firm foundation: ‘the land represents the family; the land 
perpetuates its name, origin, glory, power and virtues’.66 The land itself rooted the individual 
and provided a sense of intergenerational regard because the family land was an eternal 
testament ‘to the past and a precious guarantee of life to come’.67  
The equal division established by democratic inheritance laws ‘destroys the intimate 
connection that existed between family spirit and keeping the land’. Because individuals no 
longer see much value in maintaining or keeping property, if there is a profit to be made, ‘the 
land ceases to represent the family’. According to Tocqueville, even the sons of wealthy 
landed men in democracies, while they may not be poorer than their fathers, will likely not be 
wealthy on account of ‘owning the same lands’.68 Tocqueville saw this division of wealth as 
somewhat morally destructive. The fact that fathers and sons acquired different fortunes 
rather than worked toward a shared sense of family honour or glory separated them, divided 
them, and weakened family spirit, ushering in individualism. Tocqueville suggested that 
‘family spirit’ moderated natural human ‘egoism’ because the individual ‘seeks to perpetuate 
and, in a way, to immortalize himself in his great-nephews’.69 Without this ‘family spirit’, 
‘individual egoism reverts to its true inclinations’, which is to focus ‘on present convenience’. 
Without family spirit, the individual focuses more narrowly on his immediate family, ‘and 
nothing more’.70 Bruce James Smith summarises that Tocqueville worried ‘the loss of 
enduring objects for the affections’ would lead to ‘narcissism’.71 
Tocqueville thought that democratic inheritance law inevitably damaged ‘landed 
property’, ‘families’, and ‘fortunes’.72 This breakdown was an inevitable result of democratic 
laws in general. He wrote that the United States, offered the best example of ‘its work of 
destruction’, and he elaborated the example, showing that ‘the law of inheritance has done its 
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leveling everywhere’.73 He was deeply concerned that ‘family spirit’ worked as an 
intermediary body that buffered the individual from the encroachment of the state and 
‘tyranny’.74 Bonds of family spirit provided the citizen with ‘clients, hereditary friends, close 
relatives’. Tocqueville believed that even if ‘this support’ of surrounding companions were 
lacking, aristocratic man ‘still felt sustained by his ancestors and roused by his descendants’. 
Tocqueville was not only anxious about the individualism inherent to democratic souls, but 
also the atomised attitude with regard to patrimonies. The detachment from land could also 
undermine intergenerational regard. As we have seen, in the absence of intergenerational 
regard, members of society were unmoored and unsupported. Their mores and virtues were 
less stable. They could fall prey to democratic ills and suffer despotism. The division of 
properties and the freely chosen marriages between various groups led to levelling of 
everyone in society, but he thought that this comes at a cost to family spirit. 75 Patrimony 
provided something tangible that rooted family spirit. He worried that family spirit without 
land was far less sustainable.  
 The logic of this process is also apparent in Tocqueville’s discussion of Native 
Americans:  
by weakening the sentiment of native land among the Indians of North America, by 
scattering their families, by obscuring their traditions, by interrupting the chain of 
memory, by changing all their habits, and by increasing their needs inordinately, 
European tyranny has made them more disorderly and less civilized than they already 
were.76 
 
Tocqueville knew that the destruction of ties to family, land, and tradition isolated and made 
Native Americans vulnerable to tyranny. Here, he demonstrated that he thought family, land, 
mores, and the memory of ancestors were all bound up together, and the authority they 
provided directed daily life and worked in opposition to tyranny. If you destroy family spirit 
(and the love of land, home, and tradition that it entails), you can destroy a people. Break 
these bonds and despotism can take hold. Once the Native Americans were driven out of 
‘their paternal lands, they were already exhausted and reduced’.77 Horrors, from warring 
tribes to hunger, surrounded them, and they chose to ‘divide up’. Each became solitary, and 
dwelled ‘in the immensity of the wilderness like the outlaw in the bosom of civilized 
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societies’. Tocqueville elaborated a picture of rootless, homeless individuals without families 
and without mores. 
The social bond, long weakened, then breaks. For them, there already was no longer a 
native land. Soon there will no longer be a people; families will scarcely remain; the 
common name is being lost, language forgotten, the traces of origin disappear. The 
nation has ceased to exist.78  
 
Though Tocqueville believed democracy could be detrimental to the links between family 
spirit, land, and ancestral memory, he suggested a degree of this version of love of home 
remained among white Americans in the United States, as long as some love of family 
prevailed. In describing patriotism, he said the state, rather than the union, offered a more 
concrete object of affection for Americans. The notion of the state ‘blends with the very 
image of the land, is identified with property, with family, with memories of the past, with the 
work of the present, with dreams of the future’.79 As largely ‘an extension of individual 
egoism’, patriotism, therefore, was found in the states, the surrounding land. Here, 
Tocqueville suggested the natural egoism of individuals, as in his discussion of ‘family spirit’, 
merges with land, family, and broader social links in order to form a moderate from of 
patriotism. He suggested that American patriotism is strongest in the states, rather than the 
Union, because these important social links are more proximate to the individual and land 
where he resides.80 Love of family, for Tocqueville, is the kernel from which love of home, 
community, and fatherland can originate.  
 In the second volume, these themes resurface. In discussing the democratic taste for 
material well-being, Tocqueville referred to the equal division of property and how this makes 
people materialistic. In aristocratic society ‘wealth is fixed in the same families by 
inheritance’, and he thought that aristocrats may ‘enjoy material well-being, without feeling 
the exclusive taste for well-being’.81 For him, members of aristocratic societies were less 
prone to making material comforts their sole preoccupation. However, when ‘ranks are 
mingled and privileges destroyed, when patrimonies divide and enlightenment and liberty 
spread, the desire to gain well-being occurs to the imagination of the poor, and the fear of 
losing it to the mind of the rich’.82 Material conditions are levelled, and members of society 
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become more preoccupied with competing for wealth and satisfying material conveniences 
and comforts.  
The changed relationship between families and landed estates additionally instigated 
the breakdown of the bond between owner and tenant. Tocqueville explained that ‘[w]hen 
patrimonies divide and change hands, and when the permanent relationship that existed 
between families and the land disappears, it is no longer anything except chance that puts the 
landowner and the tenant farmer in contact’.83 He hinted at a more calculated, and ultimately 
colder, relationship. These ‘two strangers brought together by interest’ and preoccupied solely 
by ‘money’ cooperate briefly in order ‘to debate the conditions of the contract, and afterward 
lose sight of each other’.84 While there is equality and liberty to be found in the new 
democratic property arrangement, Tocqueville implied something else positive was lost, a 
link that meant landlord and tenant did not ‘lose sight’ of one another. The detachment of 
successive generations from land not only eroded family spirit; it also distanced landowner 
and tenant. Both related to the problem of individualism, increasingly separating members of 
society. In varying ways and to varying degrees, the land mattered in terms of rooting the 
individual in a set of familial and community interests—whether as a recipient of a patrimony, 
a lover of a homeland, or a party within a leasehold. Where the relationship with the land was 
weakened, so too were the social bonds.  
 In sum, the new democratic problem of individualism had an impact on the domestic 
sphere, from fostering private retreat to dividing inheritances. Individualism encouraged 
families to retreat into the materialistic pursuits, which breaks down community ties and 
endangers ‘public virtues’.85 Intergenerational regard decreased. Individual reason shaped 
girlhood and family structure, but Tocqueville’s model forms of womanhood and family life 
are not overcome by intellectual individualism. Deference to authority and nature remains in 
each model. This makes for a cohesive and peaceful domestic sphere. The orderly domestic 
sphere, he hoped, is better suited to address the selfishness of individualism and inspire 
members to other-regarding habits. The domestic sphere, the lives of women, and family 
structure are altered by individualism, but, according to Tocqueville, there is no need to 
obliterate the family unit or gender roles as the domestic sphere experiences the impact of 
individualism. He hoped gender differences and the ‘natural’ headship of the husband and 
father could be preserved.  
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The domestic sphere is remarkable: in a world drastically affected by the 
individualism of equality, how does the family remain bonded? How is moral and intellectual 
authority maintained amid intellectual independence? Why do women resist intellectual 
individualism in deciding their futures? By maintaining natural bonds, natural authority, and 
natural gender roles, the domestic sphere dispels extreme forms of individualism. While 
Tocqueville acknowledged that long-term considerations of lineage were beyond the reach of 
the democratic frame of mind, he hoped intergenerational regard and authority could be 
maintained between the immediate generations of a nuclear family. He hoped that the 
sweetness of natural bonds could compensate for the decline of a grand, compelling sense of 
family spirit. Through the individualism that equality engenders, democracy has an impact on 
the domestic sphere. Nevertheless, in important ways, Tocqueville suggested that the 
democratic domestic sphere could resist the temptations of individualism, could refuse to take 
intellectual liberties (such as making the sexes similar) that would be damaging to the 
domestic sphere, and could integrate into domestic life a moderated form of individualism—
one that neglects the past and future, but attends to the present family and community ties.  
 
Uniformity and the Domestic Sphere 
Uniformity also influences much of democratic life, according to Tocqueville. Three key 
ways of categorising this democratic uniformity emerge. The tendency of equality to make 
people similar, to make people desire similarity, and to make people think similarly and think 
in terms of similarity. Similarity emerges in people’s daily lives, similarity is desired as a 
good, and similarity dominates the intellectual landscape. It is instructive to examine how and 
to what extent the democratic domestic sphere is influenced by the democratic impulse of 
similarity. As in the case of individualism, the members of the domestic sphere that 
Tocqueville proffered appear to yield to this impulse to become increasingly similar. 
However, again on the grounds of nature, the democratic domestic sphere resists a pervasive 
form of similarity or uniformity. Uniformity is resisted by distinct gender roles and 
distinctions of authority. Within the comfort of the domestic sphere, members are somehow 
shielded from the similarity inescapable elsewhere in democracy. Tocqueville was clear: 
family members are made more similar by democracy, but they are not made perfectly 
equivalent, uniform peers.  
 




With their social statuses equalised, democrats see little difference between themselves and 
their neighbours. All citizens are their peers. ‘In democracies … all men are similar and do 
more or less similar things’.86 Tocqueville noted how professions are even made more similar 
because ‘[e]very honest profession is honorable’.87 In democracies, though ‘professions are 
not always similar, they at least have a similar feature’— a salary.88 All professions are paid, 
and this ‘gives all a family resemblance’.89 Equality of conditions lessens the disparity and 
dissimilarity between citizens’ lifestyles, and equality lessens the dissimilarity between 
individuals within relationships that were formerly driven by social difference. In articulating 
democratic womanhood, Tocqueville discussed how equality of conditions draws the woman 
closer to the man. All are made ‘closer’ by democracy.90  
It is helpful to compare the relationship of husband and wife to master and servant, as 
these are both relationships that he thought would be altered by equality. Because class and 
status fluctuate in democracies, 
[s]ervants, not forming a separate people, do not have customs, prejudices or mores 
that are their own; you do not notice among them a certain turn of spirit or a particular 
way of feeling; they know neither the vices nor the virtues of a condition, but they 
share the enlightenment, ideas, sentiments, virtues and vices of their contemporaries; 
and they are decent or knavish just as the masters are.91  
 
The servant and the master, in their daily tastes, habits, and attitudes, are made more similar 
by equality of conditions.  
Equality shapes womanhood in a similar way, although Tocqueville’s model ensures it 
does not go too far and make women like men. This is akin to the impact of democracy on the 
disparity between father and the son. They are made more similar, without being overcome by 
similarity. Tocqueville attended to the logic of equality of conditions in raising the status of 
the woman nearer to that of her husband and the status of the son nearer to that of his father. 
He also suggested that equality encourages faithful marriages because they are now based on 
‘similarity of tastes and ideas’ rather than wealth and status, just as servant and master are 
brought closer by sharing ‘customs, prejudices’, ‘ideas’, and ‘sentiments’.92 The relationship 
between father and son, who ‘are busy together with the same work’ and brought nearer by 
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‘[h]abit and need’, reflects the same pattern.93 However, the disparity between men and 
women is permanent, whereas Tocqueville suggested that it was not permanent for the son 
who grows up or the servant whose fortunes improve. While he was careful to preserve a 
womanhood defined by difference, a degree of similarity makes its mark on democratic 
womanhood all the same.  
Additionally, the result of making people’s lives similar leads to a broadening of 
sympathy because ‘there are real sympathies only between similar people; and in aristocratic 
centuries, you see people similar to you only in the members of your caste’.94 In democracies, 
mores are milder. Men ‘show a general compassion for all the members of the human species’, 
but Tocqueville noted ‘men rarely sacrifice themselves for each other’.95 There is greater 
humanity, but fewer acts of dramatic virtue, ‘heroic devotion’, or self-sacrifice.96 
According to Tocqueville, equality of conditions does not quite have this effect on 
women’s lives in democracies. Granted, increased sympathy between spouses makes for more 
faithful marriages, but democratic womanhood, in an age of mild, generalised compassion, is 
actually defined by self-sacrifice. Equality shapes womanhood by bringing a degree of 
similarity to the man, as equality brings to the servant. In a superficial sense, her daily tastes 
and preferences many be similar to the man’s. She sympathises with her husband, as perhaps 
a sheltered aristocratic wife had not. For example, she also works hard to support the success 
of the man on the frontier or in industry. Her education and their nearness mean she 
understands his world and sympathises with his toil. Inwardly, however, equality has not 
penetrated her naturally religious soul, and she remains capable of sacrifice. I discuss this 
sacrifice further in relation to moral excellence in the section on mediocrity below. In this 
regard, and because her gendered ‘path’ permanently distinguished her life from a man’s, 
democratic woman is unusual amid the effects of uniformity. 
 
Striving to be Similar  
In addition to making peoples’ lives more similar and widening sympathy, equality of 
conditions also makes people strive for similarity. For Tocqueville, democrats are offended 
by difference, and they strive for more equality. He discussed this in his chapter on 
‘restlessness amid well-being’, so there is a sense in which this ‘insatiable’ lust for an 
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evanescent and elusive equality is realised through material similarity and social similarity.97 
He explained the phenomenon by comparison to the aristocratic age. ‘When inequality is the 
common law of a society, the greatest inequalities do not strike the eye. When all is nearly 
level, the least inequalities offend it’.98 Later, Tocqueville reiterated the theme: ‘the smallest 
dissimilarity seems shocking amid general uniformity; the sight of it becomes more 
unbearable as uniformity is more complete’.99 Members of democratic societies restlessly 
seek to overcome inequality of ‘privileges’ and ‘dissimilarity’.100  
An early meditation on this theme articulated this striving neatly; Tocqueville wrote to 
Beaumont in 1828: ‘In times of democracy, even those who naturally are not alike ask only to 
become similar and copy each other’.101 Tocqueville described in Democracy in America that 
democratic man’s desire to pursue similarity relates to his belief that he can alter and better 
his condition. This striving attitude and restless desire for more was less prevalent in 
aristocratic societies, where ‘citizens are classed according to rank, profession, birth, and 
when all are compelled to follow the path on which chance placed them’.102 The changeability 
of democratic life makes democratic man believe in man’s ‘indefinite ability to improve’.103 
Equality of conditions gives birth in a citizen to a striving spirit that manifests itself in a 
desire to defy his current condition and, often, a desire to defy the disparity between himself 
and his fellows.  
Tocqueville suggested that the ideal democratic woman is immune to the 
suggestiveness of equality in this regard. He saw clearly that the logic of the unfolding of 
equality of conditions would lead to women and men wishing to be similar, striving to be 
similar. His 1828 letter to Beaumont, which concerned war between neighbouring democratic 
nations, foreshadowed his thoughts on gender similarity in Democracy in America: those 
‘naturally’ unlike want ‘to become similar and copy each other’. 104 That was his worry in 
writing about gender: he praised the Americans, who unlike the French, have not tried to 
make naturally ‘dissimilar beings’ the same.105 According to Tocqueville, the powerful, 
worrying tendencies of the insatiable envy and desire for similarity do not have an impact on 
the model democratic woman. Nor does she reflect on her agency over her position, unless it 
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is the social or material position of her family. The changeability of democratic life does not 
inflame in a woman a defiance of her condition, unlike democratic man’s understanding of his 
perfectibility. Once a wife, she operates as ‘aristocratic peoples’ do; she is ‘classed’ and 
‘follow[s] the path’ that belongs to her.106 
Tocqueville’s ideal democratic woman is made more similar to the man without being 
made the same. Democratic woman may experience material envy like any democrat, but she 
is never offended by the dissimilarity between her condition and her husband’s. Immune to 
democratic instincts, democratic woman is never shocked by her husband’s privilege over her. 
She may believe, as all democratic peoples do, in the perfectibility of man, but she never 
indulges in the notion that she could defy her own domestic ‘lot’ and have a man’s life.107 
Equality makes men similar. Women are carefully made more similar by equality, but not too 
similar. Equality makes men strive for similarity and for an altered state. Women never envy 
men. Tocqueville apparently saw the potential for equality to act upon womanhood as it does 
on other aspects of democratic life, but, in this instance, he was articulating a model in 
opposition to that potential. Democratic womanhood resists the striving for similarity that he 
predicted equality would increasingly suggest to democratic peoples.  
Tocqueville’s insistence upon family structure and paternal authority within a 
democratic society reflects a similar, though less striking, imperviousness to the democratic 
inclination for uniformity. He similarly insisted that the son exacts no ‘moral violence’ 
against the natural authority of the father when he comes of age, and the father maintains a 
degree of superiority over his children based on his age and life experience.108 The role of 
father and son remains distinct, and the son does not inappropriately strive for similarity. 
Given the need of all children to seek moral and intellectual guidance, Tocqueville’s 
insistence here on distinct parental and filial roles is perhaps less striking than in the case of 
gender roles. However, children are democrats, too, and Tocqueville’s logic elsewhere 
suggests that they, as democrats, may be tempted to assert similarity between themselves and 
their parents, particularly given the democratic preference for the authority of individual 
reason. In his model family, however, children are not offended by the dissimilarity between 
themselves and their parents, and they do not throw off the intellectual authority of parents. 
This mirrors gender roles. Nevertheless, the differences maintained by gender roles are even 
more unusual within his system.  
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Tocqueville justified gender roles and male headship on natural grounds, but the duty 
of care is less immediately apparent in the case of women than in the case of raising children. 
Additionally, it is noteworthy that Tocqueville stressed the mistakes of European women in 
his published discussion of womanhood and the problem of similarity, whereas he chose to 
remove a section from the final version that described fathers and children ‘mix[ing] in a kind 
of unnatural equality’ that leads them towards a similarity of the lowest common 
denominator.109 He thought that the ‘unnatural’ form of family structure belonged to a 
confused transition period before democracy, suggesting that he considered it likely that 
members of democratic society would instinctively seek to maintain a degree of loving and 
supervisory authority over their children.110 
Like an ‘unnatural’ family life, the confusion that Tocqueville identified in Europe 
over gender similarity easily could have related to a revolutionary and transition period, too. 
Nevertheless, he insisted on using European gender similarity as a point of comparison in his 
final, published comments, rather than setting it aside as irrelevant to the topic of democratic 
domestic life. This suggests that Tocqueville considered gender roles as far more susceptible 
to disappearing (amid the democratic striving for similarity) than paternal authority and filial 
deference. In both instances, Tocqueville clearly attempted to maintain distinct social roles in 
the face of the tide of uniformity. 
 
Similarity and Democratic Reasoning  
In addition to making men similar and making men desire similarity, equality also makes men 
think similarly and think in general terms. Tocqueville’s considerations on the ‘philosophical 
method’, the ‘the principal source of beliefs’, and ‘the taste for general ideas’ of Americans 
altogether demonstrate his belief that democrats tend toward a defiance of inherited 
intellectual authority as well as toward intellectual uniformity. Democrats, despite their 
individualism, also seek general and homogenous answers and theories. The effect is a people 
who think and act similarly, who, when confronted with difference, seek similarity. 
Uniformity of beliefs and the preference for general ideas relate to Tocqueville’s model 
domestic sphere and, in particular, the problem of similarity that he confronted in his 
presentation of gender roles. Both uniform beliefs and general ideas put moral greatness and 
liberty at risk in democracies, by damaging intellectual freedom, undermining religious 
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morality, and suggesting political centralisation. Uniformity within the domestic sphere also 
puts moral greatness and liberty at risk. 
For Tocqueville, even though similarity among members of democratic society 
encourages individuals to think for themselves and be sceptical of the authority that ‘the 
intelligence of one man can have on another’, they do ultimately arrive at ‘common opinions’ 
and homogeneity of beliefs.111 He explained: ‘because of their similarity, [democratic people] 
have no faith in each other; but this very similarity gives them an almost unlimited confidence 
in the judgment of the public’.112 Common beliefs are increasingly founded on ‘the 
disposition to believe the mass’, rather than ‘a certain man or a certain class’; ‘since all have 
similar enlightenment’, the right opinion is thought to be ‘found on the side of the greatest 
number’.113 This allows the democrat both to defy authority (of individuals or classes), and 
also to find wisdom in some form of ‘intellectual authority’.114 Though Tocqueville worried 
about the incoherence of rampant intellectual individualism, he also worried about this 
tendency towards similarity in the beliefs and opinions. This worry relates to his concern for 
the tyranny of the majority over thought.115 In times of equality, ‘faith in common opinion 
will become a sort of religion whose prophet will be the majority’.116 Tocqueville worried that 
the potential hold of majority opinion on citizens who are all intellectually similar is not 
‘suitable for the grandeur and happiness of the human species’.117 He took up the theme again 
in discussing ‘intellectual revolutions’, doubting that great intellectual innovations are 
possible among a people ‘all with a certain number of common opinions’.118 In this instance, 
he noted how equality gives people a ‘similar condition’, so ‘they see matters in the same way, 
their mind is inclined naturally toward analogous ideas’, and though they can use individual 
reason, they often end up in the same place as their fellow citizens.119 Equality leads to 
homogenous opinions both by encouraging individuals to have faith in the ‘mass’ and by 
yielding a similarity in lifestyles that necessarily leads to similarity of opinions. In both 
circumstances, Tocqueville was deeply troubled by the similarity that equality brings to the 
world of ideas. Moral and intellectual grandeur is impossible without intellectual freedom. 
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Just as Tocqueville’s logic of equality acts on the intellectual landscape, it acts on the 
religious and political landscape through the democrat’s taste for general ideas. According to 
him, ‘equality of conditions brought each man to search for truth by himself’, and ‘such a 
method must imperceptibly make the human mind tend toward general ideas’.120 In discussing 
this, he summarised the ‘philosophical method’ of democrats and expands: 
When I repudiate the traditions of class, of profession and of family, when I escape 
from the rule of example in order, by the sole effort of my reason, to search for the 
path to follow, I am inclined to draw the grounds of my opinions from the very nature 
of man, which brings me necessarily and almost without my knowing, toward a great 
number of very general notions.121 
 
Democrats ‘love general ideas’ not only because they derive easily from individual reason but 
also because they are useful and efficient. Equality of conditions leads democrats to ‘become 
impassioned excessively’ with general theories, abstractions, and answers that unavoidably 
homogenise the particulars of specific cases.122  
 The democratic zeal for general ideas exacerbates the problem of similarity, which 
Tocqueville deemed pernicious, in religious and political life.123 In both instances, moral and 
spiritual grandeur are put at risk. In democratic times, as we have seen, ‘[t]he mind is 
obsessed by the idea of unity’, and Tocqueville believed that, of all philosophical outlooks, 
the democratic spirit is most susceptible to pantheism.124 Equality leads to the introduction of 
similarity in spiritual life, by seeking unifying, homogenising theories. This is an inadequate 
substitute for religion, and it jeopardises ‘the true grandeur of man’.125 
 Tocqueville also worried that the democratic taste for general ideas would lead 
citizens to favour centralisation, which in turn altered political life and put liberty at risk. He 
wrote: ‘[i]n politics, moreover, as in philosophy and in religion, the minds of democratic 
peoples receive simple and general ideas with delight’; and members of democratic societies 
‘are pleased to imagine a great nation all of whose citizens resemble a single model and are 
directed by a single power’.126 Centralisation appeals to the democratic sensibility and the 
habit of democratic life comfortably accords with concentration of power.127 This appetite for 
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centralisation leaves democratic societies vulnerable to despotism in the form of a ‘tutelary 
power’.128 For Tocqueville, ‘the true friends of liberty and of human grandeur’ are needed to 
check this despotism.129 In the case of centralisation, the introduction of unifying, 
homogenising ideas risks freedom and moral and spiritual greatness. 
Tocqueville’s democratic womanhood was formulated in opposition to homogenising 
ideas for the same reason—preserving liberty and the possibility of moral greatness. 
Similarity in terms of gender was a problem because it puts moral grandeur and liberty at risk. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, if a woman is like a man, she is made mediocre. The 
sexes are degraded. The potential for her own moral greatness, which actually appears fairly 
exceptional within Tocqueville’s democratic theory, is degraded. Additionally, the work she 
performs for the sake of liberty through the making of mores is also degraded. Similarity 
between men and women risks the possibility of moral grandeur and liberty, akin to how 
similarity in other contexts has detrimental, enervating repercussions. Thus, his model 
avoided similarity.  
The question is: in a world widely affected by the uniformity of equality, why are 
women’s and men’s lives not made more similar? The dissimilarity between women’s and 
men’s lives, though changing, was hardly a shock to nineteenth-century sensibilities. 
However, the dissimilarity between women’s and men’s lives is unusual when compared to 
the pervasive similarity that equality brings elsewhere in Tocqueville’s thought. I argue that 
his affirmation of public and private gender roles is both traditionalist, when considered 
contextually within his time and intellectual milieu, and peculiar, when considered textually 
within Democracy in America. This belies his normative hopes for the role that womanhood 
could play in the future of democracy. Though he may have seen gender differentiation 
slipping away, for the sake of the future of moral grandeur and liberty, he hoped that his 
belief in nature’s intended gender roles would be maintained.130  
 Equality of conditions acts upon womanhood and family just as it acts on the daily 
details of people’s lives, their desires, and their ways of thinking. Yet, womanhood stands out 
as peculiar, among the consistent theme of uniformity that Tocqueville developed. He 
asserted that the democratic woman’s life is not made the same as democratic man’s. 
Somehow, the woman does not strive for or envy the man’s life. Women avoid the angst of 
striving to resolve the shock of dissimilarity. Children, too, do not seek to resolve the 
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dissimilarity between themselves and their fathers. Most remarkably, his American women 
are not affected by the intellectual taste for uniformity, which urgently threatens religious and 
political life in the forms of pantheism and centralisation. Women avoid the many pitfalls that 
Tocqueville identified in the similarity that equality brings.  
Uniformity and similarity abound in democracies. Daily occupations become similar. 
Democrats seek similarity, and they think in terms of similarity, but the domestic sphere 
stands out, ruled by a private woman who also exists apart from the force and lure of 
democratic similarity. By pointing to the European misadventures in gender equality, 
Tocqueville warned against establishing too much similarity between men and women, 
reflecting his worry that uniformity in the instances of pantheism and centralisation 
jeopardises moral grandeur. Equality, and the similarity brought by equality, had an impact on 
the domestic sphere by making all male and female family members more similar, by drawing 
all members nearer to each other in terms of status, but male authority and gender difference 
remained within the domestic sphere despite what Tocqueville’s general logic might dictate. 
Domestic life is safe from the pernicious effects of uniformity. 
 
Mediocrity and the Domestic Sphere 
In addition to individualism and uniformity, equality also brought the related problem of 
mediocrity. Individualism encouraged materialism and the neglect of ‘public virtues’.131 
Uniformity levelled fortunes, hearts, and minds. Accordingly, mediocrity abounds. Some 
elements of the democratic domestic sphere are mediocre, but it also resists pervasive moral 
mediocrity. In particular, the self-sacrifice of the democratic woman stands out as morally 
excellent and exceptional amid (male) democrats who are not prone to great acts of ‘heroic 
devotion’.132  
 In a note to his draft, Tocqueville wrote: ‘Equality of conditions, the absence of 
classes . . . are evils you say. It belittles human nature, establishes the mediocre in everything. 
Perhaps you are right’.133 He found mediocrity in nearly everything among the Americans, 
and he related this to their democratic social state: ‘[s]ince all fortunes are mediocre, passions 
are naturally contained, imagination limited, pleasures simple’.134 Democratic life is 
narrowed; it features fewer glorious and grievous moments. The manifestations of mediocrity 
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within democratic society are largely rooted in how democratic man’s ‘taste for the useful’ 
dwarfs ‘the love of the beautiful’.135 Democrats seek virtue and measure the good in terms of 
usefulness, not beauty.136  
 The ubiquity of mediocrity serves to demonstrate precisely how unusual the model of 
democratic woman is within democratic society. Mediocrity proliferates, as democratic man’s 
arts, language, sciences, work, tastes, morals, ambition, and martial spirit are all made more 
mediocre by equality. In the cultivation of arts, from industry to fine arts, ‘imperfect things’ 
are made, and the tastes of fluctuating classes tends to ‘reduce the merit’ of each work.137 The 
theme continues across literature, theatre, and poetry. Tocqueville suggested that literature in 
democracies is easy to understand, ‘quickly read’, and speedily executed for the sake of 
momentary ‘relaxation’.138 The same principles are true of theatre.139 He even noted the taste 
for general ideas brings mediocrity to ‘democratic languages’.140 While he had some hopes 
for the democratic poet, poetry nevertheless is narrowed: equality distracts ‘men from 
portraying the ideal’.141 In the development of the sciences, he noted that democrats neglect 
the grander pursuit of truth and favour simply the ‘immediate and useful applications’ of the 
sciences, favouring ‘industrial sciences’ to ‘theoretical sciences’ and ‘great scientific 
passions’.142 Professions are less ‘glorious’ in democratic societies.143 Work is not founded on 
‘ambition or virtue’ but on ‘gain’.144 The love of material enjoyments brought about by 
equality also makes the tastes and goals of democratic man ‘small’.145 The ‘love of well-being’ 
is not concerned with ‘building vast palaces, of vanquishing or of deceiving nature, of 
exhausting the universe, in order to satisfy better the passions of a man’. It is about comfort, 
not greatness; ‘the sensuality of the public’ becomes ‘moderate and tranquil’. Even the taste 
of the opulent class is made more mediocre by equality of conditions.146 
Equality does not bring ‘genius’, but ‘reason’, and it does not bring ‘heroic virtues, but 
peaceful habits’; it brings both ‘fewer great actions’ and ‘fewer cases of heinous crimes’.147 
Tocqueville noted that the Americans were not without courage, but it was a courage 
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absorbed by the cares of industry and fortune.148 Equality makes men less self-sacrificing, but 
more humane.149 Equality even curbs ‘the sentiment of ambition’ in men; love of material 
comforts and present pleasures ‘tinge’ ambition in democracies.150 As equality makes men 
similar, ‘attaining a certain degree of grandeur’ becomes more difficult.151 The aspirations of 
democratic man are dulled: ‘[h]e stops willingly at mediocre desires without daring to embark 
upon high undertakings’.152 Tocqueville also lamented a lack of ‘vigor’ and ‘moral weakness’ 
among soldiers of democracies when finally faced with war.153 A by-product of equality and 
the materialism of individualism and the dullness of uniformity, this mediocrity infiltrates all 
aspects of democratic man’s life. He produces mediocre things, and he prefers mediocre 
things. His goals are mediocre, and his morals are mediocre. He is rarely criminal, and he is 
rarely great.  
 Like these aspects of life in democratic society, Tocqueville’s ideal womanhood is 
affected by a degree of mediocrity. He did not discuss women’s taste, and gave no suggestion 
that democratic woman would be immune to the mediocrity of taste that marks democratic 
man. He did specifically highlight the mediocrity of democratic marriage, an essential aspect 
shaping Tocqueville’s womanhood. Marriage is made charmless by the democratic education 
that shapes the democratic girl’s character. However, just as womanhood is peculiar amid the 
systemic uniformity generated by equality of conditions, womanhood is also peculiar amid 
the moral mediocrity generated by equality of conditions. As we have seen, Tocqueville had 
extraordinary hopes for the virtues of women in democracies. Much as women are rescued 
from the problems of similarity that equality brings, so too they are rescued from moral 
mediocrity. Again, demonstrating the ubiquity of this negative side effect of democracy raises 
an intriguing question: in a world widely affected by the mediocrity of equality, how are 
women so virtuous?  
The relationship between father and son is also rescued from similarity, but 
Tocqueville did not elaborate on how preserving that dissimilarity related to moral greatness. 
This is because the life of the woman takes a rather different course from the son. The 
woman’s dissimilarity from the man is permanent, especially after marriage, whereas the 
child’s dissimilarity from the parent is impermanent. The son, though subject to his father’s 
gentle democratic authority, ultimately, as an adult, becomes very similar to him in 
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democratic society. The theme of gender is more prominent, therefore, in considering how the 
domestic sphere, in resisting similarity, also resists the moral mediocrity brought by equality.  
 
Moral Mediocrity: Gendered Sacrifice and Courage in Democracies 
Sacrifice and courage are different for men and women, according to Tocqueville. The 
sacrifice of democratic woman is not ‘small’, as he described sacrifice elsewhere in 
Democracy in America.154 This sacrifice is also not rare (among women). It is a great act that, 
ostensibly, all women ought to be able to undertake. This seems contrary to the moral 
mediocrity Tocqueville described as pervasive in democratic society. Instead, his description 
of the woman’s loss of ‘liberty and pleasure’ as she becomes a wife is dramatic: ‘the 
independence of the woman becomes irretrievably lost amid the bonds of marriage’.155 She 
gives up ‘a light and independent spirit’ and ‘the amusements’ of her youth.156 Her home is a 
‘cloister’.157 Tocqueville reported that American religious and commercial sensibilities shape 
the expectations of womanhood, demanding of her ‘abnegation of herself and a continual 
sacrifice’.158 At the same time, he noted this entailed ‘the voluntary surrender of their will’.159 
Among women, ‘the most virtuous’ understood the moral ‘glory’ and ‘grandeur’ in this act of 
self-sacrifice, and ‘the others kept silent’, but all women apparently ‘surrender their will’.160  
Though democratic man is more humane, ‘[i]n democratic centuries, men rarely 
sacrifice themselves for each other’.161 Tocqueville noted that in aristocratic times, men ‘are 
often disposed to forget themselves’.162 In aristocracies: ‘you scarcely think to lay down your 
life for the cause of humanity; but you often sacrifice yourself for certain men’.163 Democratic 
man is still capable of some sacrifices. In discussing free institutions and individualism, 
Tocqueville wrote that he saw ‘Americans make great and true sacrifices for public affairs’.164 
It is important to highlight, however, that in an earlier description of political associations, 
Tocqueville characterised the Americans’ praiseworthy associations by noting that ‘[n]o one 
                                                
154 See Tocqueville’s reference to ‘small sacrifices’: Ibid., 921–22. 
155 Ibid., 1048. 
156 Ibid., 1050. 
157 Ibid., 1048. 
158 Ibid., 1049. 
159 Ibid., 1065. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., 993. See also: Ibid., 884. 
162 Tocqueville, DA2, 883. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid., 893. 
   
 
168 
sacrifices his will and his reason’ to the association.165 Public affairs and associations do 
demand some sacrifices of men but they are not all encompassing. This contrasts with what is 
expected of the women in the conjugal association. Women retain their reason, but ‘their will’ 
is subsumed by the headship of their husbands in their marital association.  
 The moderated morality and the smaller sacrifices that the democratic men perform 
relate to Tocqueville’s understanding of self-interest well understood. He suggested that 
moralists in the democratic age give up slightly on ‘this idea of sacrifice’; they become afraid 
of it, as it does not suit a society where ‘each person concentrates on himself’.166 Moralists 
instead establish a doctrine of self-interest well understood as the avenue to virtue, which 
teaches the members of a democratic society ‘that man, by serving his fellows, serves himself, 
and that his particular interest is to do good’.167 For Tocqueville, this doctrine 
does not produce great devotions; but it suggests small sacrifices every day; by itself, 
it cannot make a man virtuous, but it forms a multitude of steady, temperate, moderate, 
farsighted citizens who have self-control; and, if it does not lead directly to virtue by 
will, it imperceptibly draws closer to virtue by habits.168 
 
The great actions of will of the aristocratic age are lost to small, daily sacrifices of habit of the 
democratic age. This is comfortable, but it lacks ‘grandeur’.169  
Women also have a degree of self-interest in getting married (her sacrifice) because 
women avoid the discomfort of social shame resulting from ‘public opinion’.170 We could 
assume that the democratic woman believes that she serves herself by serving her ‘fellows’ 
through wifehood, as the doctrine of self-interest well understood describes. This may be the 
case, but it is nevertheless essential to note how Tocqueville’s description of self-sacrifice in 
the case of the woman is unlike his other descriptions of sacrifice in democratic society.171 
Tocqueville wrote that ‘from the practice of independence’ the woman draws ‘the courage to 
endure the sacrifice without struggle and without complaint’.172 Her courage is directed 
towards a surrender of her will, quite unlike the courage her American brothers muster on the 
frontier and on the seas or in industry and politics.173  
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Democratic men are not incapable of courage. As politicians, democratic men are 
courageous, and Tocqueville noted the courage of the American founders who were 
motivated by their love of liberty.174 In the first volume, he mentioned that democratic 
societies are courageous in the face of urgent ‘dangers and privations’, but they are less likely 
to endure long-term ‘storms’.175 In the second volume, Tocqueville elaborated the peculiar 
nature of American (male) courage, which was linked to democratic conditions. We can 
assume he therefore expected this form of courage to be increasingly honoured among all 
democratic peoples. For the most part, democratic courage related to the adventure of material 
pursuits or the responsibility a man had to an association, rather than the profound sacrifices 
associated with aristocratic ‘warrior valor’.176  
This form of courage, taken up by a man, was usually directed towards forging an 
increasingly comfortable and wealthy future for himself and his family. In America, this was 
represented by courage in trade and on the frontier. Americans did ‘not envisage courage in 
the same way’ as Europeans, but rather prized courage ‘that makes you face the furies of the 
Ocean in order to arrive earliest in port, bear without complaint the miseries of the wilderness 
… the courage that makes you almost insensitive to the sudden reversal of a fortune painfully 
acquired, and immediately suggests new efforts to build a new one’.177 This democratic 
courage also related to ‘the maintenance and the prosperity of the American association’.178 
Male and female courage is similar in that the wife also bears the vicissitudes of democratic 
life and her courage contributes to the integrity of the family association.  
Female courage, however, is directed also towards a complete and long-term sacrifice 
of will, which gives the woman’s courage a spiritual component. She is similar to the soldier, 
who exhibits ‘warrior valor’. Warriors, too, experience total submission of the self and 
commit to a greater cause. While the democratic woman may enjoy her home, her reward is in 
the knowledge of her contribution to family and society. This is markedly different from the 
man’s courage. His courage helps him to strive, innovate, and compete, and, ultimately, he 
enjoys the pleasures of prosperity himself, with his family, and with his neighbors and 
partners in his associations. His courage helps him work for the sake of an association, but it 
never leads him to entirely sacrifice his will for the sake of an association.179 
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The role of will is also essential in considering how womanhood resisted the pervasive 
moral mediocrity that Tocqueville predicted. Tocqueville noted that, apart from public 
opinion, this dramatic shift ‘in the habits of women’ occurs because ‘[o]ften they impose it on 
themselves solely by the effort of their will’.180  In this sudden transition, women exhibit 
‘vigor of will’.181 Having been habituated to independence, liberty, and pleasure, the 
democratic woman’s sacrifice is remarkable amid the moral mediocrity so ubiquitous in 
democratic society. She cannot be habituated to this sacrifice, as it is great and her choice to 
marry only happens once. This is unlike democratic man’s small, quotidian sacrifices to his 
neighbour or his association, to which he is habituated. Her great sacrifice is one of will. His 
sacrifices are ones of habits. Male virtue is not by will, but rather it is ‘virtue by habits’.182 
I do not mean to suggest that Tocqueville thought that democratic woman’s daily 
sacrifices are not a result of a habituated morality. The exception here is the particular, unique 
great sacrifice of her liberty to husband and home. In Tocqueville’s system, all adult women 
are wives, and the suggestion is that all women make this sacrifice. In a world where 
democratic man sacrifices himself by habit and where great acts of will and devotion are rare, 
all women make the most important sacrifice of their lives by will. In a world pervasively 
affected by the mediocrity of equality, why are woman capable of such an act of self-
sacrifice? For Tocqueville, women had a nature peculiar to themselves, a nature infused with 
religiosity, and, especially when protected from the worst in democracy, this perhaps made 
them capable of peculiar things. But given the ubiquity of moral mediocrity in his thought on 
equality of conditions, we must conclude that in addition to a nineteenth-century sensibility 
about natural gender differences, he also had high hopes of the role of womanhood within his 
theory. He must have had a reason for ensuring women possess a striking immunity to the 
forces of equality of conditions.183 While her tastes and aspirations may be made smaller like 
democratic man’s and her married life itself is made mediocre, the submission of the 
democratic wife remains a peculiarly extraordinary moral act when considered within 
Tocqueville’s presentation of the effects of equality.  
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Escaping Mediocrity: the Impact of Liberty and the Pursuit of Virtue 
Part of the answer to the question of how Tocqueville’s democratic woman avoids mediocrity 
and pursues moral greatness lies in understanding the role of liberty in Tocqueville’s model 
womanhood. As addressed in Chapter One, liberty often coexists with equality because a 
people who are free from privileges are a people freer to pursue their independent ends and to 
establish free institutions and free associations. Likewise, equality of conditions is what 
makes the young girl free. Therefore, it is instructive to understand the impact of liberty on 
womanhood in the context of the impact of liberty on other aspects of social life. 
Tocqueville considered liberty to be necessary for virtue, and, correspondingly, I 
argue that if the democratic woman is to perform her virtuous sacrifice, then liberty is a 
necessary feature of the life of the democratic woman. Liberty is a hallmark only of her youth, 
however. She is more equal in status to her brother and this shapes her education. For 
Tocqueville’s model to work, she needs to be able to cope with all that equality brings to 
society, including her responsibilities over sexual mores and marriage. The changeability of 
democratic life and the gravity of her martial choice necessitate a democratic education 
marked by liberty. As noted above in the discussion of sacrifice, liberty is not a feature of the 
adult woman’s life. Liberty acts on womanhood by providing the girl with virtues she carries 
into adulthood. Even though liberty is not a constant feature of the woman’s life, liberty is 
nevertheless integral to the morally exceptional quality of womanhood because of how liberty 
relates to virtue, for Tocqueville. The liberty that equality brings imbues democratic life with 
free choice, and free choice also shapes the life of the democratic woman.   
According to Tocqueville, ‘[e]quality, which makes men independent of each other, 
makes them contract the habit and the taste to follow only their will’.184 This independence, 
combined with the habits of liberty inherited from their English forefathers, shaped American 
social life.185 Though he was predominantly preoccupied with how liberty is maintained in the 
face of the excess of equality in Democracy in America, he also explored how liberty affects 
the lives of a people in a democracy when they do possess it. In order to understand the role 
of liberty in his model womanhood, it is useful to understand the impact of liberty across 
democratic society. He concluded that liberty shapes features of social life like the press, 
religion, associations, industry, and rights. For Tocqueville, exercising independence in these 
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areas constitutes an expression of liberty. He linked active choices, commerce, and 
participation in associative and community life with liberty.186 
As equality exaggerates in citizens their trust in individual reason, equality also 
introduces liberty to the press. Tocqueville contended that ‘[w]hen you grant each person a 
right to govern society, you must recognize his capacity’ to evaluate ‘different opinions’ and 
‘different facts’.187 People examine an array of freely expressed ‘opinions’ and ‘facts’.188 
With ‘no licenses for printers, no stamps or registration for newspapers’, liberty shapes the 
press also by multiplying the number of newspapers.189 Among a free people, expression is 
easy. Freedom of religion also shapes faith in America, where Tocqueville noted ‘an 
innumerable multitude of sects’ has proliferated.190  
Liberty also develops in Americans an enterprising spirit and gives them room to 
innovate. It does so imperfectly, but Tocqueville admired it because ‘in the long run 
[democratic liberty] produces more than despotism; it does not do each thing as well, but it 
does more things’.191 This reflects Tocqueville’s discussion of the individual’s 
resourcefulness, when democratic man ‘conceives the idea of some enterprise’; ‘it does not 
occur to him to address himself to public authority’. 192 Instead, he plans and struggles, and 
‘in the long run the general result of all of these individual undertakings surpasses by a great 
deal what the government would be able to accomplish’.193 Liberty affects democratic peoples’ 
lives by allowing them to ‘succeed in doing what the most concentrated and energetic 
administration’ could not achieve.194 
Tocqueville admired how Americans used their liberty to associate, stating ‘great 
political liberty perfected and spread widely within their midst the art of association’.195 He 
reiterated the long-term view: ‘liberty of association in political matters is favorable to the 
well-being and even to the tranquillity of citizens’.196 Liberty also advances industry.197 
Tocqueville stated: ‘there is a close bond and a necessary connection between these two 
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things: liberty and industry’.198 He thought that ‘leaving man to himself is enough for him to 
work wonders’ in a land of material opportunity.199 Though he worried about the theoretical 
sciences, he anticipated that increasingly ‘democratic, enlightened and free’ countries will 
produce ‘self-seeking men who appreciate scientific genius’ and consequently ‘more 
discoveries immediately applicable to industry’ will flourish.200 He expressed his awe of 
Americans ‘rapid progress… in commerce and industry’, noting American railroads.201 He 
concluded his observations that liberty affects democratic life by generating a variety of 
solutions to the exigencies of political, spiritual, and industrial life.  
 Additionally, liberty also has a bearing on morality. Tocqueville considered ‘human 
liberty’ to be the ‘source of all moral grandeur’.202 Kahan notes that for Tocqueville liberty 
and moral greatness ‘are never wholly separate’.203 In his discussion of political rights, such 
as property rights, Tocqueville’s understanding of the relationship between liberty and virtue 
emerges further. Rights are ‘the idea of virtue introduced into the political world’. When men 
have rights and have free autonomy over themselves, they can make truly moral choices. This 
is also why he was anxious to preserve liberty in democracies: equality dulls moral greatness, 
but without liberty there is no hope for moral greatness. Tocqueville wrote: 
Enlightened by [the idea of rights], each person has been able to show himself 
independent without arrogance and submissive without servility. The man who obeys 
violence yields and abases himself; but when he submits to the right of command that 
he acknowledges in his fellow, he rises, in a way, above even the one commanding 
him. There are no great men without virtue; without respect for rights, there is no great 
people.204  
 
Liberty affects life in democracies by allowing for nobility in submission. He spoke similarly 
in his Memoir on Pauperism, developing his ‘idea of rights’ and suggesting rights offer 
‘something great’ because claims are made without ‘suppliant character’ between people ‘on 
the same level’.205 
Tocqueville noted that granting rights does not automatically liberate men to be 
virtuous.206 That requires the hard work of the ‘apprenticeship in liberty’, but in the long run 
                                                
198 Tocqueville, DA2, 950. 
199 Tocqueville, DA1, 285. 
200 Tocqueville, DA2, 784. 
201 Ibid., 976. 
202 Tocqueville, DA1, 24. 
203 Kahan, Religion, 66. 
204 Tocqueville, DA1, 389. 
205 Quoted in: Gianna Englert, ‘“The Idea of Rights”: Tocqueville on The Social Question’, The Review of 
Politics 79 (2017): 659. 
206 Tocqueville, DA1, 392–93. 
   
 
174 
liberty delivers ‘benefits’.207 Overall, liberty acts on aspects of social life in a democratic 
society by offering members free choice. Choice flourishes across society: from which 
political opinions to read and which church to attend. Possibilities proliferate for solving 
problems, associating for causes, innovating industrial advances, and making money. Most 
importantly, liberty ennobles moral choices. In his Voyages en Angleterre, Tocqueville asked 
‘what is virtue, if not the free choice of the good?’.208  
 Liberty in democracies allows for much flourishing, in particular, the opportunity for 
moral flourishing, if people are not overcome by mediocrity. Liberty has an impact on town, 
associative, and industrial life, by freeing people to work and innovate together. As 
Tocqueville’s system of associationalism demonstrates, for Tocqueville, liberty in a society 
was largely bound up with volunteerism. The daily choices made in these contexts are part of 
the ‘apprenticeship in liberty’, which habituates the mind to reason and the heart to a love of 
liberty and, Tocqueville hoped, virtue.209  
The opportunity for independence also affects the woman. The liberty of her youth 
cultivates her reason. While Tocqueville did not portray the young girl as an industrial 
innovator, advancing industry and creating wealth, he did portray her as a thinker. In a note, 
Tocqueville wrote that the young girl ‘is the mistress of her thought’.210 The girl is also not an 
enterprising organiser, resolving local issues or petitioning politicians, but she does initiate 
the most intimate of associations, the conjugal association. Her choice of spouse makes use of 
her independent reason, and her sacrifice is decisive and active. The liberty that accompanies 
equality, like other aspects of democratic life, opens women to a world of choice, to make 
rational choices and develop relationships. The young girl is not protected from the world, but 
rather she learns about the world. She is the one who decides, as Tocqueville wrote in 
accompanying notes, ‘the precise point where virtue ends and vice begins’.211  
The role of liberty in shaping a model democratic womanhood is most significant in 
terms of a woman’s free choice of husband and her free choice of submission. The liberty to 
sacrifice her independence is what makes her self-sacrifice so morally remarkable. For the 
woman to be an exemplar of virtue in a mediocre world, she must be free. Tocqueville’s 
discussion throughout Democracy in America relates liberty to volunteerism and active, 
‘manly’ participation, which produces a conception of liberty as defined in opposition to 
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despotism; however, his most direct articulation of this came later in his Old Regime and the 
Revolution.212  Liberty is ‘the pleasure of being able to speak, act, and breathe without 
constraint under the government of God and the laws alone’.213 This freedom is reflected in 
the upbringing of the girl, who speaks her mind, makes her own choices, and acts without 
constraint.  
Tocqueville proposed the reverse of the education that he had observed in France and 
elsewhere, where the girl is given a ‘secluded and almost monastic education’ and ‘most 
women begin to train and to develop their reason only in marriage’.214 Tocqueville’s 
democratic girl is free and rational before marriage, and his ideal democratic woman is 
secluded and cloistered after marriage. As discussed above, the woman makes her sacrifice 
‘by will’. This is significant, not just because it represents a contrast to the mediocre habitual 
morality of equality of conditions, as discussed, but also because it highlights how essential 
liberty is in Tocqueville’s conception of womanhood. The woman’s free will is as essential to 
Tocqueville’s womanhood as his insistence on gender difference. It is as essential for the 
same reason: the moral work that womanhood does in Tocqueville’s democratic theory. 
Gender difference preserves a womanhood dedicated to the making of mores. Free will allows 
womanhood to be marked by exemplary self-sacrifice. If women are to provide the moral 
backbone of democratic life, women must be different and (as girls) they must be free. Her 
sacrifice is moral exemplary, and therefore she is beneficial to a mediocre society, only if she 
is truly free. 
Tocqueville’s discussion of rights is also revealing of this connection between moral 
exemplarity and liberty. American women do not demand ‘such rights’ as European women 
to be ‘frivolous, weak and fearful’ nor do they ‘noisily claim the rights of woman [after 
marriage]’.215 Women, however, must have enough autonomy to ennoble their moral choice 
of self-sacrifice. To use the language of his discussion of the ‘idea of rights’, democratic 
woman must have rights enough to be ‘submissive without servility’.216 As Gianna Englert 
notes in her analysis of Tocqueville’s ‘idea of rights’ and pauperism, ‘[r]ights not only 
equalize; at their best, they create ties between individuals based initially on self-interest, then 
“general interest,” and finally respect’.217 The same is true in the case of the independence of 
the democratic girl. The respect that is fostered by equal rights to independent choices and 
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actions allows the democratic wife to be ‘submissive without servility’. She chooses 
obedience, but remains respected and morally admirable. Recall Tocqueville’s description of 
rights: ‘[t]he man who obeys violence yields and abases himself; but when he submits to the 
right of command that he acknowledges in his fellow, he rises, in a way, above even the one 
commanding him’.218 The woman must be free, so, in submission, she may rise.  
The wife’s complete relinquishment of liberty is unique in democratic life. For 
example, democratic men ‘learn to submit their will to that of all the others, and to 
subordinate their particular efforts to common action’ for the sake of associations.219 
Democratic man gains the habits of small sacrifices for associations that are often temporary 
and, mostly, leave him free in other facets of his life. For the woman, the submission of her 
will is complete and for life. ‘Manly habits’ equip her with courage, but she has never before 
faced a moral choice akin to marriage.220 Though wives forgo liberty after marriage, liberty, 
as a concept, remains pertinent to Tocqueville’s vision of womanhood. Democratic 
womanhood makes use of the liberty often brought by equality to make way for moral 
excellence and resist the mediocrity inherent to equality.   
 Tocqueville’s vision for womanhood establishes the domestic sphere as a place of 
morality and virtue. While his model family life maintains a peaceable, loving order, it is not 
marked by extraordinary virtue, as the democratic woman is. In fact, Tocqueville hinted at a 
tension between the father’s pursuit of wealth and the mother’s virtue in his discussion of 
individualistic materialism; the father’s leadership, if he ‘withdraws’, might make the family 
mediocre through the private retreat of individualism. 221 In establishing his model of family 
life, he did not counter this possibility, and even highlighted the pleasures of a private life, 
enjoyed even by aristocrats newly ensconced ‘with their children under the same roof’.222 
However, in discussing individualism, he mentioned family, but when discussing family life, 
he did not warn against introversion or private retreat.  
Contrastingly, in discussing the possibility of women abusing individual reason or 
striving for similarity by throwing off gender roles, he did explicitly counter this possibility 
for womanhood to go awry in democracies by asserting the Americans do not make these 
mistakes. Thus, Tocqueville’s hope that the family will avoid private retreat is less explicit. 
The onus of morality in the domestic sphere is on the women. It appears that Tocqueville’s 
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womanhood rescues the domestic sphere from the pervasive mediocrity of democracy through 
the moral exemplarity of wifehood and the making of mores. Democratic woman brings 
moral greatness to the domestic sphere, which she cannot and, willingly, does not escape. In 
short, by managing and defying the tide of individualism and uniformity brought by 
democratic life, the domestic sphere is also better equipped, according to Tocqueville, to 
stand apart in terms of the mediocrity of equality of conditions. 
 
Impact of Democracy on the Domestic Sphere 
According to Tocqueville, all facets of social life are influenced by equality and liberty in a 
democratic society, and it is no surprise that he acknowledged that both affect womanhood 
and family. We better understand the nature of the impact of equality and liberty on the 
domestic sphere by comparison to the impact they have elsewhere in Tocqueville’s 
democratic theory. In particular by looking to the effects of equality in the form of 
individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity, this chapter has demonstrated how womanhood 
and family life both fit within and stand out in Tocqueville’s theory. The instances where his 
model womanhood and model family seem to rebel against the general inclinations of 
equality actually shed light on how he was using the domestic sphere in Democracy in 
America.  
The members of the democratic domestic sphere resist internal divisions and 
uniformity. The democratic woman resists moral mediocrity. The main reasons the domestic 
sphere resists the drawbacks of equality are: (1) Tocqueville’s belief in natural gender 
differences, natural authority, and natural bonds, and (2) his hope for the moral work of the 
domestic sphere in democracies. This work rested on women’s difference, moral excellence, 
and dedication to the domestic sphere as well as an orderly family structure and tender bonds. 
He both believed in nature and had a purpose for a naturally defined domestic sphere. 
Tocqueville thought women had a unique capacity to moderate men and make mores. He 
thought that fathers have a natural right to some authority over their children and that family 
members enjoy natural, loving bonds. He concluded that if he wanted women to retain that 
natural influence over men and mores, and if he wanted families to remain stable, 
womanhood and family life had to be theorised for ‘a world entirely new’. 223 Tocqueville’s 
models asserted traditionalist assumptions (woman’s peculiar nature and paternal authority) 
for the sake of coping with modern democratic ills within society. Through individualism and 
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uniformity, the democratic world was eager to overturn Tocqueville’s belief in women’s 
peculiar nature, parental authority, and strong other-regarding ties.  
The selfishness, materialism, and levelling of democratic society put these specific 
features of social life at risk, but they also put moral greatness and liberty at risk. Following 
from the problems of individualism and uniformity, widespread mediocrity was a likely result 
in democracies. This inwardness and mediocrity, intellectual and moral, all yielded ground to 
the ever-present threat of democratic despotism. Liberty, the potential feature of democracy, 
could be quashed by democracy’s own inherent tendencies. Some atomising and dulling 
effects of democracy appear in Tocqueville’s domestic sphere, but he insisted that it resists 
being swept away by an excess of equality of conditions, in order to serve a flourishing and 
free democracy. By analysing the domestic sphere in the context of the by-products of 
equality, this chapter indicates that Tocqueville thought that womanhood and family life 
should not be overcome by democracy. This is because his model domestic sphere plays a 
role in managing the excesses of equality in the new democratic age. The next chapter 
explores this further, demonstrating the impact of the domestic sphere on shaping democracy.    
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Chapter 6. Impact of Womanhood and Family on Democracy   
 
The domestic sphere produces the mores that maintain liberty in a democracy, and in this way, 
it has an impact on democratic society. Tocqueville thought that liberty could be at risk in 
democracies because of defects inherent to the democratic social state. This concerned him 
because liberty was essential to his understanding of virtue and the possibility of moral 
greatness in a society. Inherent ‘defects of democracy’ like individualism, uniformity, and 
mediocrity lead to atomisation, materialism, spiritual restlessness, and a taste for 
centralisation, which in turn lead to democratic despotism—a form of tyranny unique to 
democracy that maintains the equality of citizens while devastating their liberty. 1 If liberty 
can be preserved in the face of these defects, then, not only are a democratic people not 
subject to tyranny, but they are also able to flourish and possibly achieve moral grandeur. 
Tocqueville believed that liberty could be preserved by mores. As habits exercised regularly, 
mores preserve liberty by counteracting the defects that lead to the moral mediocrity of 
atomisation, materialism, and spiritual restlessness. Mores are artificial. They are not inherent 
to democracy. They must be made and habituated. Tocqueville held that this was possible 
through a network of moderating forces. The spirit of his famous associationalism relies on 
this network.  
Tocqueville thought that women, primarily, made mores, which are forged and 
fostered across his entire array of moderating forces. This chapter refines the typical scholarly 
understanding of how these moderating forces work in his thought. I argue that the domestic 
sphere is first among these moderating forces that all operate similarly to work against 
apathetic introversion and selfishness. The domestic sphere is the place that makes these 
mores in the first instance and, therefore, it is fundamental in sustaining other moderating 
forces, making it of primary importance in maintaining liberty. The domestic sphere is a 
bulwark of liberty and it can be understood as a moderating force of analogous status to 
Tocqueville’s more famous checks on democratic defects, such as decentralisation, 
associations, localism, the press, education, and religion.  
Pierre Manent called Tocqueville’s gendered family life a ‘moderating principle’ in 
his 1993 work, but his discussion of the moderating forces in democracy principally 
addressed the topic of religion.2 Other studies of Tocqueville’s ‘democratic remedies’ and 
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‘mediating organizations’ disregard family and women altogether.3 James Schleifer’s 
introductory companion to Democracy In America answers ‘How to Preserve Liberty?’ with 
sections on decentralisation, associations, self-interest well understood, and religion.4 Women 
and family are not discussed in relation to the preservation of liberty. Craiutu’s 2005 article 
on moderation neglects to mention family or women, even though he covers some elements 
that Tocqueville identified as capable of moderating democracy’s negative aspects, including 
‘education, freedom of the press, religion, decentralization, local liberties and institutions’.5 
Family and women do not make the list. In his 2006 article on ‘Tocqueville and Civil Society’, 
Dana Villa does not mention how women and the family may fit into ‘Tocqueville’s idea of 
civil society’, which he characterises as ‘as a sphere of politically invaluable mediating 
organizations’.6 Again, family and women are not cited as mediating elements, but mention of 
Tocqueville’s thought regarding women’s particular capacity for religion, the role of private 
women as moderators of democracy’s excesses, or the fundamental mores taught within the 
family would not have been out of place.7 
Additionally, religion is a prominent, often-studied moderating force in Democracy in 
America, but much scholarship neglects to interrogate thoroughly the connection between 
religion and women, which Tocqueville made explicit. He stated: ‘[religion] rules with 
sovereign power over the soul of the woman, and it is the woman who shapes the mores’, 
which are channeled through conjugal and family bonds.8 Some studies of religion do not 
mention women at all.9 Others mention women briefly, but without systematic discussion.10 
Even Kahan’s meticulously thorough Tocqueville, Democracy and Religion, the most recent 
extensive investigation of religion in Tocqueville, also fails to address the role of women 
comprehensively.11 Lastly, Tocqueville’s perspective on women is mentioned briefly in only 
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three contributions to the 2017 edited volume on religion and liberty in his thought.12 
Conversely, studies that focus on gender in Tocqueville also rarely integrate substantial 
analysis of the role of religion.13 
On the whole, Tocqueville’s discussion of the domestic sphere, gender roles, and 
family life are not selected as important features when scholars explore the network of 
moderating forces that support democratic associationalism. Furthermore, the link between 
religion and women is often overlooked. This is an incomplete picture of how Tocqueville’s 
moderating forces work, and therefore it is an incomplete picture of his prescription for how 
to keep democracies free. This chapter intervenes by demonstrating that the ‘domestic sphere’ 
or ‘womanhood and family’ ought to feature among the typical array of moderating features, 
mediating institutions, and tempering associations – such as schools, faith, freedom of the 
press, decentralised powers, and localism – that scholars use to describe Tocqueville’s 
associationalism.14 
The mores cultivated by each of these moderating forces have a practical component 
of regularly ‘dragging man out of himself’, which in turn has a moral effect that resolves the 
selfishness inherent to the democratic condition.15 I argue that the domestic sphere is first 
among these moderating forces within Tocqueville’s system because it feeds all other 
moderating forces. While all moderating forces can be shown to relate to the practice and 
habituation of other-regarding mores, the domestic sphere is explicitly linked to the making of 
mores. There are three aspects to this relationship. 
First, the domestic sphere establishes the habit of intergenerational regard, which is 
necessary to the functioning of all moderating forces. This is because the perpetuation of the 
habits in each instance relies on an artificial, taught inheritance and some degree of deference 
to authority. Second, the domestic sphere feeds other moderating forces as the first, most 
proximate and natural, ‘school’ for the democratic individual. Finally, the domestic sphere is 
crucial to the dominion of religion in democratic society. Religion has a far more spiritually 
compelling power than habits such as reading newspapers and voting in local elections. 
Though the effect of religion is mirrored across moderating forces, religion itself remains 
particularly significant within Tocqueville’s system. It also stands out among his moderating 
forces, but the role of the domestic sphere in the success of religion is rarely studied. Religion 
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influences society through the home, not through the state. Tocqueville’s model democratic 
domestic sphere is foremost among moderating forces because of its role in the establishment 
of mores. Not only is the work of the domestic sphere similar to other moderating forces; it 
also does this work first.  
This chapter demonstrates that the domestic sphere is primary among moderating 
forces by examining why, according to Tocqueville, democracy needs moderation. The 
chapter then turns to an examination of his key moderating forces in order to unpack their 
underlying logic, showing that each case requires intergenerational regard. I establish that the 
end of moderating forces is other-regarding mores. These diverse aspects of social life are all 
instructive to the end of cultivating mores and making citizens more virtuous and less selfish. 
This chapter demonstrates that Tocqueville’s democratic domestic sphere also delivers these 
habits and feeds the entire network of moderating forces. As established in the previous 
chapter, many features of the domestic sphere prove unusual when examined in the context of 
Tocqueville’s expectations for democracy, and I suggest that the fact that it is unusual 
suggests he forged his domestic sphere for a theoretical purpose. Examination of his network 
of moderating forces illuminates this purpose. Lastly, a section is dedicated to the relationship 
between the domestic sphere and religion. This section shows how religion and the domestic 
sphere, which are closely linked in Tocqueville’s thought, provide the same moral benefits 
that resolve selfishness and root restlessness. Religion and the domestic sphere are compared 
in order to demonstrate that they manage the negative side-effects of democracy in a similar 
way, through the private sphere and by accounting for the key themes of nature and authority 
amid democratic change. This chapter concludes by justifying the significance of the unique 
place of the domestic sphere within Tocqueville’s theory.  
 
Democracy’s Need for Moderating Forces 
Before examining how Tocqueville’s democratic domestic sphere operates as a moderating 
force, it is necessary to outline which democratic tendencies it combats. As touched on in the 
previous chapter, Tocqueville thought that equality of conditions readily nudges democratic 
peoples towards individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity. Some degree of these phenomena 
is inevitable. The bonds between generations and neighbours will break down, people will 
become similar, and mediocrity will emerge in many facets of life. Tocqueville’s discussion 
of how to moderate the effects of these phenomena suggests, however, that the most morally 
mediocre effects of individualism, uniformity, and mediocrity could be kept at bay. 
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Atomisation, materialism, and spiritual restlessness could be redressed through moderating 
forces that habituate citizens to the opposite tendencies. Tocqueville’s hopes for moderating 
democracy suggested that ancestors will be forgotten and families more introverted, but habits 
of community can combat total social atomisation. People will become increasingly similar, 
but the materialism that defines a constant striving to be similar can be attenuated by moral 
habits. Literature, theatre, and science may become more mediocre, and virtue itself may even 
become less grand, but virtue is still possible through habits of rooting oneself in communities 
with goals larger than one’s own comforts. Moderating forces that habituate citizens to other-
regarding virtue can ameliorate morally mediocre forms of atomisation, materialism, and 
restlessness.  
  These effects of equality are so pernicious because atomised, materialist, and restless 
citizens are willing to surrender their liberty. Despotism may easily separate citizens, tyrants 
may offer order for the sake of well being, and restless souls may find relief in ‘equality in 
slavery’. Also, equality generates a taste for administrative centralisation, which further 
erodes liberty. The freedom and independence that equality often brings can lead to license 
that needs to be moderated lest the members of democratic society jeopardise public order and 
their habits of liberty. Tocqueville thought that morally mediocre atomisation, materialism 
and restlessness, as well as centralisation and disorderliness all contributed to the rise of 
despotism.  
 The private retreat of individualism is one of the excesses of equality of conditions. 
Some level of individualism is inevitable in a democracy: equality dismantles the bonds that 
tie the citizen ‘closely to several of his fellow citizens’. Democratic men do not have a sense 
of ‘duty’ to ‘something that is located outside of themselves’ as readily as aristocratic men 
do.16 Without those ready bonds to responsibilities outside himself, democratic man is apt to 
retreat ‘and to withdraw’, giving up ‘large society’ and ‘creating a small society for his own 
use’.17 While seemingly selfish, for Tocqueville, indulging in this is not ‘depraved’, but 
simply imprudent, while also consistent with equality.18 The last chapter explained how this 
tendency shaped the domestic sphere, but this naturally occurring individualism could also 
imperil liberty in society writ large through social atomisation. This is because ‘without a 
common bond’, men are distanced from each other, and ‘[d]espotism raises barriers between 
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them and separates them’.19 Thus, individualism and social atomisation pave the way for 
despotism.  
 Materialism, generated by equality of conditions and the selfishness of individualism, 
also leaves citizens vulnerable to despotism. For Tocqueville, again, materialism is not 
entirely immoral, but it is not without costs. The problem is not indulgence in ‘forbidden 
enjoyments’, but absorption in ‘permitted enjoyments’, which establishes ‘a kind of honest 
materialism that would not corrupt souls, but would soften them and end by silently relaxing 
all their springs of action’.20 Tocqueville noticed that that the Americans’ love of material 
enjoyments led to a restless, ‘feverish ardor’ and anxiety that they had not chosen the most 
immediate route to prosperity.21 He contended that ‘law’ and ‘custom’ settle men, and without 
those appropriate checks of this tendency embedded in the ‘social state’, ‘this restlessness of 
spirit’ will cause people to ‘continually change path’.22 Tocqueville’s hope was that mores 
could help to settle the material angst of men. When men are restless and unschooled in mores 
and ‘the habits of liberty’, ‘the excessive taste’ for material well-being ‘delivers them to the 
first master who presents himself’.23 This is a detriment to liberty, but also to the ‘genius of 
commerce and to the instincts of industry’ that fosters well-being itself.24 When citizens are 
‘[p]reoccupied by the sole concern to make a fortune’, they easily relinquish their liberties 
because the ‘exercise of their political rights seems to them a tiresome inconvenience that 
distracts them from their industry’.25 By forgoing active ‘habits of liberty’ like ‘choosing their 
representatives, coming to the assistance of the authorities, dealing together with common 
affairs’, men forget their interest ‘to remain their own masters’. Among a distracted people, ‘a 
clever man of ambition’ promising ‘good order’ could rise and turn men against liberty so 
long as his tyranny ensures ‘material interests prosper’.26 Materialism leaves men restless, 
unable to commit to a path. It directs their attention away from the active habits of liberty.27 
This defective tendency of equality can lead to despotism.  
 Equality of conditions also leads men to a spiritual restlessness, a ‘disgust for life’ that 
troubles them amid their prosperity and material enjoyments.28 Envy plagues men, as they 
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‘encounter the competition of all’.29 They struggle both to differentiate themselves from the 
‘uniform crowd’ and to ‘establish an equality that is enough for them’.30 They fail constantly 
on both fronts. For Tocqueville, people will never make theselves ‘perfectly equal’, and even 
if they ‘had the misfortune to arrive at this absolute and complete leveling, there would still 
be inequality of intelligence that, coming directly from God, will always escape the laws’.31 
He thought that even natural distinctiveness, like intelligence, frustrates and offends the 
democratic sensibility. 32 Tocqueville believed ‘[t]his immortal and more and more burning 
hatred, which animates democratic peoples against the least privileges, singularly favors the 
gradual concentration of all political rights in the hands of the sole representative of the 
State’.33 These frustrations are insatiable and disorienting, and a power that promises to 
provide order or equality, even ‘equality in slavery’, comes as a relief to men who are 
spiritually restless and existentially disgusted.34  
 Tocqueville contended that, in addition to these tendencies that make citizens 
passively susceptible to despotism, members of democratic society have an inherent, but more 
proactive, taste for centralisation, even though it ultimately encroaches on their liberty. 
Democratic peoples are most ‘at risk of falling under the yoke of administrative centralization’ 
because they are happy ‘to concentrate all governmental power in the hands of the single 
power’ so long as it ‘directly represents the people’.35 As mentioned in the previous chapter in 
terms of how uniformity shapes the political terrain, Tocqueville thought that because 
democratic peoples have a taste for general ideas, they are inclined to prefer a nation ‘directed 
by a single power’.36 The democratic social state itself ‘suggest[s] to men the thought of a 
unique, uniform and strong government’ and it does not naturally suggest ‘the notion of 
intermediary powers’.37 Concentration of power appeals to the democratic mind. 
Thus, democratic inclinations merge with a political preference. Individualism, 
materialism, and spiritual restlessness are all atomising and morally mediocre tendencies of 
equality that put liberty at risk by making citizens receptive to despotism, but also democrats 
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have an inherent taste for centralisation. They are all excesses of equality that must be 
moderated by mores, customs, and habits of liberty, if a democracy is to remain free. 
Tocqueville wrote far less about the dangers of licence associated with independence and 
liberty. He worried more about the excesses of equality taking hold and liberty itself 
disappearing. For example, he acknowledged that the reader may wonder how ‘men so 
independent do not at every moment fall into license’, but he asserted that the democratic 
acquisitive attitude always favours ‘public peace’ and disdains ‘bad morals’ that threaten ‘the 
success of business’.38 In a note to his discussion of despotism, Tocqueville wrote that the real 
danger is ‘general apathy, fruit of individualism’, which could lead to either ‘license or 
tyranny’.39  
The exercise of liberty itself, through self-governance, through town and ‘provincial 
liberties’, and through associations formed to ‘convince and not to compel’, prevents against 
‘license’.40 These moral habits also temper the excesses of equality by drawing man outside 
of himself and rooting him in other-regarding community life. Tocqueville stressed that ‘the 
risks that equality makes human independence run’ are ‘the most formidable as well as the 
least foreseen of all those that the future holds’, but they are not ‘insurmountable’.41 Liberty is 
not certain, but it is not ‘impossible’.42 Democracy can be moralised, by taming the 
tendencies of atomisation, materialism, restlessness, and by familiarising citizens with habits 
that oppose centralisation and licence. ‘A new political science’ would habituate democrats to 
virtue, and, therefore, help them remain free. 43 
 
Mores 
Tocqueville’s account of womanhood and family life are on the frontline of this moralising 
process. Fathers retain authority over children. Women, through an orderly family life, act on 
equality and liberty by making mores that constrain excess and license. In democracy, 
equality is the certainty, and liberty is the possibility. Thus, the moral work of the domestic 
sphere tempers equality for the sake of preserving liberty. In discussing the principal causes 
that maintain the democratic republic in Volume One of Democracy in America, Tocqueville 
stated that religion in America ‘directs mores’ and influences the public sphere ‘by regulating 
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the family’, the domain of women. He contended that religion ‘rules with sovereign power 
over the soul of the woman, and it is the woman who shapes the mores’.44 Tocqueville’s notes 
on this topic further demonstrate his certainty that this moral work of regulating society 
belongs to women, writing ‘[t]he influence that religion exercises over mores in the United 
States must not be exaggerated’ and jotting ‘Its [religion’s] action on the women. It is the 
women who make mores’.45 Of course, the idea is reprised in the second volume of 
Democracy in America in the chapters on womanhood itself: ‘[t]here have never been free 
societies without morals [mœurs], and as I said in the first part of this work, it is the woman 
who molds the morals’.46 Tocqueville never lost sight of this point, and it is essential to 
understanding his associationalism, which can be defined as a network of moderating forces 
that keep democracy free.  
Because they are so essential to a functioning and flourishing democracy, Tocqueville 
explained what he meant by ‘mœurs’, usually translated ‘mores’, sometimes ‘morals’. He 
clarified that by mores he meant ‘habits of the heart’, but also ‘the different notions that men 
possess, to the diverse opinions that are current among them, and to the ensemble of ideas 
from which the habits of the mind are formed’.47 The word encompasses ‘the whole moral 
and intellectual state of a people’.48 These are habits, customs, and norms, shaped culturally 
and practised personally. They are bound up with morality and the mind. They form, in the 
broadest sense of the word, a spiritual disposition of a people. Tocqueville’s trio of factors 
shaping a country is mores, laws, and circumstances.49 Among these, he ranked mores 
foremost. They are the most important of the three, and they are a necessary condition for the 
flourishing of a free society. 
Tocqueville thought that ‘those who lead society’ must learn how  
[t]o instruct democracy, to revive its beliefs if possible, to purify its mores, to regulate 
its movements, to substitute little by little the science of public affairs for its 
inexperience, knowledge of its true interests for its blind instincts; to adapt its 
government to times and places; to modify it according to circumstances and men.50 
 
Tocqueville described a moralising process, a taming of democracy, through beliefs, habits, 
and mature reason, which can be tailored to circumstances. It is the shaping of a ‘whole moral 
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and intellectual state of a people’. He concluded this description with his famous statement: 
‘[a] new political science is needed for a world entirely new’.51 Mores are central to 
Tocqueville’s ‘new political science’.  
 Tocqueville cited ‘above all, mores’ repeatedly over other factors in tempering ‘the 
passions of democracy’.52 He said that the Americans’ ‘guarantee against tyranny’ is ‘in 
circumstances and in mores, rather than in laws’.53 ‘Laws are always shaky’ without mores; 
‘mores form the only resistant and enduring power among a people’.54 Mores are the key to 
‘supporting the dominion of democracy’.55 Tocqueville found much of his considerations on 
democracy linked to mores: ‘I find [the importance of mores] placed in my mind like a central 
point; I see it at the end of all my ideas’.56 He reassured his French audience that his emphasis 
on mores was not to say that American mores ought be imitated in France, but rather 
‘regulating democracy’ is possible with ‘laws and mores’.57 This regulation and moderating 
of democracy was so essential because the inherent tendencies of the democratic social state 
can lead to despotism. Tocqueville sought to demonstrate with the example of America that 
‘mores could allow a democratic people to remain free’.58 Tocqueville feared no one would 
be free, if members of democratic society were not educated in ‘the ideas and sentiments that 
first prepare them for liberty’.59 The instructive work of the domestic sphere relates directly to 
the preservation of liberty. The domestic sphere moderates the excesses of equality, imparting 
the mores – ‘the ideas, beliefs, attitudes, customs, values, and habits’ – necessary to remain 
free.60 Within Tocqueville’s system of democratic moderation, all moderating forces are both 
supported by other-regarding mores and work towards the cultivation of other-regarding 
mores.  
 
Moderating Forces  
Mores are essential to the moderation of democracy. Tocqueville’s assertion that women 
make the mores clearly marks the domestic sphere, the sphere of women’s influence, as a 
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moderating force within democracy. To better contextualise how the domestic sphere operates 
as a moderating force, this section explores how other moderating forces work within 
Tocqueville’s system. Decentralisation, associations, the free press, education, the doctrine of 
self-interest well understood, and religion are often-cited forces that moderate democracy’s 
defects. All of these bulwarks against the excess of equality require mores and habituate 
citizens to liberty and virtue. This habituation and instruction happens in practical contexts, 
where mores are practiced, and instructive contexts, where mores are learned. In the case of 
decentralisation, association, and the free press, moderating forces are practical. In the case of 
education and religion, they are more directly instructive. There is a degree of overlap. The 
practices of decentralisation, association, and the free press all teach citizens, through 
practical application, the habits of liberty and community-spiritedness, but they are largely 
venues for the exercise of morals learned in other venues. Education, religion, and the 
woman’s domestic sphere are more instructive moderating forces, even though moral habits 
are practised and habituated in schools, churches, and homes.  
All moderating forces require ‘art’; they are not entirely natural to democratic peoples, 
and even though they are compatible with the democratic social state, they must be 
constructed, cultivated, and fostered. Self-interest well understood is the moral doctrine of a 
democratic people, and the ‘virtue by habits’ that it cultivates is expressed across all 
moderating forces. All moderating forces require the democratic citizen to make use of other-
regarding mores, a process that deepens the individual’s habituation to virtue. While some 
scholars prefer to create typologies and classifications of Tocqueville’s associations in order 
to better understand them, I hope to consolidate our understanding of associations by 
highlighting the underlying objective that unifies all associations and moderating forces.61 
Gannett thinks that Tocqueville is an inappropriate ‘cheerleader for this saccharine project’ of 
conflating ‘family picnics’ and ‘various types of political engagement’.62 My interpretation 
suggests instead that Tocqueville’s associationalism is unified in a way that shows a profound 
connection between a family reunion and a vote in a local election: both draw the inward-
looking democrat out of himself and habituate him to other-regarding mores. 
Additionally, each moderating force requires learned mores, habits, and norms that 
speak to cultural inheritance and exchange between generations. By establishing that these 
moderating forces all work towards essentially the same end of other-regarding mores and 
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that all require intergenerational regard, we can better understand the paramount role of the 
domestic sphere as the first among moderating forces in Tocqueville’s democratic theory.   
 Among the practical moderating forces, decentralisation is a principal theme. For 
Tocqueville, the American example of decentralisation manifests in provincial administration, 
local and town liberties, and free institutions. All of these avenues require the habits of liberty. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the liberties of decentralisation allow citizens to seek useful, 
effective solutions to local problems, but Tocqueville noted his real interest in 
decentralisation is not ‘in the administrative effects’ but the ‘political effects’.63 This is the 
key to understanding what was at stake for him in terms of moderating forces.  
The consequence of decentralisation is an engaged, active, and proud citizenry with 
habits that tie their own interest to their locality and ultimately to the nation.64 ‘Politically’, 
this moderates individualism, private indulgence in material enjoyment, and restlessness. 
There is a spiritual, or moral, payoff to decentralisation that has a political effect— the 
preservation of liberty. Because ‘the spirit of citizenship’ is enhanced, individuals are 
involved in matters outside themselves and their industry, and they are rooted and invested in 
their neighbourhood.65 This is the weightier facet of decentralisation: the moral and political 
effects – matters of the spirit – bolster liberty in a more profound way than effective practical 
outcomes. Local industriousness matters because it fosters habits that run counter to 
democratic defects. It matters because it fosters virtue, not simply because it makes for more 
useful administration.  
In Volume One of Democracy in America, Tocqueville contended that localism and 
these ‘provincial institutions’ guard against the ‘evils’ of ‘excesses of despotism’. He 
emphasised the practical education and habituation of these provincial institutions. They teach 
‘how to make use of liberty in small things’ so citizens can ‘support [liberty] in larger ones’.66 
Such is the nature of good habits. By learning about the use of their liberty, citizens avoid 
‘licence’ and stave off ‘absolute power’.67 Tocqueville contended that a democratic people 
‘seems to me to have a more real need’ of provincial institutions.68 Towards the end of 
Volume Two, he explained that ‘equality leads men toward administrative decentralization, 
but creates at the same time powerful instincts which turn them away from it’.69 He 
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elaborated: ‘the man of democratic centuries obeys only with an extreme repugnance his 
neighbor who is his equal’; democratic man does not trust his neighbour to be wise or just, 
and he prefers to show his neighbour ‘at every instant the common dependence that they both 
have on the same master’.70 Only learned, artificial mores can balance what is instinctive to 
democratic man and encourage men to work together in their neighbourhood. Successful 
decentralisation ‘will always be a product of art’.71 
 Tocqueville wrote of the more specific aspects of decentralisation, town and local 
liberties and free institutions, in a similar fashion. Impressed, he noted that ‘the American 
town’ works ‘to scatter power’ and ‘to interest more people in public life’. Though towns 
seem to be somewhat natural to men, this scattering of power is done with ‘art’.72 Tocqueville 
admired how the independence and liberty of the New England town roots the citizen and 
refines him.73 Trying ‘his hand at governing society’, he familiarises himself with the habits 
of liberty, and he ‘acquires a taste for order, understands the harmony of powers, and finally 
gathers clear and practical ideas about the nature of his duties as well as the extent of his 
rights’.74 The town provides a practical political education in the mores that interest the 
individual in his fellows, settle him, and keep him free. Tocqueville noted that the norms of 
the town require ‘education’.  
Though these norms may be inherited, they do not come readily to democrats, and the 
Americans are fortunate that ‘the political education of the people’ occurred ‘a long time ago’ 
and ‘they arrived already educated’.75 The mores of the town themselves are instructive, but 
they must be initially taught and inherited. However, this is a fragile inheritance. The 
transmission of habits is also ‘a product of art’, and the transmission of habits does not come 
readily to democrats either.  Though it is not reiterated in this section about town mores, two 
of the major themes of Democracy in America were that equality erodes intergenerational 
connections and equality erodes authority. These tendencies of democracy threaten the 
perpetuation of a particular political education. I suggest that Tocqueville preserved 
intergenerational regard and deference to a gentle, older and wiser, authority within his 
conception of the democratic domestic sphere. Therefore, his hopes for family life were far-
reaching: the domestic sphere could serve as a mode of transmitting these mores of local 
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liberties as well as a mode of habituating the individual to the intergenerational regard 
necessary to take up a particular political inheritance. 
 For Tocqueville, decentralisation is bound up with other-regarding mores. It requires 
other-regarding mores and it fosters other-regarding mores. Features like ‘local liberties’, 
‘free institutions’, and self-governing ‘administration of small affairs’ all work to ‘constantly 
bring men back toward each other despite the instincts that separate them’. This artificial 
element intercedes, working to counter the selfishness inherent to the democratic soul. These 
features encourage men ‘to help each other’, ‘to act together’, to invest in ‘the public good’, 
and to realise ‘that they depend on each other’.76 The Americans’ ‘free institutions’ and 
‘political rights that they use so much’ habituate men to community-oriented action because 
they ‘recall constantly, and in a thousand ways, to each citizen that he lives in society’.77 They 
remind the individual that he is a part of something larger. The individual can be habituated to 
a life away from seductive individualism. The practices of liberty ‘lead his mind at every 
moment toward this idea, that the duty as well as the interest of men is to make themselves 
useful to their fellows’.78 Activities such as ‘choosing their representatives, coming to the 
assistance of the authorities, dealing together with common affairs’ all enlighten and habituate 
citizens.79 These liberties ‘combat the evils that equality can produce’, such as the social 
atomisation and apathy caused by individualism and materialism.80 Tocqueville thought these 
decentralised aspects of political society could foster morality in a people. In turn, this helps 
citizens retain their independence and freedom. Decentralisation is a component of 
Tocqueville’s hopeful plan that virtue can flourish in democracies ‘by habits’.  
 Associations work similarly to decentralisation in political and civil life. Tocqueville 
admired how the Americans create associations for the sake of safety, business, and ideas. 
From taking on intemperance to resolving roadblocks, Americans formed associations, 
without governmental supervision or direction.81 Political associations have an impact on 
government by creating ‘a separate nation within the nation, a government within the 
government’ that can give voice to the minority and spar with the majority that does 
legislate.82 Tocqueville explicitly connected his conclusions about associations to his 
comments ‘elsewhere about town liberties’: democracies, in particular, need these forces to 
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resist ‘abuses of power’.83 Democratic people need to ‘artificially and temporarily create’ 
associations akin to the intermediary ‘natural associations’ of aristocratic societies to form a 
‘dike against any sort of tyranny’.84 Democrats cannot preserve their liberty without their 
neighbours; democratic man must ‘learn the art of uniting with his fellows’ to protect against 
tyranny.85 This is a matter of artifice and education.  Democrats must take care to maintain the 
right mores— the mores that remind them they are part of something outside themselves.  
According to Tocqueville, political associations strike democratic man as less risky 
than others because his love of wellbeing makes him hesitant to risk any of his fortune on 
business or civil matters.86 Thus, political associations are ‘great free schools, where all 
citizens come to learn the general theory of associations’.87 Again, like habits of liberty in 
matters ‘small’ and ‘larger’, a good habit is transferrable. 88 Citizens ‘learn to submit their will’ 
and ‘to subordinate their particular efforts to common action’, and they then translate these 
skills to civil associations, which range from the ‘commercial and industrial’, ‘religious’ and 
‘moral’, to the ‘serious’ and ‘useless’.89 Associations ‘celebrate holidays, establish seminaries, 
build inns, erect churches, distribute books’, commission ‘missionaries’, build ‘hospitals, 
prisons, schools’, and promote ideas.90 Again, the essential feature here is the habit and art of 
uniting with neighbours. It is fostered in a less risky environment of political associations, and 
then exercised across various types of associations. Tocqueville marvelled at what the 
Americans achieved, but his real philosophical interest was in the transferrable habit of other-
regarding virtue and how that habit combatted the worst in democracy.  
Tocqueville admired how the Americans ‘have most perfected the art’ of ‘common’ 
action and developed ‘this new science’.91 He reiterated that if democrats lose the ‘right’ or 
the ‘taste’ for common action, their liberty is imperilled.92 All the same, the cultivation of this 
taste for association is ‘more difficult’ for democratic peoples.93 The equality that makes it 
necessary also makes it challenging. Again, he highlighted the moral facet: the habits of 
association develop ‘the morals and intelligence of a democratic people’ – the spiritual habits 
of the heart and mind – as much as they aid in ‘their trade and industry’ – the material habits 
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of daily life.94 The practice of these mores and ‘the reciprocal action of men on each other’ 
enlarges ‘the heart’ and enriches the ‘mind’, and because ‘this action is almost nil in 
democratic countries’, ‘it must be created there artificially’ by associative life.95 This ‘custom 
of associating in ordinary life’ and ‘art of associating’ must be made, cultivated, and taught.96 
As in the case of decentralisation, association requires a particular moral attitude or 
disposition that is suggestive of a need for intergenerational regard. Tocqueville made clear 
these mores are not inherent to the democratic sensibility. These habits cannot flourish in a 
democratic soul absent of an artificial intervention. They must be made. I argue that the role 
of custom in associations and the necessity of a sustained nurturing of this ‘art of association’ 
both speak to themes of the domestic sphere— authority, moral and intellectual inheritance, 
and intergenerational regard.  
Once habit and the taste for association have been inculcated in citizens, they 
increasingly seek answers in associations for ‘[e]ach new need’.97 Tocqueville insisted this 
‘spirit of association’ is fragile and cannot be ‘repressed’ in some instances and permissible in 
‘certain enterprises’; ‘the habit of associating’ will whither in ‘small’ matters, if men cannot 
associate also for the sake of ‘great’ matters.98 Again, the other-regarding habits are exercised 
across the moderating forces, reinforced by this coherent moral disposition. The ‘great 
schools’ of ‘political associations’ help people ‘daily acquire the general taste for association 
and become familiar with its use’; they learn in ‘great’ political matters, the habits they 
practise in ‘civil life’.99 Associative life moralises regardless of whether matters are great, 
small, serious, or useless. Once the mores of association are established, Tocqueville advised 
that they must be fostered, continually reinforced, practised, and appreciated, for the sake of a 
community-oriented and free people.  
 Tocqueville linked the press closely to associations. Equality means that ‘men are no 
longer bound together in a solid and permanent way’, and ‘you cannot get a large number to 
act in common, unless by persuading each one whose help is needed that his particular 
interest obliges him to unite his efforts voluntarily with the efforts of all the others’. 
Newspapers help in this persuasive effort. The press is yet another tool with precisely the 
same end as all moderating forces: teaching individuals to care for one another. The press 
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creates artificial bonds in a society that lacks ‘solid and permanent’ bonds.100 Newspapers 
proliferate as associations do because they are useful to the flourishing of the association. 
Members of a group ‘must find a means to talk together every day without seeing each other, 
and to march in accord without getting together’.101 Most associations have newspapers to 
facilitate their ‘common action’.102 Newspapers are also essential teaching tools of town life; 
in towns, democratic man learns ‘to cooperate daily with some of his fellow citizens in a 
common work, and each of them needs a newspaper to teach him what the others are 
doing’.103 Just as democrats particularly need artificial associations for the sake of the habits 
of liberty, Tocqueville contended that ‘the dominion of newspapers must grow as men 
become more equal’.104 The press also serves as a vigilant check on power and politicians. 
The press is ‘watchful’ of the ‘secret motivating forces of politics’, and it investigates ‘public 
men’ in ‘the court of opinion’.105 Additionally, because the free press ‘rallies interests around 
certain doctrines and formulates the creed of parties’, newspapers have a role in shaping 
public opinion.106 The press, too, reminds ‘each citizen that he lives in society’.107 
 Each of these moderating forces described thus far contains an element of instruction 
by habituation. Education itself is another factor that Tocqueville addressed in considering 
how to restrain the worst elements of democracy. He noted that in America ‘primary 
education is available to everyone’, but ‘higher education’ is far less common.108 He had 
determined that most members of democracies require an education that is primarily 
‘scientific, commercial, and industrial rather than literary’.109 He contended, however, that 
some citizens ‘destined by their nature or their fortune to cultivate letters’ should be educated 
in ‘ancient literature and be thoroughly penetrated by its spirit’. This ‘healthy regimen’ of ‘the 
works of antiquity’ supports democracies because ancient literature, though not 
‘irreproachable’, has ‘special qualities that can serve marvelously to counterbalance our 
particular defects’. Tocqueville prescribed a classical education for some men in democracies 
because it can ‘support us as we lean over the edge’.110 Education is a countervailing force to 
the deficiencies of modern society. Primary education helps citizens participate, and higher 
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education helps some minds reflect more deeply on democratic society. Both types of 
education work in opposition to stultifying individualism: the moral individualism of 
apathetic passivity and the intellectual individualism that narrowly comprehends only the 
present age.   
Tocqueville contended that education does not constitute simply teaching ‘men to read 
and write’; that cannot ‘make them citizens immediately’.111 He considered ‘elementary 
knowledge’ a useful but insufficient condition for learning ‘the art of being free’. Practice and 
experience are the keys to educating men for liberty. Education and enlightenment does not 
simply mean ‘book learning’. Habituation, that is, becoming ‘accustomed little by little to 
governing themselves’, is central.112 Because of avenues like town liberties and civil 
associations, the American can realise the full extent of his education to know ‘what his rights 
are and what means he must use to exercise them’, to ‘know by what practices the political 
world operates, and to recognise ‘the rules of administration’ and ‘the mechanism of the 
laws’.113 While ‘formal education’ primes man, only experience teaches all ‘this practical 
knowledge and these positive notions’.114 In the Northeast, Tocqueville judged both ‘the book 
learning and the practical education of the people have been most perfected’ and religion has 
most suitably disciplined liberty. 115 He concluded that ‘all these habits, these opinions, these 
customs, these beliefs’ are ‘what I called mores’.116 Education is richer than literacy. 
Education is bound up with the development and transmission of mores from one generation 
to the next. The perpetuation of a practical education therefore requires intergenerational 
regard and deference to authority.   
Tocqueville also discussed political education as something that the Americans 
‘already’ possess.117 Though their political habits were long since shaped by earlier 
generations, this nevertheless implies a sense of the necessary role of instruction and 
inheritance in taming democracy. Tocqueville considered that the ‘Anglo-Americans arrived 
fully civilized on the soil that their posterity occupies; they did not have to learn, it was 
enough for them not to forget’.118 The Americans transmit these mores to their ‘sons … who, 
each year, carry into the wilderness, with their dwelling-place, knowledge already acquired 
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and respect for learning’. While Tocqueville emphasised the risks of individualism in 
breaking down intergenerational links, he nevertheless discussed mores and habits with 
reference to intergenerational respect and regard. The mores exhibited in aspects of social life, 
like associations and town spirit, must be taught, and thus education and the process of 
enlightenment are essential features of his network of moderating forces. He admired that for 
the Americans, ‘[e]ducation made them feel the usefulness of enlightenment and made them 
capable of transmitting this very enlightenment to their descendents’.119 In particular, he noted 
that New England has mastered this taming process: 
In New England, where education and liberty are the daughters of morality and 
religion, where society, already old and long settled, has been able to form maxims 
and habits, the people, while escaping from all the superiorities that wealth and birth 
have ever created among men, have become used to respecting and submitting to 
intellectual and moral superiorities without displeasure; consequently, you see 
democracy in New England make better choices than anywhere else.120  
 
With an education shaped by morals and religion (presumably with the help of women, given 
his statement concerning women’s influence in imparting religious mores), the well-
habituated north-eastern towns flourish in equality without being offended by inescapable 
human distinctiveness in intellect or spirit. Again, Tocqueville preserved an element of 
respect for authority, which allowed this education to take root and tame the defective parts of 
democratic life.  
Tocqueville contrasted this with the South ‘where the social bond is less ancient and 
less powerful’ and ‘instruction is less widespread’. In the South, ‘morality, religion, and 
liberty’ do not strike the right balance for good governance, as in New England.121 Here, it 
seems the perpetuation of mores relies on social attachments and a spirit of a longstanding 
legacy. Environments with fleeting or new social links are not as instructive as those where 
intergenerational cultural links are deeply embedded. This distinction matters for the 
flourishing of liberty in a democratic society because Tocqueville deemed education essential 
in the moralising against the worst within democracies. For Tocqueville’s Americans, ‘the 
instruction of the people serves powerfully to maintain the democratic republic’, and he 
concluded: ‘[i]t will be so, I think, everywhere that the instruction that enlightens the mind is 
not separated from the education that regulates mores’.122 Mores must be taught, and then 
habituated. This process of a particular moral and intellectual inheritance benefits liberty in a 
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democracy, and it relies on some degree of authority and intergenerational regard, which, I 
argue, is initially fostered in the democratic domestic sphere. 
 The domestic sphere holds the prominent position as first among moderating forces 
because it is the most proximate and natural school of habits for the democratic individual. It 
is the first school of habits that the democrat encounters. Additionally, as explained in the 
previous chapter, the naturalness of the domestic sphere also underwrites the authority in the 
domestic sphere. This authority produces the habit of intergenerational regard, which is 
essential to the functioning of all learned mores. As noted, much of what moderates 
democracy in his system is artificial. The domestic sphere is indeed cultivated as a place of 
morals and order, but its foundation is found in nature. As well as being the most immediate 
source of mores, the domestic sphere is the most reliable because it relies more on nature and 
less on art. The social bonds and interpersonal and intergenerational regard required to make 
habits are more naturally developed within the family. These bonds and regard that are 
required to perpetuate habits in other moderating forces are in need of constant artificial care, 
attention, and work. The domestic sphere is a hybrid of natural and artificial. Tocqueville’s 
insistence on the natural elements of the domestic sphere suggests it is robust. The domestic 
sphere is stalwart in the face of the democratic ills that can threaten the habits of most 
moderating forces.  
It is essential to note that the domestic sphere was not entirely unique in being partly 
natural and partly cultivated. Tocqueville did contend that town life and religion were also in 
some ways ‘natural’ to people.123 The naturalness of the town, however, must be 
complemented by ‘art’ and hard work to preserve ‘town liberty’ and ‘town institutions’.124 
Tocqueville did not suggest that familial bonds of affection need such constant attention and 
‘art’. His model of family life simply yields grand family spirit as lost to a former age and 
presents family bonds as natural and inviolable. This may be hopeful, but he proposed that 
family bonds ought to be strong on a basic level, whereas he admitted the precariousness of 
the bonds of town and associative life. While Tocqueville mourned grand family spirit, he 
suggested no such precariousness in terms of the domestic sphere. Furthermore, the 
naturalness of the family is not only robust; the naturalness also provides that basis for the 
authority that is necessary to cultivate inherited customs. The naturalness of the town is better 
off without the help of ‘the legislator’, just like natural family bonds, but the naturalness of 
the town does not provide the intergenerational authority needed to perpetuate mores— even 
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town mores.125 That begins at home, and a people, having learned how to submit to a 
moderate form of authority, are able to cultivate a flourishing town life.126 The use of nature 
in the domestic sphere is noteworthy because it is bound up with authority, which is essential 
to the production of learned mores. Nature in the family is more akin to Tocqueville’s 
considerations on religion, which are explored further below.  
 Within Tocqueville’s system, the last vestige of intergenerational regard is found in 
the domestic sphere, which relies on natural bonds and a natural form of authority. In 
Democracy in America, he was deeply anxious about the breakdown of both authority and 
intergenerational bonds. His understanding of individualism, the core defect of democracy, 
addressed the breakdown of links in the generations, first, and then the breakdown in wider 
society. Under equality of conditions, ‘the thread of time is broken at every moment, and the 
trace of the generations fades’; individualism is a uniquely democratic problem because of 
this.127 While democracy reshapes grand sensibilities about family spirit, he insisted upon a 
small, moderate degree of intergenerational regard within the democratic nuclear family. 
Intergenerational regard is comprised of a sense of deference on the part of the child and a 
sense of natural authority (and responsibility to volunteer moral and intellectual guidance) on 
the part of the parent. Neither the child’s deference, not the parent’s authority can be absolute 
in a democracy, but a degree of intergenerational regard is preserved for the sake of a free 
democratic life. Every element of Tocqueville’s associationalism that preserves freedom 
requires inherited, learned, artificial mores. These mores are imparted and taught from a place 
of authority. His understanding of a natural form of authority in the domestic sphere is based 
on a father’s natural right to command and a mother’s natural position as the maker of mores. 
He hoped that this moderate, tempered form of authority and intergenerational deference 
could be preserved in the face of a wider breakdown and disconnection from an ancestral past. 
I suggest that the domestic sphere is relevant to every moderating force. All of Tocqueville’s 
moderating forces work in a similar way towards a similar end, and they all rely on inherited, 
taught customs. Before mores are learned across various moderating forces, deference to 
inherited wisdom is habituated at home.  
 Among this array of habits and customs that cultivate a moral, outward disposition, 
Tocqueville considered the moral doctrines of a democratic people. He deemed two elements 
essential: the doctrine of self-interest well understood and religious belief. Both serve 
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democratic peoples to combat the individualism, materialism, and restlessness inherent to 
equality of conditions. The doctrine of self-interest well understood is a morality suited to the 
democratic age.128 All moderating forces express this doctrine. Tocqueville wrote: ‘I have 
already shown, in several places in this work, how the inhabitants of the United States almost 
always knew how to combine their own well-being with that of their fellow citizens’. 129 
These are the instances of decentralisation and association that encourage individuals to work 
together. The doctrine of interest well-understood is ‘the general theory by the aid of which 
they succeed in doing so’.130  
Because democrats are an inexorably practical people, virtue is ‘useful’ not 
‘beautiful’.131 He noticed that moralists teach that self-interest is bound up with the interest of 
the other, and through ‘enlightened love of themselves’, democratic men can ‘help each other’ 
and make ‘small sacrifices’.132 This doctrine is easy to understand and to adopt because it 
appeals to ‘personal interest’, and by ‘[a]ccommodating itself marvelously to the weaknesses 
of men’, it effortlessly takes hold of citizens’ sensibilities.133 While this doctrine diminishes 
‘extraordinary virtues’, it works with the defects of democracy to combat those very defects 
by interesting men in his neighbours via his own self-love.134 Tocqueville thought, however, 
that ‘the century of blind devotions and instinctive virtues is already fleeing far from us’.135 
He maintained that the way forward for the democratic age was to accept ‘individual interest’ 
will be ‘the sole motivating force of the actions of men’, and therefore men need instruction 
to ‘enlighten them at all cost’. Without the doctrine of self-interest well understood and an 
education preparing democratic citizens for liberty, ‘it is difficult to predict to what stupid 
excess their egoism could be led’ or ‘what shameful miseries they would plunge themselves, 
out of fear of sacrificing something of their well-being to the prosperity of their fellows’.136 
Less grand than the morality of the aristocratic age, this humble morality tempers, through 
habits, democratic ills. Social atomisation, materialism, and restlessness are moderated by 
habits that draw, and ‘drag’, democratic man out of himself and root him in a community. 137 
The doctrine of self-interest well understood shapes democratic morality by leading men to 
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‘virtue by habits’.138 The cultivation of moral habits that takes place in the context of each 
moderating force is an expression and reinforcement of this democratic morality. The doctrine 
of interest well understood helps us understand what really matters in moderating democracy: 
moral habits. The democratic experience demands a particular kind of moral education that 
accustoms individuals to other-regarding habits.  
 Many of Tocqueville’s moderating forces work to localise administration or to check 
power, by drawing or ‘scattering’ power, and thereby they combat despotism. All of the 
forces that moderate democracy and bolster against democratic despotism, however, deal in 
mores and deal in ‘dragging’ man ‘out of himself’. Associations and local liberties are not as 
immediately morally compelling as religious teachings and practices, but the underlying logic 
and purpose is the same. All moderating forces accustom men to other-regarding and 
community-oriented habits. Tocqueville deemed local liberties, associations, and the press 
useful and effective, but their real worth is in habituating members of society to virtue— a 
less ‘extraordinary virtue’, a humble virtue suited to democratic age. His network of 
moderating forces all combat, in different ways, the inward-looking moral mediocrity that he 
believed accompanies democracy. As previously noted, he contended that man’s capacity for 
self-sacrifice is dimmed by democracy. Thus, to maintain some degree of other-regarding 
virtue and the possibility for moral grandeur, men must be educated and redirected away from 
the inherent indulgences of democracy, and, to pursue the good, they must remain free. The 
challenge for democrats is to construct the means within society that moderate democratic 
defects, preserve liberty, and encourage men towards ‘the free choice of the good’.139 
The solution is the right mores. This takes hard work. While mores can be made fitting 
to democracy, they remain artifices that must be taught. Tocqueville instructed: ‘[w]e must 
not aim to make ourselves similar to our fathers, but to work hard to attain the type of 
grandeur and happiness that is appropriate to us’.140 This is why living freely is an art: the 
future must be made. Amidst all this concern for artifice, nature remains relevant. Tocqueville 
insisted that the making of mores is the natural responsibility of women and that fathers have 
a ‘natural right’ over children, and therefore, in the first instance, much of this hard work 
takes place within the domestic sphere, which fosters intergenerational regard and teaches 
habits.  
                                                
138 Ibid., 922. 
139 Quoted in: Kahan, Religion, 66. 
140 Tocqueville, DA2, 1283. 
   
 
202 
Religion and the Domestic Sphere 
I have made the case that all moderating forces work to cultivate a moral disposition in 
democrats. I have argued that these forces rely on the taught, artificial habits made by women 
and the norm of intergenerational regard preserved at home. If the domestic sphere nourishes 
the morality of a democratic society, the question remains: what nourishes the morality of the 
domestic sphere? The answer is religion, which is one of Tocqueville’s most discussed and 
heralded moderating forces within democratic society.  
Religion is unlike local liberties, decentralised administration, or political, industrial, 
and commercial associations. Religion is educative, but its teachings are far beyond the basics 
of literacy. Tocqueville knew religion and interest would blend in democracies, but religion 
nevertheless maintains expectations of self-sacrifice and moral grandeur. This complemented 
interest well understood. Tocqueville argued that religion was a major moderating force in 
American society, and he approved of how the Americans had ‘blended’ fruitfully ‘spirit of 
religion and the spirit of liberty’.141 In America, ‘[l]iberty considers religion as the safeguard 
of mores’, and mores as the safeguard of liberty’s ‘own duration’.142 Religion disciplines 
freedom by reigning in limitless liberty. Religion constrains men from imagining and 
venturing ‘everything’.143 When religion is moralising democratic life, it helps men to be free. 
The hold of religion on a person’s heart was unique compared to the morning 
newspaper or a recreational club. Tocqueville thought that the longing for the immortal also 
has universal, broad appeal in a way that particularities of certain associations may not. As 
Kahan neatly articulates: ‘Not everyone will want to be a stamp collector or a member of an 
environmental group, but all human beings want to go to heaven and live forever’.144 Of a 
typical list of moderating forces that comprise Tocqueville’s associationalism, religion stands 
out as the most immediately spiritually compelling. As discussed above, I hope to position the 
domestic sphere more prominently within the scholarly discussion of Tocqueville’s thought 
on maintaining liberty in a democracy. By drawing attention to how the domestic sphere 
facilitates the flourishing of religion, I connect the domestic sphere to an aspect of 
Tocqueville’s thought that is already considered ‘a major theme’.145 Demonstrating the 
connections between the domestic sphere and religion further bolsters the case for 
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establishing the domestic sphere as more prominent within the literature on how democracy is 
moderated and liberty is preserved in Tocqueville’s thought.  
All of Tocqueville’s avenues for moderating democratic ills and habituating a people 
to mores work along the same lines: they accustom people to actions that relate to something 
larger than themselves. Religion and the domestic sphere involve more immediately, however, 
the notion of self-sacrifice. Religion and the domestic sphere, as moderating forces set apart, 
also operate very similarly, in the private sphere, by relying on nature and authority. Most 
importantly, religion and the domestic sphere are closely allied within Tocqueville’s thought: 
religion influences a democratic people through the home. A closer examination of these 
special aspects of social life is warranted, given the unique status of the domestic sphere and 
religion within his thought.  
As the above sections have argued, all moderating forces work towards the end of 
moral habits. The domestic sphere and religion, however, relate to the cultivation of virtue in 
more overt ways because both relate to explicit themes of self-sacrifice, duties to fellows, and 
other-regarding mores. The regard for the other taught and modelled in church or the home is 
at work when a community comes together to solve a local problem or rally around a cause. 
The activity of local solutions merely reinforces moral habits, but peaceable, efficient 
management of an ‘obstruction’ blocking traffic is not reflective of a powerful call to self-
sacrifice.146 Religious education in the domestic sphere, however, is.  
As the last chapter discussed in the section on courage and sacrifice, self-sacrifice is 
difficult in democracy. It is bound up with acts of ‘great devotion’ and ‘virtue by will’.147 
Direct promotion of greatness and self-sacrifice does not always ring true in democratic 
society, as seen in the discussion of self-interest well understood.148 According to Tocqueville, 
neither the domestic sphere nor religion in a democracy is very heavy-handed in terms of 
speaking directly about self-sacrifice, though both relate to self-sacrifice and personal duty to 
others. Self-sacrifice is taught by example at home. The domestic sphere is largely defined by 
private womanhood. ‘[T]he details of domestic administration’ are managed by the wife, and 
the intimate sphere of family life is her domain.149 The domestic sphere is imbued with her 
moral exemplarity, and it is characterised by being set apart from the moral and material 
tumult of commercial society. The woman’s sacrifice of her liberty for the sake of husband 
and home makes the domestic sphere representative of the highest form of other-regarding 
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virtue— total self-sacrifice for the sake of an end larger than oneself. That end is ‘domestic 
felicity’, the orderly private sphere that helps moderate democratic society.150  
Likewise, religion requires a commitment to a greater whole. Tocqueville highlighted 
that all religions ‘impose on each man some duties toward the human species or in common 
with it’.151 He believed that the moral dogma provided by religion benefits democratic society. 
It resolves moral questions and encourages democrats to contradict their selfish impulses.152 
He contended that there was a ‘direct action of religion on politics’ in America and that 
Christianity ‘of all religious doctrines’ is ‘the one most favorable to liberty’ as well as ‘the 
one most favorable to equality’.153 However, he found the ‘more powerful’ influence of 
religion on political life occurs ‘when religion is not speaking about liberty’; this is when ‘it 
best teaches the Americans the art of being free’.154 He immediately proceeded to discuss ‘the 
duties of men toward one another’ and to assert that society benefits from the ‘morality’ 
fostered by religion, whether ‘any’ or ‘the true religion’.155 Tocqueville saw a practical link 
between Christianity and liberty, but his real interest in religion for democracy was the 
moralising element, the imposition of duties. The mores taught by religion are more 
politically relevant than the immediate practical link to liberty. Though the moral element is 
more prominent in the case of religion, this is akin to the logic of the scattered power of local 
liberties (discussed above), which practically defend against a mighty central power, but 
whose real value lies in the habituation to other-regarding mores. The real political impact lies 
in the moralisation of souls and sensibilities. By demonstrating the example of sacrifice and 
establishing (albeit dogmatically) the expectation of duty, the domestic sphere and religion 
introduce the democrat to the notion of other-regarding virtue. It is not a habit until it is 
practised. This requires a peaceful, affectionate home and regular religious observance.  
The home is not only the location of a uniquely grand sacrifice in a democracy; it also 
accustoms restless democratic men and unschooled children to love of neighbour. 
Tocqueville’s family members share natural loving bonds, and fathers interact gently with 
children, respecting their independence while sharing his wisdom. The woman makes mores 
and shares them in the family; they are practised first at home. Family life habituates 
individuals to other-regarding norms through daily instances of social negotiation. Allen has 
noted this and proposes an explanation: ‘[s]ympathy was seldom a response to the other in the 
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abstract; the art of responding empathetically required actual knowledge of self and 
conjectures about others gained from experience and refection’.156 I agree that the proximity 
of siblings makes for citizens’ earliest experiences of sociability. Womanhood and family life 
together are primary in instilling habits that resist the wayward inwardness of democratic ills. 
These habits are encouraged within the domestic sphere by moral instruction and by the 
woman’s moral example.  
Religion also teaches ‘entirely opposite instincts’ to the worst side effects of equality 
of conditions.157 The democratic individual is usually free in a democracy, but ‘religion 
prevents them from conceiving of everything and forbids them to dare everything’.158 These 
messages are transmitted through religious services and a shared active religiosity among a 
people. Tocqueville highlighted how Sunday worship in America addresses ‘the innumerable 
evils caused by pride and covetousness’, teaches the management of ‘desires’, and 
communicates ‘the fine enjoyments attached to virtue alone’.159 At the same time, he noted 
that American priests encourage people to worship by highlighting a self-interested 
component in religion.160 The democrat enters church largely by interest, continues 
attendance by habit (or perhaps at the insistence of a wife or mother), and he leaves more 
virtuous. This is another instance of the democratic morality of ‘virtue by habits’. Tocqueville 
was impressed by American religiosity. When writing glowingly of town life, he included 
comments on church life as well.161 He thought that the Americans possessed a ‘religious zeal’ 
that mixed with their love of liberty, which encouraged them to send missionaries to moralise 
the frontier.162 Clubs and associations gathered to address religious needs, such as building 
churches or funding ‘missionaries to the Antipodes’.163  
He was struck by the Americans’ respect for the Sabbath. He painted a picture of 
dramatic stillness, quite unexpected among a competitive, restless democratic people. ‘A 
profound rest, or rather a kind of solemn recollection follows; the soul, finally, regains self-
possession and contemplates itself’. He found that the wider social norms made way for 
American religiosity: ‘commercial and industrial life seems suspended; all noise ceases’, and 
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‘each citizen, surrounded by his children, goes to church’.164 Tocqueville admired this scene, 
and he noted that regular worship is a family activity. He also noted some Americans’ 
proclivities for ‘an excited and almost fierce spiritualism’ that spurred them to ‘cross difficult 
places and go through uninhabited woods in order to come from far away to hear [itinerant 
preachers]’.165 A meaningful impact of religion on political life in a democracy required 
active involvement, regular practice, and a variety of expressions of faith that work to 
habituate democrats to the impositions of other-regarding duties. This is how they become 
other-regarding mores. Teachings concerning duties and sacrifice are practiced and habituated 
within the domestic sphere and the religious sphere.  
 Tocqueville contended that the work of religion and the domestic sphere is essential in 
the face of the socially divisive forces of democracy, which ‘loosens social bonds’.166 In both 
instances, he thought that as the social and political bonds of the past declined, which had 
demanded other-regarding duties and social obligations, new bonds were needed to foster 
other-regarding virtue. Tocqueville asked, in writing of religion, ‘[h]ow could society fail to 
perish if, while the political bond grows loose, the moral bond does not become tighter?’.167 
Moral obligations to others must be made by religious customs to compensate for the lost 
sense of duty that was embedded in the aristocratic system. Likewise, Tocqueville’s 
discussion of the domestic sphere submitted a model family life where ‘natural bonds’ of 
familial intimacy flourish with ‘energy and sweetness’ in the absence of the political and legal 
obligations of aristocracy.168 These non-political bonds allow for the development of the 
mores that are so necessary to the preservation of liberty in a democracy.  
Not only do the domestic sphere and religion foster mores that resolve selfishness, 
they also root restlessness. The home and religious dogma both root democratic man in a deep 
and permanent way. This rooting is more substantial than an investment in local town life or 
volunteering with a faith group, which can also root man within a community. The home and 
religious dogma both bring the democrat a deeper peace, that in turn serves him in the wider 
world. Tocqueville’s domestic sphere, as exemplified by the Americans, contrasted with ‘the 
agitation of the political world’. By offering democratic man ‘order and peace’, ‘the bosom of 
his family’ countered and calmed the frenetic anxiety inherent to the democratic condition. 
Tocqueville was impressed that the ‘American draws from his home the love of order that he 
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then carries into the affairs of the State’.169 In the case of religion, he wrote that religious 
dogma resolves the ‘perpetual agitation’ of countless moral decisions and ‘limitless 
independence’ in the moral and intellectual realm.170 The home and religion alike root 
restlessness and revive agitated weariness.  
Tocqueville’s hopes for how religion and the domestic sphere operate in and influence 
a democracy noticeably parallel each other. He adamantly insisted on the element of privacy 
in each of these moderating forces. He admired Americans for preserving the privacy of the 
womanhood that defined the domestic sphere, and he pointed to the separation of church and 
state and the apolitical position of priests in America as positive assets. These two moderating 
forces also mirror each other in their balanced, moderate formulation. As discussed in 
previous chapters, Tocqueville imagined a domestic sphere that balanced democracy, nature, 
and authority. His understanding of religion was akin to this.  
The domestic sphere is a private retreat run by a strictly private woman. For his 
womanhood to do the moral work Tocqueville hoped for in a democracy, womanhood had to 
be private and domestic, and it had to exhibit something akin to the ‘extraordinary virtue’ of a 
lost age. The safe haven of home is paramount to women’s work. Though he warned of the 
possibility of an atomising private retreat of families from wider society, he contended that 
the democratic woman was strictly domestic. The home relies on her leadership within the 
home. Between husband and wife, the democratic woman is ultimately subordinate, but 
‘enclosed in her home’, the woman ‘rules’.171 This is akin to the impact of privacy on 
religion; Tocqueville appreciated that in America religion ‘acts only within a single circle, but 
… predominates within it without effort’.172  
For the influence of the woman to predominate within the home, Tocqueville 
suggested her interests cannot be divided. The home is her realm, and it is her only realm. The 
woman is tasked solely with domestic work and making mores. All her effort and attention 
are focussed on the home, from housekeeping to moral inculcation. All her ‘manly traits’ are 
directed towards creating a comfortable retreat and a schoolhouse of mores. Additionally, the 
influence of womanhood does not overreach and become fruitless. Correspondingly, 
Tocqueville admired how religion in America is fortified and made ‘more durable’ because 
the sphere of its command is bounded.173 Privacy in each of these moderating forces works 
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similarly. The socially beneficial impact of each is most considerable when each remains 
private.  
Women are relegated to the private sphere in order to consolidate their scope of 
influence and realise the full potential of their moralising impact. In addition to this 
consolidation of power, relegating women to the private sphere protects women from the 
competition and envy of public and professional life. Tocqueville desired a particularly 
virtuous and unselfish womanhood in democratic society, but materialism, greed, and 
selfishness are fostered by democratic society. If the ultimate end of womanhood is the 
production of moral habits, it follows that it is to women’s benefit to avoid commercial and 
political life. If shielded from the worst of democracy, the democratic woman’s moral purity 
is sustained. Additionally, because she does not participate in the public sphere after marriage, 
she does not introduce competition into the home, which would lead to the destruction of the 
family.174 The family unit may compete within the community, but husband and wife do not 
compete with each other. This private element of Tocqueville’s womanhood ultimately 
fortifies and protects the mores themselves that women are uniquely equipped to mould. 
Tocqueville likewise insisted that priests remain apart from public life. He admired the 
American norm that priests ‘take a kind of professional pride in remaining apart’ from 
political power.175 He believed that religion was necessary to society, but had to remain 
separate from the public sphere for it to flourish: 
I feel so convinced of the nearly inevitable dangers that beliefs run when their 
interpreters mingle in public affairs, and I am so persuaded that Christianity must at all 
cost be maintained within the new democracies, that I would prefer to chain priests 
within the sanctuary than to allow them out of it.176 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two in the section on Tocqueville’s intellectual development and his 
experiences of the citoyenne, Tocqueville noted how Americans are always preoccupied by 
‘political concerns’, think it ‘the greatest business’ and ‘the only pleasure’ in the first volume 
of Democracy in America.177 Recall that he highlighted how much this preoccupation 
permeates society, by stating that ‘women themselves’ attend ‘public assemblies’ and 
‘political speeches’ to ‘relax from household cares’. Any suggestions of public engagements 
and even leisure are absent from his account in the second volume. Women’s involvement in 
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political ‘clubs’ is overlooked in the more thorough account of womanhood.178 Women only 
appear in Volume Two (separately from his chapters on womanhood) in his discussion of 
spiritualism: ‘families, old people, women and children’ all travel far afield to hear spiritualist 
preachers.179   
As noted in Chapter Two, given the necessity of the private to the moral work of 
Tocqueville’s womanhood, as well as his increasingly anxious perspective on democracy, it is 
likely that setting aside women’s fondness for ‘political concerns’ in his more specific 
reflections on womanhood was purposeful in his hope to establish a private womanhood, 
rather than negligent reporting. Tocqueville included women in his discussion of spiritualism 
in much the same way as he did in his discussion of political concerns in the first volume— as 
emphasis, even women participate. Nevertheless, given his more direct discussion of women 
excludes any mention of womanly activities outside the home, perhaps it is unsurprising the 
only example of women’s activities outside the home, in the second volume, relates to 
passionate religious activities. Tocqueville’s great worry was an immoral, inward-looking 
populace that could allow itself to lose its liberty. In an effort to combat this, he ensured that 
womanhood and religion are private for the sake of the mores that keep society free. Their 
political impact relies on privacy.  
Additionally, Tocqueville’s understanding of religion and the domestic sphere both 
account for nature and authority as well as democracy. The previous chapters on 
Tocqueville’s models demonstrated this in the instance of the domestic sphere. The themes 
are reflected in his comments on religion. Tocqueville was aware that religions in 
democracies would inevitably become worldlier and more democratic. He saw American 
priests make use of self-interest to coax people to church, and he noted how Americans 
understood religion as useful to liberty in political life and ‘the good things of this world’.180 
Even though democracy gave religion this practical flavour, he believed in the naturalness of 
religion, in a natural spiritual need, that did not dissolve simply because the new democratic 
state accommodates complete moral and intellectual independence. He thought that the 
‘power over [American] souls’ demonstrated precisely ‘how useful and natural religion is to 
man’ because it dominates most in the country ‘the most enlightened and the most free’.181 
Even enlightened and free peoples cannot escape nature. ‘[Religion] is as natural to the 
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human heart as hope itself’, and ‘faith alone is the permanent state of humanity’.182 Religion 
will always have natural resources to draw upon: ‘the taste for the infinite and the love of 
what is immortal’ are ‘sublime instincts’ that ‘have their unchanging foundation in [man’s] 
nature’.183 The moral strength of the position of religion in society relies in large part on 
nature, something outside and beyond the trappings of a particular, be it democratic or 
aristocratic, social state. This is akin to my discussion of the domestic sphere explored in 
Chapters Three and Four. The moral strength of the domestic sphere, and the particular type 
of womanhood necessary to its flourishing, also relies heavily on nature. Likewise, the 
domestic sphere retains elements of authority, softened by, but not obliterated by, democracy.  
 Tocqueville also contended that authority was valuable in religion. Authority 
contributed to religion as a moderating force within democratic society. One of the great 
benefits of religion to democrats lies in how it roots them. This requires ‘authority’ in 
‘religious matters’, and without it, ‘men are soon frightened by the sight of this limitless 
independence’, and ‘perpetual agitation’ depletes them.184 Tocqueville thought that ‘authority 
must always be found somewhere in the intellectual and moral world’, and he thought 
religious dogmas were a good place for democrats, ever prone to intellectual independence, to 
begin.185 In the arena of ‘God and human nature’, ‘there is the most to gain and the least to 
lose by recognizing an authority’.186 
Additionally, the theme of authority emerges in Tocqueville’s discussion of 
Catholicism. Though he later, privately, revised his prediction that Catholicism would 
flourish in a democracy, his logic concerning the attraction of Catholicism for democratic 
man was consistent with his expectation that all peoples, democratic or otherwise, need some 
form of authority.187 Even in democracies, this can be expressed in social hierarchies, like that 
of husband and wife and father and child within the domestic sphere. Tocqueville perceived 
that Catholicism may be attractive to the democratic sensibility because of ‘its great unity’ 
and the democrat’s ‘secret admiration for its government’.188 For the democrat, perhaps there 
is comfort in the hierarchical authority of the Catholic church, even though this contradicts an 
inherent passion for equality. The authority and hierarchy that structures the Catholic Church 
has the appeal of unity, for which democrats long, without the mediocre homogeneity so 
                                                
182 Ibid., 482.  
183 Tocqueville, DA2, 940. 
184 Ibid., 745. 
185 Ibid., 716. 
186 Ibid., 744. 
187 Ibid., 755 note e. 
188 Ibid., 755. 
   
 
211 
dangerous to democracy. Although Tocqueville was motivated to demonstrate to both French 
Catholics and French liberals the compatibility of democracy and Catholicism, nevertheless, 
his statements concerning Catholicism are congruent with his broader logic concerning the 
relationship between democracy and authority, as exemplified in his vision of the domestic 
sphere.189  
Again, as in the case of the domestic sphere, Tocqueville believed balancing 
democratic instincts with authority would most benefit democratic society, and authority was 
an integral part of making religion effective. His thoughts on pantheism, which is necessarily 
free from hierarchy and dogma, demonstrate his scepticism that religion without authority can 
be beneficial in the effort to preserve liberty and moral grandeur in democracy.190 His 
preferred formulation of religion that heeds nature and authority, while yielding somewhat to 
the earthliness of democracy, maps precisely onto his hope for the domestic sphere. Religion, 
like the domestic sphere, draws strength from this balance in order to best moderate 
democracy. A fully democratised home and spiritual sphere, where nature and authority are 
overrun by the whims of democratic defects, cannot provide the solutions that Tocqueville 
was seeking.  
 In addition to providing for democracy the same moral benefits and doing so in a 
similar fashion, religion and the domestic sphere are also explicitly linked in Tocqueville’s 
thought. Religious mores feed into society through the woman within the home. As noted, 
separation of church and state was important to Tocqueville, and he believed this standard 
helped religion and democracy flourish. He assigned family life, rather than political life, as 
the vehicle for the influence of religion on society. Tocqueville admired how religion 
moderated democratic defects in America, and he admired that it did so, not through ‘laws or 
on the detail of political opinions’, but through ‘mores’. These religious mores ‘regulate’ 
political life through the family: ‘it is by regulating the family that [religion] works to regulate 
the State’.191  
This is the crux of how mores work within Tocqueville’s system. They are 
fundamentally moral habits, not simply good political norms, that are made at home. The 
domestic sphere serves all aspects of associative life by establishing these essential religious 
and other-regarding mores. Because the domestic sphere acts as the conduit for religion, it 
might be said that religion is foremost among moderating forces. I contend however that 
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religion cannot work as a moderating force in democratic society in Tocqueville’s system, 
unless it works through the domestic sphere. Religion cannot do without the private sphere. 
Religion, while grand, is less effective – in terms of what Tocqueville’s hoped religion could 
do in democracy – without the work of women within the family. The domestic sphere, while 
less grand, remains the keystone of Tocqueville’s associationalism.  
 Religion, because of its moralising capacity, is ever-present in considerations of 
Tocqueville’s associationalism and system of moderation. Religion is usually prominent in 
scholarly discussions of his hopes for the preservation of liberty in a democracy, from 
Manent’s iconic 1993 book to Scheilfer’s 2012 companion to Democracy in America to the 
2017 volume of essays on ‘the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty’.192 The domestic 
sphere is a less standard theme. However, an examination of the similarity of the domestic 
sphere and religion, within Tocqueville’s thought, illuminates my argument that the domestic 
sphere is similarly significant. Additionally, by highlighting the integral role of the domestic 
sphere in his understanding of how religion can successfully influence democratic society, the 
significance of the domestic sphere is further established. In terms of the moderating forces 
that Tocqueville signalled as necessary to free democracies, the domestic sphere, though not 
often heralded, proves fundamental. 
 
Domestic Sphere and Tocqueville’s Democratic Theory 
In the domestic sphere, mothers, with their natural ally religion, and fathers, with their natural 
right to command, shape moral and intellectual habits. The other-regarding mores made in the 
domestic sphere are practised elsewhere within a wider network of moderating forces. Herein 
lies the significance of the domestic sphere to Tocqueville’s democratic theory. His 
associationalism, liberty, and virtue itself rely on mores. Mores rely on a particular kind of 
womanhood and family life, and in trying to understand Tocqueville’s hopes for moderating 
democracy, we must unpack his hopes for the domestic sphere.   
While the gendered separate spheres thesis was hardly revolutionary, as addressed in 
Chapter Two, it is evident from the context of Tocqueville’s democratic theory and his logic 
concerning the progress and defects of equality of conditions that he was doing something 
interesting and important with his formulation of womanhood and family life. His effort to 
articulate a specific model of domestic sphere for the democratic age, in the face of 
democratic defects, adds credence to the idea that womanhood and family life are crucial to 
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his democratic theory. He went to great lengths to describe a form of domestic life contrary to 
many American realities of the period and contrary to his own logic of equality of conditions. 
He must have had a reason.  
From the earlier examination of his intellectual context, it is evident that Tocqueville 
largely accorded with a plethora of political philosophies that assigned women to the 
domestic sphere, though his account of democratic girlhood is somewhat unusual. From 
looking to the realities of social history in Jacksonian American, it is evident that he 
documented some American norms while decidedly overlooking others. From examining 
womanhood with a view to his wider democratic theory, we have learned that he articulated a 
womanhood and family structure that resisted the inherent impulses of democracy. By 
establishing these backgrounds, both contextual and textual, it is incontrovertible that 
Tocqueville had normative motivations behind his report of American women and family life. 
He proffered a domestic sphere that was superficially traditional, but made for the new 
democratic age. In order for this domestic sphere to be an effective tool in Tocqueville’s quest 
to moralise democracy, it actually had to defy much of what was inherent to democracy.  
The sequestered aspect of womanhood is contrary to the inherent instincts of 
democracy. This contradiction indicates his normative motivation. He was motivated to 
preserve liberty. By resisting democracy, womanhood preserves liberty. Upon close 
examination of his thought, this version of womanhood is seemingly incongruous, and that 
fact that it is unusual suggests he forged his womanhood for a theoretical purpose. This 
discussion of his network of moderating forces has clarified that purpose. 
The woman, through family life, has the initial, most personal influence upon the 
inculcation of moral habits. The woman works through the most intimate association, the 
family. Though Tocqueville’s discussion of the democratic domestic sphere comprises a few 
chapters of Democracy in America, by demonstrating the connection of the domestic sphere 
to major themes in Tocqueville’s democratic theory, we can better determine its significance. 
Clearly, womanhood and family life work in Tocqueville along the same lines as the other, 
perhaps more famous, moral mechanisms, like associations or religion.  
Womanhood defies democratic defects, and family life maintains authority in the face 
of democratic levelling. The domestic sphere is first among moderating forces. The woman’s 
superior and matchless position suggests that as a feature of a flourishing democracy, she is 
irreplaceable. Democratic man, who, Tocqueville admitted, is readily susceptible to pervasive 
uniformity and mediocrity, cannot perform the work of the woman. Family life provides for 
an intimate school of habits and establishes the norm of intergenerational regard and 
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deference to authority. Local liberties, associations, and even religion cannot perform the 
work of the domestic sphere. Relying on natural authority and intimacy, the domestic sphere 
is particularly robust and consistent amid the array of moderating forces. It is first among 
many.  
The domestic sphere plays an essential role in the making of mores that keep 
democracy free, and therefore, allow for the possibility of moral grandeur. Additionally, there 
is no substitute for the democratic domestic sphere in Tocqueville’s theory. The democratic 
woman is unique in both how she is affected by democracy and how she affects democracy. 
The natural moral and intellectual authority preserved in the home is rare among democrats. 
Tocqueville’s domestic sphere is essential to the formation of a peoples’ ‘intellectual and 
moral state’, their mores, and therefore, it is essential to the preservation of liberty. This 
chapter has sought to justify the profound normative significance of women and family life 
within Tocqueville’s democratic theory by demonstrating how mores are both the fuel and the 
end of all moderating forces. Woman and family life feed the network forces of moral 
habituation by makings the mores and by preserving intergenerational regard. As makers of 
religiously infused mores, Tocqueville’s exemplary women moderate the ‘defects of 
democracy’ through their conjugal and familial associations at home that in turn nourish all 
aspects of associative life.193 Democratic defects can lead to an erosion of liberty and the 
possibility for moral greatness within democratic society. The maintenance of liberty in a 
society prone to neglect liberty was Tocqueville’s highest political concern. Women and their 
domestic sphere were his highest political hope for remedying that concern. Womanhood and 
family life, as modelled by Tocqueville, are primary in outfitting citizens with the mores that 
permit other moderating forces to function and to further habituate citizens to a less grand, but 
worthwhile, democratic form of virtue. This ‘virtue by habits’ keeps a people free.194 This 
freedom allows for greatness.  
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Chapter 7. Towards a more ‘Tocquevillian’ Social Science: Family, 
Gender, Loyalty, and Virtue in Modern Democratic Associationalism 
 
I have argued that Tocqueville conceptualised a domestic sphere particular to the democratic 
condition in the hopes of benefitting the democratic social state. He proposed this domestic 
sphere because it bolstered his network of moderating forces that work to maintain freedom in 
democratic society. This thesis has demonstrated that, though often-overlooked, a 
thoroughgoing understanding of the domestic sphere is essential to understanding 
Tocqueville’s associationalism, which is comprised of the mores, institutions, and political 
habits that moderate democracy. 
Turning now to modern projects of social science, this final chapter addresses what 
this insight may mean for democracies today. Modern political and social science continues to 
find Tocqueville to be relevant. From opinion articles to academic scholarship, modern 
democratic societies repeatedly return to his insights. Among democrats who are interested in 
community, social capital, and localism, it could be said ‘we’re all Tocquevilleans now’.1 If 
we are going to continue to look to Tocqueville as an authority to strengthen democracy, we 
have to look at the entirety of his theory, including the domestic sphere. 
This chapter begins this process by connecting my reading of Tocqueville’s 
associationalism to twentieth and twenty-first-century political and social science research. 
This chapter surveys three conversations in political and social science related to matters of 
community, association, and localism. Robert Putnam represents the study of social capital, 
Elinor and Vincent Ostrom represent the study of polycentricity, and Robert Nisbet represents 
the study of communitarianism. The theme of associationalism is prominent in all three 
schools, and all use Tocqueville as an intellectual poster-child or historical mascot. 
My intervention is based upon how Tocqueville’s thought is appropriated within these 
circles. I have established the significance of the domestic sphere within his associationalism 
that still fascinates us. I draw on four key observations from the preceding chapters of the 
thesis to evaluate the three research agendas. First, this thesis has argued that the domestic 
sphere is fundamental within Tocqueville’s associationalism. Second, I have noted that 
rootedness and longstanding loyalty to locality is important in the formation of associative 
mores. Third, this thesis addresses how Tocqueville’s passion for associations related to his 
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hope to preserve morality and other-regarding virtue. Fourth, this thesis argues that 
Tocqueville’s associationalism itself is underwritten by a unified habit or social attitude 
exercised across various associations and social contexts. A truly ‘Tocquevillian’ outlook 
would address the unity of moral habits and the connections between the settings in which 
they are practiced. 
These observations serve as a framework for evaluating social capital, polycentricity, 
and communitarianism. If we take him seriously – or even take him as inspiration – on 
matters of association, we should take him seriously on the domestic sphere. Modern social 
science projects that deal in ‘Tocquevillian’ themes ought to attend comprehensively to the 
subjects we learn about as we wrestle with understanding the place of the domestic sphere in 
Tocqueville’s thought. These themes are: family and gender roles, love of local community, 
and other-regarding mores. 
Offering a critique of these schools from a Tocquevillian perspective, I evaluate them 
using the themes of family, gender, love of locality, and other-regarding mores. My critique 
does not suggest these schools should ‘be more Tocquevillian’ in the sense that they should 
adhere more strictly to Tocqueville’s original thought. Rather, I suggest that these 
perspectives should confront the difficult questions that Tocqueville’s thought raises about the 
complex relation between the domestic and public spheres. These three perspectives provide 
rich solutions—a focus on social capital, a return to local governance, an emphasis on 
intimate community; however, they fail to interrogate the moral foundation and its place of 
origin (the home) that Tocqueville recognised as crucial to the democratic project. As such, 
what they offer may be a cure for symptoms and not the disease.  
My critique notes how the schools contrast with each other. I affirm the importance of 
Tocqueville’s unified habit that ‘drags’ the citizen ‘out of himself’. Overall, most of the 
criticism is levelled at Putnam and the social capital perspective, though I raise issues 
concerning the polycentricity perspective in terms of the tension between loyalty and exit. 
Nisbet proves the most ‘Tocquevillian’, as he included the most (though still not extensive) 
attention to these themes that I contend could augment discussion of modern associationalism. 
Additionally, communitarians appear to favour the perspective of a unified habit in describing 
a flourishing associative life. The chapter concludes by sketching new avenues for a more 
Tocquevillian social science and by outlining some possibilities for hope in the face of the 
‘problem’ in modern democracy.  
With anxieties reflective of Tocqueville’s concerns for democratic society, proponents 
of social capital, advocates of polycentricity, and communitarians were and are motivated by 
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an urgent sense that American democracy has a problem. Each identifies a slightly different, 
yet related, problem. Putnam, the Ostroms, and Nisbet all have a similar answer in mind to 
address ‘the problem’ of modern democracies. The answer is the revitalization of associative 
life. With slightly different focuses and slightly different normative commitments, all are 
aiming to draw attention to both the plight and potential of associations in modern 
democracies. The scholarship in all three fields touches on associations – small, large, 
religious, recreational, and administrative – and all three schools have a claim to the 
‘Tocquevillian’ legacy.  
When it comes to studying modern associations from a Tocquevillian perspective, the 
domestic sphere, family, and gender roles are relevant to understanding the formation of 
social capital. This chapter criticises modern scholarship in relation to my observations on 
these themes. For example, I note that, primarily concerned with habituating citizens to virtue, 
Tocqueville’s associationalism was not merely addressing the decentralisation of power, 
efficient solutions, or social cohesion, as some modern social scientists may suggest. In the 
domestic association and in wider associative life, Tocqueville’s hopes for staving off 
democratic despotism related to moral themes. For him, the domestic sphere, local loyalty, 
and other-regarding virtue, all related to the possibility of a transferrable unified social habit 
that is exercised across associative life, from family to wider society; modern researchers do 
not fully appreciate this possibility.  
Alan Kahan has recast Tocqueville as a moralist; and, in turn, he contends that 
Tocqueville is relevant to sociological debates. Kahan states that Tocqueville’s understanding 
of religion within democracies ‘makes Tocqueville a suitable discussion partner in debates 
over the place of religion today’.2 This chapter mirrors Kahan’s project, following his 
perspective that it is Tocqueville’s concern for morals and virtue that enriches contemporary 
discussions concerning the social organisation of democratic life. While the chapter connects 
Tocqueville to social science, I do not highlight, with Elster, Tocqueville as a social scientist.3 
Smith has concluded that Tocqueville likely thought of himself ‘as a theorist of the political 
affections, a student of the relation of politics and the heart’.4 This moral perspective is an 
enriching starting point for fruitful discussion with modern social science agendas. 
More emphasis on the four areas (family, gender, love of locality, and other-regarding 
mores) that I highlight is appropriate to Putnam’s social capital, the Ostroms’ polycentricity, 
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and Nisbet’s communitarianism. These three schools address ‘Tocquevillian’ subjects that 
were, for Tocqueville, conceptually bound up with what I argue the domestic sphere can teach 
us about associationalism. A more thoroughgoing understanding of Tocqueville’s 
associationalism may help provide a richer analysis within political and social science.  
 
Putnam and Social Capital  
I begin with Putnam and social capital research. Investigating measurable details of social 
networks, the social capital research agenda attends to associative life with a less explicitly 
normative bent than the other schools. With less emphasis on the value of intimate 
relationships over other associations, social capital research interrogates the workings of civil 
society or civil engagement more broadly. Advocates of social capital lament ‘the problem’ of 
modern democracy as one of civic disengagement and weakened social ties across many 
facets of social life. Political scientist Putman recorded the depletion of social capital in 
American society by the end of the twentieth century. He observed: ‘Americans have been 
dropping out in droves’ from civic engagement.5 He documented the collapse of social capital 
in many areas: from formal, informal, political, civic, and religious to the bonds between 
colleagues and friends, volunteerism, and social trust.  
The work of Putnam, a guest of American presidents and preeminent researcher, is 
largely representative of this research agenda.6 Political scientist Wendy Rahn heralded his 
famous Bowling Alone as ‘the De Tocqueville of our generation’.7 Putnam occasionally 
gestured to Tocqueville’s thought, but without extensive examination. He self-consciously 
participated in the fashionable norm of quoting him, saying Tocqueville’s ‘lines’ about 
American associations ‘are often quoted by social scientists because they capture an important 
and enduring fact about our country’.8 Bowling Alone and American Grace both feature 
smatterings of references to Tocqueville.9 The social capital research agenda is less 
normatively committed to the wisdom of Tocqueville’s thought than communitarianism, but it 
remains suggestive of Tocqueville’s relevance nevertheless.  
 Putnam wanted to instigate a conversation about ‘how to renew our stock of social 
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capital’, and he acknowledged that this desire related to communitarian projects.10 Social 
capital itself is about relationships and networks. Broadly, it is ‘capital’ because of ‘the 
potential benefit accruing to actors because of their insertion into networks’.11 Putnam offered 
this formulation: ‘Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a college education (human 
capital) can increase productivity (both individual and collective), so too social contacts affect 
the productivity of individuals and groups’.12 
Social capital literature benefitted from ‘political scientists who equate social capital 
with the level of “civicness” in communities such as towns, cities, or even entire countries’, 
and Putnam was ‘the most prominent advocate of this approach’.13 Once this element of civic 
engagement took hold in the discussion, social capital analysis became bound up with the 
study of civil society, and ‘the gist’ of this approach ‘goes something like this: a robust, 
strong, and vibrant civil society strengthens and enhances liberal democracy’.14 As social 
capital takes on a connotation of civic engagement, ‘it principally describes norms and 
networks that exist at a societal or community-wide level’, which means social capital is often 
understood in the context of relationships or ‘generalised norms of trust and reciprocity’ 
amongst ‘people who are not well known to one another’.15 Nevertheless, social capital that 
exists in familial relations is sometimes studied too.16 Putnam contended that the trust built by 
common understanding becomes ‘generalized reciprocity’, without perfect score-keeping.17 
Bowling Alone focused on the decline in civic engagement, social capital, and this form of 
trust across a multitude of facets of American society. He included analysis of the role of 
women and the family within this portrait of America’s plunging supply of social capital. 
Putnam’s research found that ‘[i]nformal social connections are much more frequent 
among women, regardless of their job and marital status’.18 He concluded that ‘women are 
more avid social capitalists’, but he ultimately found that American ‘civic disengagement 
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Multifaceted Perspective, ed. Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 
2000), 13–39. 
17 Putnam, Bowling, 21. 
18 Ibid., 95. 
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over the past several decades’ cannot be explained by the changing position of women.19 He 
also thought that ‘the transformation of American family structure and home life’ did not play 
a very significant role in the national civic disengagement.20 Unlike Nisbet’s 
communitarianism as we will see, Putnam’s social capital project does not worry that the 
changing nature of the family and modern womanhood are integral elements in explaining our 
current atomised condition.21  
Reminiscent of Tocqueville, social capital research explores norms and moral habits 
that bind citizens and make for flourishing societies. The social capital research, however, 
does not have an overarching moral or normative consensus that makes sense of how these 
various facets of social life interact or why it is morally good to enrich our stock of social 
capital.  
 
The Ostroms and Polycentricity  
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom founded the political economy research agenda, loosely termed 
the ‘Bloomington School’, which investigates institutional diversity and polycentricity. 
Across their published writings, the Ostroms self-consciously linked their work with 
Tocqueville’s thought. 22 Vincent Ostrom conceived of his philosophical project as 
‘resolv[ing] Tocqueville’s puzzle about whether democratic societies are viable forms of 
civilization’.23 Additionally, recent scholarship grappling with the Ostroms’ legacy continues 
to refer to Tocqueville and to use the term ‘Tocquevillian’.24 Polycentricity scholarship also 
claims a Tocquevillian outlook.25  
                                                
19 Ibid., 203. 
20 Ibid., 278. See the Tocquevillian critique of these conclusions on women and family below.  
21 Putnam does address ‘families’ and ‘parenting’ in Our Kids, but this work is largely about the income and 
opportunity gap, not waning social capital: Putnam, Our Kids, 46-134. 
22 See: Ostrom, Meaning; Vincent Ostrom, ‘A Conceptual-Computational Logic for Federal Systems of 
Governance’, in Choice, Rules and Collective Action: The Ostroms on the Study of Institutions and Governance, 
ed. Paul Dragos Aligica and Filippo Sabetti (Colchester: ECPR, 2014), 240; Filippo Sabetti and Paul Dragos 
Aligica, ‘Introduction: The Ostroms’ Research Program for the Study of Institutions and Governance: 
Theoretical and Epistemic Foundations’, in Choice, Rules and Collective Action: The Ostroms on the Study of 
Institutions and Governance, ed. Paul Dragos Aligica and Filippo Sabetti (Colchester: ECPR, 2014), 3; Ostrom, 
Crisis, 147. 
23 Ostrom, Meaning, x. 
24 See: Peter J. Boettke, Jayme S. Lemke, and Liya Palagashvili, ‘Polycentricity, Self-Governance, and the Art & 
Science of Association’, The Review of Austrian Economics 28 (2015): 313–15; Paul Dragos Aligica and Peter 
Boettke, ‘The Two Social Philosophies of Ostroms’ Institutionalism’, Policy Studies Journal 39 (2011): 31–32; 
Roberta Q. Herzberg, ‘Governing Their Commons: Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and the Bloomington School’, 
Public Choice 163 (2015): 97; Meadowcroft and Pennington, Rescuing, 34. 
25 See also volume (dedicated to the Ostroms and Bloomington workshop) that studies modern democracy: 
Aurelian Craiutu and Sheldon Gellar, eds., Conversations with Tocqueville: The Global Democratic Revolution 
in the Twenty-First Century (Lanham: Lexington, 2009).  
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The Ostroms and scholars of polycentricity saw ‘the problem’ of modern democracy 
as rooted in the tension between a large centralised state and a multitude of local nodes of 
organisation. Localism is crowded out by uniform bureaucratic solutions, creating 
inefficiencies for communities. The project of polycentricity identified increasing scientism 
and Wilsonian centralised administration as serious problems for the flourishing of a free 
democracy.26 Vincent Ostrom related ‘the contemporary malaise in American society’ to the 
consolidation of ‘overlapping jurisdictions’, worrying that the ‘benefits’ formerly provided by 
smaller nodes of organisation had become extinct.27  
The project of the Bloomington school interrogates how citizens govern themselves 
‘within systems of multiple and overlapping authorities’.28 Influenced by Public Choice 
economics, the Ostroms challenged the ‘“market” vs. “state” dichotomy’ and the 
‘monocentric’, centralised administrative solution.29 Their new viewpoint highlighted the 
possible impact of a multipart structure of ‘hybrid’ organisational systems.30 The Ostroms 
saw the complexity of social organisation as ‘a knowledge and learning process’ that 
actualised the varied rules by which communities lived.31 They aimed to meet the 
bureaucratic administrative ‘consolidationists’ within their own ambit, speaking in empirical 
language. The Ostroms’ project, and Elinor Ostrom’s Governing the Commons in particular, 
communicated a new outlook for parsing common pool resource solutions in diverse 
institutional contexts.32 The Ostroms’ research framework is undeniably bound up with 
philosophical concerns.33 They linked their love of democracy and liberty to comprehensive 
testing of institutions to develop a research framework that expanded the scope of public 
choice economics to encompass the details of social groups and communities. The study of 
polycentricity includes analysis of how competition between nodes of authority and 
organisation can promote more efficient outcomes. They were also preoccupied with mores 
and the transmission of social rules.  
                                                
26 Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (Tuscaloosa: University Alabama 
Press, 2007), 8. 
27 Ibid., 100. 
28 Boettke, Lemke, and Palagashvili, ‘Polycentricity, Self-Governance, and the Art & Science of Association’, 
313.  
29 Paul Dragos Aligica and Peter Boettke, “The Two Social Philosophies of Ostroms’ Institutionalism”, Policy 
Studies Journal 39 (2011): 30. 
30 Ibid., 37. 
31 Peter Boettke, Liya Palagashvili, and Jayme Lemke, ‘Riding in Cars with Boys: Elinor Ostrom’s Adventures 
with the Police’, Journal of Institutional Economics 9 (2013): 423; Aligica and Boettke, ‘Two’, 30. 
32 Roberta Q. Herzberg, “Governing Their Commons: Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and the Bloomington School”, 
Public Choice 163 (2015): 101. 
33 See: Aligica and Boettke, ‘Two’, 29; Boettke, Palagashvili, and Lemke, ‘Riding’, 421. 
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Vincent Ostrom wrote that ‘the most fundamental source of human and social capital 
in any society is family households as they function in speech communities in which patterns 
of associated relationships are constituted in neighborhoods’.34 Though much of the research 
agenda of the Bloomington School is not based on how the domestic sphere relates to wider 
associative life and local initiatives, the Ostroms themselves nevertheless emphasised, 
similarly to the communitarians, the importance of family and local neighbourhood in the 
formation of mores. At the same time, research in the Bloomington School tradition not only 
examines internal dynamics of groups and communities but also the competitive dynamics 
between groups and communities.35 For this reason, this research agenda differs from the 
schools of communitarianism and social capital (and Tocqueville himself), which have less 
emphasis on competition between groups and more emphasis on the norms, rules, and bonds 
internal to groups.   
 
Nisbet and Communitarianism  
Communitarianism could be said to rest on what has been called ‘the Burke/Tocqueville 
thesis’ that family and intimate relationships of kinship matter in the formation of flourishing 
and moral democratic citizens.36 Like Tocqueville, communitarians emphasise the domestic 
sphere and intimate relationships. Also like Tocqueville, they contend that authority within 
small associations is necessary for free and flourishing democracies.  
 According to Nisbet, ‘the growing sense of isolation in society’ and ‘quest for 
community’ reflects how our intimate relationships are ‘functionally irrelevant’, politically 
and economically, and ‘meaningless’ to our ‘moral aspirations’.37 A disjuncture between the 
possibility of a fulfilling, community-oriented moral life and the realities of the modern 
democratic state and complex economy means that Americans half-heartedly expect ‘the 
small traditional associations, founded upon kinship, faith, or locality’ to provide for citizens’ 
moral and spiritual needs – yet, these small associations are increasingly irrelevant.38 Given 
the tension between mass society and private life, small associations ‘and the whole network 
                                                
34 Ostrom, Meaning, 78. 
35 For example, see: Jayme S. Lemke, ‘Interjurisdictional Competition and the Married Women’s Property Acts’, 
Public Choice 166 (2016): 291–313. 
36 William A. Galston, ‘Individualism, Liberalism, and Democratic Civic Society’, in The Essential Civil Society 
Reader: Classic Essays in the American Civil Society Debate, ed. Don E. Eberly (Lanham, MD, USA: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2000), 369–70. See also: Brad Lowell Stone, Robert Nisbet: Communitarian Traditionalist 
(Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2001), 63. 
37 Nisbet, Quest, 43. 
38 Ibid., 45, 47. 
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of informal interpersonal relationships’ no longer offer substantial provision of ‘mutual aid, 
welfare, education, recreation, and economic production and distribution’.39 
Nisbet is representative of the communitarian answer to the problem of association, 
and he proves the most ‘Tocquevillian’ of these three groups. He called for a reinvigoration of 
the intimate human relationships in order to bolster the fraying social ties that shape moral 
and political habits. Addressing contemporary concerns about community, civil society, and 
authority in our modern democracies, the communitarian movement is self-consciously 
‘Tocquevillian’ in tone. For the communitarians in Nisbet’s vein, family, religion, and 
neighbourhood are paramount.40 These are ‘the small areas of association within which alone 
such values and purposes can take on clear meaning in personal life and become the vital 
roots of the large culture’.41 Nisbet asserted that these associations truly refine character to the 
degree necessary for a flourishing society. Similar to Tocqueville, he contended that ‘social 
interdependence’ of smaller, interpersonal associations alone fortifies citizens ‘to resist the 
tyranny that always threatens to arise out of any political government’.42 Associations shape 
moral order and liberty.43 For Nisbet, the experiences of private, religious, and communal life 
provide the most intimate social bonds that foster moral and political habits, and these realms 
must be perpetually promoted. 
 Family roles and the nature of authority are key themes within communitarianism.44 
Nisbet saw mid-twentieth-century American society as being pulled in two directions: 
towards ‘the historic world’ of values associated with family, faith, and neighbourhood and 
also towards a new world of ‘values identical with the absolute political community’.45 This 
first world offers genuine authority and meaningful social roles that can form authentic moral 
character, while the latter offers a form of tyranny. Citizens should be committed to ‘the 
authority and hierarchy of genuine communities, the contexts that form of true character’.46 
Communitarians have no qualms about asserting the necessity of authority and social, 
sometimes hierarchical, roles. Nisbet concluded, in a line reminiscent of Tocqueville and the 
                                                
39 Ibid., 47. 
40 See: Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, ‘To Empower People: From State to Civil Society’, in The 
Essential Civil Society Reader: Classic Essays in the American Civil Society Debate, ed. Don E. Eberly 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 143–81. 
41 Nisbet, Quest, 62. 
42 Ibid., 247. 
43 Ibid., 248. 
44 For more on authority, see: Alan Ehrenhalt, ‘The Lost City: The Case for Social Authority’, in The Essential 
Civil Society Reader: Classic Essays in the American Civil Society Debate, ed. Don E. Eberly (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 239–55. 
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themes featured in this thesis, that the supposed disorderliness plaguing ‘the modern family is, 
in fact, simply an erosion of its natural authority’.47 Nisbet worried that modern politics and 
economics could make familial ‘membership’ gratuitous, sometimes burdensome.48 In short, 
families are ill-fitting in ‘a democratic, industrial age’, yet necessary for perpetuating norms 
and morals.49 
 Nisbet also addressed the changing position of women. He believed the shift away 
from defined gender-based social roles within the family structure had an impact on how the 
‘whole family group’ related to ‘society’.50 Additionally, he thought that the ‘psychological 
problems’ that women face were related to the breakdown of roles and traditional authority, 
which instigated ‘historical changes in social position’.51 While this may strike twenty first-
century readers as old-fashioned, Nisbet’s point was a simple one: in the ‘emancipation from 
clear, socially approved function and role within the institutionalized family group’ and from 
‘a social function and conceptualized role’, many women experienced a sense of dislocation.52 
Nisbet stated that these ‘historical changes’ were precisely ‘the same context in which lie 
contemporary problems of the role of the father and the child’.53 This historical breakdown of 
authority and hierarchy is not solely gender specific.  
Though he referred to Tocqueville elsewhere, he did not refer to Tocqueville on this 
particular topic. As this thesis has demonstrated, however, this was Tocqueville’s perspective, 
too: the same democratising force affects gender roles and familial authority. Nisbet 
concluded that the family had a unique social function, and therefore he saw the dismantling 
of social roles, hierarchy, and authority within the family as detrimental to the psychology of 
the individual and troublesome for the formation of community members.54  
The communitarians see reliable authority, hierarchy, and social roles as undergirding 
the integrity of ‘this sphere of interpersonal relationships’ and small associations. 55 Nisbet 
thought that additional associations also shape citizens, ‘but the major moral and 
                                                
47 Quoted in: Ibid., 144. 
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50 Ibid., 56. 
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53 Ibid., 55–56. 
54 Francis Fukuyama has highlighted similar themes. He examines the role that authority and hierarchy play in 
the formation of trust and moral norms, reminding readers that without authority and hierarchy, a community has 
little power or clout in promoting ethical norms. See: Francis Fukuyama, ‘Trust: The Social Virtues and the 
Creation of Prosperity’, in The Essential Civil Society Reader: Classic Essays in the American Civil Society 
Debate, ed. Don E. Eberly (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 258. 
55 Robert Nisbet, ‘“The Quest for Community”: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom’, in The Essential 
Civil Society Reader: Classic Essays in the American Civil Society Debate, ed. Don E. Eberly (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 36. 
   
 
225 
psychological influences on the individual’s life’ are forged in smaller associations.56 
Communitarians, if we take Nisbet as largely representative, live up to the legacy of 
Tocqueville in two ways. They mirror him in their emphasis on the domestic sphere and the 
relationships closest to home. Second, they accept authority within those relationships as 
relevant to a thriving democratic life, which, as this thesis has explored, is also an essential 
aspect of Tocqueville’s theory. Nisbet’s communitarianism explicitly attends to the moral 
habits, intimate sphere, and associative life, which, as this thesis argues, lay at the core of 
Tocqueville’s thought.  
 
Three Perspectives on Association: Tocqueville’s Critique and the Unity of Habit 
Each of the modern perspectives have in common a ‘Tocquevillian’ attitude, and they all 
believe in the potential of associative life to resolve the woes besetting democratic, and 
specifically American, society. Some commonalities unite the three projects, while notable 
differences make the projects foils to each other. Overall, I contend that each project would be 
better served by a stronger understanding of the ‘Tocquevillian’ attitude that ostensibly 
informs each scholarly endeavour. Tocqueville’s associationalism may serve modern 
associationalism, or, at least, in reminding us of his historical version of associationalism, it 
may open new avenues for thinking about modern associationalism. 
  As discussed, family life, rootedness, and virtuous mores are paramount to 
understanding Tocqueville’s associationalism. Because of this, I contend that these three 
research agendas are un-Tocquevillian in some regards, while maintaining a superficially 
Tocquevillian pretence. I concede that it is possible that these scholars may have simply 
sought the usefulness or charm of invoking Tocqueville as an authority or historical mascot. 
While using a mascot is unobjectionable as a stylistic flourish, I nevertheless submit that 
social scientists may benefit from re-examining misunderstandings of Tocqueville or 
identifying where they would profit from his insight. This offers the beginning of a new 
framework for studying associationalism.  
 In this section, noting points of tension between the three perspectives, I address the 
themes of gender roles and family, rooted love of locality, and other-regarding virtue, before 
turning to the unified habit of sociability. The Tocquevillian outlook on these themes 
complements our modern discussion of associationalism, provoking interpretations or new 
questions that may be overlooked when only making use of Tocqueville as a mascot.  
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First, consider family and gender roles. From a strict Tocquevillian perspective that 
attends to gender roles, Putnam’s presentation of the changing position of women and the 
decline in traditional family cohesion would be subject to criticism. Putnam’s conclusions 
contrast with Nisbet’s handling of gender roles, which, though not extensive, did account for 
the effects of the changing position of women on community life. Putnam noted in Bowling 
Alone that women are ‘avid social capitalists’ and that the entry of women into the workforce 
meant ‘fewer educated, dynamic women with enough free time to organize civic activity, plan 
dinner parties, and the like’ were able to foster civic engagement.57 As these types of women 
disappeared, ‘the rest of us, too, have gradually disengaged’ from civic life.58 Putnam 
characterised the ‘movement of women out of the home into the paid labor force’ as ‘the most 
portentous social change of the last half century’.59 Concurrently, Putnam contended that 
women’s entry into paid work is not ‘the primary cause of civic disengagement over the last 
two decades’ because ‘civic engagement and social connectedness have diminished almost 
equally for both women and men, working or not, married or single, financially stressed or 
financially comfortable’.60 He did not elaborate why widespread disengagement, irrespective 
of gender or marital status, explains that the changing position of women does not account for 
a significant portion of the decline.  
Putnam himself hinted that as women no longer plan dinner parties, ‘the rest of us’ opt 
out too. Of course we do—there are fewer dinner parties to attend. Putnam’s justification here 
is far from being what he deemed a ‘central exculpatory fact’ that relieves the changing role 
of women from the burden of guilt in the sad story of civic decline that he painted. The fact 
that all of us—male, female, married, unmarried, employed or not—have opted out could 
possibly demonstrate the precise opposite of Putnam’s conclusion. It could indicate the 
immense influence that these women ‘with time’ for social activism and party planning had 
over their communities, as facilitators of networks that instil in ‘the rest of us’ the habits of 
sociability, neighbourliness, and civic engagement. Missing this possibility is at odds with 
Tocqueville’s associationalism. Putnam quoted Tocqueville on American associations as a 
neat opener to a new section of his book, but demonstrates little interest in making further use 
of Tocqueville’s insights. Tocqueville’s understanding of American associationalism was 
deeply bound up with the position of women inside the home.61 Understanding the historical 
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weight of women as ‘makers of mores’ through domestic life may have led to a less definitive 
conclusion on Putnam’s part.  
Putnam’s perspective on women’s participation in the workforce was heavily 
criticised by Margaret Talbot in her review of Bowling Alone. Sardonically, she wondered 
how television could account for so much of the problem and ‘suburban sprawl and the time 
crunch for working women and their families’ so little (10 per cent each). She asked ‘how 
could the movement of women into the paid labor force possibly matter that little in this 
particular social equation?’. She accused Putnam of shying away from ‘focusing on women’s 
paid labor as a drain on civic engagement’. This did not add up: ‘if the women who led 
community efforts in the past are busy elsewhere, and those efforts fall into desuetude as a 
result, that reduces everyone else’s opportunities to participate in one too’. She rightly mused 
that it may be more fashionable to shame television and ‘couch potato-ism’ rather than ‘the 
expansion of autonomy and opportunity for women’.62 Talbot’s criticisms appeal to concerns 
that, as I have shown, are central to Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy. The lesson here, 
then, is that a more Tocquevillian social science should not shy away from observing how 
gender roles relate to the production of social capital.  
Likewise, Putnam was eager to absolve the changing nature of family solidarity and 
authority from ‘much’ impact. While Putnam observed that ‘the loosening of family bonds is 
unequivocal’ and ‘[t]he traditional family unit is down (a lot)’, he maintained that ‘apart from 
youth- and church-related engagement, none of the major declines in social capital and civic 
engagement that we need to explain can be accounted for by the decline in the traditional 
family structure’.63 In Putnam’s analysis, ‘the transformation of American family structure 
and home life over the last thirty years (fewer marriages, more divorces, fewer children, more 
people living alone)’ accounts for ‘not that much’ of the downturn in civic engagement.64 
Putnam could ‘find no evidence that civic disengagement is among’ the reasons to maintain 
‘traditional family values’, though he had some (unelaborated) reasons of his own.65 
According to Putnam, ‘[f]amily instability’ is not relevant to the story of the ‘critical period’ 
when the decline began because the decline ‘began with the children of the martially stable 
1940s and 1950s’.66 Correspondingly, ‘working mothers are exonerated’ because ‘the plunge 
in civicness among children of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s happened while mom was still at 
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home’.67 Perhaps this provides ‘an ironclad alibi’ for the parents of that particular generation, 
in that particular moment in time, but that boomer generation is described elsewhere by 
Putnam as particularly negligent in terms of civic engagement.68 Where is the ‘alibi’ for their 
parenting and family norms?  
Putnam compared the wartime culture to the carefree, beatnik culture of the 
subsequent generation. One generation, which was ‘a cohort of men and women whose values 
and civic habits were formed during a period of heightened civic obligation’, were replaced 
‘with others whose formative years were different’.69 Indeed, culture shapes habits, and 
something as momentous as world war leaves an impression on the culture of that generation, 
but this subsequent generation also influenced the making of the new culture, which in turn 
shaped habits. Putnam cannot disentangle the continued decline in civic engagement after the 
boomer generation from the family instability associated with the boomer generation simply 
because the boomers’ parents were married. Generational replacement may be the central 
explanatory factor, but only insofar as we acknowledge that the boomer generation greatly 
transformed a host of American cultural norms. At that point, however, we have to explain 
how those norms affect civic engagement. Family norms may be among those new cultural 
norms. It seems unlikely that ‘the martially stable 1940s and 1950s’ explain or exculpate as 
much as Putnam assumed.  
Again, I contend that Tocquevillian perspective would benefit Putnam’s analysis here. 
Tocqueville emphasised the role of a bonded, affectionate family life in the formation of 
habits. By keeping Tocqueville in mind as we observe this type of evidence, we may expect 
family instability to explain part of the problem. Of course, if the evidence does not indicate 
this, the family should be set aside as a variable in deciphering this social change, but 
Putnam’s conclusion remains puzzling. He seems to have suggested that the stay-at-home 
mothers and family stability of the baby boomers’ childhoods could ‘exonerate’, ‘exculpate’, 
or provide an ‘alibi’ for later family instability and later two-income households in terms of 
civic disengagement. Understanding Tocqueville’s views on how the habits of associative life 
are formed might make us sceptical of Putnam’s conclusions.   
Turning now to matters of authority and rooted love of locality, a wholeheartedly 
‘Tocquevillian’ outlook would also problematize the project of polycentricity. The 
communitarians reflected Tocqueville on these topics.  
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The communitarianism emphasis on authority likewise problematizes the family and 
self-sacrificing social care. The traditionally involuntary nature of the family habituated – 
perhaps coercively – individuals to caring responsibilities and habits of communal life, and 
the liberal language of ‘rights’ and choice cannot adequately describe the community realities 
of caring duties. 70 The free choice we associate with a liberal project, like the Ostroms’, is not 
as straightforwardly valuable in all institutional arrangements. Communitarians complicate 
the more straightforward vision presented by social capitalists and polycentrists.  
Additionally, the communitarian perspective on authority and loyalty is at odds with 
the freedom of choice implicit in the competitive aspect of the polycentric order.71 The 
liberalism of the Ostroms is more complex than we may at first assume. The Ostroms valued 
the community. They also valued competition between communities, but this complicates the 
integrity of the communities. The Ostroms and Bloomington School scholarship heavily 
emphasise competition between nodes of power, jurisdictions, or means of social organisation. 
The value of institutional diversity is bound up with an experimental and competitive outlook. 
Because this scholarship is self-consciously operated in the legacy of Tocqueville, it is worth 
highlighting that Tocqueville did not indicate that the real value of associations or localism 
lay in competitive diversity. Tocqueville did not admire the plethora of American associations 
because they could compete. He admired the fact that there was a plethora, which built up the 
moral habits of self-governance. Also, he admired American federalism because it allowed 
America to be ‘free and happy like a small nation, glorious and strong like a large one’.72 
These benefits were accrued, he thought, because federalism allowed ‘provincial patriotism’ 
to flourish and attention ‘turned toward internal improvements’ of each state.73 Communities 
and smaller jurisdictions flourish, according to Tocqueville, based on a love of home. The 
longevity and perpetuation of mores also relies on loyalty to a given community.  
The mores developed by Tocqueville’s localism required habituation over time, 
through repetition. He referred to the commitment of the citizen to town life, the engagement 
with free institutions, the exercise of local liberties, and the practice of association as learning 
processes concerned with building artificial habits.74 His discussion connoted a sense of 
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maturation and acclimatisation. These are processes that take time and commitment to a given 
locality or group. For instance, his admiration of New England, ‘where society’ is ‘already 
old and long settled’, demonstrates his belief that older mores fared better in taming 
democracy. Tocqueville contrasted this with the South ‘where the social bond is less ancient 
and less powerful’.75 For Tocqueville, social attachments and participation in a longstanding 
legacy are important for the cultivation and perpetuation of the mores that shape associative 
life. Localities with transient or new social links are not as instructive as those where 
intergenerational cultural links are deeply embedded. ‘Voting with our feet’ and making use 
of ‘exit options’ is in tension with this aspect of Tocqueville’s associationalism.76 
In some ways, the Ostroms’ work captured this insight, even though the theme of 
competition seems to define the spirit of their corpus. For example, Vincent Ostrom wrote 
that ‘intergenerational continuities’ are essential to ‘intergenerational transmission of 
knowledge and skill’.77 This hints at the Tocquevillian insistence upon intergenerational 
regard that provides for authority behind the transmission of mores. Indeed, peer culture can 
put community norms at risk. However, in addition, too much emphasis on inter-community 
and inter-jurisdictional competition can also undermine the rootedness necessary for 
communities to successfully cooperate on matters of administration and develop mores. The 
work of the Ostroms was ‘Tocquevillian’ because it stressed how variations in local social 
norms and mores meant local administration could be more effective. Tocqueville thought 
that centralised governments have a ‘uniform character that does not allow for the diversity of 
places and mores’, but he did not favour associative life because smaller communities could 
compete.78 While Tocqueville admired free movement for the sake of enterprise within the 
United States, from a wholly ‘Tocquevillian’ perspective, the concept of ‘a mobile citizenry’ 
voting with their feet might raise concerns, much as the unmoored frontiersman fascinated 
and worried Tocqueville.79  
Next, modern social science research agendas ought to consider Tocqueville’s hope 
for a virtuous habit in democracies that could ‘drag’ citizens out of themselves.80 The social 
capital literature struggles with the problem of how what is useful and effective intersects 
with what is self-sacrificing and virtuous. Sacrifice in the social capital literature is usually 
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associated with long-term benefits for the self or the group, not virtue for virtue’s sake. The 
notion of ‘moral grandeur’ is not among the set of virtues, such as trustworthiness, 
cooperativeness, and accountability, often discussed in scholarship concerning social capital, 
polycentricity, and modern associative life.81 Most scholars agree that ‘social networks can 
affect economic performance’.82 Coleman explained that ‘social capital is productive, making 
possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible’.83 However, 
social capital is also not like other forms of capital. Social capital is enriched through a 
practice of useful habits that often blends with virtuous habits. Families, friendships, and 
volunteerism often rely on a moral spirit that is far removed from ideas about economic 
production, effective administration, and calculations about how to ‘make us healthy, wealthy, 
and wise’.84  
Contrastingly, the communitarians are more aligned with Tocqueville on this theme. 
The communitarian emphasis on morality and personal virtue problematizes the liberal 
understanding of how social capital is formed and the liberal emphasis on individualism. 
Participation in the moral process of developing social norms is much more complex and 
precarious than ‘other forms of human capital’ which can be acquired ‘through a rational 
investment decision’.85 These moral communities that provide for trust are based on ‘shared 
ethical values’, and they ‘do not require extensive contract and legal regulation’.86 The 
formation of this kind of ‘capital’ requires an organic, historical community that is both 
nebulous and reliable. It requires a set of relationships that are more complex than the 
minimal relationships of trust necessary to for the transactional acquisition of capital.  
Putnam advocated a regeneration of social capital to benefit Americans because 
evidence suggested that civic engagement and ‘social capital makes us smarter, healthier, 
safer, richer, and better able to govern a just and stable democracy’.87 Putnam quoted 
Tocqueville in his discussion of how social capital relates to the functioning of democracy. 
Putnam partly understood Tocqueville’s message about associationalism and democracy. He 
aptly noted how Tocqueville observed that that ‘local civic activity served as the handmaiden 
of their national democratic community’ whether or not that activity is ‘self-consciously or 
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only indirectly political’.88 Putnam captured the ‘Tocquevillian’ assertion that associations 
foster the internal development of ‘habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness’ and 
‘practical skills necessary to partake in public life’.89 Using Tocqueville’s phrase ‘schools for 
democracy’, Putnam noted that ‘voluntary associations’ teach ‘how to run meetings, speak in 
public, write letters, organize projects, and debate public issues with civility’.90 This seems to 
suggest that associations are useful to the end of developing skills needed for political action, 
and in this way they serve democracies. This is true, but it is not the whole picture, or, at least, 
not Tocqueville’s whole picture.  
Tocqueville’s admiration of American associationalism ran deeper than getting along 
with neighbours and forming administrative capabilities. Indeed, these transferrable skills are 
necessary in terms of political action and wellbeing, but they are also significant to 
democratic life for other reasons. Putnam did not emphasise other aspects of Tocqueville’s 
admiration for associations beyond being schools that teach skills. For Tocqueville, 
associations are schools that benefit Americans in the immediate sense that they produce 
effective outcomes for a local community, and in turn they establish local administration as 
the norm, rather than intervention from the centralised state. Most importantly, they are 
schools that attended to Tocqueville’s deepest concern for democracies—moral mediocrity. 
The habits of associative life guide the instinctively morally mediocre democratic citizen 
towards virtue, not simply towards political action, good health, wealth, and education. The 
maintenance of virtue in a democracy related to the maintenance of liberty, according to 
Tocqueville. Civic connections mattered to democratic flourishing primarily because of how 
they related to virtue and liberty, rather than the development of skills for daily activities. 
Putnam said social capital is good for us and for our democracies. Tocqueville would say it 
makes us good, and thereby, it is good for our democracies. 
 Economist Kenneth Arrow in fact wanted to abandon ‘the metaphor of capital’, in 
large part because ‘[t]he essence of social networks is that they are built up for reasons other 
than their economic value to the participants’.91 They are ‘habits of the heart’, not habits of 
the bank account, however much they may ultimately benefit the bottom line. Unsurprisingly, 
Nisbet and his fellow communitarians highlight this moral aspect of associations more often 
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than other scholars of civil society and associations.92 The moral and communal aspect must 
come first. If it does come first, associations can be truly profound, and then and only then, in 
turn, can associations make us ‘healthy, wealthy, and wise’. 
  From religion to free institutions, Tocqueville’s forces for moderating democracy all 
related to his hope to ‘drag’ citizens ‘out of contemplation of’ or ‘away from looking at 
themselves’.93 Though democratic peoples tend to find virtue ‘useful’, Tocqueville’s attention 
to the problem of sacrifice within democracies, which has been explored in this thesis, can 
augment our understanding of modern democracies. The value of an other-regarding habit, for 
Tocqueville, related to much more than cohesion, cooperation, and trust for the sake of 
efficient societal outcomes. The value of this habit, for Tocqueville, was that it preserved 
virtue in the face of a social state that inherently encouraged individualism and selfishness. 
 Most importantly, this thesis also contends that Tocqueville’s associationalism was 
defined by a unified habit of outward-looking virtue, expressed and developed in a range of 
contexts. A truly ‘Tocquevillian’ attitude would address the unity of moral habits and the 
links between the environments in which they are expressed. Communitarians emphasise a 
unity of habits within associationalism, while advocates of social capital and polycentricity 
emphasise a plurality of habits in associationalism. Nisbet wrote of a ‘union of family, local 
community, and religion’, highlighting how religious observance contributes to the ‘fusion’ of 
religious life and other aspects of associative life.94 Religion supports and is supported by 
other ‘associative purposes’.95 The ethical habits of the heart, based on trust and other-
regarding virtue, are reliable, transferrable, and generalizable between different social 
contexts. In their alertness to the possibility of a unified moral habituation, the 
communitarians are particularly Tocquevillian. This theme of unified habits may be especially 
significant to the area of scholarship on the potential ‘dark side’ of associations.96 Perhaps, 
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further investigation is needed into whether our associations are less likely to become ‘dark’ 
when they are embedded within a set of associations and institutions that express the ‘bright 
side’ of associative life. 
 The social capital literature often works with different types of social capital in order 
to codify and measure the benefits of types of bonds and networks in different contexts. For 
example, scholarship makes distinctions between ‘bonding’ social capital and ‘bridging’ 
social capital. Bonding is ‘narrower’, usually relating to the local and intimate connections 
that sustain individuals, whereas bridging broadens the individual’s network, usually relating 
to the wider connections of reciprocity that profit individuals.97 Bonding finds you friends; 
bridging finds you a job.98  
The concern of some social capital literature about the ‘misguided’ communitarian 
emphasis on ‘the relationships necessary to sustain the social fabric’ (family, church, 
community) indicates a liberal position at odds with the holistic communitarian perspective. 
This concern over small moral associations betrays the liberal expectation that ‘generalised 
trust or bridging social capital’ is the primary form of social capital, and it suffices in the 
maintenance of an associationalism that serves the ‘social fabric’.99 Bridging social capital 
allows citizens to develop ‘rules of interaction which enable them to go about their separate 
purposes’.100 Again, I question whether such a division between the habits of the intimate and 
the habits of the public is truly Tocquevillian. Scholars of social capital sometimes elaborate 
the transferrable skills learned in a family because the family can be ‘a bridge between the 
“micro-order” of the small group and the “macro-order” of the wider society’; however, this 
literature does not insist upon the necessity of family solidarity, like the communitarians.101 
If the success of the wider networks relies, in part, on skills learned in more intimate 
contexts, then perhaps it is worthwhile to advocate, with the communitarians, for family 
solidarity and intergenerational regard. Whatever the knowledge, skills, and habits of a given 
culture, strong family bonds and parental authority produce intergenerational transmission of 
knowledge, skills, and habits. Without these bonds, the child has no reason to listen to, and 
learn from, the parent. As noted, Vincent Ostrom knew this, but seemed to overlook how 
competition intersects with community loyalty. Advocates of social capital shy away from 
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advocating the precise way to embolden the family to have a meaningful impact on the 
macro-order, i.e. insisting on a rich family life that prises bonds, authority, and 
intergenerational regard. The hesitation is an example of how social capital scholarship 
wavers, or is blind, regarding the possibility of unified habits.  
Perhaps because of the problem of ‘fashion’ raised by Talbot concerning his gloss on 
gender, Putnam clearly fell prey to this blind spot. Intriguingly, Putnam came close to 
establishing, empirically, a sense of unified social habits and transferrable skills or other-
regarding attitudes. This is particularly obvious in his discussion of religious practice. Like 
Tocqueville, all three perspectives on association take religion seriously in terms of both the 
meaning it gives the lives of individuals as well as the role it plays in the formation of 
associative life.102 Putnam concluded that ‘religious involvement is a crucial dimension of 
civic engagement’ and that ‘trends in civic engagement are closely tied to changing patterns 
of religious involvement’.103 He saw the church as an ‘incubator for civic skills’.104 He noted 
‘churchgoers are substantially more likely to be involved in secular organizations, to vote and 
participate politically in other ways, and to have deeper informal social connections’.105 He 
concluded that both ‘social ties embodied in religious communities’ and ‘religious beliefs’ 
contributed to ‘volunteerism and philanthropy’ among religious people.106 Overall, he 
estimated that ‘religious Americans are up to twice as active civically as secular Americans’, 
and children raised in religious contexts are more involved with ‘philanthropy and good 
works’ and are higher achieving, ‘academically and nonacademically’ than their non-religious 
peers.107 This research begins to point to generalizable habits, but Putnam was hesitant to 
assert such an explicit and interdependent relationship between religion and community, as 
Nisbet did.  
Despite his empirical research sometimes flirting with the idea of a unified other-
regarding social attitude, as in the example of religion, Putnam also overlooked this 
possibility elsewhere. Puzzlingly, he emphasised the role of time as a resource that 
underwrites social ties. Because informal socialising is ‘higher among single and childless 
people’, Putnam wrote ‘we might have expected the real-life equivalent of Cheers and 
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Friends to take the place of civic organizations and dinner parties’, since ‘conventional family 
life has become rarer’.108 I question why we would expect that, and, indeed, he found a 
decline in traditional family life is not accompanied by ‘a compensating increase’ in informal 
socialising among peer communities in bars or cafés.109 He mused that ‘to some extent the 
decline in family obligations ought to have freed up time for more social and community 
involvement’.110 Perhaps, if time is a key factor, this would be our expectation, but if the 
habits of family solidarity relate directly to general habits of sociability and responsibility, we 
may expect otherwise. Indeed, if we expected that, then the evidence might be on our side 
because both are in decline. In fact, he concluded time and money are not large explanatory 
factors. The largest is ‘generational change’ followed by ‘electronic entertainment’ including 
television.111   
‘Generational change’ may explain the decline in civic engagement, but because this 
encompasses an entire generational culture, it serves more as a catchall for the social norms 
and habits of a non-civic generation. If the wartime generation is ‘the first actor in our civic 
morality play’ and the baby boomers are the second, this raises the question: what was the 
nature of the ‘civic morality’ of the previous generation?112 Additionally, Putnam’s 
presentation as to what ‘killed’ American social capital seems to unbundle time management, 
financial wherewithal, and electronic entertainment from generational change. American 
social norms around those three areas are also linked with cultural generational norms. This 
betrays a lack of appreciation for the possibility of a coherent unified set of virtues, habits, or 
attitudes that could be relevant to the production of social capital.  
From the Tocquevillian perspective, the key to a flourishing democracy is to ‘drag 
man out of himself’ so that the democratic citizen can become habituated to other-regarding 
virtue. Once so inclined, the benefits are more likely to accrue across all avenues of social 
interaction: from – to use Putnam’s phrase – ‘“do good” civic activities’ to ‘informal 
connecting’.113 Social capital scholarship seems to understand that there might be a 
relationship between different forms of social capital, but, once its has been pulled apart, 
dissected, and measured, the social capital perspective struggles to put it back together again. 
This unity matters, however. In democracies, virtue is a habit. Elinor Ostrom herself offered 
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the essential insight: ‘[s]ocial capital does not wear out with use but rather with disuse’.114 A 
thoroughly Tocquevillian perspective would add: habituated virtue wears out with disuse, and, 
for this reason, must be exercised on all social fronts.  
 For our modern democracies, there is no consensus on how to get associationalism 
right. Communitarians are deemed ‘misguided’ in their moralism and focus on small 
associations from the perspective of classical liberal social capitalists, while Putnam 
contended the breakdown of the traditional family is not that significant in terms of the 
breakdown of social capital.115 The communitarian perspective on caring duties complicates 
the liberal polycentrist’s preference for free choice. While all of these ‘Tocquevillian’ schools 
are motivated by a ‘problem’ in civil society and hope to enrich associationalism, ideological 
tensions remain between the various schools.  
Though these research agendas lay claim to the spirit of Tocqueville, a more faithful 
Tocquevillian outlook would actually find several details to criticise in the study of modern 
associationalism. Putnam’s handling of the family, the social capitalists’ emphasis on utility, 
and the polycentrists’ inattentiveness to the tension between competition and community all 
raise questions. Likewise, social capital research hesitates to suggest that a unified habit of 
virtue may play an important role in fostering widespread investment in social capital. They 
miss Tocqueville’s paramount insight about associationalism. Across a range of human 
activity and relationships, associationalism provides a key service: it fosters the opposite of 
individualism. If this is the legacy of Tocqueville today, we have moved away from his 
perspective substantially, for better or worse. 
The democratic citizen is free and flourishing, not because her local association fixes a 
pothole instead of a central power or because she has the choice to join a different community 
that is better at fixing potholes.116 Primarily, the democratic citizen is free and flourishing 
because she is not alone. She is not alone in fixing potholes. She is not alone on the ‘public 
road’, at church, or at home. Therefore, the unifying feature of Tocqueville’s associationalism 
is the other-regarding virtue that allows the citizen to escape solitude by offering a deeply 
rooted, robust, and well-habituated alternative, from the home to the local community. Much 
of the scholarship on modern associationalism overlooks the depth of Tocqueville’s moral 
perspective. 
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I do not propose a ban on the use of historical mascots in modern social science 
research, I merely suggest that a deeper understanding of our mascots can open up new 
approaches, raise important questions, and alert us to old explanations. For example, 
researchers grappling with the role of the family and the changing position of women in 
society may benefit from understanding Tocqueville’s thought on the role of the domestic 
sphere, and this may offer the beginning of an explanation for new trends. Advocates of a 
polycentric order may benefit from understanding Tocqueville’s emphasis on rooted local 
norms and community spirit, and this may provoke questions about the impact of competition. 
Scholars of social capital may benefit from understanding the underlying unity of 
Tocqueville’s associationalism, and they may develop a new approach for looking for patterns 
across the different forms of relationships that they investigate. These suggestions are not to 
scold political and social scientists, but rather to point us towards a broader scope of inquiry. 
If Tocqueville and his associationalism truly matter to modern scholars and democratic 
societies, it is worth gleaning more than snippets and slogans from his thought. 
 
Tocqueville’s Hope and Our Modern Democracies 
Tocqueville knew he had much to fear and hope for in democratic society.117 The worries of 
the scholars discussed in this chapter – the decline in associative life and the growth of the 
administrative state – were certainly among Tocqueville’s fears for democratic society during 
the nineteenth century. He was not without hope, however, and he was optimistic that 
democrats could forge the mores of the future while respecting the wisdom of their 
communities. Modern democracies need not despair as long as they remain alert to the need 
for meaningful associative life. We may dispute and discuss what constitutes meaningful 
associative life, but as long as we hold fast to this important conservation, we, like 
Tocqueville, can remain hopeful.  
If mores underpin associationalism, then it follows that we need to understand where 
these mores come from and what they are for. I suggest that these social science debates, 
which lay claim to Tocqueville, ought to continue to look to Tocqueville for more answers. 
For Tocqueville, women make mores in the domestic sphere. Contemporary sensibilities 
about gender have shifted, but I contend that gender roles and family must be a component of 
a thoroughgoing evaluation of associations. I also suggest that our admiration for the benefits 
of competition between localities or associations should not distract us from the value of 
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faithfulness to a particular locality, community, or group. Finally, I propose that the work of 
mores to drag citizens out of themselves aims at a more profound moral goal than much 
literature on social capital and polycentricity currently suggests.  
 Features like technological change and market shifts may be ultimately 
inconsequential in the grand scheme of civil society in our modern democracies because, 
though they may be detrimental to some types of social capital, they may also breed 
unforeseen ‘forms of associational life’.118 Communitarians of Nisbet’s ilk may dispute such 
optimism that older, small forms of social capital are so readily replaceable with new forms 
that can offer the same social value. Nisbet himself, however, was not overly nostalgic. He 
wrote that ‘[n]either science, nor technology, nor the city is inherently incompatible with the 
existence of moral values and social relationships which will do for modern man what 
extended family, the parish, and the village did for earlier man’.119 Our associations do not 
need to be inappropriately ‘antiquarian’, but they do need to serve us as ‘traditional’ ones 
have.120 In the meantime, Nisbet thought it worthwhile to adjust, with moderation, the forms 
of associative life that we already know can serve us well, rather than obliterate these forms 
through democratic passion or simple negligence. Wolfe concluded similarly that if modern 
society implies ‘a withering away of such institutions as the tight-knit family and the local 
community that once taught the moral rules of interdependence, modern people must simply 
work harder to find such rules for themselves’.121  
This may be a burdensome call to action considering the moral weightiness and 
intense intimacy of older forms of association. This conversation moving forward has to face 
difficult questions about our values. The position of women is the prime example. My critique 
from a Tocquevillian perspective forces us to question: can we have Tocqueville’s 
associationalism without Tocqueville’s gender roles? As I argue, gender is an essential theme 
within his associationalism, and Tocqueville would contend that women, as makers of mores, 
are integral to a flourishing associative life. Perhaps, the only way moderns can have 
Tocqueville’s associationalism without his gender roles is if we address very carefully the 
work that the gender roles were doing within his system. We must ask ourselves the stark 
question: have modern democracies taken up this work, or have we let it fall by the wayside? 
Liberal democrats now tend to value equality of opportunity for women and marriage 
equality for LGBTQ couples. We may simply have to acknowledge a social shift. An old way 
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of operating, which strikes us as partly bad (because we value equality) and partly good 
(because we value a rich associative life), is lost. Talbot, in her critique of Putnam, concluded 
that this ‘trade-off may be worth it’ when it comes to the loss in social capital due to women’s 
empowerment.122 She called on men and women to work together to compensate. If we 
identify shifts, trade-offs, and new modes of association, and if we understand how older 
forms of association served individuals, and, finally, if we call for mores that serve a free and 
flourishing future, then we can call ourselves truly ‘Tocquevillian’.  
At the end of Democracy in America, Tocqueville concluded that democracies cannot 
try to hold onto the ‘particular advantages’ of aristocratic society, and that the task of the 
modern age is to guarantee ‘the new advantages’ of democratic society. He wrote: ‘[w]e must 
not aim to make ourselves similar to our fathers, but to work hard to attain the type of 
grandeur and happiness that is appropriate to us’.123 When it comes to gender roles, we no 
longer live by the standards of ‘our fathers’, but we can ‘work hard’ to provide, if by different 
means, a rich family and associative life.  
We may ask ourselves what can replace gender roles and still fulfil the necessary work 
for a flourishing associative life. Steven Horwitz addresses the distinction between the ‘form’ 
and ‘function’ of the family in his work, highlighting the changing nature of the modern 
family in terms of gender roles and LGBTQ families.124 The most immediate answer appears 
to be an egalitarian division of childcare and domestic work between two parents who also 
operate in the public sphere. Men and women ought to equally divide the responsibilities of 
the private sphere, so they can both enjoy equal status in the public sphere. Even though this 
may be our instinct, studies show that women, even after mass entry into the paid workforce, 
still assume responsibility for the majority of domestic duties.125 As women are attempting to 
fulfil most of a private role as well as a public role, even among the most well-meaning and 
caring working mothers, it seems possible that the private role may become thinned. The 
moral work that takes place at home may be at risk. This indicates that our modern 
democracies are still working on establishing new mores and modes of providing sufficiently 
for childcare and a rich family life. Future democracies may rethink their expectations of 
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women and men, better divide domestic responsibilities between men and women, or, as 
grandparents increasingly live longer and in good health after retirement, establish a 
generational division of labour. The new norms remain malleable. Tocquevillians should take 
care not to lose sight of the mores made at home. Tocqueville’s hope for democracy is hard 
work, but his thought can serve for political and social scientists undertaking this hard work 
as we examine our norms and make our mores. However, if we conclude that Tocquevillian 
democratic flourishing and women’s liberation are in conflict, his thought may make us 
pessimistic about the future of associative life, as we face a stark trade-off: we value equality 
more than community. Tocqueville would not be surprised to discover democrats making 
such a trade-off.  
This concluding chapter leaves us with a set of important questions. How robust is a 
justification of localism and association on merely instrumental grounds? Can associations 
and localities that lack loyalty endure in the face of social atomisation? Are they conducive to 
the cultivation of virtue? Can we move beyond the idea that ‘Tocquevillian’ localism is 
simply efficient? Can we acknowledge the trade-off between an older form of associative life 
and women’s participation in the public sphere? How do men and women share the burden of 
forming moral norms and social networks? Can we draw to the fore the idea of virtue, over 
efficiency, in considering social capital? Can we make mores ‘appropriate’ to our age that 
continue to serve liberty? In short, can we do the hard work? It is my hope that rigorous 
intellectual history can recover these questions for social science, and thereby intellectual 
history can contribute in an effort towards a more ‘Tocquevillian’ social science.   
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Conclusion: How to be free 
According to Tocqueville, liberty was the first of human goods. His hopes for democracy lay 
in the possibility that equality could foster liberty and safeguard justice, but he feared that 
equality could easily undermine the freedom and independence necessary for democratic 
regimes to flourish. Absent hierarchy, democrats lack prescribed social roles, social classes, 
and economic destinies. Equal citizens are free citizens. However, without a pre-determined 
way to be in the world, the individual democrat could be set adrift and without a means of 
directing his or her life, leading an aimless, contingent, even haphazard existence. One might 
even lose sight of the question of how one should be in the world. Tocqueville feared that the 
pitfalls of equality would increasingly appear to democrats as the appropriate way that one 
ought to conduct oneself in society. Equality could seduce the democratic mind, making an 
individualist pursuit of wealth, unthinking uniformity, and contentment with mediocrity seem 
like morally and intellectually acceptable behaviour. Tocqueville’s greatest fear was a 
citizenry composed of individuals who lead their lives in this shallow fashion. They risked 
somnambulating into despotism, and the grandeur of the liberty that equality had afforded 
citizens would be lost. To preserve liberty, Tocqueville needed to articulate how democracy 
could cultivate the resources necessary for an individual to live a noble and moral life. Some 
institution or practices were needed that could show democrats a good way to be in the world. 
What could provide this? The solution needed to be moderate. It needed to be applicable to all 
citizens, not only to particular classes. It needed to be more flexible than the many 
authoritative and rigid modes of finding one’s way that belonged to the aristocratic age. His 
solution was mores.  
 Tocqueville saw that the democratic social state undermines ‘the spirit of system’, ‘the 
yoke of habits’, ‘the maxims of family’, ‘the opinions of class’, ‘the prejudices of nation’, and 
‘tradition’.1 This is because the democratic individual ‘appeals only to the individual effort of 
his reason’.2 Democracy challenges the wisdom of ‘ancestors’, by dissolving ‘the bond that 
links generations’.3 Democracy also undermines the wisdom of ‘class’, by dismantling rigid 
hierarchies that formerly provided a coherent ‘opinion’ regarding right conduct.4 In the 
deracinated condition of democracy, the old ways of knowing, the old avenues to truth, and 
the old authorities that taught people how to behave are weakened.  
                                                
1 Tocqueville, DA2, 699. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 700. 
4 Ibid. 
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 If democrats must avoid the seductive temptations latent in equality in order to remain 
free, where can they learn to do so? In democracies, where can citizens find the requisite 
moral and intellectual guidance? Tocqueville thought that good mores could provide guidance 
in a world of independence, choice, and possibilities. Mores constitute the ‘moral and 
intellectual state of a people’; social norms, habits, and customs determine how people 
approach moral and intellectual matters, make moral and intellectual decisions, and discover 
moral and intellectual truths.  
 Total ‘independence of thought’ can be tempered and curtailed because ‘authority 
must always be found somewhere in the intellectual and moral world’.5 He named dogma, 
public opinion, and self-interest as sources by which democrats understand truth and make 
moral decisions, and he thought that the Americans had been particularly successful in this 
regard using religion, which ‘confines the work of individual analysis within narrow limits’.6 
The prevalence of dogma, the force of public opinion, and the habits of self-interest all relate 
to social mores. Guidance in the moral and intellectual realm is found in mores. By gently 
limiting democrats, mores help them to be free.  
 This thesis has argued that mores are made at home through the moral and intellectual 
authority of the parents. Within the domestic sphere, a mother is naturally the maker of mores 
and the father rules his family by ‘natural right’.7 By modelling his domestic sphere with a 
view to nature, Tocqueville was able to propose a domestic sphere that avoids extreme 
manifestations of democracy’s worst defects as well as maintains the authority necessary to 
the transmission of values, norms, and habits. Without the intergenerational regard preserved 
in the family, the authoritativeness of social mores dwindles. The perpetuation of mores is 
impossible without the new generation of democrats recognising that their predecessors know 
how to operate, morally and intellectually. This respect for longstanding mores, which is 
learned within the domestic sphere, facilitates the flourishing of Tocqueville’s wider system 
of associationalism. None of his moderating forces could flourish without some deference to 
the pre-existing habits and norms. This is why the domestic sphere underpins his 
associationalism and why the domestic sphere is integral to the flourishing of liberty.  
 In Chapter Two, I explored the contexts that illuminate Tocqueville’s position on the 
topics of gender and family. Few scholars place his views in the broader discourse of gender 
roles during the nineteenth century; this thesis has contributed this contextualisation. 
                                                
5 Ibid., 709, 716.  
6 Ibid., 707. 
7 Ibid., 1035, 1041. 
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Additionally, Tocqueville scholars are often concerned with the extent to which Tocqueville 
‘got’ America.8 I have examined this question with regards to the topic of women. Next, this 
thesis has demonstrated Tocqueville’s continuing interest in women, marriage, and domestic 
happiness during his travels and throughout his life. Contextual analysis also revealed a 
difference between his conception of the citoyenne from personal writings and the democratic 
woman in Democracy in America. Using his American correspondences, I expanded upon 
Welch’s work. 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four showed that the well-ordered democratic domestic 
sphere is one that combines elements of nature, authority, and democracy in order to support 
the functioning of associationalism within democracies. Moral and intellectual authority at 
home provides for the mores that keep people free. These chapters have contributed to the 
interpretive debate concerning the role of nature in Tocqueville’s understanding of the 
domestic sphere. Chapter Four also made a scholarly contribution by correcting the shortage 
of attention to Tocqueville’s comments on family throughout all of Democracy in America.  
Chapter Five demonstrated the impact of democracy on womanhood and family life. 
This chapter also explained the ways in which Tocqueville’s womanhood and family are 
noticeably protected from extreme versions of the negative by-products of equality of 
conditions. Scholars rarely address how atypical the domestic sphere is, considering 
Tocqueville’s logic of equality. I examined this puzzle more carefully, beyond the simplistic 
observations that this domestic sphere is peculiar or nostalgic, by offering a thoroughgoing 
account. Chapter Five contributed to the scholarship on individualism, which usually neglects 
the relationship between intergenerational, familial links and individualism and favours 
highlighting interpersonal, social links. I have shown how Tocqueville’s theory of family and 
gender is somehow inappropriate to his democratic theory (considering his logic of equality 
of conditions), and yet it is necessary to his democratic theory (considering its integral 
position within his associationalism). 
Chapter Six demonstrated the major role of the domestic sphere within Tocqueville’s 
system for keeping democracies free. I also used the domestic sphere to explore his 
moderating forces, by stressing the need for a unified social attitude of other-regarding mores 
and the need for intergenerational regard in fostering these mores. Moreover, I contributed to 
the scholarship on religion in Tocqueville by scrutinising the under-examined relationship 
between womanhood and religion. 
                                                
8 Wills, ‘Did Tocqueville “Get” America?’ 
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Chapters Three through Six demonstrated my overarching contribution that 
Tocqueville’s thought on the domestic realm is profoundly significant in terms of his 
democratic theory and his ‘first of goods’—liberty.9 Therefore, this thesis has provided a 
thorough case for why the domestic sphere deserves to be considered alongside other more 
famous themes and topics, such as civil associations, religion, freedom of the press, 
decentralisation, and localism.  
Lastly, this thesis connected the themes of Tocqueville’s domestic sphere to modern 
social science. I discussed how ‘Tocquevillian’ research agendas concerning community, 
social capital, and localism ought to consider the themes of gender and family, love of home, 
and other-regarding mores. Finally, I noted that even though our stances on gender and 
familial roles in Western democracies have evolved to provide women and same-sex families 
with increasingly diverse opportunities, our mores—the way we deal in moral and intellectual 
matters—have not yet solidified into common practices. I hope, with Tocqueville, that the 
mores of tomorrow can foster virtue ‘by habits’ and steward a rich associative life. In doing 
so, we can enjoy the ‘grandeur’ and ‘beauty’ brought by the ‘justice’ inherent to equality of 




                                                
9 Tocqueville, ‘Lettre à Madame Swetchine, 7 Janvier, 1856’, 307. 
10 Tocqueville, DA2, 1282. 
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